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A LAWYER LOOKS AT CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE*
Lxwis F.

POWELL, JR.t

We have witnessed, over the past decade, the rise of a heresy which
could weaken the foundations of our system of government, and make
impossible the existence of the human freedoms it strives to protect.
This is known as the doctrine of civil disobedience. Its basic approach is that the ancient justification for revolt against tyranny can
somehow be transmuted into a rule for day to day life under a system
of government under law. Putting the old wine of revolution into
the new wineskin of constitutional government, it argues appealingly
that: some laws are "just" and others "unjust"; that each person may
determine for himself, in accordance with his own conscience, which
laws are "unjust"; and that each is free to violate the "unjust" lawsprovided he does so peacefully.
The doctrine of civil disobedience has been associated with the
civil rights movement, and for this reason it has gained a wide and
respectable following. One would have supposed that lawyers, trained
in logic, and the guardians of our legal system, would have rallied
promptly to denounce civil disobedience as fundamentally inconsistent
with the rule of law. Yet most lawyers have remained silent, and of
the few who have expressed opinions a surprising number have
written in justification.'

This remarkable surface consensus-among social scientists; theologians, politicians and even many lawyers-is understandable only in
the context of the deep emotions engendered by the civil rights movement. But lawyers, of all people, must retain a wholesome degree of
rational detachment in face of emotional causes, however appealing.
Our profession has a heavy responsibility for the preservation of the
*This is the John Randolph Tucker Lecture delivered at the School of Law,
Washington and Lee University, on April 16, 1966.
t B.S. 1929, LL.B. 1931, Washington and Lee University, LL.M. 1932, Harvard
University. President, American Bar Association 1964-65.
ISee, for example, Black, The Problem of the Compatibility of Civil Disobedience
witb American Institutions of Government, 43 Texas L. Rev. 492 (1965); Wofford,
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rule of law.2 It is our duty to examine critically and test against proven
principles any doctrine affecting the law which is as far reaching as
civil disobedience.3
Most of what has been said and written on this subject has related to
civil rights. This has inevitably clouded perspective and prevented
dispassionate analysis. If it were possible I would like, for the purpose
of this paper, to disassociate civil disobedience from civil rights and
consider the doctrine solely on its merits. Despite the fashion to the
contrary, one may understand and condemn-as I certainly do-the
injustices which initially provoked civil disobedience without condoning or approving a concept which in the end could produce even
greater injustice.
It is true that the Negro has had, until recent years, little reason
to respect the law. The entire legal process, from the police and sheriff
to the citizens who serve on juries, has too often applied a double
standard of justice. Even some of the courts at lower levels have failed
to administer equal justice. Although by no means confined to the
southern states, these conditions-because of the history, economic and
social structure of that region, and its population mix-have been a
way of life in some parts of the South. Many lawyers, conforming to
the mores of their communities, have generally tolerated all of this,
often with little consciousness of their duty as officers of the courts.
And when lawyers have been needed to represent defendants in
civil rights cases, far too few have responded.
There were also the discriminatory state and local laws, the denial of
voting rights, and the absence of economic and educational opporThe Law and Civil Disobedience, The Presbyterian Outlook, Sept. 26, 1960, p. 5;
Bickel, After a Civil Rights Act, The New Republic, May 9, 1964, p. 11; O'Con-

nell, Is Civil Disobedience to be Regarded as a Paralegal Right, Trial, December/
January 1965, p. 11; Dean C. Willard Heckel of Rutgers Law School, as quoted
by Gunter David in 'Defiance of Law: Pros and Cons," Newark Sunday Times,
March 13, 1966.
2
Former Justice Charles E. Whittaker has spoken out strongly against civil disobedience. See Whittaker, Law and Order, address delivered before and published
by Tenn. Bar Association, June 17, 1965; and Whittaker, Will Civil Disobedience
Lead to Chaos in Our Society, Trial, December/January 1965, p. 10. For other
articles by nationally known lawyers critical of civil disobedience see Leibman,
Civil Disobedience: A Threat to Our Law Society, Vital Speeches, Oct. 1, 1964,
Vol. 30, No. 24, at 766; Waldman, Civil Rights-Yes; Civil Disobedience-No, 37
N.Y. State Bar Journal 331 (1965); and Fuchsberg, Editorial in Trial, December/
January 1965, p. 8.
aBurke Marshall has done this incisively as to the relationship of civil disobedience to the civil rights movement. Marshall, The Protest Movement and the
Law, 51 Va. L. Rev. 785 (1965).
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tunity for the Negro. Finally, there was the small and depraved
minority which resorted to physical violence and intimidation.
These conditions, which have sullied our proud boast of equal
justice under law, set the stage for the civil rights movement. Engrafted thereon-both as a slogan and a justification of tactics-was the
concept of civil disobedience. Articulated by Martin Luther King
in his much publicized Letter from a Birmingham Jail, this quickly
gained nationwide attention and support outside of the South. It met
the needs of intellectuals and theologians for a moral and philosophical
justification of conduct which, by all previous standards, was often
lawless and indefensible. Civil disobedience was thus enthroned as a
doctrine, proclaimed from pulpits4 and acclaimed in many of the
media.
While these conditions go far to explain the wide acceptance of
civil disobedience, they shed no light upon its soundness as a
doctrine, the legality of its tactics or its significance for the future.
Let us now examine these questions, both as they relate to the
civil rights movement and to civil disobedience as a concept of general
applicability.
THE HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
It may be asked at the outset whether the doctrine has, as it is
claimed, respectable historical antecedents. Dr. King and others have
cited an imaginative list of precedents ranging from revolt against
Nebuchadnezzar to the Boston Tea Party and the American Revolution.
There have been many situations in history where the tyranny of a
regime has justified revolution. Indeed, we need look only to the
contemporary world for numerous examples of totalitarian rulewhether Fascist style or Communist-where fundamental human rights
do not exist. As these rights cannot be asserted in the courts, nor reform accomplished through political institutions, revolution is often
the only recourse. The chance of success may be remote-as the Freedom Fighters found in Hungary-but few would deny the moral
right of a people to overthrow tyrannical rule where no other means
of redress are available. The American colonists were in that position,
4
"Nearly every Protestant denomination has officially endorsed non-violent direct action for racial equality, and the National Council of Churches has engaged in a series of projects to aid the movement." Miller, Nonviolence in the
Racial Crisis, The Christian Century, July 22, 1964, p. 927.
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and the product of their courage is our present system of government.
But the irrelevance of this type of revolution as a precedent or
moral justification for civil disobedience must be apparent, even
to most of those who rely on it. There is no parallel situation in
America today where, despite some conditions of injustice, wrongs
can be and ultimately are redressed in the courts, the legislatures and
through other established political institutions. It must be remembered
that revolution, conceptually and in fact, is outside of and designed
to supplant the existing governmental system. Only the most reckless extremists would wish, by the tactics of revolution, to weaken or
destroy our representative democracy to meet their personal views of
immediacy.
Henry David Thoreau and Gandhi are relied upon as the modern
inspiration and authority for civil disobedience. One may wonder how
many of those who cite Thoreau have actually read him. His basic
premise was "that government is best which governs not at all," and
he argued for a utopia in which there would be no government.
Thoreau did indeed assert that each man should determine which laws
were just and obey only those so classified. He said:
It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as
for the right. The only obligation which I have

. . .

is to do

at any time what I think is right.
He was opposed to slavery and to the war against Mexico. He refused to pay taxes, and spent one night in jail. I suppose we all find
a certain enchantment in the idea of paying no taxes where one disagrees with the government. 5 But however appealing this may be,
Thoreau's political philosophy is simply a doctrine of anarchy.6
Nor is Gandhi's heroic struggle for India's independence an intellectually honest precedent for civil disobedience in America today.
India was a colony, and Gandhi was forced to use techniques of
disobedience as democratic processes and lawful remedies were wholly
unavailable.
American precedents loosely invoked as justification for civil disobedience include Shay's Rebellion, the Whiskey Insurrection, evasion
of the Fugitive Slave Law, and the civil disorders in our labor move5
Some of those who oppose American policy in Vietnam, including scholars
who hold research grants from the government, are refusing to pay their federal
income taxes. See editorial comment, Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 1966.
6
See One Hundred Years Ago, American Writing of 1848, p. 2 (Wood ed.
1948).
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ment. These may prove that we have had episodic disobedience of law
and even some violence in our past. But they fall far short of any body
of genuine authority for a doctrine which affirms the right of every
man in a representative democracy to choose which laws he will
obey.
THE NATURAL LAW CONCEPT
The philosophical justification of civil disobedience is even less impressive to a lawyer than the miscellany of precedents cited in its
behalf. In essence, it is that there is a higher law than man-made law,
namely, the law of God or of nature. An "unjust law" is one that
is "out of harmony" with morality or God's law Or as one
writer has put it, an act of civil disobedience is "an affirmation of a
higher law of God or humanity." 8 This resurrects the jurisprudence
of natural law, 9 and it also has undoubted appeal to many theologians.
But where does this philosophy leave us in a complex modem
society governed by the rule of law? As someone has said "one man's
natural law is all too often another man's poison." There is rarely a
wide consensus, much less unanimity, as to which man-made laws
are in fact just and fair to all concerned. This diversity becomes
chaotic when we enter the subjective realms of morality, God's law
and natural law.
The segregation issue itself provides a striking example of where
the natural law concept leads us. Senator Eastland is quoted as asking:
"Is not the segregated way of life a better life? Is not that way the law
of nature?" i' Indeed, it is this view-deemed by thousands of Southerners to be God's or nature's law-that provided the justification for
"massive resistance" to the Court's decision in Bro'wn v. Board of
Education."
7King, Letter from Birmingham Jail. The Rev. Adam Clayton Powell, another
theologian who frequently invokes the laws of God and morality, is reported recently to have reaffirmed that: "Black people must continue to defy the laws of
man when such laws conflict with the laws of God." Richmond News Leader,
March 30, 1966.

SRobert J. O'Connell, Is Civil Disobedience to be Regarded as a Paralegal

Right?, Trial, December/January, 1965, p. 11, 13.
9

As Prof. Cohen, writing sympathetically in The Nation, has said: "It [natural
law] has its roots deep in the history of Western thought-in Cicero and Aquinas
and Hooker and Grotius and Locke, in Jefferson and a host of others who have
sought to justify conduct by virtue of its harmony with some antecedently
established superhuman moral law, usually divine." Cohen, The Essence and
Ethics of Civil Disobedience, The Nation, March 16, 1964, pp. 257, 260.
' 0See Harris Wofford, Jr., The Law and Civil Disobedience, Presbyterian
Outlook, Sept. 26, 1960, p. 5.
11347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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As has been observed:
If the decision to break the law really turns on individual conscience, it is hard to see in law how Dr. King is any better off
also bethaii former Governor Ross Barnett of Mississippi, wh6
2
lieved deeply in his cause and was willing to go to jail.1
Whatever may be said for the idealism of a view that permits each
man to apply his own predilection as to a higher natural or moral
law, it affords no basis for a system of organized society.
THE RECORD IN THE COURTS
The first example of disobedience relating to civil rights may have
been set by the Southern legislatures and officials who attempted to
disobey or evade court-decreed integration of schools. These decrees
were earnestly believed by many in the South to be unjust and contrary
to established constitutional principles. It was therefore argued that
massive, but peaceful, resistance to desegregation orders was a proper
form of protest. Indeed, resolutions of nullification or interposition, in
varying forms; were adopted in a number of Southern states.' 3 But
there was neither popular support at the national level nor legal justification for this form of civil disobedience, and it was-as it should
have been-struck down by the courts.14
The next phase of the disobedience movement, this time against
segregation in the South, was sheltered in many of its aspects by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and it also attracted-for the
reasons indicated above-widespread public and political support. It
nevertheless resulted in a flood of arrests and litigation. Most of this
occurred prior to' enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, andbroadly speaking-two types of cases reached the Supreme Court:
(i) -sit-ins in segregated facilities, testing the validity of state and
local segregation and anti-trespass laws; and (ii) demonstrations, -resuiting in arrests under "breach of peace" laws.
12 Marshall, supra note 3, at 800. King, not surprisingly, thinks there should be
a different rule for the "segregationists" whose concept of moral law he brands
as "uncivil disobedience" and as "lawlessness." King, Address, The Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, April 21, 1965, pp. 15, 21.
'sAla. HJ.R. 18, Act 42, 1956, Spec. Sess. at 70; Fla. S. Con. Res. 17-20, Acts
1956, Spec. Sess. at 401, H.R. Con. Res. 174, Acts 1957, at 1217; Ga. H.R. 185,
Laws .1956, at 642; La. Rev. Star. Ann. § 49:801-10 (Supp. 1964); S.C.J. Res. 914,
Acts 1956, 49 S.C. Stat. 2172; Tenn. H. Res. 1, 9, Acts 1957, at 1437, 1449; and
Va.4 SJ. Res. 3,Acts 1956, at 1213.
1 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Buck v.Orleans Parish School Bd., 188
F. Supp. 916, 922-27 (E.D. La. 1960).
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In all of these cases the Court reversed the convictions under
state or local laws.' 5 These results represent a striking vindication of
some of the tactics associated with disobedience. But the Court has
been careful, even in decisions which have profoundly disturbed dissenting Justices, to indicate limitations on these tactics, and certainly
there has been no endorsement of civil disobedience as a right or doctrine.
Indeed, Burke Marshall has perceptively suggested that the "theory
of civil disobedience [is] wholly inapplicable to the efforts of the protest movement to overturn the segregation laws and practices of the
South." 16 There was, of course, disobedience of state and local laws.
But Marshall points out that under our federal system the Constitution
is the controlling law, and that these tactics were prompted by the
failure of many local law enforcement officers to protect constitutional rights, and to recognize the Supreme Court as the ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution. He further notes that the action was
usually taken only after advice of counsel that the local laws were
constitutionally invalid.
Thus, Marshall concludes that, in the sit-in and demonstration cases
which reached the Supreme Court, there was "nothing illegal in an
ultimate sense;" the conduct in question was "under color of lawfederal law-rather than in disobedience of it." 17
Two decisions of the Court, each decided by 5 to 4 margins, merit
special attention. In Harm v. City of Rock Hill, s the majority held
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 abated convictions of sit-in demonstrators in an eating establishment covered by the Act.19 The state
15 See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Blow 'v. North Carolina, 379
U.S. 684 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 555 (1965); Hanm v. City of
Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964); Fox v. North Carolina, 378 U.S. 587 (1964);
Mitchell v. City of Charleston, 378 U.S. 551 (1964); Williams v. North Carolina,
378 U.S. 548 (1964); Bouie vu. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); Bell 'v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Barr
v. City of Columbia, 378 US. 146 (1964); Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 375
U.S. 136 (1963); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Wright v. Georgia,
373 U.S. 284 (1963); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Edwards
v. South Carolina,372 U. S. 229 (1963).

'6 Marshall, supra note 3, at 794-98.
1
71t is evident that Marshall believes the civil rights leaders unnecessarily invoked the doctrine of civil disobedience: "Dr. King takes on an argument he need
not take on, and defends a position he need not defend, when he relies on his
conscience to determine which laws are just and which are not." Marshall, supra
note 3, at 796.
18379 U.S. 306 (1964).

'9Indeed, in its broadly ranging opinion, the Court construed the Act as abating
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had argued that the defendants should have used the Act's exclusive
legal remedies to challenge the segregation rather than resort to selfhelp or "extra legal" means such as sit-ins. In denying validity to this
argument, the majority held that
although... the law generally condemns self-help, the language
of § 203 (c) supports a conclusion that nonforcible attempts to
gain admittance to or remain in establishments covered by the Act,
are immunized from prosecution... 20
Dissenting Justices took special exception to this holding, with Mr.
Justice White doubting that Congress had intended to authorize
"massive disobedience to the law," 2 1 and Mr. Justice Black thinking
that this interpretation invited persons to take the law into their own
hands.2The majority opinion in Hamm does indeed go far toward sanctioning certain disobedience tactics, rather than resort to prescribed legal
means. This, it seems to me, is an unnecessary and regrettable interpretation of the Civil Rights Act. But it is important to remember that
this sanction is limited to peaceful (e.g., "non-forcible") action in the
exercise of rights expressly conferred by the public accommodations
section of the Act. There was no blanket approval of sit-ins either
generally or even to implement rights under other provisions of the
Act.
The second Supreme Court decision of special interest is Brown v.
Louisiana,3 in which convictions for sit-ins at a public library were
reversed. The majority opinion could have disposed of the case on
its finding that the evidence failed to show a violation of the state
breach of peace statute, but it went on to assert broadly that freedoms
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments include the right
to protest segregation policies in a "peaceful and orderly manner . . .
in a place where the protestant has every right to be." 24
Mr. Justice Black, joined in dissent by three other justices, 25 contrespass convictions, whether before or after passage of the Act, in both federal
and state courts. Id. at 315.
2OSupra note 18, at 311.
2'Supra note 18, at 328. Dissenters were Justices Black, Clark, Harlan, and
White.
22Supra note 18, at 318.
23383 U.S. 131 (1966). The Court's prevailing opinion by Mr. Justice Fortas,
was concurred in by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas. Justices Brennan
and White concurred in the result but on different grounds.
24.d at 142.
25 Justices Harlan, Clark, and Stewart. It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice
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strued the majority opinion as establishing "a completely new constitutional doctrine," and as holding that:
[T] he Constitution, the First and the Fourteenth Amendments, requires the custodians and supervisors of the public libraries in this
country to stand helplessly by while protesting groups advocating
one cause or another, stage "sit-ins" or "stand-ups" to dramatize
their particular views on particular issues. And it should be remembered that if one group can take over libraries for one cause, other
groups will assert the right to do so for causes which,
while wholly legal, may not be so appealing to this Court.
The States are thus paralyzed with reference to control of
their libraries for library purposes, and I suppose that inevitably
the next step will be to paralyze the schools. Efforts to this effect
have already been made all over the country 26
The minority and majority opinions in Brown differed sharply as
to the facts, and particularly as to whether there was racial discrimination by this library. It is therefore not clear to what extent this difference influenced the respective views. The four dissenters found no evidence of racial discrimination by this library or against the particular
demonstrators2 The thrust of the minority view seems to be that libraries (and schools), of all places, need protection from this type of interference even where segregation exists. The majority, however, considered this to be a segregated library, and another example of racial
discrimination in Louisiana, against which the First Amendment rights
may be "peacefully" used-whether in a library or elsewhere.
If the dissenting opinion correctly construes the decision of the
Court, Brown does introduce into our law "for the first time in history
. . . a startling new constitutional doctrine." 28 This would mean that
any individual or group could exercise the rights of free speech and
assembly, in behalf of any cause, by sit-ins in libraries and other
public buildings, the only limitation being that they must be peaceful.
Those who oppose American policy in Vietnam could thus demonstrate at will in every library in the country. So also could the ComStewart was with the majority in Hanm and Mr. Justice White, who dissented in

Hanm, joined the majority in this case.
2oSupra note 23, at 165.
2
7"[T]here simply was no racial discrimination practiced in this case." Mr.
Justice Black dissenting, supra note 23, at 160.

2SDissenting opinion, Brouwn v. Louisiana, supra note 23, at 166. Mr. Justice
Black felt so strongly about the "startling (new) doctrine" that he supplemented
his written opinion by a verbal statement from the bench denouncing the threat
to "public buildings such as libraries, schoolhouses, fire ,departments, courthouses
and executive mansions." N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1966.
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munist Party and the American Nazi Party, as the First Amendment
protects the rights of the unpopular as well as the popular.
It is difficult to believe that the Court's opinion went so far. As
recently as Cox v. Louisiana,29 a sharp distinction was drawn between
"pure speech" and attempts to communicate ideas by conduct:
We emphatically reject the notion. . . that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who
would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments
afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech.80
And in the second Cox case, although the conviction for breach of
peace was reversed, Mr. Justice Goldberg warned that the Court
would not sanction
riotous conduct in any form or demonstrations, however peaceful
their conduct or commendable their motives, which conflict with
properly drawn statutes and ordinances designed to promote law
and order, protect the community against disorder, regulate traffic,
safeguard legitimate interests in private and public property, or
protect the administration of justice and other essential governmental functions.
There is a proper time and place for even the most peaceful protest and a plain duty and responsibility on the part of all citizens
to obey all valid laws and regulations. 3 '
In view of these statements, there seems little doubt that the Court
would sustain the nondiscriminatory enforcement of a properly drawn
statute regulating conduct and prohibiting sit-ins or other demonstrations in libraries. In short, the issue of racial discrimination (hence
denial of equal protection) was probably decisive in Brounz v.
Louisiana.
But even this rationalization leaves Brown as an unwelcome and
disturbing precedent. One would have hoped that libraries would be
protected from the disruption of all disobedience tactics, including
those directed at racial discrimination. And as pointed out by Mr.
Justice Black, if libraries are not immune from this type of intrusion
29379 US. 536 (1965).

3Old. at 555. The Court also said: "The rights of free speech and assembly,
while fundamental in our democratic society, still do not mean that everyone
with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public place and at
any time." Id. at 555.
3'Cox v. Louisiana,supra note 29, at 574 (Black, J, concurring).
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we can now expect similar conduct in schools, museums and other
public buildings. It would have been wiser public policy, and more
consonant with the rule of law, to require resort to the courts rather
than self-help where public facilities of this character are involved in
racial controversy.
What then can be said, in view of these decisions, as to the Supreme
Court's position on civil disobedience?3 2 There has been no case requiring the Court to accept or reject, or even to discuss, disobedience
as a "doctrine" or as a "right." And here I use the term civil disobedience as Dr. King and those who follow him use it: namely, as
the right, under principles of natural or moral law, to determine which
laws are just and to disobey unjust laws provided the disobedience is
open and peaceable. If and when such a case reaches the Court, rejection of a doctrine so incompatible with an ordered society seems certain. Even the ebullient Dr. King has recognized that his theory is not
"legal." 33
But there is a distinction, often overlooked or blurred, between the
doctrine of civil disobedience and the tactics associated with it. As
noted above, some of these tactics have been approved quite specifically by the Court. The First and Fourteenth Amendments have
been held to protect certain sit-ins and public demonstrations. And at
least a qualified sanction has been given certain sit-ins as a means of
asserting rights specified by the Civil Rights Act.
The Court has, however, carefully noted certain limitations. Emphasis has been placed on orderly or peaceful conduct and violence
has been condemned. The interests of the states and localities to regulate use of public thoroughfares, to protect their judicial process
and to assure public order, have all been recognized. Yet the hard
fact remains that in every case reaching the Court for decision, the
convictions below were reversed-and the disobedience tactics thereby
34
sanctioned
32

See note, 16 V. Res. L. Rev. 711 (1965), for an excellent analysis of the
relevant Supreme Court cases prior to Brown v. Louisiana, supra note 23.
33
"Civil disobedience can never be legal.... In fact, civil disobedience means
that it is not legal." Martin Luther King, Address before the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, April 21, 1965, p. 21. But Prof. Harrop A. Freeman
of the Cornell Law School is so enthusiastic about this "new moral-political
force" he argues it should be recognized as a "legal right." Freeman, Civil Disobedience, published by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions,
1966, pp. 2, 10.
3
1Three remarkable district court decisions by Judge Frank Johnson, one sustaining and two others rejecting civil disobedience, deserve the most careful
study. These afford helpful guidelines in determining the limitations of disobedience tactics. When read together they are both a ringing reaffirmation of
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ESCALATION AND PROLIFERATION
On another occasion I commented that the frightening thing about
civil disobedience is that its use and techniques tend inevitably to
escalate.35 If this is a justifiable concern, it is a most serious one. Let us
examine-briefly as we must-the record.
NOT CONFINED TO "UNJUST" LAWS

Most of the court cases have involved direct disobedience of state or
local laws deemed to be unjust. Sit-ins in public accommodations have
been aimed at laws providing for segregated facilities or the anti-trespass laws which implemented segregation. Less direct, but nevertheless related to laws deemed to be unjust, have been the street demonstrations in southern communities against denial of voting rights.
But as the use of disobedience tactics has expanded, the relationship between the act of protest and the law protested has become increasingly attenuated.as For example, when James Farmer and other
CORE workers were arrested for lie-downs at the World's Fair in
New York, the breach of the peace law they violated was not questioned. They were simply using disobedience techniques, as Farmer
is quoted as saying, to dramatize "the contrast between the glittering
world of fantasy and the real world of brutality, bigotry and poverty." 37 If valid breach of peace and trespass laws may be violated at
will to protest these age old infirmities of mankind, rather than seeking
to ameliorate them by lawful and democratic processes, there would
soon be little left of law and order. s
Another example of indirect coercion, involving organized violation
of admittedly valid and just laws, is the school boycott used in New
York and elsewhere by Negroes to protest failure to accelerate integration and by whites to protest busing of children from neighborhood schools. Whether the protest was for or against integration, the
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and a blunt denial of any right or
privilege to engage in civil disobedience per se, whether peaceful or not.
Forman v. City of Montgomery, 245 F. Supp. 17 (MD. Ala. 1965); Johnson
v. City of Montgomery, 245 F. Supp. 25 (MD. Ala. 1965); Williams v. Wallace,
240 F. Supp. 100 (MD. Ala. 1965).
35
Powell, The State of the Legal Profession, 51 A.B.A.J. 821, 827 (1965).
36
See Rustin, From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement,
Commentary, February 1965, p. 25.
37
See Bickel, After a Civil Rights Act, The New Republic, May 9, 1964, p. 14.
28
Burke Marshall has commented upon the inappropriateness of "direct
action" [e.g., sit-ins and demonstrations] where the problems are poverty, health,
and education. These can only be dealt with by "long range political action."
Marshall, supranote 3, at 801, 802.
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compulsory attendance laws were wilfully and extensively violated to
the detriment of many thousands of innocent children.3 0
NoT Co NINED To SoUTH
In its relatively short life civil disobedience has become encrusted
with a number of myths. One of the more persistent is that it is a
doctrine confined, in its conception and application, to conditions in
the South.
When the point is made that grievances should be remedied through
the ballot box or in the courts rather than in the streets the answer
given is that these democratic and orderly means are not available in
the South. Unfortunately, as I have indicated earlier, this was too often
the situation in certain areas-but by no means all-of the South 40 It
is also fair to say that redress has always been available in the federal
courts and in far more state courts than most critics recognize. Moreover, legislation at both the national and state levels has demonstrated
that reform-even if at times the process is slow-may be achieved
through orderly political action.
Civil disobedience tactics undoubtedly accelerated the pace of legislative reform. But the ultimate price of this acceleration may be costly
indeed-in terms of racial bitterness and discord, and particularly in
the disrespect for law and order engendered and the lawlessness in
the streets which the doctrine of disobedience has encouraged. Moreover, if our system is to survive, worthy ends can never justify resort
41
to unlawful means.
39
The boycott tactics of Rev. Dr. Milton A. Galamison, New York civil
rights leader, were characterized editorially as "shocking violence" and a "lesson
in delinquency." N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1965.
40
0ne of the unfortunate by-products of the racial strife of the past decade
has been the wholesale indictment of "The South." If by this term is meant
the states which supported the Confederacy, there are eleven which seceded and
three others which were divided in their loyalties. Conditions in these states
with respect to civil rights have varied enormously. This is also true of conditions within particular states. The frenetic and unrestrained attacks on "The
South" and "Southern justice," without distinction between totally different
factual situations, and with little or no recognition that de facto racial dis-

crimination is widely practiced in other sections of the country, has revived much

of the regional bitterness of the reconstruction era. The indiscriminate and
often intemperate nature of these attacks has also prevented or retarded in many
communities the type of biracial communication and tolerance which has been
so urgently needed.
41Mr. Justice Douglas has said: "We reject the philosophy that the end justifies the means. The vitality of human rights means respect for procedure as well
as respect for substantive rights .... History shows that man's struggle to be
free is in a large degree the struggle to be free of oppressive procedure." Address
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But however one may view the justification for its use, civil. disobedience has not been limited either in theory or in practice to the
South. Indeed, the most militant advocates of disobedience have never
confined its applicability to any one area nor discontinued its use
when initial goals were achieved-in the courts or by legislation. Dr.
King, the author of the doctrine in its contemporary form, has been
quite explicit on this point:
There may be a community where the Negroes have the right to
vote, but there are still unjust laws in that community....

I

think wherever unjust laws exist, people on the basis of conscience have a right to disobey those laws.
I would say that there are very few unjust laws in most of our
northern communities. .

.

. But there is injustice and there are

communities which do not work with vigor and determination to
remove that injustice. In such instances I think men of conscience and good will have no alternative but to engage in some
kind of civil disobedience in order to call attention to the injustices. .. 42
The fact is that civil disobedience has been preached and practiced
in all sections of the country. Many examples come to mind: the sit-ins
in public offices and buildings, including those of the Governor of
New York, the Department of Justice and even the White House; the
picketing and boycotting of schools; the stall-ins and lie-downs related to the Fair in New York; the menacing and prolonged demonstrations against Girard College in Philadelphia; 43 the sit-ins on college
campuses, and especially the disorderly and obscene conduct at Berkeby Mr. Justice Douglas, Judicial Conference of the Americas, San Juan, Puerto
Rico, May 26, 1965.
42
King, Address before Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
April 21, 1965, pp. 21, 24.
43
1n a story entitled "NAACP is Waging a 'War of Attrition' on Girard
College," the N.Y. Times reported that "Several hundred policemen are manning
wooden barricades to protect the 10-foot high walls of a [private] school for
white orphans from militant Negro pickets." The paper further reported that this
conduct went on nightly as "a picketing marathon"; that one of the boasts of
,the civil disobedience leaders is that 'We'll not only have Girard College. We'll
bankrupt the City of Philadelphia too," referring to the nightly need for 250 to
800 policemen to protect the school. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1965.
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ley;" and the campaign of studied coercion in the streets against the
school administration in Chicago 5
The disorders in Chicago in 1965 may be a "spring lark" compared to what lies ahead. As this is being written (spring of 1966), Dr.
King is launching a new "campaign to remove the Gargantuan structures of injustice in the North." 46 The commendable specific objec47
tives include nothing less than the eradication of poverty and slums.
But the announced methods seem less commendable, especially in a
community long concerned with these problems, 48 where all citizens
vote, and where the courts are especially sensitive to any discrimination. Dr. King proposed:
We must organize this total community [Chicago] into unities of
political and social power. We must also reaffirm our allegiance
to the time-honored tactics and strategies that have served us so
well in the past ten years. As long as injustice is around, demonstrations will be necessary. So when it is appropriate we will
encourage sit-ins, stand-ins, rent strikes, boycotts, picket lines,
marches, civil disobedience and any form of protest and demonstrations that are nonviolently conceived and executed. 49
44

See hearings, Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States
Senate, 89th Cong., Part I, page 17, et seq., May 17, 1965. See also statement of
Dr. Max Rafferty, California State Superintendent of Public Instruction, reported in U.S. News & World Report, May 17, 1965, p. 70; and Lipset and
Wolin, The Berkeley Revolt, 1965.
45
Civil rights groups in Chicago were determined to "get" Superintendent
Willis because he would not further disrupt public education by busing pupils
and dismantling the neighborhood school system. As a result, Chicago experienced
in the summer of 1965 a series of "nonviolent" eruptions numbering nearly
100 separate demonstrations directed against the Democratic Mayor and the
Board of Education to force removal of Mr. Willis. Groups of demonstrators,
purporting to be practicing "peaceful" civil disobedience, lay down in the
middle of streets during the rush hours, blocking traffic and causing extreme
inconvenience to the public generally. More than 800 people were arrested during
the4 6summer.
Martin Luther King, Address at Chicago Freedom Festival, The Amphitheatre,
March 12, 1966 (References are to the mimeographed text of this address as released to the Press). It may surprise many, especially in the North, to have Dr.
King also say: "While the South burst forth with the dynamic vibrancy of new
democracy, the Negro in the North found himself increasingly pressed down
by47the cruel weight of vicious and discriminatory forces."
0ne of the most novel extensions of disobedience tactics was Dr. King's recent
"assumption of control" of a Chicago slum tenament building for the purpose
of collecting and applying the rents, presumably due the landlord, to renovate the
building. King conceded his action was "supra legal," but relied on moral law as
his justification. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1966. A Chicago Circuit Court subsequently enjoined this seizure. Chicago Tribune, April 7, 1966.
4
S5ee N.Y. Times, March 24, 1966, Special report by Gene Roberts.
49King, Address in Chicago Amphitheatre, supra note 46, at 8. One of the evolv-
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Thus, civil disobedience is practiced not merely, as its apologists so
often say, where the right to vote is denied or the local courts are
hostile; rather it is now practiced wherever impatient leaders deem it
a more efficacious means than the normal processes of a democracy.
NOT CONFINED TO CIVIL RIGHTS

Perhaps the greatest popular myth is that civil disobedience is
confined to civil rights causes. It is true that initially the use of disobedience occurred predominantly in the civil rights movement and
its most articulate advocates have been the leaders of this movement. o
Yet, just as its use has exploded geographically across the country,
so have the "causes" proliferated. First, the civil rights objectives have
broadened from specific discriminatory laws and practices of the
South to the limitless problems of bias, poverty and unemployment
everywhere. Other causes in which disobedience tactics have been used
include such sweeping subjects as American policy in Vietnam, peace
generally, disarmament, control of the poverty program, and the
"participatory democracy" now advocated by elements of the New
Left.
ANTi-VETNAM PROTEST

It may be illuminating to take a closer look at some of these. The
anti-Vietnam protest has gained momentum as our commitment in
Southeast Asia has expanded. A number of national organizations have
been formed, much of the academic community has mobilized, and a
significant portion of the civil rights leadership has become committed
more or less to this protest against major American policy. 1
ing concepts of civil disobedience is "total community" involvement, meaning
(among other things) increasing popular participation in demonstrations.
50
This association with one of the most appealing causes of our time goes
far to explain the remarkable sympathy and toleration with which civil disobedience has been accepted by the public generally. But the intellectual leadership for civil disobedience as a doctrine comes from political activists who are
not so naive, and who fully understand the potential of civil disobedience as an
extra-legal means of attaining goals they deem desirable. See collection of essays
entitled "Civil Disobedience," published by The Center for Study of Democratic Institutions, 1966.
5iKing, Farmer, Rustin and others have frequently expressed sympathy with
this protest. For example, it was reported that King "endorsed . .in principl"
the far-out policy statement of SNCC which condemned the United States involvement in Vietnam and expressed sympathy for persons who avoid the military draft. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 13, 1966. It has also been said that
"King [has) committed his Southern Christian Leadership Conference to the
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The Vietnam war and the role of this country in Asia are indeed
subjects of grave national concern. They should be responsibly debated and questioned-as they have before Congressional Committees,
on the campus and in the media-and no one should stigmatize the
dissenter's vital role in this democratic process.
The concern arises not from this wholesome process but from the
use of undemocratic means by some and from vicious anti-American
action by others 2 The employment of civil disobedience tactics by
these extremists has become commonplace. In addition to the nationally organized and coordinated demonstrations (sometimes with Viet
Cong flags flying), there have been numerous sit-ins, attempts to stop
troop trains, incitements to burn draft cards and evade military service,
and anonymous telephone calls to families of service men. Many who
speak for this movement bitterly attack American "aggression" and
"brutality," and rarely-if ever-criticize the conduct or record of the
Communist enemy.P
THE NEW LEFT

Closely associated with the anti-Vietnam protest is the movement
called the New Left. This is a conglomeration of activist organizations
and groups, many with campus or student orientation, which reflect
a varying spectrum of leftist thought and action. This movement is to
be distinguished from traditional American liberalism, regarded by the
New Left with disdain.
Two of its more prominent organizations are the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and Students for a Democause that the United States should quit defending South Viet Nam and let those
who want to crush civil rights take over in that nation." Roscoe Drummond,
syndicated column in Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 20, 1966. See also article
by Roy Reed, N.Y. Times, April 14, 1966.
Bayard Rustin thinks "race relations" and "international relations" are "inseparable," and that the "non-violen' direct action movement will merge these
two issues "more overtly in the years to come." See Oppenheimer and Lakey,
A Manual for Direct Action, Strategy and Tactics for Civil Rights and All
Other Nonviolent Protest Movements, published by Quadrangle Books, 1965,
with foreword by Rustin, p. x. This textbook for disobedience tactics suggests
that the lessons learned in the civil rights movement be applied to the "peace
movement:'
G2See Staff Study, Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the
United States Senate, The Anti-Vietnam Agitation and the Teach-In Movement,
Oct. 13, 1965, pp. vii, viii, xv. This study refers to the extent of Communist
participation and to the "call for massive civil disobedience."
53
See, for example, statement by Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
(SNCC) charging the United States with "murder" and "aggression" in Vietnam,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1966, p. 1.
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cratic Society (SDS).54 Both were initially concerned with civil rights,
but have expanded their targets to include American foreign policy
and various domestic demands.
It is said that "SNCC has become a magnet, pulling the entire civil
rights movement to the left, pushing the NAACP (not a part of the
New Left) out of the courtroom and into the streets ....," 15 Both
SNCC and SDS have been leaders of anti-Vietnam demonstrations
and in divisive tactics. SDS "has evolved a way-out foreign policy
that opposes the West in Vietnam, the Congo and much of Latin
America" s5and has been under investigation by the Department of
Justice for alleged "aiding and abetting of draft evasion." 57
Other organizations associated in varying degrees with New Left
causes include the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America,5 8 Progressive
60
Labor Party, 9 Vietnam Day Committee, May 2nd Movement, Student Peace League, Youth Against War and Fascism, Sparticists, and
the Young Socialist Alliance.
On the domestic scene, although the New Left groups have not
yet coalesced into a united front, the objective of extreme segments
of the movement is to substitute, by coercive means if necessary, a
"participatory democracy." This is described as a "communitarian"
system, modeled much after the theory (but obviously contrary to
54

ee Newfield (Assistant Editor of The Village Voice), The New Student
Radicals, Current, July 1965. Newfield stated that (in July 1965) SNCC had
"260 full-time field secretaries" and SDS had about "60 formal chapters and 50
staff members." SDS is more recently reported to have up to 10,000 members,
including 300 professors. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1965 and Oct. 20, 1965.
55
Newfield, supra note 54. The NAACP has been far more restrained in its
use and endorsement of civil disobedience than other more militant civil rights
groups. Indeed, Roy Wilkins is quoted as declining to support civil disobedience
as a doctrine because he thought segregationists could invoke it to disobey the
Civil Rights Act. See editorial, Memphis Commercial Appeal, reprinted in
Times-Dispatch, June 6, 1965.
Richmond
5
6Newfield, supra note 54.
57Newfield, Idealism and Action, The Nation, Nov. 8, 1965, p. 330.
58
Cited by the Attorney General as a "Communist Front" group. See N.Y.
Times, March 27, 1966, pp. 1, 32. Also described in 1965 Annual Report of the
FBI as "another major weapon which the Communist Party is directing against
the young people." It is said to have 35 chapters, mostly on college campuses.
FBI Annual Report, fiscal year 1965, p. 24. See also hearings, Subcommittee of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, Part I, May 17, 1965, p. 31.
59
Said to have been implicated in the Harlem riots of 1964. See N.Y. Times,
Dec.0 31, 1965.
G Said to be "actively sympathetic to the National Liberation Front, which
seeks to overthrow the South Vietnam government," to have "sent first aid
supplies to the Vietcong," and to contend that the struggle in Vietnam is
between American "imperialists" and a "freedom movement of oppressed people." N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1965.
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the practice) of Castro's Cuba and Mao's China, in which the peoples'
will would be expressed directly (e.g., in mass meetings and demonstrations) rather than by elected representatives.61
The call for "participatory democracy," in an organized sense,
originated in 1962 with the formation of SDS. The manifesto then
adopted, described as the "basic intellectual doctrine of the New Left,"
demands "participatory democracy" in all economic, political and hu62
man relationships.
Staughton Lynd has been described as a leader in the movement for
participatory democracy. In quoting from and commenting upon
Lynd's views, Father Walsh of Wayne State University has said:6 3
Writing in Liberation, Staughton Lynd, often described as the
foremost intellectual of the new activism, says: "We have moved
into a twilight zone between democratically delegated authority
and something accurately called 'fascism.'" For Lynd the answer
is participatory (as distinct, it seems, from representative) democracy, which means "ordinary people, making decisions for themselves.., a new politics which forces the representative back to
his people, and politics back to life." To bring about this change he
admits is revolutionary; it may mean students chaining "themselves
to the Capitol this summer in wave after wave of massive civil
disobedience; it could mean people organized from all over the
country setting up their own 'Continental Congress,' defying
their elected representatives, sending emissaries to make direct
contact with the people of other countries." Lynd admits this kind
of revolution makes sense "only if our situation is desperate." But
he adds, "I think it is desperate. ..

."

The demonstration and the sit-in are the standard weapons of the
Gt See Kristol, "What's Bugging the Students," Atlantic Monthly, Nov. 1965,

p. 108, 110, 111. Advocates of a participatory democracy "dismiss American
democracy as a sham." What they seek is a "pure self-perpetuating popular
revolution, not a 'planned economy.' . .. This is why they are so attracted to
Castro's Cuba and Mao's China, countries where the popular revolution has not
yet become 'bourgeoisified.' As for mass terror in Cuba and China-well, this
actually may be taken as a kind of testimony to the ardor and authenticity of
the regime's revolutionary fervor. Our radical students, like other radical students before them, find it possible to be genuinely heartsick at the injustices
and brutalities of American society, while blandly approving of injustice and
brutality
committed elsewhere in the name of 'the revolution.'" Id. at 111. 62
Newfield, supra note 57, at 330, 331. Another militant organization said to
favor "participatory democracy" is the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Newfield, "The Question of SNCC," The Nation, July 19, 1965,
pp. 338, 39.
6 Father Joseph L. Walsh, "What the Students Want," Commonweal Magazine, Nov. 19, 1965, pp. 206, 207.
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New Leftists." Lynd's proposal of "wave after wave of massive civil

disobedience" to remake America suggests how difficult it may be
to prevent the expanding use of coercive disobedience methods by
the increasing number of malcontents who have little sympathy for
normal democratic processes. 5
CIVIL DISORDER
The concept that civil disobedience is non-violent and peacefulindeed even "loving"-has been pervasively and skillfully woven into
the speeches and literature on this subject. It is fair to say that the
more responsible leaders of the civil rights movement also have made
a genuine effort-and with considerable success-to prevent serious disorders in most of the organized demonstrations. 6
This has resulted in a carefully nurtured impression that disobe-

dience is essentially a peaceful (nonviolent) procedure, resulting in
little or no disorder and practiced without infringement of the rights of
other citizens. Like the other myths, this impression will not stand
critical examination.
An unauthorized sit-in on public or private property is normally a
trespass and a violation of law. It is also "one of the surest ways anyone can pick out to disturb the peace." 17 This is especially true where
groups physically block or occupy, by sit-ins or lie-downs, public offices and private property. In short, a sit-in is not a peaceful act and it
frequently provokes actual disorder.68 The Supreme Court has sustained the validity of civil rights sit-ins under the circumstances discussed above, but one may be confident that in a proper non-civil
,""It is the civil rights movement which instructed them (New Leftists) in
the tactics of civil disobedience, that are now resorted to at the drop of a hat."
Kristol,
supra note 61, at 110.
05
An illuminating example of the New Left's contempt for democratic processes is the boycott by SNCG of the 1966 Alabama primary election. Commenting editorially on this "attitude of extremism," the New York Times of
April 21, 1966, said: "The SNCC officials insist they would prefer segregationist
officials because their presence would keep Negroes aroused and militant. In other
words, they reject reforms and improvements that could be achieved politically
in favor of a revolutionary posture toward all of society and government."
6
6 The historic march on Washington in 1962 and the Selma to Montgomery
march are the "show pieces" of nonviolent demonstrations. Yet each required
enormous organization and the mobilizing of large forces of police and troops
to assure
order.
. 67Brown v. Louisiana, supra note 23, at 162 (dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice
Black).
68No one would suggest, for example, that the sit-ins on the Berkeley campus
were peaceful, and scores of the offenders were convicted of disorderly conduct.
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rights case the Court will reaffirm traditional concepts of trespass and
breach of peace.
The typical street demonstration is usually a civic disorder in fact,
whatever it may be in law. Fortunately, the marchers in most civil
rights demonstrations to date have been well disciplined, elaborately
escorted by police, and therefore essentially orderly. But there have
been far more actual disorders than many suppose, both by the marchers and by those incensed by the demonstrations. And the threat of
serious violence is ever present.0
Moreover, even the nonviolent demonstrations frequently exact
a high price from the public generally. They disrupt traffic, create
discordant noises, litter the streets, and deny the streets and sidewalks
to other citizens. They also impose heavy responsibilities upon police
and are burdensome to the public treasury. 70 The payment of some
price to allow due exercise of cherished First Amendment rights may
be justified so long as public order and the rights of others are safeguarded. The problem-and a very difficult one indeed where multitudes take to the streets and are told that only just laws need be
obeyed-is to strike a balance which preserves the liberties of all. There
is mounting evidence of imbalance and that the use of demonstrations
is getting out of hand.
RELATIONSHIP TO RIOTS

Possibly the most serious aspect of the expanding use of protest
methods in the name of civil disobedience is the resulting incitement
to mob violence. No one knows the extent to which the doctrine of
disobedience, and especially the widespread resort to the streets, has
contributed to the general deterioration of respect for law and order
and specifically to major outbreaks-such as riots in Harlem, Rochester,
Philadelphia, Chicago and Watts.7 1 Yet few objective observers would
69
Disorders have frequently occurred in major demonstrations: e.g., in Chicago
in 1965 when hundreds were arrested for blocking traffic and other disorders; in the "Julian Bond" demonstrations led by King in Atlanta (See, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 15, 1966); and in a number of the anti-Vietnam
demonstrations; see for example, N.Y. Times, March 27, 1966.
7OThe payroll of the National Guard, mobilized to assure that the Selma
march was in fact orderly, exceeded $500,000. See Marshall, supra note 3, at 788
for a description of the Selma march. Leaders of the marathon demonstrations
against Girard College, where hundreds of police were required to protect the
college, boasted that they would bankrupt the City of Philadelphia. N.Y. Times,
May
14, 1965.
71
1n the August 1965 anarchy in Watts, which lasted for three days, 34 per-
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deny that the contribution has been significant. 72
The disquieting question is whether there will be further and more
serious outbreaks. The talk of "nonviolence," however sincere, may be
less persuasive than the continuing examples of marching demonstrators, the purveying of hate and blame, and the preaching of a doc8
trine that "one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws." 7
Or, putting it differently, is it possible for the masses-especially the
economically deprived and emotionally inflamed-to draw fine distinctions between "just" and "unjust" laws or between various methods
of disobedience? Can we reasonably expect throngs in the streets to
understand and observe subtle differences between peaceful protest,
74
disorderly conduct, and mob violence?
No one has warned against the probable answers to these questions
more eloquently than Mr. Justice Black:
Experience demonstrates that it is not a far step from what to
many seems the earnest, honest, patriotic, kind-spirited multitude
of today, to the fanatical, threatening, lawless mob of tomorrow.
And the crowds that press in the streets for noble goals today
sons were killed, 1,032 injured, nearly a thousand buildings were damaged or
destroyed, and property loss alone exceeded forty million dollars. A total of
3,952 persons were arrested for one crime or another, and in the words of
the Study Commission, this "lawlessness ... had terrified the entire county
(of Los Angeles) and its six million citizens." Report by the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots, Dec. 2, 1965, pp. 1, 2.
72
For example, Charles E. Rice, Professor of Law, Fordham University, wrote
that a "contributing factor" to the first Watts riot was "the anarchic effect
of the campaign of nonviolent civil disobedience." N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1965
(letter to editor).
John A. McCone, who headed the California Commission to investigate the
1965 riots, commented on the reoccurrence of rioting in Watts in March, 1966:
"A contributing cause [to the initial riot] was the continuing exhortation of
some leaders of the civil rights movement for extreme action to correct real or
imagined wrongs." Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 17, 1966, p. 18. The Commission itself made the following finding as to the "aggravating events" causing
the Watts riots: "Throughout the nation, unpunished violence and disobedience
to law were widely reported, and almost daily there were exhortations here and
elsewhere, to take the most extreme and even illegal remedies to right a wide
variety of wrongs, real and supposed." Report of Governor's Commission, supra,
note 71, pp. 4, 85.
Arthur Krock, in discussing causes of racial riots, cited: "The preachment of
Dr. Martin Luther King that individuals have a right to select the laws they will
obey...." New York Times Service, as published in Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 17, 1966.
73
Martin Luther King, Letter From A Birmingham jail. See Cohen, "Essence
and Ethics of Civil Disobedience," The Nation, March 16, 1964, p. 257, 260.
74
ee Charles E. Whittaker, Dangers of Mass Disobedience, Reader's Digest,
December 1965, pp. 121-4; see also Whittaker, supra,note 2.
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can be supplanted tomorrow by street mobs pressuring . . . for

precisely opposite ends

5

But others, concerned with the "causes," do not fear the consequences of spiraling disobedience in the streets. Professor Black, a
widely known constitutional scholar, has discussed sympathetically
the idea of mounting "a massive and general campaign of civil disobedience . . . against the power structure of some state with the
aim of producing a total change." '1 This would take place in a state
which has demonstrated, through its denial of civil rights, that "it
cannot and will not fulfill its basic obligations to federal law and human justice."
Professor Black thinks that such an attempt to overthrow a state
government by civil disobedience is a definite possibility and should
be "welcomed." While he does not discuss techniques, Black does
recommend the full support and cooperation of the Federal Government-by federalizing the National Guard (to prevent their use to put
down the insurrection), by providing additional federal judges (to
broaden opportunity for habeas corpus), and by assuring the "interstate movements of goods and people (from other states) for the
sustaining and counseling of the civil disobedience movement." 7
In pondering techniques which might be employed in such a revolution, it may be remembered that there was a written plan, considered but not used, to paralyze Montgomery and create a major
crisis by the "physical use of thousands of bodies to prevent the
running of buses and trains, and the
passage of traffic upon roads, the
8
landing of planes at airports." 7
Is there any wonder, in view of the record and all of these incite75Cox v. Louisiana,supra note 29, at 584 (Black, J., dissenting).
OBlack, The Problem of the Compatibility of Civil Disobedience with American Institutions of Government, 43 Texas L. Rev. 492 (1965). In commenting
on this startling proposal, Burke Marshall states that the "total defiance" suggested by Professor Black, and a somewhat similar view expressed by Professor
Bickel, "are political suggestions and political judgments ... outside of our
ordered system of law.. :" Marshall, supra note 3, at 799.
77Black, supra note 76, at 500-506. Professor Black argues curiously that conduct which he admits could not be tolerated against a unitary government,
should be tolerated against state governments because of our federal system.
This impatience with the delay in bringing conflicting state law into conformity
with federal law-a delay deliberately imposed by our system of checks and
balances-suggests disagreement with basic concepts of our constitutional system
of which federalism is an integral part.
78
See Marshall, supra note 3 at 792, 797. Mr. Marshall characterized this plan
as "revolutionary," involving deliberate and "massive violations of law," far
beyond the Gandhian concept of genuine peaceful disobedience.
7
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ments, that there have been riots and expanding lawlessness? And who
can say what discord lies ahead?
It has been said wisely:
Once you give a nervous, hostile and ill-informed people a
theoretical justification for using violence in certain cases, it is like
a tiny hole in the dike: the rationales rush through in a torrent,
and violence becomes the normal, acceptable solution for a problem. .

.

. A cardinal fact about violence is that once initiated it

tends to get out of hand. Its limits are not predictable.sa
Although there can be no doubt that civil disobedience has contributed significantly to lawlessness in the streets, it is a justification
rather than a fundmental cause. The central causes of unrest in urban
slums involve complex and deep-seated social and economic problems. 79 These constitute, together with the related problems of crime,
the most serious domestic crisis of this decade. I have spoken of this,
and the urgency of an adequate poverty and educational program, on
other occasions.8 0 But this is a paper on civil disobedience, and my
conviction is that due process and democratic procedures, even though
painfully slow at times, are a far more dependable and certainly less
dangerous means of correcting injustice and solving social problems.
THE FUTURE: WHERE DOES CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE GO FROM HERE?
So much for a review-obviously an incomplete one-of the origin,
characteristics and proliferation of contemporary civil disobedience.
It is perhaps now appropriate to ask where America may be headedif we continue on the widening path of disobedience.8 1
We live in a period of unprecedented unrest and discord. Throughout the world, change is being accomplished at a reckless pace and far
too often by force and revolution. The street mob demonstrating
against everything from visiting dignitaries to the ruling regime is the
symbol of our times. These mobs sometimes reflect spontaneous uprisings by oppressed peoples; more often, they are synthetically created
78aDr. Howard Zinn, Chairman, Department of Social Science, Spelman College,
The Nation, March 17, 1962, pp. 227, 229, 230.
79

See Report of Governor's Commission, supra,note 71.
SOSee Powell, Address, National Conference on Law & Poverty, 51 ABA

Journal 751 (1965).
81"People

who are prepared to pursue any course of action leading to social

change may find themselves in the contradictory position of using such violent

and uncontrollable means that there is no society left to enjoy the benefits of
the changes they seek." Zinn, supra note 78a, at 229.
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and deliberately manipulated by cynical leaders seeking personal
power.
We are blessed in America by a system of government which provides expressly for the accomplishment of change by orderly processes. The Constitution, both by amendment and interpretation, has
proved to be a remarkably flexible and resilient charter of government
and of personal liberty. The street mob and massive civil disobedience,
so familiar in countries not governed by the rule of law, have had no
82
place in our country.
The question now being seriously asked is whether we are making
a place for these techniques of coercion and lawlessness. The record
of the past decade is sobering to anyone concerned with due process.
We started with massive disobedience of Supreme Court decisions by
segregationists. The concept of disobedience was then adopted and enlarged, far more skillfully and effectively, by integrationists in the
civil rights movement. More recently we have witnessed an ever-growing diffusion and expansion of the use of civil disobedience, of the
causes in which it is employed, and in the character of its tactics.
There are no indications that this trend has abated. Too many militant leaders have found in civil disobedience a sure road to personal
publicity and power. Moreover, many people of good will-including
scholars and large segments of the clergy 8 3-have become so enchanted
by the "causes" that they give little thought to the means employed
84
or to where the disobedience road could lead.
82

Whatever other functions governments may perform, a principal function of
all government is to regulate and control the use of force within the society that
it encompasses. Perhaps the principal difference between our system of government, with its checks and balances and constitutional safeguards, and the rule
of the totalitarian state or the totalitarian mob, is the deliberate restraint imposed
on the use of force. We endanger the rule of law whenever we permit coercion
to be substituted for due process-whether against individual citizens or against
government itself.
83A few members of the clergy have spoken out against civil disobedience.
Cardinal Cushing has said: 'We are free to disagree with the law but not to
disobey it ....
observance of the law is the eternal safeguard of liberty, and
defiance of the law is the surest road to tyranny." N.Y. Times, March 28, 1966.
To the same effect, see sermon of Dr. Robert B. Watts, Episcopal minister in
San Diego: 'We must once and for all reject the doctrine of a morally justified
civil disobedience." Richmond Times-Dispatch, Sept. 7, 1965. See, also, letter
to the Herald Tribune by Rabbi Jacob S. Cohen of New Jersey, stating that
civil disobedience has contributed to disorder. Richmond Times-Dispatch,
Oct. 11, 1965.
84
0ne chilling example of where the doctrine of disobedience may inadvertently lead us is the spiraling addiction to drugs (especially LSD) by teenagers and
college students. This is attributed in part to the "growing collegiate uncertainty
about how binding laws ought to be." Fred M. Hechinger, Drugs-Tbreat on
Campus, N.Y. Times, Sunday, April 10, 1966.
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Those drawn to civil disobedience by the worthiness of causes might
reflect that the doctrine is urged as one of universal application, with
its moral imperatives and techniques available to all. If sit-ins and
massive demonstrations are justified for the "worthy" they are equally
justified for the "unworthy," as under this doctrine each man may
determine which laws are unjust, and each has the "moral duty" to
disobey them. The fortunate fact that the Ku Klux Klan has not yet
engaged in massive disobedience against civil rights legislation suggests
no unique respect for law by Klansmen but rather a lack of numerical
strength and organization, elements which it could acquire.
In simplest terms, we are talking about the foundations of an
ordered society. As Mr. Justice Goldberg has said:
The constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the existence of
an organized society maintaining public order, without which
liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy."
The logical and inescapable end of civil disobedience is the destruction of public order, and in the anarchy which follows, all liberty
would be lost.
Although many voices still call, irresponsibly I think, for "enlargement of the role of civil disobedience," s1we may assume that
most of these would draw the line at some point-if they could. But
there may be real doubt whether the forces and passions already set
in motion can be reversed short of grave damage to basic values of a
free society.
We may already have reached the point where the long-range success of the civil rights movement is endangered, especially the hope
that racial minorities will be genuinely accepted and respected by their
fellow citizens. Much ill will has been engendered by disobedience
tactics. As disobedience campaigns move into the North and assume
more massive proportions, as class and racial discord are openly
fomented, and particularly if further rioting occurs, the ugly barriers
of resentment and hatred will have been reinforced for decades to
come. It is difficult to imagine a more unfortunate result.
Moreover, the very rights and causes now sought to be vindicated
through these tactics can, in the end, be assured only so long as laws
are observed and due process followed. It has been wisely said that
"minority groups. . . are the ones who always suffer the most when
street multitudes are allowed to substitute their pressures for the
85Cox v. Louisiana, supra note 29, at 554.
86See, for example, Keeton, The Morality of Civil Disobedience, 43 Texas L.
Rev. 507 (1965). See also collection of essays on Civil Disobedience by the Center
for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1966.
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less glamorous but more dependable and temperate processes of the
law.")87
The ultimate danger is to the rule of law and the framework of
government which sustains it. Extremist groups of the New Left,
already bold enough to counsel draft evasion, carry Vietcong flags
and tolerate, if not encourage, Communist participation, 88 now threaten
the massive use of civil disobedience to force changes in our form
of government.8 9
While we need not, at this time, view such a threat with undue
alarm, the principles involved go far beyond any particular group or
groups. History has demonstrated that once a society condones organized defiance of law and due process, it becomes increasingly difficult to protect its institutions and to safeguard liberty.
One may hope, with reason, that America has not yet reached this
point of no return. And yet we would be foolish indeed not to heed
the warning of a great liberal judge, whose concern for civil rights
and freedom of dissent is exceeded only by his concern for our
country. Mr. Justice Black has recently said:
Governments like ours were formed to substitute the rule of law
for the rule of force. Illustrations may be given where crowds
have gathered together peaceably by reason of extraordinarily
good discipline reinforced by vigilant officers. "Demonstrations"
have taken place without any manifestations of force at the time.
But I say once more that the crowd moved by noble ideals today
can become the mob ruled by hate and passion and greed and
violence tomorrow. If we ever doubted that, we know it now.
The peaceful songs of love can become as stirring and provocative
as the Marseillaise did in the days when a noble revolution gave
way to rule by successive mobs until chaos set in. . .. It
[is] more necessary than ever that we stop and look more closely
at where we are going.90
v. Louisiana, supra note 29, at 583 (Black, J. dissenting).
See Staff Study, Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, supra;

87Cox

88

FBI Annual Report (1965), p. 24; FBI Bulletin, Vol. 35, No. 2, Feb. 1966; New-

field, supra The Nation, Nov. 8, 1965, pp. 330, 333; Editorial Comment in Rich-

mond Times-Dispatch, Feb. 28, 1966. See also advertisement for "Ad Hoc Com-

mittee of Veterans for Peace in Vietnam," publicizing demonstration planned for
March 26, signed by Gus Hall, Herbert Aptheker, and others. N.Y. Times,

March
20, 1966.
8

9See Walsh, supra note 63, quoting Staughton Lynd, at 207; see generally
Kristol, supra note 61, at 108, 110, 111; Newfield, supra note 62, at 38, 39; and
Newfield, supra note 57, at 330, 331; Marguerite Higgins, Radical Crusades
Peril US. Colleges, Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 23, 1965. Miss Higgins quoted
a New Left leader as saying "the larger goal [is] bringing about radical changes
in 9the structure of the United States society."
OBrown 'v.
Louisiana,supra note 23, at 168 (Black, J. dissenting).
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Perhaps no subject today raises more controversy among attorneys
than the subject of Legal Aid. To some it presents the golden opportunity to fulfill the traditional role of the la'wyer to provide legal
services and to make the phrase "equal justice under law" a reality.
To others, perhaps a majority, it raises the vision of an octopus whose
tentacles threaten the independence of the organized bar; a vision that
this is the initial step toward socialized legal practice.
With this controversy in mind, the Legal Aid Committee of the
Junior Bar Section of the Virginia State Bar Association, under the
chairmanship of Mr. David G. Simpson of Winchester,, Virginia,
sponsored the following seminar. Presented at Arlingtonj Virginia, on
29 January 1966 the seminar had as its purpose the presentation of
the concept, scope, and problems of Legal Aid today.
Many rumors are heard about Legal Aid and the entry of the
Federal Government into what has traditionally been a privatelyhandled area of the law. Since these questions are of prime importance
the Washington and Lee Law Review presents this transcript of 3
outstanding attorneys in the field of Legal Aid. The editorial board
gratefully acknowledges the assistanceand co-operation of the seminar
panelists, the efforts of Mr. Simpson, who made publication of the
seminar possible, and the support of Mr. Shriver in the contribution of
his excellent Foreword.
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FOREWORD
SARGENT SHRIVER*

"Revolution!" may not seem to be a rallying cry to inspire enthusiasm in the legal profession. Certainly, neither lawyers nor laymen envision the bar as a hotbed of radicalism, and perhaps this popular
conception of lawyers has a certain validity, for no doubt many
attorneys would be among the first to be guillotined should such an
unlikely event as a violent revolution ever occur in this country.
Revolutionaries today as in 1789 still might be expected to respond
passionately to Robespierre's command: "The first thing we do, we
kill all the lawyers!"
But under the common-law legal system which we have inherited
from England, American lawyers in a very real sense are keenly responsive to the cry for revolution. Indeed, from the Magna Carta
to the present time, with rare exceptions, lawyers have been responsible for nearly every revolutionary change our society has experienced. It was the lawyers in England who devised ways to achieve
private ownership of land when all property technically belonged to
the king; it was the lawyers in America who developed the corporate
forms of business enterprise which have allowed American business
to flourish so astonishingly; and it was the lawyers who under the
New Deal forged new tools to aid people out of the chaos and rubble
of the depression. Most recently, it is once again the lawyers who take
credit for the fact that the civil rights revolution has taken place almost entirely in the courtroom and not on the streets.
Development, modification, and change are built into our legal
system, and the legal profession, which perhaps sees itself more conservatively as the guardian and custodian of tradition, is in fact our
most revolutionary body, because its entire raison d'etre is the accomplishment of change. Every time a case turns on the law rather
than the facts, one of the attorneys must be arguing for a new interpretation of the law, and when his argument prevails, a slight modification occurs in the entire legal system. It is this role-the role of
gatekeeper to the future, admitting changes and modification in the
system, but insisting that they be carefully examined, and, when
admitted, accompanied by legality and order-that has earned for
American lawyers their justifiable prominence in our national life. It is
our constitutional commitment to the achievement of revolutionary
0 Director, Office of Economic Opportunity.
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change by non-revolutionary means which makes the Anglo-American
legal system one of the most enduringly just and stable legal systems
the world has ever known.
And yet it is a shocking fact that a legal system which prides
itself on the motto "Equal Justice for All" still tolerates, in 1966, a
restriction of that justice to people who happen to have no money.
Because the poor cannot afford legal fees, they have no lawyers, and
because they have no lawyers, they are the natural prey of almost
everyone with whom they come into contact: merchants, landlords,
employers, and even the welfare workers whose purpose should be
to help and comfort them. As William McCalpin reveals in his address
to this Seminar, the need for legal services for the poor is great and
the bar has significantly failed to make its services available to them.
Acting under the authority of the Economic Opportunity Act of
1964, OEO has attempted to meet this problem by the establishment
of the Legal Services Program. The functioning of this program is
carefully and thoroughly described in this Seminar by its Director,
Clinton Bamberger, a distinguished lawyer in his own right. The
Virginia Bar Association, like many other bar associations in this
country, is responding with interest and enthusiasm to the challenge
of the Legal Services Program, and the sponsorship of this Seminar
is merely one indication of the concern which it has manifested in the
legal problems of poor people, and in OEO's attempts to deal with
them. This Seminar and the other activities of the Virginia Bar Association in this field are proof of the fact that the bar has no intention
of abandoning its traditional role of leadership in achieving change.
The transcript of the Seminar makes exciting reading. It consists
of addresses by three attorneys with expertise in the field of legal
services for the poor: F. William McCalpin, Chairman of the Special
Committee on the Availability of Legal Services of the American Bar
Association, who discusses the present and actual need for a federally
supported program of legal services for the poor; Clinton Bamberger,
the Director of the Legal Services Program of the Office of Economic
Opportunity, who discusses what the government's program is trying
to accomplish, how it works, and the role of local attorneys; and
,Wayne Theophilus, Director of the Legal Aid Society of Pittsburgh,
who discusses in detail the actual workings of a Legal Aid Society,
the philosophy underlying it, the attorney-client relationship, and the
kinds of problems dealt with.
It may be that the excited interest in legal services shown by the
participants in this Seminar is not shared by every member of the
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Virginia Bar. Indeed, there are certainly lawyers who are adamantly
opposed to the program, just as there are lawyers who are adamantly
opposed to women's suffrage, civil rights for Negroes, and the other
social achievements of the Twentieth Century. But the leading role
being played by such great lawyers as Lewis Powell, a Richmond
lawyer and immediate past President of the ABA, and Edward V.
Kuhn, the present President of the ABA, indicate that the responsible
leaders of the bar are just where they have always been: at the doorway to the future, guiding and channelling the changes to be made.
The Junior Bar Section of the Virginia Bar Association has performed an important public service by sponsoring this Seminar. As
other lawyers throughout the country begin to take similar responsibility for making "Equal Justice under Law" a reality for all, we may
reach a time when a Twentieth Century Robespierre would cry,
"The last thing we do would be to kill the lawyers." Hopefully, that
time is not far away.
REMARKS OF MR. McCALPIN'
When I got Mr. Collins Denny's request to appear here some weeks
ago I wasn't sure initially whether I was being invited because of the
American Bar Association hat that I wear or because of the fact that
I am also a Board Member of the Legal Aid Society of the City and
County of St. Louis which got the first grant from OEO in the preBamberger days when it was a whole lot easier.
Assuming, however, that Mr. Theophilus will fill that void of what
it is like to work one of these things at the operational level, let me
don my Special Committee on Availability hat and cast the net just a
bit wider and come back into legal aid in the course of my remarks.
Our profession has not, I submit, adequately met our responsibility
to make our services fully available to the public who need and want
them. The message of current developments beginning with the
Button case,2 which amount almost to a revolution in legal services,
I Chairman, Special Committee on Availability of Legal Services, American Bar
Association. St. Louis Univ., A.B. 1943; Harvard Univ., LL.B. 1948; Lecturer, St.
Louis Univ. School of Law, 1953-61; Member of Missouri Bar, American Bar
Ass'n (House of Delegates, 1966), and St. Louis Bar Ass'n (President, 1961-62).
Member of firm of Lewis, Rice, Tucker, Allen & Chubb, 1555 Railway Exchange
Building, St. Louis, Mo. 63101.
2N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). Held unconstitutional as applied
to the NAACP a Virginia statute forbidding solicitation on behalf of "any particular attorneys" which had been interpreted to proscribe as criminal a person's
advising another that his legal rights had been infringed and referring him
to a particular attorney or group of attorneys. The Supreme Court said that
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is that we are being handed a challenge and perhaps a last opportunity
to live up to our professional responsibility. The threat of these
developments is that unless we do so, someone else will do the job
for us.
I make this rather bald accusatory statement in spite of the fact
that probably every lawyer in this room has in the past and may
even now be offering his professional services in behalf of some poor,
unfortunate individual free of charge.
Let us not delude ourselves, however, that this meets the problem.
In the first place, it is only a pretty select group of the poor, your
cook, or the cleaning woman's daughter or someone of that sort
who get into our offices, and when they do they come with a rather
narrow category of problem: perhaps a police court appearance or a
domestic relations case.
While the problem of an individual indigent may be the responsibility of an individual lawyer, the needs of the poor as a class are and
have been the responsibility of the whole profession. We, as a profession, can take some, but really all too little credit for the organized
services of legal aid societies in behalf of indigent clients.
It is true that we have sponsored 252 legal aid offices, an additional 136 voluntary legal aid societies and 194 defender offices
to render civil and criminal legal aid to indigent persons. It is comforting to know that in the most recent year for which figures were
available these agencies handled more than 650,000 new cases3 in addition to an undetermined number of open and continuing files.
If there has been a general tendency on the part of the bar to be
satisfied with this performance, that complacency has not been shared
by those closest to the problem. For years Legal Aid Committees of
the American Bar Association and of state, county, and local bars have
indicated a need larger than they have been able to serve and have
besought greater means and facilities for the rendition of these servthere "inheres in the statute the gravest danger of smothering all discussion looking to the eventual institution of litigation on behalf of the rights of menibcrs
of an unpopular minority." Id. at 434.
See also, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State
Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). Held that an injunction issued under the same Virginia
statute, prohibiting a labor union from advising injured members or their dependents to obtain legal assistance before settling claims, infringed rights guaranteed by the 1st and 14th Amendments.
3
The period covered was essentially 1964, although certain reporting organizations included figures for fiscal 1964. From an unpublished A.B.A. compilation
"Statistics of Legal Aid and Defender Work in the United States and Canada."
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ices. I am sorry to say that these pleas have not usually been met
with an enthusiastic response from either the public or the bar.
In recent years the desperate dimension of this unmet need has
become steadily more visible. The problems of the urban poor have received the attention of a number of experimental projects. Many of
these have included elements designed to alleviate the legal problems
of the poor or to attack nonlegal problems through the employment of
legal process.
Among these experiments were Community Progress, Incorporated,
in New Haven, Action for Boston Community Developments, and
Mobilization for Youth in New York, all of which pre-dated the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and which became in some measure
the springboard for the current programs of the Office of Economic
Opportunity.
As a result of these experiments the involved members of the legal
profession began to be aware not only of the fact that established
legal aid societies were inadequately meeting the needs of the poor
for legal services in what might be termed conventional legal problems but that there was precious little being done about a whole
host of unconventional problems which might be attacked through
the employment of the legal process.
These community programs demonstrated quite adequately that the
urban poor are essentially immobile. If it were not so tragic it would
be quixotic that in this motorized and mechanized age many of the
urban poor rarely travel more than 5 or 6 blocks from their place of
habitation. Consider this in light of the fact that the vast majority of
established legal aid offices exist at the courthouse or at the bar association office in the downtown commercial area, usually well removed from the substandard housing areas where the poor live.
We began to learn through these experimental projects that if our
services were to be really available to those who need them, then we
had to get out of the courthouse and the bar association office and
into the neighborhoods where the poor live. When we have done so
the results have been startling. The volume continues to rise at
the downtown office and in the neighborhood office the case load soon
equals or exceeds that of the old, existing and continuing office. Thus,
a real need has been unfulfilled simply because of the geographic distance between the client and the legal aid lawyer.
In addition, many of our legal aid societies, for budgetary reasons,
because of pressure from support groups within the community, or
perhaps even because of the philosophy of the sponsoring bar associa-
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tion, have imposed limits on the types of legal services they will render
or, to state it perhaps more accurately, they have refused to render
legal services in certain types of legal problems.
On top of this there has been the slow appreciation of new legal
problems or of the possibility for the employment of the legal process
to solve old problems. Very few legal aid societies have represented
displaced slum dwellers against the local land clearance authority.
Equally few have represented public housing tenants against the
local public housing authority.
It is true that many legal aid societies have represented welfare
recipients or applicants where aid has been denied or cut off. A day
in a welfare office will, however, convince any lawyer that this potential for the employment of legal services is virtually untapped.
And I may say that this also is the view of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare.
What lawyer or legal aid society has represented the son of an impoverished family who becomes a forced drop-out at the insistence
of a local board of education? Yet I can cite you examples where this
has happened in clear violation of existing state statute.
The sad truth of the fact is that the poor badly need legal representation as against the very welfare authorities which were created
to assist and protect them. And we, as a profession, have been slow
to grasp that fact. Thus even in this area of the poor where we
have occasionally prided ourselves on discharging our professional
responsibility there is a yawning gap between the need for legal services and the fulfillment of that need.
It is an uncomfortable fact that the advent of Community Progress,
Incorporated, ABCD, and Mobilization for Youth has opened our eyes
to that gap. Yet these needs to which our eyes have but recently been
opened are only the visible 20% of the iceberg. What of the other
80% of our population? Here there has never been any grounds for
professional complacency.
It is true that beginning 25 or 30 years ago we, as a profession,
took note of the necessity for making our services more available to
citizens of moderate means, able to pay something, though perhaps not
what we would regard as a full legal fee. In 1950 the American Bar
Association named its Committee on Lawyer Referral Services and
both before and after that State and local bar associations adopted and
instituted the same device.
Today there are nearly 400 legal aid agencies in the United States,
but barely more than 200 lawyer referral services. Great. credit is
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due the more than 17,000 lawyers enrolled in lawyer referral panels
serving the needs of perhaps 150,000 middle-income citizens annually.
The fact, though, is that this figure represents less than 10% of the
lawyers in this country who serve only a tiny fraction of 1% of
the middle-income citizens.
Scholars and leaders of the bar have noted the profession's failure to
discharge its service responsibility to these citizens for more than a
quarter century. Perhaps the earliest was Dean, later Judge Clark of
the Second Circuit, writing with Miss Emma Corstvet in a 1938 issue
of the Yale Law Journal. 4 In the same year the late Professor Karl
Llewellyn addressed himself to the same problem in an article entitled, "The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices-and Cures?" 5
Down through the years the bars of half a dozen States have conducted surveys and studies designed to measure either the need for
legal services or the performance of the bar in meeting the need, and
these studies have uniformly demonstrated substantial failure on the
part of the profession to discharge its total responsibility.
Just over 2 years ago in October 1963, an eminent scholar and
teacher addressed himself to these problems in the Carpentier Lectures
delivered by him at Columbia University. In those lectures, published
under the titie, "A Lawyer when Needed," 6 Professor Elliott Evans
Cheatham said: "Yet these growing classes-the middle classes-with
an increasing need for legal services, do not obtain in proportionate
measure the legal services they need, at least from lawyers. The wide
gap between the need and satisfaction by the bar had been indicated
by numerous studies beginning in the 1930's. Lawyers have been kept
aware of this by the extent of unauthorized practice of law by laymen and by the ingenuity and the insistence of laymen in developing
new group methods of obtaining legal services."
He concluded that lecture by saying: "Some conclusions are
submitted on the conditions that have been described: Legal service
needed by the middle classes is not rendered at all, or else it is performed by laymen inexpert in the law and free from professional control, or it is performed by lawyers who are retained by intermediaries
under no supervision by the courts, the profession, or any public
body."
The proof of Professor Cheatham's remarks was published 9 months
4

Clark & Corstvet, The Lawyer and the Public, 47 Yale L.j. 1272 (1938).
G5 Law &Contemp. Prob. 104 (1938).
OCheatham, A LAWYER WB-x NEmDi,
Columbia Univ. Press (1963). An

abridged and footnoted version appears in 63 Colum. L. Rev. 973 (1963).
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later in the Progress Report of the Group Legal Services Committee
of the State Bar of California.7 On the basis of evidence which it detailed in its voluminous report, a large majority of that committee
concluded that there was so great an unfilled need for legal services as
to be a cause for public concern.
I am chagrined to report that a part of that evidence was an analysis
made at the Center for the Study of Law and Society of the University
of California of a survey conducted in my own home state in 1963.8
This analysis revealed that in Missouri only 25% of persons who
bought or sold a home consulted a lawyer; that nearly 2/3 of persons involved in an automobile accident producing either a personal
injury or property damage in excess of $100 did not see a lawyer.
And while 2/3 of those who had a will had had it drafted by a lawyer,
only 17% of the public in fact had a will.
Coincident with these revelations we have become aware of the
phenomenon now known as group legal service programs. I need not
describe in detail to a bar which has been so deeply involved in
the Button and Brotherhood cases" what group legal service programs
are. You know about them firsthand. Let me only say to you that
since the adverse decisions in those cases, many additional examples of
such programs have come to light in Maryland, New York, Illinois,
and elsewhere.
Without in any way seeming to approve of such programs, I do
suggest that one reason for their existence may lie in the fact that we
as a profession have been remiss in making our services available to the
public on a basis which the public understands and accepts; and let
us not forget that in the final analysis it is that same public which
grants us our licenses who will determine when and how they shall
be used.
Here, then, are the challenges which are hurled at us, not just by
the poor, but by the whole American public. "We need legal services," they say to us in fashioning group legal service programs, in
enacting the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. "You devise the
methods," they in effect say, "but do so in a method which is acceptable to us." I scarcely need add that the same public which has created
group legal service plans now validated by the Supreme Court of
the United States, the same public which has, through its representa739 J. State Bar of Calif. 639 (1964).

sOriginally compiled as a joint undertaking of The Missouri Bar and the PrenHall Foundation, later published in LAWYER'S PRAMrCE MANUAL, Pren-Hall, Inc.
(1964).
oSupra note 2.
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tives, enacted the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, can take further
steps if we continue to ignore their pleas.
The reason that I am here today is that the American Bar Association, under the wise and able guidance of a great Virginia lawyer,
Lewis F. Powell of Richmond, has heard this plea and heeded it. It
was he who perceived the problem, even before the California report
was published and the Economic Opportunity Act enacted. He sent
me here to Washington in November and again in December of
1964 to learn the facts, to report to him and to help shape the response
of our profession.
Part of the current posture of that response is the Special Committee
on Availability of Legal Services created under his guiding counsel.
We, as a committee, are directed to ascertain the nature and extent of
the unfilled needs for legal services; to evaluate existing methods of
providing those services; and to consider new, supplemental or alternative means, specifically including an examination of group legal service
programs.
Our work has only just begun. I can say, however, that we have already begun to identify ways to make it possible for the entire
bar to make its services available to more and more of the public.
We have already decided that we must consider very seriously the
identification, training, and utilization of sub-professionals in the
legal profession to do for us what nurses, dieticians, x-ray technicians,
laboratory assistants, physical therapists, and others do for the medical
profession.
Most of us feel that cost is a part of the problem. To overcome
this obstacle to making our services more fully available, we intend to
consider very seriously whether or not an application of the insurance
principle, along the lines of Blue Cross, is not a possibility, whether
tax deductions for necessary, basic legal services are not as justified as
deductions for medical services and, indeed, whether the subsidy
system adopted by our English brethren may possibly have any application in this country.'0
Finally, we know that legal aid and lawyer referral as we have
known them in the past can and must be improved.
I think it is entirely appropriate that I should appear here on this
platform today with Clint Bamberger, because I think there is a
necessary connection and relationship between what he is doing in
the Office of Economic Opportunity and what the Special Committee
10

Mr. McCalpin explains the operation of the English subsidy system in the
Q & A portion, infra at 261-62.
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on Availability of Legal Services sees as necessary and useful in the
development of the practice of law in the future.
I know, for instance, that there is in the works a submission from the
Missouri Bar to the Office of Economic Opportunity, part of which
is designed to train secretaries, investigators, and court attaches, and
broader subprofessional training programs are in prospect.
Durham, North Carolina, and the State Bar of Wisconsin have already submitted proposals to OEO for experimentation with the
English subsidy idea on local and regional bases. 1 The District of
Columbia and the Legal Aid Society of the City and County of
St. Louis have already been funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity to reach out from the courthouse and the bar association
office into the neighborhood of the poor with revitalized legal aid
services.
There is an unfilled public need for legal services. There exist more
ways to fill that need than we have heretofore tried. The existence of
the OEO and its programs offer us the opportunity for research and
experimentation with new methods for providing services. While it is
true that OEO programs must, by legislative mandate, be directed
specifically at the very poor, let me suggest that these programs should
generate devices to serve all the people. Beyond that, they promise to
broaden the acquaintance of a whole generation of the poor with
the possibilities afforded by lawyers and the law.
If we will but look upon the current Federal programs not as the
solution to our problems or as a threat to our institutions, but rather
as a laboratory for experimenting with new and improved ways to
make our services available to all the people, we can surely meet the
challenge which has been hurled at us.
12

REMARKS OF MR. BAMBERGER
Those of us who are concerned with the development of legal services programs for the poor are sometimes inclined to stimulate bar associations by telling shocking stories of injustices and indignities suffered
by poor people who are not represented by lawyers. And the most
significant conclusion from these stories is the irony of the fact that
"'These proposals are elaborated upon in the Q &A portion, infra at
262-63. On April 26 the Washington Post reported the announcement by OEO
Director Sargent Shriver of a grant of $240,000 to the Wisconsin Bar Association
for implementation of its rural area "judicare" program. A similar program was
announced for the establishment of 5 legal services offices on the Navajo reservation in northeastern Arizona.
12Director, Legal Services Agency, Office of Economic Opportunity, 1200 19th
Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20506. Loyola College, B.S. 1949; Georgetown
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they frequently arise out of contacts between the poor and institutions
which we have created to serve the poor and to better their lot.
Let me tell you a few capsules to give you the flavor of this:
Investigators pay a midnight visit to the welfare recipient and
find a male friend there. Under a prevailing interpretation of very
vague regulations, he is presumed to live with her and to be able
to support her. Her welfare is terminated.
A migrant farm worker seeks help from a state agency during
a crisis. He doesn't get it because he is a nonresident. As a matter
of fact, he is probably a nonresident of every state in which he
ever works or lives.
Unemployment compensation recipients required to serve on
public works projects refuse to cut brush in knee-deep snow during sub-freezing weather. They are convicted of interfering with
administration of the compensation laws.
A poor child is suspended from school for unspecified misconduct which he did not commit. He is too frightened to challenge his suspension and his parents are too ignorant.
These are true examples of actual cases. They describe a consistent
and pervasive pattern that shapes the life of poverty. They are evidence of society's failure to provide the poor with adequate legal
services.
For more than a half century the organized bar has labored without
noticeable public support to furnish adequate legal aid for the poor.
Expanded legal aid is still necessary. But even if the bar's traditional
concept of legal aid, a concept which is often much at variance with
the much loftier ideal and ambitions of the leaders of the legal aid
movement, is multiplied a hundredfold, it will not achieve the ideal
of equal justice under law.
Before the poor take the initiative to seek legal services they must
be taught to recognize the legal aspects of their experiences so that
they know when a lawyer's aid is needed. The poor must be encouraged to seek legal assistance when they perceive that it is needed.
An office in a store front may seem demeaning to some lawyers,
but formidable office buildings are alien to slum dwellers. Riding
Univ., LL.B. 1951; Instructor, Univ. of Maryland School of Law, 1964-present.
Member, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Court of
Appeals of Maryland, 1958-present; Assistant Attorney General of Maryland,
1957-58. Member of American Bar Ass'n, Maryland Bar Ass'n, Baltimore Bar
Ass'n, International Ass'n of Insurance Counsel. Member (on leave) of firm
of Piper & Marbury, Baltimore, Md. Mr. Bamberger resigned his OEO post as
of 29 June 1966.
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circuit may seem old-fashioned, but it may be the only way that
lawyers and the law can reach migrant workers and farm families.
The poor must be served by competent advocates in the formulation, the enactment, and the elaboration of the laws which affect them.
And our traditional attitudes toward breaking this cycle of poverty
has been that the social worker, the public health experts, the urban
planners, the lawyers, in short, the comfortable, know what is best
for the poor, and the poor need not raise their voices because they
will not be heard, and if heard, they will not be heeded, because they
don't know what is good for them.
I don't mean to deprecate the motives from which spring these
charitable approaches. What I mean to suggest is that this approach is
not only bad for the poor in many respects, but it is bad for ourselves
and it is bad for the legal system that we are sworn to uphold.
Let me give you some examples. Building codes are enacted to insure minimum standards of decency in today's homes, but the tenant
who complains about rat infestation finds himself evicted by a court
order as a trouble-maker without redress.
Low-cost public housing was created because of the inability or
unwillingness of the private sector to furnish adequate housing for the
poor. But inflexible standards of indigency or of eligibility have
served to dampen ambition and to remove from public housing
communities the very families whose example and influence would
be most beneficial to their neighbors.
Public assistance laws have saved inestimable numbers of our fellow
citizens from starvation, but the present scheme of public assistance
has also assaulted their privacy, reinforced their dependency, and disintegrated their family.
I could go on. I hope the point is clear. Do you think that a corporation code or a fiduciary law or banking regulation which had
such disturbing paradoxical effects would long survive the onslaught
of lawyers? Of course not. But an urban renewal program or a
consumer credit law or a public health scheme can, because the poor
who are affected by them have no spokesman.
Stand by the bench in a court of lesser jurisdiction and listen while
evictions issue unchallenged, while judgments by default are rattled
off in a dreary monotone and while writs of repossession are signed in
bundles. The judge is bored while he listens to a lawyer for the
landlord or the merchant recite a tedious litany. The poor are not
represented. A search for truth and for justice built upon an adversary
system walks half blind when one side is not represented. And all of
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us, not just the poor, lose when the poor are not advised and represented by lawyers.
A large body of our law is considered only by the legislative and
the executive branches of government and never tested and scrutinized
by the judiciary. Legislators and administrators are not omniscient.
What they do is improved when lawyers debate what they did and
a judge with a mind sharpened and enlightened by the debate construes and applies the legislative rule.
Lawyers make our laws better and they make our public officials
more responsible. But so many of our laws which affect poor people
are no better because there are no lawyers for the poor or, at best,
only insignificant representation of the poor. No other economically
defined segment of our population is so pervasively affected by statutes,
regulations, and administrators as are the poor. Public assistance laws,
public housing laws, fair employment and open occupancy statutes,
consumer credit legislation, statutes which govern landlord and tenant
relations, these laws affect the poor more than they affect you and me.
Attorney General Katzenbach expressed this more than a year ago
when he said, "To us, laws and regulations are protections and guides,
established for our benefit and for us to use. But to the poor, they are a
a hostile maze, established as harassment, at all costs to be avoided." '3
It ought to be obvious that there is an essential role for the law
and for lawyers in this nation's War on Poverty-in this nation's effort
to better the lot of the impoverished and, in so doing, to improve
the quality of our own lives.
Under the Economic Opportunity Act the Federal Government is
extending significant financial assistance to local community action
programs, including legal services programs for the poor. Congress is
authorizing the underwriting of such programs with up to 90% federal
financing. But let me emphasize that the initiative in planning community action programs, including legal services programs, rests with
the individual communities. My office is ready to assist any community
in drafting a legal services proposal and to make available the assistance
of experienced consultants. But we respond only to invitations, to
questions and to expressions of interest. We have not and will not
impose ourselves and our program on anyone.
We are encouraged by the degree of local initiative in Virginia.
There are lawyers in this Commonwealth who have a sense of respon13
From a speech delivered by Attorney General Katzenbach to the Conference on Extension of Legal Services to the Poor in Washington, D.C., 12

Nov. 1964.

248

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIII

sibility to the poor. Virginia lawyers, like lawyers in my home State
of Maryland, have long and often served individual impoverished
clients. But I don't think you should be surprised or offended when
I say that the organized efforts of the bar in Virginia to extend legal
services have not been outstandingly successful.
To my knowledge there are only 3 legal aid societies actively in
existence in Virginia. 14 Norfolk has none, though I understand that
the Norfolk Bar, under the leadership of Ed Baird, will soon fill that
breach. Richmond's Legal Aid Bureau has been limping along for a
number of years with grossly inadequate support. Its volume of cases
is only slightly more than one-half per thousand persons in the area
served. The National Legal Aid and Defender Association has deemed
the minimum number of cases from 1000 people to be 7 A.
But there are some good signs. I understand that applications for
legal aid charters have been made in Alexandria and in Norfolk, and
that active planning is underway in Newport News and Winchester.
A proposal for a legal services program for Roanoke and for the surrounding counties has been submitted to the regional office of OEO.
I am sure there are other activities going on in the State of which I
am not aware.
The guidelines for the financing of legal services programs under the
office of Economic Opportunity will be published soon.
Usually a legal services program must be funded as part of a community action program. There are some exceptions to this rule where
there is no existing community action program, where it is not possible
to form one or for some other reason it is infeasible, impractical, or
impossible to conduct the legal services program as a part of the
overall community action program. Thus, one of the first steps in
planning for an OEO funded legal services program is to talk to the
local community action agency, work with them, coordinate the plans
with them to develop the program.
Although legal services programs are a part of a total community
action program, they must have a degree of operational independence
from the community action agency. An independent policy-making
board or committee should be established for the legal services program. The independence of professional legal judgment is absolutely
essential. It is not inconceivable that a lawyer working in one of these
programs will represent a client against some other program of the
14A discussion of the operation of the Arlington organization may be found
in the Q & A portion, infra at 263-64.
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community action agency or even against that agency itself, and he
must be free to do so.
Any proposal for a legal services program must describe the
standards by which the eligibility of clients will be determined. There
is no national standard of eligibility, no OEO standard of income and
assets. We have no set figures in mind; we realize that local conditions vary. We have just 2 criteria: First, the standards should not
be so low that it excludes people who, after they have paid for housing,
clothing, and food as human beings, cannot afford to employ a lawyer.
And second, the standards should not be so high that it makes people
eligible who can pay the fee of a private attorney without jeopardizing their ability to have decent housing, clothing, and food. This is a
program of legal assistance for the poverty-stricken.
A legal services program should provide a full range of legal
assistance in all areas of the civil law. No type of civil case should
be arbitrarily excluded except cases which are customarily taken on a
contingent fee basis or cases for which, by statute or regulation, there
is provision for the payment of an attorney's fee. The program may
also include advice and representation in the areas of criminal law;
that is, in those areas of the criminal law in which counsel are not
provided for indigent defendants.
An essential ingredient of a legal services program is comprehensive
education to apprise eligible persons of their legal rights and their
obligations and of the assistance that lawyers can render. Here an
organized bar can make a significant contribution. In Mr. McCalpin's
home city of St. Louis the bar association is donating 1500 volunteer
hours. Lawyers will speak to groups of poor people and to social
workers, to those who work with the poor, to acquaint them with
legal problems and with the availability of the legal assistance program.
This kind of activity is one of the methods of fulfilling the requirements of the 10% nonfederal contributions. That nonfederal contribution need not be in money; it can be in property and in services.
Law schools and continuing legal education programs of bar associations should sponsor in-service training for the lawyers who
will work in these programs and for their assistants. The lawyers are
going to be dealing with problems which are sometimes novel, with
problems with which they have probably not had much experience, and
they and their clients would benefit from a continuing legal education program.
A legal services program funded by OEO must be conducted in
complete and faithful observance of the letter and spirit of the Canons
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of Professional Ethics. We have not had a single proposal which suggests conduct in violation of the rules of professional ethics. Even the
most ambitious and visionary role which legal services can perform
for the poor can be conducted within the honorable traditions of the
bar. The devotion of each lawyer must be solely to the individual
interest of his client, and it is mandatory that each program insure the
professional independence of the lawyer.
The controlling board of a program will, in all likelihood, include
some lay persons. For years legal aid agencies have included lay
persons on their boards of directors. This should present no problem.
As a matter of fact, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association
has-recently stated in its standards for legal aid societies the encouragement of this practice as the official policy of that association.
Legal services lawyers are expected to work closely with other
community organizations, such as block clubs, farm bureaus, credit
unions, and tenants' associations. Much of the lawyer's sensitivity to
the problems of the poor and much of the planning of strategy may be
derived from insights gained in such contacts. This kind of activity is
in the tradition of the most skilled corporation lawyer who insists on
knowing his client's business inside and out in order to make plans
to place his client's legal interests in the most advantageous position.
This war that Congress, the President, and our Nation have declared
on poverty contains the seeds of its own frustration. Coordinated
planning of educational, social, and legal services for the poor is
neither new nor demonstrably successful. In this respect there is
nothing new about the federal program except its magnitude. But the
Anti-Poverty Program also contains a seed of hopeful triumph-the
maximum feasible participation of the poor in the planning and the
operation of anti-poverty programs.
In this concept the Anti-Poverty Program has a potentiality of
growing far beyond traditional charity programs. By mobilizing active
participation of the poor we hope to instill in them a new sense of
dignity, a new awareness of the processes by which their lives are
determined and a new opportunity to be the masters of their own
destiny.15 The principle of participation of the poor is based upon 2
very simple propositions: first, the poor know their own needs better
than others; second, simple charity may do more harm than good
to the-recipient.
When I say that the poor know their own needs better than others,
15Mr. Bamberger explains in the Q & A portion how leaders are found among
the poor, infra at 264-65.
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I do not mean to suggest that the expert skills of sociologists, community planners, educators, and lawyers are not required for the success
of the Anti-Poverty Program. On the contrary, their skills may be
more greatly needed and more pointedly challenged when the definition of goals and the selection of the means must be achieved jointly
with their clients. Anyone can impose a course of apparently desirable
action upon a passive recipient. It takes a better man to sense the
client's perception of his own needs, to assist the client in articulating
and weighing these needs and to work cooperatively with the client
in developing a program best designed to meet those needs. The
really excellent lawyers, like the really excellent sociologists and
planners and educators are needed in the War on Poverty.
OEO has no rigid preconception about what maximum feasible participation means. Certainly, to use the statutory language, "the residents of the areas and the members of the groups served" must be
involved in the formulation of policy for the conduct of a legal services program. They or their representatives should be on the policymaking board or committee.
In addition, and not as a substitute for a vote where policy is made,
advisory councils representing the potential clients can be effective
instruments to involve the people we are committed to assist. These
councils should be afforded an opportunity to make suggestions to the
policy-making group and that group should be obliged to hear and
act upon these suggestions.
We recognize that "maximum feasible participation" requires flexibility. As Sargent Shriver said in his address to the American Bar
Association in August 1965: "Our statute requires maximum feasible
participation of the poor in all aspects of the anti-poverty programs.
We intend to carry out the mandate of Congress on this! But to do
so does not require the imposition of inflexible and arbitrary quotas.
We have already financed legal service programs approaching this
requirement in a variety of ways. We believe in flexibility, but flexibility cannot become a euphemism for evasion of our statutory duty."
In all phases of our national life, this is a time of great change and
a time of unprecedented opportunity.
Our purpose in OEO is not just to stimulate and implement community efforts to provide a lawyer for a poor person in a particular case.
We want lawyers to be advocates for a group of people who are inarticulate and unsophisticated and who do not have advocates. Lawyers
will be a voice of the poor in the community. If the poor are represented, we may begin to learn their problems, their aspirations, and the

252

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIII

futility of some of our ill-conceived efforts to help them. If the
poor are not represented by lawyers, the voices in which they will
learn to speak may sound very alien to our ears.
The bar has responded admirably to the challenge of the Economic
Opportunity Act. As a matter of fact, not a single legal services program that has been backed by OEO has been opposed by any bar
association, and, on the contrary, the bars have supported and endorsed many of the programs.
The American Bar Association's resolution of last February evidenced the Bar's positive response. There is a National Advisory
Committee to the Legal Services Program with 21 members, of whom
6 are ABA officers: the Past President, Mr. Powell; the President,
Mr. Kuhn; the President-Elect, Mr. Marden; Chairman of the Special
Committee on the Availability of Legal Services, Mr. McCalpin; and
the Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, Mr. Curnmiskgy. Mr.
Theodore Voorhees, the President of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, is also a member.
The ABA resolution is, I might add, a testimonial to the statesmanship and leadership of a great Virginia lawyer, Lewis Powell. In carrying forward this adventure, I hope that I may look forward to an active partnership and cooperation with the Virginia Bar Association.
REMARKS OF MR. THEOPHILUS0
Of course, we all know that legal aid is the assistance provided any
person by an attorney, but that meaning has narrowed over the years.
The words "legal aid" have come to mean the legal assistance provided by an attorney or attorneys free of charge and particularly
that legal assistance given by an organized legal aid society as distinguished from the legal assistance provided a client for a fee.
Legal aid is the modern, practical way of assuring the guarantees
of the Magna Carta that justice shall not be sold, delayed or denied
to anyone. To be equal before the law is itself a right, and the idea
behind legal aid is the protection of that right.
Most lawyers recognize they have a monopoly on the practice of
law and feel that the monopoly carries with it an obligation to see that
no one is without legal assistance. In varying degree they give of their
16Attorney in Charge, Legal Aid Society of Pittsburgh, 200 Ross Street, Pittsburgh, Pa. Univ. of Pittsburgh, B.S. 1925; Univ. of Pittsburgh, LL.B. 1928; Member of American Bar Ass'n, Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n (Chairman, Comm. on Service to the Public), Allegheny County Bar Ass'n. Member of firm of Shoemaker,
Eynon, Clasper, Rolston & Theophilus, Suite 1324 Frick Building, Pittsburgh, Pa.
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time and talent to help the poor. This is true today, even where
organized legal aid societies exist. Although we know this does not
meet the need, we hope it will never stop. On this one point we definitely can all agree that the need is not being met.
Even though organized legal aid will continue to be necessary and
does provide a real service, somehow it fosters a feeling that the poor
are a class apart if the only legal service the poor can expect at any
time is from a legal aid attorney. That is bad. This often comes to
light somewhat amusingly when a client is being questioned to determine his eligibility for legal aid. He will tell the attorney somewhat
indignantly that he would not be there asking for help if he could have
afforded the services of a real lawyer.
In communities where the legal aid lawyer is permitted a practice
of his own and the legal aid client finds out there are persons who come
to the legal aid lawyer in his private capacity expecting to pay a fee
for the service which that lawyer can provide, somehow the client
feels better about it. Actually, he is not a man set apart receiving the
services of a lawyer for which no one else can or will pay. Suddenly
the poor man is just as good as one who can pay.
The present concept of legal aid dates back to the Legal Aid
Society of New York. This organization, incorporated in 1876, grew
out of the activity of Arthur von Briesen, who gave advice and legal
assistance voluntarily to newly arrived immigrants from Germany. We
are told that von Briesen carried on in one of the many German clubs
to which these new arrivals gravitated, and his advice and assistance
were so helpful that his fame grew and others in need of advice and
legal counsel sought his help. Von Briesen enlisted the assistance of
other lawyers, and from this came the Legal Aid Society of New
York.
The work of this organization inspired the organized legal aid
movement in this country. Originally the service related only to civil
matters, but soon representation was provided to the indigent defendant in criminal court as well. The path of organized legal aid
was not always smooth. Attorneys, not always fringe attorneys at that,
looked upon such work as taking away their clients. But the leaders of
the Bar saw and approved. The movement gained strength and guidance from them, and additional support was provided by the leaders of
finance and industry.
The purpose of the Legal Aid Society is not to compete with the
private attorney. It fills in only where the private attorney will not or
cannot reasonably be expected to meet the need. The sole purpose
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of organized legal aid was to assure justice to those who had
no attorney and could not reasonably be expected to pay an attorney's
fee. Unfortunately, no matter how good the laws governing us might
be, they just are not self-enforcing. Someone has to start the legal
process to assure the enjoyment of the rights granted the citizen. In
our system that someone is a lawyer. Somehow a lawyer must be made
available to all persons. Legal aid is the concept which provides that
service.
It is interesting to note that the private practitioner has some freedom in the choice of his clients. The legal aid attorney has no choice.
Once the need is established, the legal aid attorney must accept the
client and give the best representation possible, regardless of how insolent, ungracious, or difficult the client be, and whatever the race,
color, sex, age, or religion of the client.
Although the organized bar did have some legal aid committees,
legal aid societies struggled along for a long time primarily with
7
such assistance as their own national organization might provide;1
which organization, fortunately, had able and conscientous guidance
from many leaders of the bar. Finally, the American Bar Association
House of Delegates, at the suggestion of Chief Justice Arthur T.
Vanderbilt of New Jersey, by resolution on 26 February 1951 asked
the Chief Justice and the chairman of the state bar legal aid committee in each state to create and execute a legal aid plan through
a legal aid society supported "through private sources without government aid." 18

'7The organization referred to was the National Association of Legal Aid
Organizations, subsequently the National Legal Aid and Defender Association.
18 The full text of the resolution read as follows:
"WHEREAS, the American Bar Association by resolution adopted at the
1950 Annual Meeting in Washington declared that its policy with reference
to legal aid was"i. That it is the primary responsibility of the legal profession to assume
the leadership in establishing adequate aid in conjunction with private agencies
without government aid; and
"2. That the state bar associations should organize such legal aid service
in the respective states;
"NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the American Bar Association, through its Committee on Legal Aid Work, recommends a procedure
to the state bar association as follows:
"a. That the President of each state bar immediately request the Chief
Justice and the Chairman of the state bar legal aid committee to act with
him in creating and executing a statewide legal aid plan, and
"b. That legal aid societies be organized and administered in each county
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There was no sudden surge of support, but legal aid was recognized
everywhere and was made a respectable arm of the Bar. Since that
time, organized legal aid has made great strides, although there always seems to be a greater need than there is service available to
meet that need.
Legal aid in practice takes many forms, but the organization found
to be the most effective is a charitable corporation organized to provide that service alone. The advantages of the corporation are many,
but chiefly: (1) perpetual existence, and (2) effective supervision
through the charter and by-laws. The board of directors is made up of
community leaders motivated by the ideal that justice is a matter of
right and determined to do everything possible to make it available to
all. In smaller communities the legal aid organization is often a committee of the Bar Association, or even a division or arm of a social
agency, such as a family and children's welfare association.
Operating any Legal Aid Program requires 4 essentials:
(1) There must be a definite place where the service can be
found. Ordinarily this is near the courts and social service agencies. The place should be well known and accessible to those who
desire to use the service. It is interesting to note that many legal
aid societies had their first office in communities where they expected to find their clients. For instance, the offices for the service
which later became the Legal Aid Society of Pittsburgh were set
up in 1901 in 2 heavily populated districts where the service
was deemed most needed. Eventually it was consolidated in a
downtown office at a point where all streetcar lines converged
near the social agencies and the courthouse.
(2) A definite time when the client can obtain the service. This
means regular office hours which meet the convenience of the
people who may need the service.
(3) A definite person who will provide the service.
(4) A supervisory body, which could be the Bar Association, a
board of directors of a separate charitable organization, or a
boaro of dilectors of a tamiy agency. A good supervisory body,
representative of the best the community has to offer, has-up to
this time at least-been deemed best to assure a sound program.
through local bar associations and be financially supported through private
sources without government aid, and
"c. That each member of the Board of Governors pledges his cooperation
and assistance to the Legal Aid Committee of the American Bar Association
and to the state bar associations in his circuit in organizing and implementing
such plan and procedure."
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The foregoing are relatively simple except when the operation is
carried on by a committee of the Bar. Usually the members of the
committee like to carry on the service from their own private offices.
If there is a bar association with a paid staff, a staff member can
direct legal aid applicants to the members of the Legal Aid Committee in rotation. If the Bar is so small that there is no definite
headquarters except the office of the President, which changes from
year to year, then the assistance of a public official, such as the
Clerk of the Courts, is often enlisted.
How is the operation financed? Except where the service is a committee of the bar association, the usual and most satisfactory method
is by funds raised by general subscription such as through the United
Fund or Community Chest campaigns. Thus, the whole community
is involved. There are other methods, of course. Some societies conduct their own campaigns; others are supported by membership fees;
and some by an extra assessment of court costs. The Bar committee
method of legal aid is usually supported by the Bar Association
through dues assessments, or profits from the bar journal, although
frequently it is a voluntary service provided by the members of the
committee.
Operating a legal aid society has been described as the same as
operating any other law office except that the office is busier and no
bills are sent out. A good legal aid operation should identify itself
with the local bar association and the local lawyers to the greatest
possible extent.
One of the best ways to keep the local Bar actually concerned
about the situation of the poor in their efforts to be assured of their
legal rights is to see that the legal aid societies do not accept as a
client anyone who has the assistance of a private attorney. It is not
uncommon for a person who is actually being helped by a private
attorney to apply to the legal aid society, claiming that he is unable
to pay an attorney's fees and that he cannot conscientiously accept
any further help from his attorney. Even so, we have always taken the
position that we will do nothing to interfere with the charitable
instincts of any lawyer.
We have found upon investigation of a number of these cases that
the lawyer hopes that he will be paid but has no present expectation of
collecting a fee and no expectation of dunning a client for a fee. We
have found that very frequently the cases are being handled as a favor
to a paying client because he is a fellow church member or for any
of a number of reasons. Sometimes there is no reason except that he
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wants to do something for this person and has the time to do it. I think
it is fortunate for all of us when a private attorney proceeds in this
way. Thus, a legal aid society will not interfere with an established
attorney-client relationship, nor appraise or second-guess the way the
private attorney is handling the case for the applicant.
Present Lawyer Reference Bureaus are the outgrowth of the legal
aid society's determination to involve the Bar with the work. These
societies had many requests for help from persons who could afford
to pay or who had a case which, successfully prosecuted, would
generate a fee. The Lawyer Reference Bureau developed from the
practice of getting from the Bar Association a list of attorneys who
would take referrals, many for reduced fees, from clients who were
not eligible for legal aid.
Legal aid lawyers, even where a Lawyer Reference Service is available, make every effort to get a client to a lawyer of his choice. Many
times the client has forgotten a lawyer who handled satisfactorily
a case for a relative, or a fellow church or lodge member who is a
lawyer to whom he would be happy to entrust his problem. If a
client can recall no lawyer to whom he might go, then the Lawyer
Reference Service is a wonderful substitute. The accepted practice
is to send the client to this service with a note under the Legal Aid
letterhead indicating the reason for the referral. Never may the referring attorney, if he is permitted a private practice, take the case
himself or refer it to a friend. An applicant often suggests this solution, but doing it is grounds for immediate discharge.
There are other ways of keeping the Bar interested and active in
legal aid. One is to seek volunteers from the Bar when a superabundance of applications bogs down the regular legal aid staff. This
happens most often in programs involving the defense of the indigent
in criminal court. Another is to operate a law school clinic. This often
instills in a student a life-long interest in helping the poor solve their
legal problems.
How do potential clients get to know about legal aid? There is no
advertising and there is no one going from house to house inquiring
whether anyone there might have a legal problem, but all social workers know of the availability of legal aid and have some understanding
of its nature. This same is true for court attaches, the court itself, and
jail officials. In addition, feature stories in the newspapers, legal aid reports, and word-of-mouth are quite effective.
The client is expected to do all that he can for himself by locating
and bringing in witnesses and, of course, he must pay the court costs.
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The collection of court costs serves a two-fold purpose. It prevents the
Society from being flooded by nuisance cases. Second, it is somewhat
akin to a surgeon's advising a patient that the operation will be painful
and result in a long period of convalescence. If the patient says go
ahead and operate, the surgeon has a pretty good idea that the patient is not a malingerer. The same is true of a legal case. If the
client is willing to pay the costs, then he is really in earnest about proceeding with the case. Of course, if the client cannot raise the costs
and he is really in jeopardy of losing his rights, most societies have a
cost fund available for an emergency. The costs are usually paid in the
expectation that they will be returned when the client is in a position
to do so.
Of equal importance to providing representation for the poor person
is the work of legal aid in doing what it can to make such changes in
the law or procedure as will make unnecessary the assistance of an
attorney and still obtain for the client the protection or assistance
which the client must have. One example will suffice: legal aid may
be called upon to draft pleadings and represent the client in many
cases involving only a small amount of money. A small claims court,
where no formal pleadings are required, will give the client the relief
that he needs without the assistance of an attorney.
Many years ago the Legal Aid Society of Pittsburgh used to handle
many appeals from the Magistrate's Courts-which were not courts of
record-to the court of record where the case was heard de novo. It
took most of the time of one legal aid attorney to draft pleadings and
appear in court on these cases. Now, the transcript prepared by the
Magistrate in all cases under a certain amount serve both the plaintiff
and the defendant in the court of record, and that court hears the
case, usually without counsel on either side. However, counsel can
appear for either party, and where a difficult problem is to be decided
a lawyer may be necessary. In such a case the matter will be referred
to the Legal Aid Society if one of the parties has no attorney and
is a poor person.
Now, having heard something of the general procedure of legal
aid in practice, just what kinds of cases are handled? By far the largest
number of cases fall into the category of family problems. The person
consulting the legal aid society is usually the wife. It is in this category that most often both parties come into the office and the society
is faced with the quandary of what to do since the society cannot
represent both sides of the case.
As persons make application for legal aid, the receptionist checks the
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files to see whether the applicant or the named defendant has ever
before been in the office. Should the other party have been in the office
on the same case before the current applicant is accepted, the lawyer
will apprise the applicant of that fact and will go no further with the
case unless the first applicant is willing to try to mediate the matter
and the current applicant wishes to tell his story with the understanding that if it should come to court action, then legal aid could not
represent him. If the case gets into court, the attorney for the society
will enlist the assistance of another attorney not connected with
the society in handling the case for the other party if the applicant
cannot himself get an attorney.
Usually the domestic problems do not concern divorce, but rather
support, the right of one party or the other to require the spouse to
leave the home, custody of the children, and similar matters. Usually
divorce is cited as an example of a situation in which, it is alleged,
the poor person cannot get the same representation through legal aid
as he could from a private attorney. In the beginning most legal aid
societies addressed themselves to what were felt to be actions necessary
to protect the client's rights; divorce was not usually considered a
right but a privilege. It was thought this principle applied to all, rich
and poor. However, it soon became apparent that there were cases
when a divorce was actually a necessity, and where counsel fees can
not be paid legal aid usually does step in and take care of the matter,
although some organizations, my own included, for a long time insisted that a divorce could not be handled by legal aid without a
written recommendation and report from a social agency that a
divorce in the particular case would serve some useful purpose. Now,
however, the policy is that the attorney should decide whether a divorce should be sought using the same criteria as for a private client.
It is expected that if a social agency is involved, the attorney will
consult a social worker to assist him in arriving at a decision as to
whether he should handle the case.
The criticism directed toward the policy of divorce often gives
the impression that a person ought to be able to step into a legal aid
society or any lawyer's office and order a divorce just as he would
order a hamburger in a restaurant. I do not think that this is the way
most attorneys handle the matter. Even though court proceedings are
adversary in nature and it is up to the other party to present a defense
if he has one, I think most attorneys take into consideration that it is
to the benefit of all to preserve marriages where possible. The first
step is to try to work out a reconciliation, particularly if children are
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involved. Only after considering the matter from all angles and advising his client of his obligations and responsibilities does he go ahead
with the case even when the client can pay a fee.
Another phase of family problems is the question of adoption. Legal
aid societies ordinarily limit themselves to family adoption; that is
to say, the case must entail the adoption of a child born prior to
the present marriage to either the husband or the wife. At times,
the adoption is by a grandparent, aunt, or uncle. For the most part
legal aid societies will not handle an adoption of a child placed with
the client by an adoption agency. There may be exceptions, of course,
but it is the feeling that we are not promoting the welfare of the
child by encouraging an adoption into a family that could not even
pay the court costs to make that child a true member of the family.
The clients that legal aid societies never handle are those with a feegenerating case, such as a personal injury matter, unless it is minor and
directed only to recovering out-of-pocket expenses, such as a small
medical bill or damaged clothing. No attorney would be interested in
such a case because of the smallness of the amount involved. Generally, if the client feels that he has pain and suffering for which he must
receive compensation the case is not for legal aid. In such cases as
legal aid does handle the client is always made to understand that a
settlement for out-of-pocket expenses only will preclude him from
any further recovery. As a result, tort cases are handled very cautiously and represent only a small part of legal aid work.
As a matter of course, no legal aid societies undertake libel and
slander actions. The reasons for this should be obvious.
Next to family problems, contracts are the biggest category of
cases handled. This includes wages, landlord and tenant, small loans,
installment contracts and the like. Landlord and tenant problems
usually form the largest share of this category, and of course the
society always represents the tenant. Even here, however, there may
be circumstances which could justify an exception.
Small loans do not present the problem they did at one time, at
least in Pittsburgh. Ordinarily small loan companies are very careful of their public image and can be reasoned with so that such matters
are frequently resolved without recourse to the courts.
Wage claims do not present the problem they once did. In most
states, the Department of Labor provides a very effective procedure
for collecting them. It is usually the policy of legal aid, perhaps born
of necessity, that it will not undertake anything unless there is no
adequate remedy elsewhere.
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Legal aid will represent clients who have had their relief status questioned. This is becoming a somewhat larger field. Usually these
matters can be resolved without formal action being taken against the
Relief Board. At least, that has been our experience.
Legal aid does not handle patent and copyright matters. I know of
no legal aid with a patent expert on its staff. Usually such assistance
is not required, since patent attorneys are almost always willing to
gamble their fee for a piece of any patent which appears to have any
merit. We consider this a fee-generating case.
Legal aid societies do not handle real estate transactions or examine
titles to real estate. Any person buying property certainly should have
enough money to pay for an attorney's services to assure him that he
will have good title.
Estate matters are not handled unless they are very small. In Pennsylvania, this usually means the Family Exemption Procedure. 9 In
past years this presented a very real problem to our Legal Aid
Society, but the Legislature has since made it possible for many claims
which could have been paid only through Family Exemption Procedure to be paid directly to the family.
It has been the practice in most legal aid programs to represent
only the individual. If a number of persons come into the office, who
individually may qualify for legal aid but wish to collectively undertake some single action affecting all of them, every effort is made to
direct this group to a private attorney. Even a small sum equivalent
to a week's cigarette money from each of them can provide a fee
which will interest a lawyer, often not because of the fee but because it provides the lawyer with multiple contacts which can be
helpful to him as his practice develops. Generally, legal aid does everything possible to supply a proper client with the same aid as that
supplied by the private attorney for a fee-paying client.
I hope I have made it clear that legal aid provides a real service,
which, properly run, can help assure to all the preservation of their
legal rights, the preservation to the private lawyer of his practice, and
foster the feeling that we are truly a classless society as far as equality
before the law is concerned.
QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR
Q: Mr. McCalpin referred several times to the English subsidy
system and also to the fact that Durham, North Carolina, I believe, has
19 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, H 320.211-320.216 (Supp. 1965).
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a proposal to adopt that system. Could you explain what the English
subsidy system is?
MR. McCALPIN: I can attempt to explain it at secondhand. One
of the things I am looking for is the opportunity to go through it at
firsthand. So far that opportunity hasn't arisen.
The English pride themselves on advertising that every English
citizen may be represented by the lawyer of his choice, and I am told
that there are even billboards lining the highways of England proclaiming this fact.
The way the system works is that an individual goes to a lawyer
with his problem. If he proclaims himself unable to pay the lawyer's
customary fee, the lawyer hands him a form. The lawyer proceeds to
handle the case without any delay. The man takes the form to the
National Assistance Board of England, which determines what portion
of the fee shall be paid by the client, and at the conclusion of the
matter the client pays that portion of the fee. The difference between
what the client pays and what the lawyer receives is paid to the
lawyer by the Law Society out of funds provided by appropriation
by the Government to the Law Society.
As I understand it, the lawyers involved in the program-and this
involves more than 90% of all the solicitors in the Law Society, at
least-have agreed in advance that they will accept from clients of this
sort 90% of the customary fee rather than 100%. What it amounts to
is a subsidy inversely to the clients' ability to pay, the subsidy being
paid by the government but being administered by the Law Society.
Now, Clint Bamberger can tell you better than I how the Durham
and Wisconsin proposals approach this program.
MR. BAMBERGER: The Wisconsin proposal originally was to
cover the whole State of Wisconsin, except Milwaukee County, where
there is an existing Legal Aid Society which has applied for a grant
from OEO to expand its program. But, now the Wisconsin State
Bar Association is the applicant as well as delegate agency funded
by the Office of Economic Opportunity for the purpose of conducting a program for legal services in 27 sparsely populated, predominantly rural counties in northern Wisconsin, embracing approximately
50,000 underprivileged residents. A person in need of legal services,
upon establishing eligibility, will be given a "judicare" card, enabling
him to select the lawyer (cooperating with the plan) of his choice. The
State Bar Association, upon rendition of a bill, will then compensate
the attorney from OEO funds at a rate not to exceed 80% of the
minimum fee schedule established by the Bar Association, subject to

1966]

LEGAL AID

a maximum fee of $300 on any one particular matter. This is not to
be considered as a statewide plan, but only as a demonstration program
for the purpose of evaluating the effectiveness
of the so-called "Judi20
care" plan, particularly in rural areas.
In Durham, North Carolina, I think there is a total bar of about 100
lawyers. They will have 2 full-time salaried attorneys in the office
to whom all applicants will come. These attorneys will decide the
eligibility of the applicant for free legal assistance, and will handle as
many of the cases as they can. They will refer some cases, particularly cases that require some specialized skill and cases that will
require extensive briefing and argument, to private attorneys in cooperation with the Bar Association according to an ethical referral
system.
Those attorneys will be compensated, again, a percentage-I think
in this case it's 75%, but some percentage-of a minimum fee schedule,
and there is some kind of maximum hourly charge for services. I think
it is geared to the Federal Criminal Justice Act of $10 per hour for
office time and $15 for court time.
We are going to fund some programs like that on a purely demonstration basis to see how it works. I doubt that we will fund any
more than the 2 we have, and perhaps one other, one from some
other kind of an urban complex, something different from the sparsely
21
populated area in Visconsin and the medium-sized town of Durham.
Q: Mr. Bamberger, I would like to describe briefly a type of legal
aid organization which I haven't heard specifically mentioned here.
It happens to be the one that exists in Arlington County, which is the
third of the 3 legal aid societies in Virginia. As far as I know it has
been in effect about 20 years. The members of the Arlington bar, almost all of whom belong to the County Bar Association, simply line
themselves up on a list-that makes about 200 lawyers-and they take
legal aid days in turn so that every lawyer has a legal aid day about
every 200th day. On the day his turn comes up in strict rotation a
lawyer keeps his calendar clear, he stays in his office, and he is available to take any cases that come in that day. He must handle such
cases through to the end, even though it means going through an appellate case. The burden thus spread is not too heavy, and I have
never heard of a lawyer's refusing to take a case that came to him on
that basis. Also, I have never heard it suggested by any lawyer that
"uSee note 11, supra.
2
lPopulation of Durham was 78,300 at the 1960 Census; it is now approximately 81,500.
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he should be compensated for this; it seems to be an obligation which
follows as a concomitant of the monopoly that we enjoy.
Where something like this is apparently adequate to suit the needs
of the poor and is donated by the lawyers as a kind of public charity,
I gathered from Mr. Bamberger's remarks that there is a certain disapproval of that type of legal aid system and a certain preference for
one which is funded. I would like to inquire what objection there
is to this kind of program.
MR. BAMBERGER: I am sorry if you gathered that from my
remarks, because I did not mean to imply that. If your program is
adequate to meet the need, we have no desire to duplicate it or supplant it. We have funded a program like that where none existed,
in Clarksdale, Mississippi, a small town. There are, I think, 6 groups of
law firms or lawyers in Clarksdale, and each of these groups will
supply a lawyer to the office on a particular day. He takes any case
that comes in that day and follows through on it. He will be compensated for that day at something less than you would expect him to
earn in his office, and for that compensation for that day he performs
whatever 'work is requiredas a result of the business that comes in that
day. There is a staff lawyer who will administer the program and will
handle some of the cases. But there is no effort on the part of OEO
to duplicate existing adequate legal aid services.
Q: I found quite interesting that part of the Government program
in which the poor themselves are to participate in the operation of
the plans. Frequently there is the experience that when you are trying
to get help from the so-called underprivileged classes you cannot find
the leadership. I wonder if Mr. Bamberger can tell us the experience
so far in successfully locating poor people who can really contribute
to the program and in just what fashion they have been able to contribute.
MR. BAMBERGER: The only problem I have heard so far is
finding too many leaders.
Let me repeat something else I said. You know, this is not just OEO
policy, but this is the standard for legal aid societies of the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association, which says that "the residents of
the area and members of the group served"-they don't use exactly
that statutory language, but it's darn near the same-should be on the
policy-making board or on advisory committees. Now, we differ a
little bit about the advisory committee. Leaders from the poor are
found in a number of ways. If there is an existing community action
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agency,2 it very often has advisory councils in the neighborhoods
where it locates its offices. It will have on its own board residents
of the area or members of the group served, and let me emphasize, you
use the word "poor", and I tend to use it as shorthand for the statutory language, which is "maximum feasible participation of the residents of the area and members of the group served." "Maximum
feasible participation" means that the board should include actual residents of the area served and actual members of the poor community.
They are selected in a variety of ways. In some places it may be desirable to have those people choose their representatives-who need not
be poor-for the board. If there is an existing community action agency
it might select these people. In some cases some of the residents of the
areas and members of the groups who are on the community action
agency board would nominate, or themselves sit on, the board of a
separate legal services program.
In some places they have actually conducted elections. In Philadelphia and Kansas City elections have been conducted among the
poor for their representatives on the community action agency. You
can look to church groups, civil rights groups, and other groups who
have concerned themselves with the problems of these people for
leadership.
Q: Mr. Theophilus, concerning the nonsupport case, you say that
quite a few of the cases heard were nonsupport on behalf of the
woman. Surely you don't mean where the husband is capable of paying the court costs and the fees, and the court orders him to do so,
that the woman would still be able to be represented by the legal
aid society.
MR. THEOPHILUS: Unfortunately, where we operate, the court
ill not order fees to be paid by the husband in desertion and nonsupport cases. They will in a divorce case. Automatically, on application by the wife to the court for counsel fees in a divorce case
22A "community action agency" is a broadly-based local body designed to unite
the efforts of institutions and groups concerned with the alleviation of poverty.
It is incorporated under the charitable corporation statutes of its jurisdiction to
operate a variety of anti-poverty programs attacking local problems in the field of
health, education, housing, employment, etc. Some projects are run by the agency
itself; others by local public or private organizations under contract to the community action agency. With regard to projects proposed by other local organizations
for funding by OEO, the community action agency screens proposals in the
light of community needs and availability of funds and submits endorsed proposals
to OEO. The legal aid services program is one of the few exceptions to the direct
supervisory control of the community action agency. See GumauiNis FOR LE.A
Svwcns PROGAMdS, available from Community Action Program, Office of Economic Opportunity, Washington, D.C. 20506.
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there will be a reasonable fee required of the husband. But in desertion and nonsupport cases there is no order made by the court for
counsel fees, so the woman, if she is going to be represented, will
have to be represented by us or some other attorney free of charge.
Q: Returning to the question of representation on the advisory
committee and advisory group, I would like to ask Mr. Theophilus the
extent to which, in the Pittsburgh Legal Aid Society, representation
follows the guidelines which have apparently been put out heretofore
by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, and also the
extent to which the Pittsburgh Legal Aid Society has had to or would
have to change its make-up in order to comply with Mr. Bamberger's
Office of Economic Opportunity criteria.
MR. THEOPHILUS: I don't have the copy of the conditions
with me, but we do not have an advisory committee, we just have a
regular board made up of persons who have been considered as
leaders in the community interested in only one thing: that we do

a job.
The conditions imposed by the Office of Economic Opportunity
would have required us to accept on the board one person from
each of the 8 poverty pockets in the City of Pittsburgh. They would
be selected for us. We wouldn't know who they would be. In addition
to that, the board would have had to have been constituted in proportion to the population of the community. For instance, in the city
of Pittsburgh 20% of the population are Negro, and that would mean
that somehow, if the members selected for us by the target areas did
not give us 4 Negro members, then we would have had to rearrange
our board in order to make sure that there were 4 Negro members
on the board, 2 of whom we were told would have to be professionals.
Should 4 or more Negroes be selected for us by the target areas and
none of them be professionals, then we would have to further rearrange our regular board by providing 2 more Negroes who would
be professionals. Those were the conditions which were imposed upon
US.
Q: Will you give us a definition of what you mean by "poor" or
"indigent"?
MR. BAMBERGER: That depends upon in what sense you are
asking. You mean, who is eligible for free legal services?
Q: Yes, sir.
MR. BAMBERGER: Well, as I said, there is no national standard
of eligibility for free legal services. The local community would determine the standard, based on the cost of living and the cost of legal

1966]

LEGAL AID

services in that community. We have just 2 concerns: (1) that the
standard isn't so low that it excludes a considerable number of people
who, after they pay for decent food and housing and clothing,
cannot afford a lawyer; and (2) that it not be so high that it includes
people who can afford a lawyer. Every program which has been approved has a different standard of eligibility.
Q: Mr. Bamberger, assuming that a properly constituted community
action group-one with representatives of the poor on its board-has
a contract with OEO, may such a group also contract with a local
legal aid society that does not have representatives of the poor on its
board?
MR. BAMBERGER: While a Community Action Program may
contract with a local legal aid society (or any other acceptable group)
as a delegate agency for the purpose of developing and rendering
competent legal services, it is required that such a delegate agency have
a separate and independent board, including representatives of "the
residents of the areas and members of the groups served." Let me
emphasize that this is not only the policy of the Office of Economic
Opportunity, but is now the standard for legal aid societies promulgated
by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association and approved
by the American Bar Association. The purpose of an independent board
is to preserve the attorney-client relationship inviolate, and to insure
staff attorneys the freedom and discretion of handling cases in the
same manner that a private practitioner would have in a matter for a
fee-paying client. The attorney in a legal services program should be
free to litigate in behalf of clients against public bodies and administrative agencies, including the Community Action Agency itself,
if such a course is indicated. Involving the poor on the board lends
dignity and a sense of pride to those who so long have been told "what
is good for them" rather than ascertaining an expression from them
as to their needs and problems.
Q: I would like to know approximately how you determined the
need for legal aid in the communities. Did you just take a few
cities and go on this average? It seems to me you are accusing the
Virginia Bar of not having done all it should for the poor. Have you
gone into it thoroughly enough to see exactly what systems we have
before you make this accusation, to see whether we are handling the
problem adequately?
MR. BAMBERGER: Well, what I said was that I thought that
the evidence of only 3 legal aid societies in the State of Virginia didn't
indicate to me that the organized bar had been very strong in sup-
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port of the legal aid movement. Now, that may not necessarily
mean that the lawyers in Virginia are not providing all of the legal
needs of poor people, but I would be willing, on the basis of past
experience, to make that generalization without making any investigation.
In every community in which a legal aid society has begun to
operate, it has uncovered in a few months a vast need that it could
not meet. The 4 gray areas projects funded by the Ford Foundation, of which Mr. McCalpin spoke, New Haven, Boston, Oakland and
Washington, D. C., uncovered this tremendous need just by reaching
out and making the lawyers visible and accessible to the poor.
In Washington, D. C., there has been an existing Legal Aid Society
for about 50 years, with a present annual case load of about 8,400 cases.
The recently established Neighborhood Legal Services Program, 2 at
the end of 9 months had a case load at an annual rate of an additional
7,800 cases a year, just 600 less than the long-existing Legal Aid
Society. At the same time the rate of intake in the Legal Aid Society
increased and they had the highest annual rate of increase of new cases
that they had ever had.
What has happened is that where anybody has really started a
legal services program and reached out and identified it, made it visible
and accessible, he has uncovered a need the depths of which nobody
has yet determined, because every program is swamped. Our concern
is that they not become so swamped that they don't really, in every
case, get at the roots of the problems.
Q: I want to say something about what we have done in Norfolk.
I hate to say we lawyers are ignorant, but this thing is new to us, and
the organizational period, which I would say is the first couple of
years, is a whale of a lot different from the operation period through
the years to come. It requires me and my friends in Norfolk to adjust
our philosophies, our traditions relating to charitable practice.
The Norfolk and Portsmouth Bar Association has approved the incorporation of the Tidewater Legal Aid Society, and it has a
Board of Trustees which is its governing body, and an Advisory Board
which is advisory only.
The Board of Trustees has 15 members and is comprised of lawyers
or judges elected by the Bar Association. The Advisory Board has 10
members, and they are the community leaders, officers of the United
Community Fund, the Health, Welfare and Recreation Planning Coun23
This program is funded jointly by the Ford Foundation and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
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cil, which I think is the OEO local community action agent, labor
union officials, indigent residents of the neighborhood to be served,
physicians, women, all sorts of people [laughter]. I got that in the
wrong order.
Personally, I don't think much of the Tidewater Legal Aid Society,
because I think it is a mere subsidiary of the Bar Association. I think
we ought to have a majority of lawyers or judges in order to insure
the operation within our county and within our traditions, but I am
personally very sure that we ought to have representatives of the
poor and representatives of the community on our Board of Trustees.
And I am just as sure that we have got to go out into a neighborhood and establish our office, rather than hoping to have the indigents
come downtown to our office on the 19th floor of a new bank building. I don't think that's the way to operate this thing.
What I am really trying to explain is that we are making a start, and
there is quite a variety of opinion on how it should be done. But just
because we lawyers are ignorant about it and are trying to do something that we all agree is in the right direction, that doesn't mean it
is controversial.
What I want to ask you, Clint, is the name and address of a lawyer
on your staff in Washington who can come to Norfolk and spend a
day or two with us just chewing the rag and helping work the
thing out.
One of the great problems is that when we talk in the terms of
OEO, the community action program covers Norfolk, the City of
Portsmouth, the City of Virginia Beach, part of the City of Chesapeake
and part of Nansemond County. I am thinking in terms of starting 1
neighborhood legal aid office, but when you have to think in terms
that broad, why, shucks, I could run into 15 in my mind, that might
not even scratch the surface. I am satisfied that the business is there.
Who can come to each community and help us?
MR. BAMBERGER: Let me take this occasion to tell you something about how we operate and also to introduce someone to you.
We have myself and a deputy director, Earl Johnson, who is a
graduate of the University of Chicago with a master's in criminal law
from Northwestern and was formerly the Deputy Director of the
Neighborhood Legal Services Project in Washington. He is my
deputy. In addition to that, there are 3 other lawyers on the staff
in the Washington headquarters. As a matter of fact, 1 of them I
stole from Mr. McCalpin's firm, Chuck Edson.
OEO divides into 17 regions around the country, and there are
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regional offices. Virginia is in the Mid-Atlantic Region, which has
its office in Washington. There will be 1 legal services representative
in each of those regional offices. The man in the regional office in the
Mid-Atlantic Region is Herman Wilson, who is a graduate of the
Harvard Law School, and he is the man that anybody in Virginia
who wants to talk about a legal services program should contact.24
And in addition to that, we have consultants. These are lawyers and
law professors. We have about 20 of them scattered around the
country, and when we can't take care of the problem (principally
because of time) we ask them to go and meet with a program, and
they will help you. I can't think of any we have in Virginia, but we
have several in Washington. Dean Kenneth Pye, who is Assistant Dean
at Georgetown University, is one; Jack Murphy, who is a Professor
at Georgetown, is another; a young lady who was an associate in
Covington & Burling, Zona Hostetler, is a third. Those are the people
we send, but if you got in touch with Herman Wilson, he would
either come down or send someone to talk to you.
One other resource we have is the National Legal Aid and Defender Association. We have made a grant to them to assist them
by employing 1 additional field representative who will go around
and help communities begin legal aid societies which may or may not
want to seek federal financing.
Q: Mr. Bamberger, might a legal services program be funded
without the formal approval of the local bar?
MR. BAMBERGER: It could be, and I had to say that first in
my own town in the Baltimore City Bar Association when they had
500 of them there to roast me; but that's right, we look to organized
bar support. It is one of the things that we want and will consider.
But even if the organized bar takes action against a program, we consider it. If we think that it is a good program, we will fund it. We
won't fund it just because they disapprove it, and we don't disapprove
it because they disapprove it-it is an important factor to be considered.
Q: Mr. Bamberger, may I ask this question: It seems to me a
great deal of our discussion this morning has been directed to the performance of legal aid duties by members of the bar on a part-time
basis. Is it true that a great portion of these services, instead of being
performed by the bar, would finally come into a staff system where
there would be 1 or more of the staff attorneys handling the great
majority of the cases, with only the remainder finding their way into
the hands of the general practitioner?
24 Mr. Wilson's address is 1730 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20506.
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MR. BAMBERGER: We have no kind of standard program.
One of the things we are very interested in doing is funding different
kinds of programs, some using full-time staffs, some using part-time
people, some using a combination of both to find out the most effective way to provide legal aid. I think that in most large cities there
should be full-time staff. I think in any city it would be well to involve other lawyers on some kind of advisory basis, perhaps on a parttime basis handling cases. One of the things I would like very much
to see in a city where you had a full-time staff would be an advisory
committee of lawyers to help that staff-a sort of law-firm-senior-partner concept-since the full-time people are going to be overworked,
and occasionally along comes the kind of case that Mr. Theophilus
talked about, one that if properly appealed will change a rule and
lighten your burden in the future.
If the kind of case comes along that requires a good deal of research, preparation, briefing, and argument, the full-time lawyer servicing the clients in the legal aid office may not have the time to do
the best job. It would be very good if the bar would volunteer to
help in that kind of case, and the best lawyers would take that kind
of case.
I think in rural communities you may not need even one full-time
person to handle legal needs. It may be that what you would want to
have is some kind of staff person who would administer a system
which would call on the bar in several small towns or counties to
represent poor people who could not afford a lawyer and had legal
problems. We have also talked about the circuit-riding concept; that
is, a lawyer, probably full-time, who would be available at little
crossroads towns or market centers on particular days to render
assistance to people.
We don't have any preconceived notions about the necessity for
everybody's being full-time or volunteer help. I have only one concern about volunteer help, and that is if you tried to run a large
program with just volunteer lawyers we might never solve the really
big problems.
For example, Lawyer A on Tuesday has a retaliatory eviction case,
Lawyer B has another one the next day, and another lawyer has one
next week, and they never really get together, and they see that what
is needed here is an amendment of the statute, a real challenge to the
practice in courts with an appellate decision which will correct this
practice thus avoiding the necessity for a good number of these cases
in the future.
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I worry a little bit about whether, with an entirely voluntary system
that disseminated the cases that broadly, you would ever achieve a concerted attack on the problem. On the other hand, you could well
argue that by spreading the work around enough lawyers would get
to know about the problem and maybe they would begin to do
something about it. But we want to try different ways and find the
best way.
We will require record keeping not much greater than the records
kept by legal aid societies under the standards of the National Legal
Aid and Defender Association, and we will use these records to evaluate
programs. All of them will go through at least some kind of evaluation
at the community level by the community action agency when they
come up for refunding. We will evaluate some sample programs
to see what is the best way.
Q: Mr. Bamberger, when you are making your determination about
funding a community action program with a legal component, how do
you go about determining whether the services already rendered in
that community are sufficient.
MR. BAMBERGER: Well, we have some guides on those. Studies
have been made and articles published which have made some assessment of the number of legal problems to be expected in any group
of 1000 poor people. However, we haven't really had to face the duplication of services problem yet because we haven't had any application
coming in alongside a large existing legal aid society where that
society said it was meeting the need. I haven't yet heard a legal aid
society say that it was satisfied that it was meeting the total need in
its community.
Q: Mr. Chairman, a lot of us have heard some things about the
program in Gum Springs, Virginia, and I am wondering if Mr. Bamberger would like to enlighten us officially about that. Things we
have heard are not very complimentary, and I wonder if he would
develop it.
MR. BAMBERGER: I have not heard anything, either complimentary or uncomplimentary about it. All I know is that the Gum
Springs'operation is somewhat of an anomalous situation. The Director
of the Community Action Program is a lawyer who agreed to render
legal services as the need arose, and has enlisted a number of volunteer
lawyers from the nearby Washington area to assist him. Technically,
no money has been allocated for a comprehensive legal services program from our- office. The United Planning Organization has allocated
the funds from its grant for the Gum Springs Community 'Action
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Program, as the incidence of poverty is very great in this area. But if
there is anything that you have heard about it, I would like to know
it, and you will get an answer, I assure you. 25
Q: Mr. Bamberger, just to determine the scope of the program, are
you familiar -with what the budget will be for the fiscal year 1967 for
the Legal Aid Section of the OEO?
MR. BAMEERGER: That sort of changes from day to day as
there are demands for other money for community action programs.
You see, we are part of the total community action program, but the
last figure I heard is $20 million, and the programs which have been
approved so far are spending a total of about $3.2 million.
Q: What are you doing to increase the moral standards of people
that you may be working for? I will grant you there are some of them
that have very little, but my experience as an old country lawyer
is that you will get men who may not be able to pay a cash fee but can
bring in a half-gallon of sorghum or something like that. And over
the 40-odd years that I have been trying to practice law I have seen
a number of people come in with practically nothing and I have
given them services. Every time I gave them some service they wanted
to come back and beg more, or they wanted to ride me, and if I
made them pay something, they earned it and they felt better about
it and their pride was not hurt. I am not sure making "corn" affected
their moral character.
IR. BAMBERGER: Well, I don't know. I think you are getting
into a whole philosophical debate whether government ought to do
anything for poor people. That would take a long time.
I think it helps the moral fiber of a man when he finds out that
this system of justice is a system for him too, and that a lawyer
is somebody other than the man who comes to evict him or comes
to repossess his automobile. I think that is the picture the poor
have of lawyers, and there are some good studies that show that.
As Mr. McCalpin said, among the poor in Missouri the number of
people with personal injuries who go to lawyers is considerably less
than any of us lawyers thought it was. I have forgotten who said it,
but the poor think of the law as a night stick, and the law is occasionally an oppressive force for the poor. I think it helps a man when he
finds out Mr. Lawyer in town, the judge, and the law are things
that help him. I think it helps his moral character.
25The attorney who asked this question later wrote to Mr. Bamberger that he
had no further questions to ask and no information to pass on concerning the
legal service program in Gum Springs.
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THE ACQUISITION AND PRESERVATION OF OPEN
LANDS
MARVIN M. MOORE*
INTRODUCTION
This article seeks to establish 3 major points: that the United

States is gradually losing its heritage of open land, that this unspoiled
land is worth saving, and that we have available to us legal devices
with which we can preserve much of it. These devices will be
individually discussed.
I. THE INCESSANT Loss oF OPEN LANDS
At the present time developers in the United States are consuming
an average of over 3000 acres of suburban and rural lands per day,'
and the rate of consumption is gradually increasing. The principal
causes of this phenomenon are the rapid rate of population growth,
increasing urbanization, and developers' common practice of using land
wastefully.
The population of the United States has mushroomed since World
War II. In the 10-year period from 1950 to 1960 the nation's population expanded by 18.2%,2 and its present population of 196 million
is increasing at the rate of one person every 11 seconds.3 If this rate of
growth continues unchanged, our population in 1970 will be 215 million, and in 1980, 260 million. 4
Rapid population expansion necessitates the building of many new
homes, and in the last 25 years most home construction in the
United States has taken place in Metropolitan areas-especially in the
suburbs surrounding our large and middle-size cities.5 The 1950 census
revealed that the central cities experienced a population increase of
5,700,000 (13%) during the preceding decade, and that the suburbs in* Associate Professor of Law, University of Akron College of Law; B.A., 1955,
Wayne State University; LL.B., 1957, LL.M., 1960, Duke University.

'Moore, Legal Action to Stop Our Population Explosion, 12 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev.
314, 323 (1963).
2
Fairfax County, Virginia Planning Division, The Vanishing Land 16 (1962).
3

Akron Beacon Journal, June 23, 1965, p. 2A, col. 7.
-Hauser, Our Population Crisis Is Here and Now, Reader's Digest, Feb., 1962,
p. 147,
5
Haar, Land-Use Planning347 (1959).
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creased by 9 million (35%). 0 The trend toward urbanization became even more pronounced during the 5-year span following 1950.
During that period rural areas gained only 300,000 people (0.05%),
but the central cities added 2 million persons (4%).7 As a result of
this influx into metropolitan areas, by 1963 the population of the
United States had become 63% urban, as compared to only 45.7%
urban in 1910. 8
Although our municipalities have been growing rapidly for the
past 2 decades, they are expected to balloon even more during the
next 25 years. Demographers believe that 95% of our anticipated additional population will dwell in areas where a city or town now existsY
A writer in the American Bar Association Journal says:
[T]he projected metropolitan growth for the next 25 years is
roughly equal to the 1950 populations of the metropolitan areas
(not central cities alone) of New York-Northeastern New Jersey,
Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Detroit, Boston, San Francisco,
Oakland, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Cleveland, Washington, Baltimore,
Minneapolis-St. Paul and Buffalo plus 15 million more persons. If
this pattern of growth follows the 6 years, 1950-56, 41.5 per cent
of this urban explosion will occur in the fringe areas. 10
One gets an inkling of the impact that this expansion will have on the
countryside surrounding these cities from the prediction that in the
area surrounding Chicago alone one million acres of land will shift
from rural to urban in the next 30 years."
The already difficult problem of finding room for the bulk of an
expanding population on the periphery of our metropolitan areas has
been aggravated by the wasteful practices of developers. Subdivision
and shopping center developments typically proceed with little regard for the preservation of open spaces and aesthetic features and
with even less regard for the question whether the specific project
under construction is consistent with any rational plan for the region's
development. Subdividers typically leapfrog over parcels of open
land lying just outside the city in order to obtain land at cheaper prices
farther out. The result is that many acres of undeveloped land are
left behind in the form of isolated chunks and strips that are too small
or grotesquely shaped or poorly situated for development and too
Olbid.
7Haar, op. cit. supra note 5, at 347.
SMoore, People Make the Land, Lawyers Title News, May, 1963, p. 2.
Fairfax County, Virginia Planning Division, op. cit. supra note 2, at 15.
lOBook Review, 46 A.B.A.J. 80 (1960).
"Ibid.
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dispersed or poorly located to constitute effective open space. 12 A
primary cause of the disappearance of usable open space is the inefficient manner in which land is being developed. "It is not the
growth itself [which creates the shortage], but the pattern of
growth." 13

In summary, the 3 factors of population growth, urban immigration, and wasteful land use have combined to threaten our country's
supply of open lands and to render such lands least plentiful in those
regions where the population is densest.
II. THE VALUE OF OPEN LANDs
One may reasonably inquire why a shortage of open spaces should be
a cause for concern. After all, most of the lands being absorbed are
put to constructive use. The answer is that open spaces serve a number
of very important functions. They constitute water reservoirs and
flood inhibitors, timber preserves, recreational sites, agricultural areas,
buffer zones between municipalities, and game preserves. The first 5
of these functions merit individual treatment.
A substantial portion of our country's open lands are stream and
river valleys and coastal lowlands. 14 These lands are extremely useful.
Since they have not been covered with buildings and asphalt, they
act like a great sponge, and this phenomenon produces double benefits: By retaining most of the rainwater in the ground, these lands constitute a huge storage tank, making water available for the future
needs of those who dwell in the region, and by minimizing the amount
of runoff, such lands prevent floods. Concerning the latter benefit,
the writer, William H. Whyte, Jr., declares:
Quite aside from any of the other benefits produced by an open
space plan, it could be justified on the basis of watershed protection ....
[W]hen there is a heavy rainfall, the streams and
the creeks that flow into a natural storm sewer system are far
better accommodated than [they could be] by anything constructed by man.' 5
' 2 Eveleth, An Appraisal of Techniques to Preserve Open Space, 9 Viii. L. Rev.
559,562 (1964).

-l3bid. Even in our most heavily populated cities, such as New York and
Chicago, over 10% of the land is left vacant. This land is usually unsuitable for
park or recreational purposes because of its size, shape, or location, or occasionally because the tide is clouded. Id. at 563.
14 Encyclopedia Americana, United States-Hydrography 307-08 (1939).
15 Whyte, Securing Open Space for Urban America: Conservation Easements
16-17 (1959).
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Forty-three per cent of the forests in North America are in private
ownership and therefore subject to commercial exploitation. 16 A few
states exercise some control over the forest management practices of
private owners,"t and some of the corporate owners with extensive
timber holdings follow exemplary conservation practices,' 8 but no
state prohibits an owner from selling his forest land to a subdivider or
shopping center builder, and there is no federal legislation dealing
with this problem.' 9 That our forest resources are not being adequately protected is revealed by this prediction of the United States
Forest Service: Assuming the continuation of current forestry practices and the present rate of consumption of private forest lands by
subdividers and others, by 1975 we will be cutting annually approximately 14% more timber than we are growing.2 0
A major value of open spaces is the fact that they provide a site for
outdoor recreation. National, state, and municipal parks and forests
have long served as a retreat for cooped-in urbanites, and these sanctuaries will attract much greater numbers of people in the future.
The demand for all forms of outdoor recreation will increase
at an unprecedented pace during the next 25 years. . . . [T] he
impact on the need for parks and other open spaces becomes a
major challenge of our time.21
The basis for the quoted prediction is that there will be a rise in
each of the factors which most affect the demand for recreation:
population, per-capita income, leisure time, and ease of travel. 22 An
increase of any one of these would be significant. When gains in all
4 categories are combined, the result to be anticipated is obvious.
A considerable part of our country's prime agricultural land is located near metropolitan areas.t Hence the problem created by the
constant absorption of this land is more serious than is generally realized. Admittedly, United States farmers are currently producing more
food than our population is consuming, and they should be able to con'GEncyclopedia Britannica, Forests and Forestry 618 (1964).
171d. at 620. Among these jurisdictions are California, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. See Note, 1952 Wis.
L. Rev.
186 (1952).
18 Two such corporations are Crown Zellerbach Corporation and Weyerhaeuser
Company. Akron Beacon Journal, July 7, 1965, p. 3A, col. 3.
'DEncyclopedia Britannica, op. cit. supranote 14, at 620.
20U.S. News and World Report, April 4, 1958, p. 74.
2t
Fairfax County, Virginia Planning Division, op. cit. supra note 2, at 16.
22lbid.
2

3Whyte, op. cit. supranote 15, at 17.
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tinue doing so throughout the foreseeable future. However, the United
States has assumed the burden of feeding much of the underdeveloped
world. The magnitude of this undertaking is partially revealed by
the fact that 80% of the 500 million new mouths the world has ac2 4
quired during the past 10 years are in the underdeveloped nations.
Since 1954 the United States has shipped $12 billion worth of surplus
foodstuffs overseas, 25 and at the present time our country is providing some form of daily supplementary food ration to more than
100 million persons abroad. 26 Even if our country's existing agricultural acreage remains intact and our population becomes stabilized,
our agricultural wealth will not be inexhaustible, for not all of the nutrients in the soil are replacable by fertilization. As evidence of this,
it has been estimated that the agricultural value of Iowa farmland is
deteriorating at the rate of 1% a year in relation to its original inherent productivity.2 It is, of course, possible that some of the foreign
peoples now being fed by the United States will eventually be able
to feed themselves, and it is likewise possible, though unlikely, that
we may someday decide to reduce our food shipments regardless of
whether the need for them decreases. But until one of these developments occurs it seems prudent for us to conserve our existing farmland,
particularly acreage of prime quality.
Finally, whatever other functions may be ascribed to open lands,
equally important is the role they can play in channeling the growth
and improving the environment of urban areas. In many sections of
the country the boom in suburban development has nearly exhausted
the open spaces between cities. If the cities and towns affected wish
to prevent a complete merger and preserve some semblance of individual identity, they will obviously have to find some means of curbing urban sprawl. Open spaces taking the form of greenbelts can readily serve as checks to urban sprawl and stabilizers of suburban property values.
Planners, city officials, attorneys, and interested citizens must find
new ways of encouraging developers to set aside [or refrain from
purchasing] more open spaces, particularly in rapidly expanding
metropolitan areas. If this is not done, few natural amenities will
remain in these urban complexes and many citizens may live in a
24Cook, World Food Crisis-1964, 20 Population Bulletin 205, 222 (Dec., 1964).
251d. at 214.
26Cook, supra note 24, at 213.
2

7Cook, supra note 24, at 214.
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suburbia characterized by all-pervasive pavement and28 the monotonous development of every square inch of property.
Thus it is evident that open spaces contribute some very tangible and
valuable benefits to our society, and the constant consumption of these
lands is something to be deplored.
III.

DEVICES FOR PRESERVING OPEN LANDS

Fortunately, some effective devices are available for restraining the
absorption of our open spaces. These devices, which may be used individually or in combination, are: (A) acquisition of land by right of
eminent domain; (B) acquisition of conservation easements; (C) compensable regulation of land use; (D) exclusive use zoning; (E) imposition of minimum lot sizes; (F) compelling of subdividers to dedicate a
percentage of their land to parks, playgrounds, or similar uses; and (G)
employment of property taxes to encourage nondevelopmental land
uses. Each of these approaches will be discussed individually.
A.

CONDEMNATION THROUGH EMINENT DOvAN

Although this tool is very commonly used, its usefulness is somewhat limited by two unrelated factors: the constitutional requirement
that land be taken only for public purpose,29 and the costliness of
condemnation.
In a state with no special legislation on the subject it is not certain
that the courts would regard the acquisition of land solely to preserve
it as an open space or greenbelt as satisfying the "public use" requirement. 30 However, a number of states have legislation expressly
authorizing the purchase of land for open space purposes, 3 ' and even
in states lacking such enactments land can unquestionably be taken
for certain kinds of open space uses. For example, it has long been
established that the government can take land to create a park or play2
SVolpert, Creation and Maintenance of Open Spaces in Subdivisions: Another Approach, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 830, 845 (1965).
29U.S. Const. amend. V, which reads in part: "[Nlor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." Although this wording does
not directly forbid a taking for a non-public use, the implication is clear, and
the courts have interpreted the Amendment as prohibiting such a taking. See
Beuscher, Land Use Controls-Casesand Materials 528 (1964). The Constitutions
of Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Washington,
and Wyoming expressly disallow the taking of property for a non-public purpose.
Ibid.
3
OWhyte, op. cit. supra note 15, at 54.
311bid.
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ground 82 or to promote irrigation 3 or flood control.8 4 More recently
it has been decided that when land is condemned to eliminate an undesirable condition such as a slum or blighted area this serves a public
purpose even though the property is not subsequently devoted to a
use traditionally considered public. 5 Many decisions have found a
public purpose present where more land was condemned than was
needed for a particular public project in order to protect the improvement by surrounding it with open land. 86 For example, the courts
have ruled that bluffs above the Hudson River may be condemned to
preserve the beauty along a parkway8 7 and that land around a library
may be taken to enhance the beauty of the building. 3 It therefore appears that while the public use requirement may be a restraining influence, it does not prevent states and municipalities from accomplishing many open space objectives through the use of the eminent domain
power.
The great expense of condemnation is a more serious restraint. Because of this, it is unrealistic to suppose that communities could ever
obtain enough open lands solely through purchase of the fee simple
title. Three developments have rendered the expense problem somewhat less formidable than it was:
(1) in 1961 Congress passed a statute authorizing federal grants
of up to 30% to help defray the cost of urban and suburban land
usable for park, recreation, historical, or conservation purposes. 39
Several states have obtained additional money for land acquisition
through the issuance of bonds.4°
(2) in recent years states and municipalities have come to
realize that a surprising amount of land can be obtained by gifts.
A Regional Plan Study of Connecticut, New Jersey, and New
York found that about 25-30% of the total land acquired by the
2 2Village of Lloyd Harbor v. Town of Huntington, 4 N.Y.2d 182, 149 NE.
2d 851 (1938).
33Matter of Tuthill, 36 App. Div. 492, 55 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1899).
34

Gruntorad v. Hughes Bros., 161 Neb. 358, 73 N.W.2d 700 (1935).
5Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 Sup. Ct. 98 (1954).

83

36 Comment, Techniques for Preserving Open Spaces, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1622,
1633 (1962).
S7Bunyan v. Commissioners of Palisades Interstate Park, 167 App. Div. 457, 153
N.Y. Supp. 622 (1915).
38sUniversity of Southern California v. Robbins, 1 Cal. App. 2d 523, 37 P.2d
163 (1934).

3gHousing Act of 1961, §§ 701-06, 75 Stat. 183-85, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1500(e)
(Supp. 1963).
4

OEveleth, supranote 12, at 564.

OPEN LANDS

19661

states for parks from 1942-56 was procured through gifts.4 ' One
form of gift which is now being encouraged by a number of
communities is the donation of the remainder in fee simple with
the retention of the life estate. However, most gifts are in the
form of devises.
(3) government land-acquisition officials have recently learned
that the expense of condemnation can often be significantly reduced by first regulating the use of the property as much as is
consistent with the legitimate scope of the police power and then
condemning and paying for the remaining uses.2 Since the just
compensation requirement demands only that the condemnor pay
for those property rights which he is taking, the payment retured to condemn land already subject to controls is normally
less than that needed to take land which is free from zoning regulations. This approach must be used cautiously, however, for
it has often been held that a city may not zone unreasonably in
order to lower the value of property prior to condemnation.3 An
illustrative case is Grand Trunk W. Ry. v. City of Detroit.4
There the court invalidated an attempt to zone for exclusive
multiple-dwelling use property located in an industrial area in
which no prudent investor would erect multiple dwellings and
which the city was contemplating condemning for redevelopment purposes.
B. CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

There is an alternative to condemning the entire fee simple in the
land desired for open space. This is merely to take a "conservation
easement" in the property. Under this approach the government
purchases a negative easement comprising the landowner's development rights in the property. Title to the land remains in private hands,
and the owner may make any use of the property not inconsistent
with the rights conveyed to the government agency.4 5 Nondevelopmental uses such as farming and grazing normally remain available
to the landowner. The deed granting the easement to the government
agency typically contains provisions disallowing:
(a) erection of structures.
(b) removal or destruction of trees, shrubs, or other greenery.
(c) construction of private roads or drives.
4'Id. at 575.
42

Comrnent, supra note 35, at 1638.

43lbid.

44326 Mich. 387,40 N.W.2d 175 (1949).
45Whyte,

op. cit. supra note 15, at 31.
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(d) uses other than residential, agricultural, and those incidental to
the installation and maintenance of public utilities.
(e) display of billboards and other forms of outdoor advertising.
(f) dumping of trash, wastes, and other unsightly materials on
the land.
In addition the deed usually authorizes the grantee-agency to allow
any changes requested by the owner which the agency deems consistent with the purpose of the easement 48 The landowner's compensation is the difference between the market value of the property
without the easement and its value subject to the easement.
The use of conservation easements has a number of advantages over
condemnation of the entire fee simple. The easement approach:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

is usually less expensive.
seldom injures the community's tax base.
permits the government to escape maintenance costs.
mitigates the pressure on farmers and others to sell to developers, since the realty taxes no longer reflect the property's
value for development purposes.
(5) increases the number of gifts of open lands. Relatively few
landowners are wealthy enough or public-spirited enough to
donate their land outright, but there are many who can and
would give a conservation easement if this led to a reduced tax
valuation on the property and enabled them to deduct the47value
of the easement from their income tax as a charitable gift
Since there is some controversy about the actual value of items one
and two, they will be given individual attention. It is sometimes
asserted that a jury is likely to award a landowner almost as much
money for the taking of a conservation easement as it would for the
acquisition of the fee simple; hence the government might as well take
the whole fee and get the full value of what it is paying for anyway.
This view is probably explained by the fact that for many years the
kind of easement most commonly taken by the government has been
one for a highway or railroad right of way.4 8 Here the owner has
usually been awarded nearly as much money for the easement as he
60f course the agency could allow such changes even in the absence of a
clause so providing, but it is good psychology to expressly mention this authority
in the deed, where the landowner can see it.
47
See Whyte, op. cit. supra note 15, at 36.
.48d. at 30.
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would have obtained for the land itself.49 In this kind of fact situation
such an award is understandable, for a highway or railroad easement
renders the affected strip virtually useless to the owner of the servient
tenement. On the other hand, a landowner who grants the government
a conservation easement retains his present uses plus the right to engage
in any others that do not conflict with the stipulated restrictions
against improvements. Of course, under given circumstances he may
still be surrendering a lot, for his property may comprise choice
building sites located in the midst of suburban developments. But in
many cases the value of the property will be ascribable mainly to its
usefulness for farming, grazing, commercial recreation, or some other
purpose not requiring improvements, and in these circumstances the
landowner gives up very little by granting a conservation easement.
On the average, therefore, it should be cheaper to purchase a conservation easement than to buy the fee simple, especially if the government agency is diligent about acquiring easements before the land has
become ripe for development.
Those who doubt that conservation easements are usually harmless
to the community's tax base point out that in instances when the
value of the land is attributable mainly to its usefulness for commercial or residential development, to subject the property to a conservation easement will substantially reduce its tax valuation. This
observation is true, but it overlooks 3 significant considerations:
(1) a lot of land derives its principal value from its usefulness
for purposes not requiring development;
(2) whatever taxes are lost through lower valuations on property subject to conservation easements are commonly recouped
through increased valuations on nearby property, which is made
more valuable by the assurance that neighboring tracts will not be
despoiled by development. For example, in New Jersey the Union
County Park Commisssion reported that between 1922 and 1939
there was a 631.7% increase in assessed valuations on properties
adjacent to Warinanco Park.50 This was nearly 14 times the
average increase of 46.4% for the entire city during the same period.5 1 A similar increase was reported for land contiguous to a
park in Elizabeth, New Jersey.5 2 Property located near land
subject to a conservation easement may not increase in value as
49lbid.
GOHerrick, The Effect of Parks Upon Land and Real Estate Values, The Plan-

ners' Journal, Oct.-Dec., 1939, p. 89.
51lbid.
521d. at 90.
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much as does land adjacent to a park, but one may nevertheless
expect the former to rise substantially in value;
(3) property restricted by a conservation easement does not
burden the community with new demand for sewer and water
lines, school construction, and police and fire protection. Thus any
loss of tax income from such land is to a great extent offset by a
concomitant absence of expenses.
A number of states have enacted enabling legislation providing for
the purchase of conservation easements 53 Such enactments typically
state that governmental units have the power to condemn easements
in land, as well as the fee simple, and declare that open lands are
beneficial to society. It is not certain that such legislation is necessary,
since power to purchase the fee simple should, logically, include the
power to buy something less than the fee, and since many courts
would doubtlessly deem open lands to be beneficial to the public even
in the absence of a statute so stating.M Nevertheless, since these points
are not entirely free from doubt, a state desiring to promote the use
of conservation easements is well advised to enact such enabling legislation.
C.

COMPENSABLE REGULATIONS

An approach similar to that of purchasing a conservation easement
is to zone out the right to develop and then compensate the affected
landowners for any losses suffered by them. This is the substance of
the compensable regulation scheme devised by Professors Jan Z. Krasnowiecki and James C. Paul of the University of Pennsylvania. 55
Under this plan an area is selected for preservation, and then all of
the parcels making up the area are evaluated. The values thus determined are guaranteed to the landowners by the government authority;
then regulations are imposed limiting the uses of the properties to those
of a nondevelopmental character. To the extent that these restrictions
impair the value of the land for uses actually being made at the time
the owner is allowed immediate compensation.5 6 To the extent that
the controls merely reduce the value of the property for potential
development, the owner is awarded damages if and when he
53

E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40, § 8(c) (Supp. 1965); N.Y. Gen. Munic.

Law § 247.
54
See Whyte, op. cit. supra note 14, at 54 and Comment, supra note 35, at 1636.

55
Krannowiecki & Paul, The Preservationof Open Space in Metropolitan Areas,
110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 179, 180 (1961).
56
Comment, supra note 36, at 1639.
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sells the land at an administratively supervised public sale. 57 Since
the compensation allowable to a landowner cannot exceed the initially
determined market value of the property, it follows that subsequent
increases in development value are not compensable.
This approach appears to have 3 advantages over condemnation
of the fee simple or of a conservation easement:
(1) the imposition of compensable regulations does not require
the expenditure of large sums at the beginning of the program, for
an affected landowner is not entitled to compensation for loss of
development value until he conveys his property at a public sale;
(2) this plan is likely to be less expensive overall, for any
intervening increases in the market value of the regulated land
reduce the amount that the government must pay at sale time;
(3) this device can facilitate more rational planning, since
flexibility can be achieved by amending the regulations. 8 A
significant disadvantage of the scheme is that it is likely to get a
hostile reception from some segments of the public, for notwithstanding the plan's provision for compensation, it will doubtlessly
impress many as being "socialistic."
D. ExcLusIVE UsE ZONING
Since the celebrated decision in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company 0 in 1926 the courts have recognized that it is a legitimate
exercise of the police power to enact reasonable zoning ordinances
promoting those uses for which a given area is best adapted and preventing the establishment of disharmonious uses within the area. In
the years following that decision communities have employed various
forms of open space zoning, including flood plain, historical, scenic,
recreation, and agriculture zones. 0 Of these classifications agricultural
zoning has probably received the most use. Santa Clara County in
California and Lancaster County in Pennsylvania have both made extensive and effective use of agricultural zoning.0 ' One may wonder
why communities resort to the expensive devices of condemnation and
compensable regulation when exclusive use zoning is available. There
are 2 reasons:
571bid.
58If an amendment reduces the property's development value still further, the
owner will simply be awarded additional compensation when he conveys the

property at public sale.
02272 US. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114 (1926).
cOSee Eveleth, supra note 12, at 573.
GiWhyte, op. cit. supra note 15, at 23.
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(1) unless the particular property is peculiarly adapted to a
given open space use such as agriculture, outdoor recreation or
service as a flood plain, the courts are likely to invalidate any
attempt to zone out other uses, deeming such an ordinance unreasonable and confiscatory. 62 Invalidation is especially likely
when nearby lands have been developed and the property in
question has acquired considerable value for subdivision or shopping center purposes, for the courts are understandably loath to
sanction land-use legislation that causes landowners to suffer a
substantial economic detriment;
(2) even if the zoning act withstands attack in court, once the
local population becomes sufficiently dense and development and
tax0 pressures become intense, zoning laws commonly give way.
This phenomenon generally begins with the granting of numerous
variances and ends with an amendment of the zoning code.
E. MINIM-AUM-LoT-SIzE ZONING
The most commonly employed method of protecting open spaces
is to impose large minimum lot sizes in suburban residential areas.64
The courts have invalidated ordinances implementing this approach
in a few instances, but these have usually been cases where the
specified minimum size was clearly too large to permit the kind of
development for which the area was suited or where the restricted
area covered too vast a section.6 5 The courts have sanctioned largelot zoning in a distinct majority of the cases in which the question
has been presented,6 6 and in recent years they have manifested a disposition to approve higher minimums. In Flora Realty & Investment

Co. v. City of La Due'7 the court supported a 3-acre minimum:
Any intrusion of smaller lots into such an area will have the effect
of impairing the value of buildings already constructed. A reduction of the minimum area restrictions on appellant's property would
have a materially adverse effect on the value of all property in the
62

See Cribbet, Principles of the Law of Property 322 (1962).

63Land

zoned for unintensive use is commonly taxed as though it were available
for development, because assessors share the local public's belief that once the
market demands a more intensive use, the zoning will be changed. See Hagman,
Open Space Planningand Property Taxation-Some Suggestions, 1964 Wis. L. Rev.
628, 631.
64
Eveleth, supra note 12, at 573.
65

Note, Snob-Zoning-A Look at the Economic and Social Impact of Low

Density Zoning, 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 507, 510 (1964).

66Whyte, op. cit. supra note 15, at 21. At least thirty-nine states have recorded
decisions on the subject. Book Review, supra note 10, at 80.
67362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771, 776 (1952).
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general vicinity of appellant's land. The ordinance was intended
to stabilize and preserve the value of the property in the several
districts.
An ordinance changing the minimum from 2 to 4 acres was upheld in Senior v. Zoning Comm. of To wn of New Canaaea mainly
on the grounds that the land's most appropriate use was for a "superior
residential district" and that the zoned area lacked city water and sewage facilities. And in Fischer v. Bedminster Township 9 the court sanctioned a 5-acre minimum, stressing the desirability of large-lot zoning as a means of preserving the rural character of the community. However, ordinances specifying minimum lot sizes are not certain
to withstand attack unless they in some manner promote the health,
safety, morals, or general welfare of the community and are deemed
reasonable in the light of the facts of the particular case.70
Large-lot zoning has been criticized on the grounds that large
minimums necessitate the consumption of even more land to house a
given number of people, thereby contributing to urban sprawl; that
big home sites render utilities and other public services more expensive, since sewer and water lines, roads, and school buses must
travel farther; and that large lots-whether considered separately or
together-do not produce an ideal kind of open space, for they are
commonly fenced, cleared of all but a few trees, relatively devoid of
wildlife, and inaccessible to all but their owners.
These criticisms are not without merit, but they are answerable. Although an area zoned for large minimums can accommodate comparatively few people, a community that wishes to adopt such zoning
in one section can avoid creating a housing shortage by zoning some
other section for duplexes and apartment houses. That large-lot zoning
makes road and utilities cost more expensive is undeniable, but it is
equally undeniable that a large-lot district is less costly to service with
schools, public welfare, and police protection than is a high-density
section.7 ' A recent tax-cost analysis of the residential sections of Yorktown, New York, revealed that tax revenues from Yorktown's residential property-the bulk of which is high-density-constituted 75
per cent of all revenues, but that services to this property consumed
83 per cent of the revenues; 72 hence the owners of business and in68146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415 (1959).
60911 NJ. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952).

7ONote, supranote 65, at 510.
71See Id. at 514.
721d.

at 515.

288

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIII

dustrial property were compelled to make up the deficit by paying
higher taxes than would otherwise be demanded. In response to the
last criticism, it is true that minimum-lot-size zoning cannot create
anything akin to a wilderness, but it can provide open lands of a
less primeval character, and domesticated open space would seem to
be greatly preferable to none at all. Moreover, there is a type of
large-lot zoning which can provide open lands of a relatively natural
character, although at a sacrifice of certain advantages incident to
orthodox large-lot zoning. The approach referred to is "cluster-zoning," which has been enthusiastically received by many planning
authorities. It merits individual discussion:
Cluster zoning limits the number of homes that can be built on
a given acreage of land, just as large-lot zoning does, but permits the
builder to reduce the individual lot sizes to a limited extent so long as
he provides a corresponding amount of open space elsewhere within
the tract.7" For example, in an area zoned for one-acre lots a developer
might be able to create 100 lots on 100 acres (assuming land for streets
is included in the one-acre calculation). Under cluster zoning he
might be allowed to place 100 homes on 75 acres if he reserved 25 acres
for permanent open space.
In addition to its ability to preserve open land in a natural statethat is, in the form of large, unbroken parcels-cluster zoning has
several other advantages over orthodox minimum-lot-size zoning: The
former is more economical for the homeowner, since it involves lower
costs for water, sewers, road-paving, natural gas, similar utilities,
and landscaping. It permits more flexibility, since lots can be tailored
and located to fit the topography of the tract, thereby making possible
a more interesting pattern of landscaping and architecture. Finally,
where sewer facilities are unavailable it provides a large open area for
the leachbeds commonly needed for septic tanks.
However, cluster zoning has 2 significant disadvantages when compared to large-lot zoning:
(1) to the extent that the individual lots are reduced in size the
homeowner's privacy is likewise reduced. There are many persons
who would rather have a small parcel of open land all to themselves than have access to a large tract of such land that must be
shared with their neighbors;
(2) implicit in cluster zoning is the danger that the compact
open space set aside at the beginning will later be encroached
7

3Volpert, supra note 28, at 843.
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upon if development pressures build up and efforts are made to
alter the zoning law.
F. COMPULSORY DEDicArioN OF LAND
A number of states have enabling legislation authorizing communities to require developers to dedicate a portion of their land for
park purposes.7 4 New York has such a statute:
Before the approval by the [municipal] planning board of a plat
. . such plat shall also show in proper cases and when required
by the planning board, a park or parks suitably located for playground or other recreational purposes ....
[T]he parks shall be
of reasonable size for neighborhood playgrounds or other recreational uses. .... 7r
*

Currently the amount of land required to be set aside in the states
having such legislation varies from 3%-12% of the subdivision's gross
area.7 6 Some municipalities permit the subdivider to reduce his lot
size below the specified minimum to a limited extent if he dedicates
an equivalent amount of land to a park or similar open area. 77
Although there is a division of opinion among treatise and law review writers as to the validity of legislation authorizing the compulsory dedication of land, most recent cases have upheld such enactments 78s However, in several instances the courts have invalidated
attempts by municipalities to compel developers to dedicate property
for parks or schools to be used mainly by the general public, rather
than principally by the inhabitants of the development1 9
The compulsory dedication device has been criticized on 2 grounds.
The first is that it is simply unfair to require a developer to provide the locality with park land or other open space at his expense.
The test used by the courts in passing judgment on questions of this
kind probably accords with generally accepted notions of fairness.
The courts ask whether a given rule or restriction affecting property
rights is a reasonable means of promoting the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare.80 It would seem that compulsory dedication
74
Note, Subdivision Control Requirement for Parkland, 12 Syracuse L. Rev. 224,
225 (1960).
75N.Y. Town Law § 277.
76Note, supra note 74, at 226.
77See Crinko v. South Brunswick Planning Board, 77 N.J. Super. 594, 187 A.2d
221 (1963).
78
Eveleth, supra note 12, at 583.
79Ibid.
8
0Kratovil, Real Estate Law § 545 (1958).
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used with a modicum of restraint is as reasonable a means of preserving
open space as the imposition of minimum lot sizes or the employment
of exclusive agricultural or recreational zoning. The second criticism
is that since this device permits the developer to determine which
land is to remain open, the community has no assurance that the land
set aside will be suitable for park, recreation, or other open space
purposes. After all, the developer will typically set aside that property
which is least suitable for development, such as swamp land or land
containing rough terrain. This objection overlooks the fact that open
lands (as indicated earlier) 81 serve a variety of useful functions, hence
the land selected for preservation is almost certain to serve some
valuable purpose, regardless of its features: land characterized by
rough terrain is commonly desirable for park purposes, and swamp
land usually makes an ideal water basin and wildlife sanctuary.
The principal merit of compulsory dedication is that it represents a
method of preserving open land in a residential area at no expense to
82
the public.

G. THE TAXATION APPROAcH
In recent years planners have manifested a growing interest in the
use of taxation as a planning device. They have become aware that a
community can retard the loss of its open lands by lessening the tax
burden on landowners whose property is devoted to certain open
space uses such as agriculture, ranching, recreation (including golfing), flood control, the provision of airport buffer strips, or the
preservation of historical landmarks.
That the system of property taxation presently employed throughout most of the United States contributes to our nation's loss of open
space is obvious.8s As a result of the national phenomena of population growth and increasing urbanization, suburban communities have
been facing mounting economic pressures for the past 20 years.
To provide all of the needed new services such as schools, roads,
sewers, water, and police protection these communities have had to
obtain more money, and this problem has generally been "solved" by
raising property taxes.8 4 But the medicine has aggravated the illness,
81
Supra, at
82

276-79.
The loss of tax revenue from the dedicated land might be regarded as a
public expense.
83
See Hagman, supra note 63, at 637.
84

Whyte, op. cit. supra note 15, at 38.
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for local farmers and other owners of open lands have found their
tax burden so great as to render uneconomical continued unintensive
use of their property, and so they have commonly sold the land to
a developer or changed their use to a more intensive one, thereby
creating a need for more public services.
Farmers have been particularly pressured by mounting real estate
taxes, especially those whose land is located in the path of impending development. Since the tax assessor must, in theory, base
his assessment on the market value of the property, not limited to
its current agricultural use, taxes have often forced the farmer to
subdivide prematurely.Y
The result is that the tax assesor has become in effect a master planner
who has contrived to gradually rid suburban areas of their open spaces.
The undesirability of this state of affairs led Maryland in 1956 to
become the first state to adopt a broad-scale tax plan calculated to
encourage the preservation of open land. Since 1956 8 other jurisdictions have enacted legislation implementing comparable tax schemes.88
The approaches adopted by these jurisdictions fall into 1 of 3 classifications: a general directive to assessors, a tax preference, or a tax
87
deferral.
When the general directive is employed, tax assessors are ordered
to presume that a land-use control (such as zoning) currently applied
to a given parcel of land is permanent in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary. 88 It is presently common for the assessor to take
into account the local market's assumption that an existing restriction
on the use of land will be removed when the pressure for more intensive use becomes great enough.8 9 He therefore values the parcel as
if it were free of the restriction, thereby increasing the pressure on
the owner to get the restriction removed and develop the property.
If a general directive is issued, the owner of such land may still be
tempted by attractive offers from speculators and developers, but he
8

GEveleth, supra note 12, at 588.
8aThe nine states (including Maryland) are: California, Cal. Rev. & Tax Code
§ 402.5; Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Star. Ann. §§ 12.63, 12.207 (a)-(e) (Supp. 1964);
Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 193.11 (3), 193.201 (Supp. 1961); Hawaii, Hawaii Rev.
Laws 5§ 98H 1-16, 187 (2-3) (Supp. 1961); Indiana, Ind. Ann. Star. § 323
(1963); Maryland, Md. Ann. Code art. 81, § 19 (b) (Supp. 1962); Nevada, Nev.

Rev. Star. § 361-313 (1961); New Jersey, N. J. Rev. Star. § 54:4-1 (Supp. 1962);
and Oregon, Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 215.130, 203, 213, 308, 370, 375, 380, 390, 395
(1963).
S7Hagman, supra note 63, at 638.
881bid.
891d. at 63 1.
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will no longer be subject to the additional-and more compellingpressure of a heavy tax burden.
The preferential assessment involves assessing land being used for a
specified open space purpose at its value for its present or an allowable
use.90 This approach differs from the general directive in that it does
not apply only to selected land uses and in that it does not necessarily
assume that the property favored is to be permanently restricted to
its present uses. A preferential assessment statute is of doubtful validity
under many state constitutions, for most of them require that all taxation be equal and uniform, thereby prohibiting unreasonable classifications and partial exemptions.91 In addition, a number of state constitutions require that assessments be based on "just valuation" or some
similar concept.92 Consequently, in those jurisdictions tax statutes
employing other measures of value are open to constitutional challenge9 3 There are at least 2 ways of coping with these constitutional
barriers. The first and most obvious is to amend the state constitution, assuming that enough people can be persuaded that the preservation of open lands is of sufficient importance to warrant such
action. The second is to preface the open space taxation statute with a
preamble presenting legislative findings that open lands are vital to
the public welfare and therefore merit distinctive tax treatment. There
is no certainty that a preamble of this kind will protect the act from
invalidation, but apprising the court of the legislature's land-use-planning motives will normally improve the statute's chances of being sustained.
Both the preferential assessment and the general directive have been
attacked on the ground that their effect is simply to increase the tax
burden on everyone other than the owners of open lands:
The process of granting exemptions feeds upon itself. As more
and more exemptions are granted, the tax burden becomes higher
upon the persons left to carry the load, and so demands begin
to be heard for even more exemptions. . . . It seems to be part
of our national psychological heritage to consider property tax
exemptions as an ideal means of promoting worthwhile enter9Old. at 639. California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, and
New Jersey, have preferential assessment statutes. The citations are given at note
86, supra.
0151 Am. Jur. Taxation S 156 (1944). A Nevada taxation statute favoring open
land was held to create an unreasonable classification in State v. Boyne, 390 P.2d
225 (Nev., 1904).

921d. at § 119.
0384 C.J.S. Taxation S 54 (1954). The majority of these constitutional provisions do not require that property be taxed at its full value.
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prises, dispensing charitable aid, [or] furthering social reforms.
.. . There is little or no recognition of the fact that many of
these objectives could be more economically and more equitably
achieved through a direct and visible subsidy. Instead, however,
we prefer the devious, never-count-the-cost method of chiseling
away at our property tax base, in true devil-take-the-hindmost
fashion.9 4
The short answer to this criticism is that all devices for preserving
or acquiring open space impose a financial burden on someoneP5
and that it is highly debatable whether the above-discussed tax
approaches are less economical or equitable than other devices.
The deferral approach involves postponing the payment of taxes
on that portion of the market value of the land which exceeds the
value of the property for its present use until the owner subjects the
land to a more intensive use.9 6 Under this system the owner of open
land pays a low rate as long as his property remains undeveloped,
but he must pay the accumulated difference between the low taxes
which he has been paying and the higher taxes which reflect the full
value of the land if he ever exploits the property commercially.97 Thus
deferral eventually recovers for the public the taxes temporarily forgiven. Although many commentators favor tax deferral and although it
appears to be above constitutional challenge,9 the device is not free
from objections. The record-keeping required by the system renders it
expensive to administer, and the scheme does not benefit the owner of
undeveloped land a great deal unless he plans to live on the property
until his death. Landowners commonly fear the accumulation of taxes
and prefer to keep their property liquid, even though they may not
contemplate selling in the near future.
CONCLUSION

This article has sought to establish that our country is constantly
losing portions of its open land, that this land is clearly worth preserving, and that much of it can be saved if we make diligent use of
04Walker, Loopholes in State and Local Taxes, 30 Tax Policy 4 (Feb., 1963).
9
5For example, condemnation under eminent domain is financially burdensome
to the public, while exclusive use zoning and minimum-lot-size zoning impose an
economic burden on the landowner, who can no longer sell his property for
certain purposes or subdivide it into smaller lots.
9
6Hagman, supra note 63, at 639. Nevada & Oregon have deferral legislation. See
note 86, supra,for statutory citations.

97M. at 639.

981d. at 645.
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the legal devices available. On the whole, compulsory dedication,
cluster zoning, and the purchase of conservation easements appear to
be the 3 most promising devices. The first 2 have the merit of
being cost-free to the community,19 and the last constitutes an ideal
tool for protecting extensive tracts of unspoiled land at a minimum
of expense. Which of the various devices should be used or emphasized by a given community depends on its political and economic
climate. The longer a community waits to initiate an open spaces
preservation program, the less satisfactory the ultimate results will be,
for once a tract of open land has been developed, it is seldom feasible
to restore the land to its natural condition.

99
Minimum-lot-size zoning is also cost-free to the public, but, unlike the two
approaches referred to, it cannot preserve open spaces in the form of large,
compact parcels.
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LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT AND
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING
IN VIRGINIA
RALPH EISENBERG*

The Commonwealth of Virginia, like other states in the United
States, has been very much preoccupied during the past 5 years with
problems of legislative reapportionment and redistricting. For the past
3 years, State concern with redistricting problems has been prodded
by suits which sought to compensate for the earlier failures of the
political process to bring about equal representation in the State legislature, congressional districts, and on municipal governing bodies.
Stimulated by Baker v. Carr,1 decided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1962, litigation successfully challenged the apportionment of
both houses of the General Assembly, the composition of the State's
10 congressional districts, and representation on the councils of 2 Virginia cities. A reapportionment or redistricting was brought about in
each instance. Only county governing bodies in Virginia thus far
have escaped challenge in the courts.
The Virginia experience in the national "Reapportionment Revolution" is not unique. Most other states have been deeply involved in reapportionment and redistricting activities. But Virginia faced reapportionment crises on all levels of government in a relatively short
period of time. What perhaps most distinguishes Virginia in the midst
of the reapportionment problems afflicting the states is its response to
the judicial insistence upon one man one vote standards for legislative
representation. Virginia legislated acceptable plans for redistricting
both houses of the General Assembly, the State's 10 congressional districts, and at least 1 city council without the delaying tactics and
bitter acrimony characteristic of some other states. Undoubtedly,
part of the explanation for Virginia's compliant response to the demands of equal representation lies in the fact that deviations from that
principle were not deeply rooted in the State's political traditions.
In addition, the political impact of reapportionment in the Commonwealth was not so great as to produce immediate and substantial re- A.B. 1952, A.M. 1953, University of Illinois; M.A. 1957, Ph.D. 1961, Princeton

University; Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, Assistant
Director of the Institute of Government, University of Virginia.
1369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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alignments of political power in this decade. Finally, the legislative
process in Virginia takes place in an environment of strong majority
party control of both houses of the General Assembly which serves to
reduce the probability of deadlock on reapportionment solutions.
It is appropriate to examine the Virginia involvement in reapportionment on the 2 levels of government where the reapportionment
issue finally has been closed. Litigation further challenging the apportionment of city councils is still under way. This article will focus
on the Virginia legislative and congressional cases and not attempt to
treat the numerous other issues of reapportionment raised in cases
affecting other states.
The Virginia cases did not raise the panoply of issues and questions
which had to be confronted by courts sitting in other states. Malapportionment of the Virginia legislature was not a result of long-standing legislative failure to act to reapportion. The Virginia Constitution
did not provide explicitly for the composition of legislative districts
nor contain formulas for apportionment which produced inherent
inequalities in representation. No question of a "Federal analogy" was
really pertinent to the Virginia General Assembly since an area
concept of representation had not been applied to either legislative
chamber. The relevance of an initiative or referendum process to
the selection of an apportionment system was not present.
What a population standard required when it was applied was
perhaps the most vital question of apportionment. How close to
population equality legislative districts must be was the primary
operational problem of the one man-one vote standard for apportionment adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court. This problem was faced
directly by the Federal court in the Virginia case well in advance of
Reynolds v. Sims.2 The manner in which the problem was resolved in
the Virginia litigation suggested the later approach of the U.S. Supreme
Court.
Peripheral issues were present in the Virginia cases. But the only
issues of consequence related to the permissible disparities in the population size of legislative districts, the rationale or "proof" required to
justify larger disparities, and the ingredients of population which
could be used to structure districts. After Baker, Gray, and Wesberry,3 and the cases decided by Federal and state courts elsewhere,
the inherent questions posed in applying a population standard were
2377 U.S. 533 (1964).

sBaker v. Carr, supra note 1; Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Wesberry
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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the only difficult issues in the Virginia litigation. The State court's
resolution of the question in the congressional case, relying upon its
own precedent, as well as that of the Federal courts in the legislative
case, similarly was a reasonable approach to the problem, although
the outcome was never seriously in doubt. Virginia's historic application of a population standard for representation made the judicial
problem a little simpler, as it enabled the courts to concentrate upon
the meaning of population for apportionment purposes.
I.

THE GENE AL ASSEMBLY

The challenge to the apportionment of representation in the Virginia
General Assembly culminated in the case being one of the famed
"Reapportionment Cases" decided by the United States Supreme
Court on June 15, 1964.4 Davis v. Mann, the Virginia case,5 was included among the cases from 5 other states for the Supreme Court
to rule on standards of representation for state legislaturesP
The Virginia reapportionment case had roots in the results of the
1960 Federal census. Although the State's population had increased by
over 19% since 1950, the rate of population increase was unevenly
distributed throughout Virginia. 7 Most of the State's increase in population occurred in a crescent shaped corridor of counties and cities
extending from the Northern Virginia suburbs of Washington, D. C.,
southward to the Richmond metropolitan area, thence eastward to the
Tidewater cities and counties of Hampton Roads." Illustrative of the
uneven population growth were Fairfax County's increase of 179% in
population in 10 years, Alexandria's 47% increase, and Norfolk's
40% increase. On the other hand, the populations of other counties
and cities of the State either remained relatively constant or suffered
decreases since the previous census.9
The inevitable uneven population movements in Virginia exaggerated the disparities in the population of legislative districts both
for the election of State senators and members of the House of Dele4

McKAY, REAPPoRTIONME.xT: TnE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQuAL REPREsENTATIox

vii (1965).

F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Va. 1962).
OThe other states were Alabama, Delaware, Colorado, Maryland, and New
York.
7U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960, Census of Population: General Population
Characteristics,Virginia (1961).
8Lorin A. Thompson, "Recent Population Changes In Virginia," 37 The
University of Virginia News Letter 21 (Feb. 15, 1961).
5213

91bid.
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gates. The 2 delegates elected from the district embracing Fairfax
County and the City of Falls Church each represented 142,597 persons; the City of Alexandria's delegate represented 91,023 persons.
Other areas and the number of constituents per delegate were:
Princess Anne County and the City of Virginia Beach, 85,218; the
City of Portsmouth, 57,386; Arlington County, 54,467; and the City of
Norfolk, 50,812. At the other extreme, 5 delegates were elected from
individual districts ranging in size from 20,071 to 23,201. A similar
situation prevailed in the State Senate. Each of the 2 senators from
the City of Norfolk represented 152,435 persons, while Arlington
County's single senator had 163,401 constituents, and Fairfax County
and the City of Falls Church had 1 senator for a population of
285,194. However, 9 State senators were elected from districts which
contained populations of less than 70,000. These extremes in the population size of districts contrasted with the 39,669 persons and 99,174
persons which each delegate and senator would ideally represent if
an equal population standard for apportionment were applied. 10 The
discrepancies in the number of people represented by the various State
senators and delegates dramatized the need for a reapportionment of
the General Assembly.
The Virginia Constitution provides for decennial reapportionment
of the legislature. § 43 of the Constitution asserts:
The present apportionment of the Commonwealth in the Senatorial and House Districts shall continue; but a reapportionment
shall be made in the year nineteen hundred and thirty-two and
every ten years thereafter.:"
This provision in its present form was inserted in the Constitution by
an amendment adopted in 1928 which did not, however, make any substantive change in the original provision of the 1902 Constitution. The
1902 Constitution continued the apportionment of the legislature enacted by the General Assembly in April 1902 but permitted a reapportionment to be made in 1906. However, the 1902 Constitution directed
that a reapportionment "shall be made in the year 1912, and every
tenth year thereafter." 12
The provisions of the Virginia Constitution indicate that reapportionment of both houses of the General Assembly was obligatory upon
'oSee Ralph Eisenberg, "Legislative Apportionment: How Representative Is
Virginia's Present System?" 37 The University of Virginia News Letter 29 (Apr.
15, 1961).
lV. CoNsr.,
2Ibid.

§ 43.
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the General Assembly. The Constitution is clear that a reapportionment is to be enacted at the first regular session of the legislature
following the Federal decennial census, since Virginia's regular biennial legislative sessions occur in even years.' 3 However, the Virginia
Constitution does not mention the standards to be used in reapportioning State legislative representation. The omission of standards for reapportioning the General Assembly is in marked contrast to the constitutional provisions concerning the redistricting of congressional districts in the State. In regard to congressional districts, the Constitution
provides that:
districts shall be composed of contiguous and compact territory
containing as nearly as practicable, an equal number of inhabitants. 14
The absence of an explicit population standard for representation in
the legislature did not suggest that the General Assembly was free to
apportion representation in any manner that it deemed appropriate,
although arguments to this effect have been developed in recent years
as the concentrations of urban population have become more pronounced. It can be suggested that the requirement to reapportion 2
years after a decennial census was not merely coincidental. Each
census presumably would demonstrate the need for a redrawing of
legislative district lines to accommodate population movements over
the previous decade. Linking the time to reapportion to a legislative
session following the census was not new to Virginia constitutions.
A brief recitation of the provisions of Virginia constitutions concerning reapportionment and standards for representation provides a useful background to the current constitutional provisions.
The original Constitution of Virginia, adopted in 1776, provided
that each county would elect 2 representatives to the House of Delegates while the City of Williamsburg and the Borough of Norfolk
would each elect 1 representative. But the Constitution went on to
provide for a representative from each city or borough as it was
created and, perhaps more significantly, when any such city or
borough decreased in its number of voters for 7 successive years
so that its voters totaled less than half of the voters in any 1 county
of the State, that city or borough would cease to have a representative
in the House of Delegates. 15 In a sense, these provisions took cog'3 VA. CoNs?., § 46.
' 4 VA. CONST., § 55.
15

VA. CONS?. 1776,

§ 5.
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nizance of the relevance of population as an apportionment standard,
although the principle itself was not enunciated.
The Constitution adopted in 1830 reflected concern with the representation of the western and eastern sections of the State. At that
time sectional differences in the State were pronounced. The Convention which drafted the Constitution adopted a compromise to
meet the demands of western Virginia for increased representation in
the legislature. The Constitution apportioned representation among
4 major sections of the State and the representatives for each section
were then distributed among its constituent counties and cities primarily upon the basis of white population. But the Constitution also
provided that when any municipal body not entitled to separate representation grew in population size sufficiently to merit representation on
its own, the General Assembly's duty was to secure representation to
such a city, town, or borough even if it was necessary to reapportion
the representatives in that great section of the State."' The 1830 Constitution first declared the duty of the legislature to reapportion "in
the year 1841 and every 10 years thereafter."
The 1851 Constitution did away with the allocation of representatives among the 4 great districts of the State. In its place, the Constitution described specifically the composition of legislative districts and
the number of representatives to be elected from each.'Y This Constitution also affirmed the duty of the legislature to reapportion every
10 years if it could agree upon a principle of representation. But if
no agreement on a principle of representation occurred, the Constitution contemplated that the electorate would decide which of 4 alternative representative systems would be used: (1) a suffrage basis (number of voters in the several counties and cities), (2) the amount of all
State taxes paid in the counties and cities, (3) a mixed basis combining
the number of inhabitants and the amount of State taxes paid, and (4)
a mixed basis in the Senate and a suffrage basis in the House of Delegates.' The alternatives more closely approximated a population
standard than did the requirements of earlier constitutions.
The 1864 Constitution again described specifically the composition
of legislative districts and allocated varying numbers of legislators to
districts across the State. That Constitution also stated the duty of the
legislature to reapportion representation in both legislative chambers in
1870 and "every tenth year thereafter .. .from an enumeration of
16VA. CONST. 1830, art. III, §§ 4 and 5.
1
7VA. CoNsT. 1851, art. IV, § 5.

lSIbid.
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the inhabitants of the state." 19 The 1869 Constitution did not specify
the composition of legislative districts nor provide a standard for
legislative apportionment. It provided for a reapportionment in 1879
and stipulated that a reapportionment "shall be made in the year 1891
and every tenth year thereafter." 20 This allusion to the legislature's reapportionment duty has remained in constitutional provisions ever
since.
The Constitutional Convention of 1901-02 apparently was not concerned with the question of legislative apportionment. The Convention produced the vague statement noted above of the duty of the
General Assembly to reapportion. 2 ' The constitutional statement
merely updated the provisions of the preceding constitution.
If the State's constitutional concern with reapportionment implicitly
connoted a population standard, Virginia's legislative performance in
reapportioning under the 1902 Constitution indicates an understanding
of population as the primary guideline for structuring representative
districts in both houses. Unlike other states, which were distinguished
by their failure to reapportion for 60 years or more despite constitutional provisions for decennial reapportionment, Virginia has regularly
reapportioned legislative representation since 1902. Except for the State
Senate in 1906 and 1912, the Virginia General Assembly has reapportioned after each census in accordance with § 43 of the Constitution.2 Some legislative reluctance was evident in the delay in reapportioning the State Senate in 1934. However, the relationship of
Virginia's legislative apportionment systems throughout this period to
a population standard was closer than in other states. 23 These factors
indicate to many observers that Virginia's standard for legislative
apportionment was principally a population standard. 4
Legislative and special study commissions in Virginia considered
population to be the principal basis for apportioning representation
19
VA. CoNsT.
20

1864, art. IV,§ 6.

VA. CONsr. 1869, art. V, S 4.

21

VA. CoNsr., § 43.
House of Delegates apportionment: 1906 Acts, c. 83; 1910 Acts, c. 7; 1922
Acts, c. 271; 1923 Acts, Ex. Sess., c. 14; 1932 Acts, c. 169; 1942 Acts, c. 387; 1948
Acts, c. 407; 1952 Acts, Ex. Sess., c. 18; 1958 Acts, c. 33.
State Senate apportionment: 1922 Acts, c. 271; 1923 Acts, Ex. Sess, c. 14; 1934
Acts, c. 169; 1942 Acts, c. 387; 1948 Acts, c. 407; 1952 Acts, Ex. Sess, c. 17; 1958
Acts, c. 333.
23
See DAVID & EIENBERG, DEVALUATION OF THE URBAN AND SUBURBAN V-roE,
vol.
1, at 1-5, 11-15, 64 (1961) and vol. II, at 164-70 (1962).
24
See NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COMPENDIUM ON LEGISLATI
AppoRTION?iwr (1961
ed.); BAxER, STATE CONsTITUTION: REAPPORTIONMENT 70 (1960);
McKay, op. cit. supra note 4, at 474-75.
22
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in both houses of the General Assembly. A legislative committee in
1940 conceded that the timing of the reapportionment duty "argues an
obvious intention on the part of the framers of the Constitution that
the population figures should be a major consideration in redistricting." The committee, however, noted the absence of a specific statement of population as a controlling standard and concluded "that it
was intended to allow the General Assembly discretion to modify
the population basis in line with other factors which must be considered." 5 A Commission on Redistricting which reported in 1951
reached a similar conclusion but added: "Equality of population is not
mandatory and the General Assembly may concede such factors as
it deems appropriate ....,,26
. The increasing reluctance of the legislature to redistrict the General
Assembly became evident after the 1950 Census. The first regular
session of the General Assembly failed to enact. redistricting legislation in 1952. Governor John S. Battle had to call a special. session to
reapportion both legislative chambers. In 1960 Governor J. Lindsay
Almond asked the General Assembly to create a commission to study
the need for legislative reapportionment and congressional redistricting, but legislation for that purpose was not enacted. Governor Almond in early 1961, therefore, appointed a Commission on Redistricting. A. legislator and a citizen were appointed to the Commission 7
from each of the State's 10 congressional districts.
The Commission on Redistricting in its report, submitted to the
Governor and the General Assembly in November 1961, proposed
redistricting plans for both the State Senate and the Iouse of Delegates.28 The Commission's proposals contemplated the shift of 3
Senate seats and 8 Delegate seats from less populous to more populous
areas of the State. Its plans were guided by concern for "the factors
of compactness, contiguity, ease of access and communication, community of interest, and a reasonable degree of equality of representation." 9
The 1962 General Assembly fulfilled its reapportionment responsibility for both legislative houses, but it did not enact the apportionment plans recommended by the Commission on Redistricting. The
S251940 House Document #6, Report of the Commission on Redistricting of

House and SenatorialDistricts 14.
211951 House Document #15, Report of the Commission on Redistricting
6-7.

27
Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 17, 1961, pp. 1, 3.
28
Virginia, REP RT OF THE CoMMIssIoN ON REDISTRICfING, Nov.

291d. at 8.

15, 1961.
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1962 redistricting merely shifted 1 Senate seat and 3 Delegate seats to
urban areasP0 It appeared that the redistricting was merely a token
effort in the direction of equality of representation in both houses.
Table I indicates in statistical terms the limited scope of the 1962 redistricting.
TABLE I
VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, MEASURES OF REPRESENTATIVENESS

BEFORE AND AFTER

1962

REDISTRICTING

STATE SENATE

Prior to 1962 Redistricting..
After 1962 Redistricting ....

HOUSE oF DELEGATES

Ratio of
Largest
District
to
Smallest
District

Percent of
Population
Necessary
to Elect a
Majority
of Members

Ratio of
Largest
District
. to
Smallest
'District

Percent of
Population
Necessary
to Elect a
Majority
of Members

5.5
2.4

37.7
41.1

7.1
4.4

36.8
40.5

Based on 1960 population figures.

The most underrepresented areas of the State, however, were not
provided with the additional legislators to which their populations
would have entitled them. Only I additional senator and 1 delegate
were allocated to Fairfax County and Falls Church, while Norfolk received no increases in its representation. Thus, in the Senate, Norfolk
had only 65% of the representation to which on a population basis it
would have had, while Fairfax County had 70%, and Arlington County, only 61%. In the House of Delegates the situation was much the
same with Fairfax County having 42%, Hampton City 44%, Arlington
County 73%, and Norfolk 78% of the delegate representation a population-based apportionment would have provided. There were, in contrast, 4 Senate districts in rural areas which were overrepresented by at
least 50% and 8 Delegate districts which were also overrepresented by
at least 50%.
Governor Albertis S. Harrison, Jr., in signing the redistricting bills,
had acknowledged "the disparity in population between some districts." The Governor expressed his view of apportionment standards
in Virginia in the following terms:
Historically, population has been utilized as the principal factor
in redistricting in Virginia, although population alone has never
301962 Acts, c. 635, c. 638.
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been deemed the sole basis of redistricting. The General Assembly
-properly, I think-has always considered not only population,
but also geographical area, the number of political subdivisions
within a district, terrain, and community of interest, in drawing
district lines....
Unless equality of population be permitted to overbalance completely all considerations of compactness, contiguity, habit, convenience of the people, and community of interest, I am convinced
that the present plan is a fair reapportionment of Virginia's legislative representation. 1
To justify the equity of the redistricting acts, the Governor cited
factors of geographic diversity and geographic barriers and the need to
have few political subdivisions within legislative districts. He particularly emphasized Virginia's comparatively high standing among the
rest of the states in the relation of its legislative apportionment to
population,
The legal attack on the 1962 redistricting acts was launched on
April 9, 1962, when suit was filed in Alexandria in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia by 4 legislators from
Northern Virginia.3 2 The plaintiffs contended that they were denied
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed to them by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, because the 1962 redistricting
acts prevented them from casting votes as effective as those cast by
voters ,resident in overrepresented legislative districts. The plaintiffs
maintained that the 1962 acts invidiously discriminated against them
and other voters in districts where effective votes were similarly
diluted. They pointed out that the redistricting acts permitted a
minority of the people of Virginia to control the General Assembly.
The suit sought injunctive relief to prevent elections from being held
under the 1962 apportionment or under the existing (1952) apportionment system. It is to be noted how soon after Baker v. Carr,3 decided
on March 26, 1962, the Virginia case was filed.
The 3-judge panel appointed to consider the complaint consisted
of Judge Albert V. Bryan of the Court of Appeals of the 4th
Circuit, Judge Oren R. Lewis of Alexandria, and Judge Walter E.
Hoffman of Norfolk, both of the Eastern District of Virginia.
The Court. permitted plaintiffs from Norfolk, who alleged'that they
3
IStatement by Governor Harrison re: HB 250 and SB 145, Apr. 7, 1962.
-uThe 4 plaintiffs were Delegates Harrison Mann and Kathryn Stone of Arlington County, and-Delegate John C. Webb and Senator John A. K. Donovan of

Fairfax County.
33

Supra note 1.
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suffered the same inequalities as Northern Virginia voters, to intervene
in the case. After hearing the case on October 22 and 23, the District
Court handed down its decision on November 28, 1962, with Judge
Bryan writing the opinion for the majority and Judge Hoffman dis34
senting.
The Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint,
noting that Baker v.Carr "unequivocally declares .. .that allegations
comparable to those now before us state a claim upon which the relief here prayed may be granted." 35 The Court also refused to
grant dismissal upon other grounds claimed by the defendants. Dismissal was not justified because the Court did not see the "'exceptional
circumstances'" present for the State remedy "to oust Federal jurisdiction." 36 Judge Bryan denied the defendants' contention that the
suit was one against the State barred by the Eleventh Amendment
and held that it ".. . was against State officials acting pursuant to State

laws, a type of action universally held appropriate to vindicate a
Federally protected right." 3 7 The Court, however, did sustain the motion to dismiss the Governor and Attorney General as defendants because they did not have a "'special relation'" to the elections.38
To the contention that the Federal court should abstain from deciding the case until State courts had had an opportunity to review
and interpret the redistricting acts and the relevant State constitutional provisions, Judge Bryan answered that the redistricting acts were
not ambiguous and the constitutional provisions were not unclear. The
acts, he noted, were specific and the Constitution alluded to no
special local considerations:
Whether the acts of the Assembly are within the aim and purpose of the Constitution can, therefore, be gained only from the
bare words of its clauses, fair inferences from the acts themselves
34
Mann v. Davis, 213 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Va. 1962). For a description of early
developments in the case see Eisenberg, "Reapportionment: Journey Through a
Judicial Thicket," in CASES IN AMERICAN NATIONAl. GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS,

182-94 (Tresolini & Frost ed. 1966).

35Mann v. Davis, supra note 34, at 579.
36lbid. The court cited the following cases to support its position: Lane v.

Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 274 (1939); United States v. Bureau of Revenue, 291 F.2d
677, 679 (10th Cir. 1961); Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724, 729 (4th Cir. 1956),

cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957).
37
Mann v. Davis, supra note 34, at 579. Judge Bryan cited the following cases
to support this view: Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908); Duckworth
v. James, 267 F.2d 224, 230-31 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959);
Kansas City So. Ry. v. Daniel, 180 F.2d 910, 914 (5th Cir. 1950).
38

Mann v. Davis, supra note 34, at 579, noting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,

157 (1908).
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and commentary evidence. This determination is thus as well
within the competence of a Federal court sitting in Virginia.
Furthermore, the strong implication of Baker v. Carr, if not
its command, is that the Federal three-judge court should retain
and resolve the litigation.3 9
As to the merits of the plaintiffs' allegations, Judge Bryan declared that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
demanded that apportionment afford "substantially equal representation" to the State's citizens, and he then examined the disparities in the
population size of districts in both legislative houses. He noted the
obvious inequalities in the voting power of various legislative districts
and, while asserting that population was not "the sole or definitive measure of districts when taken by the Equal Protection Clause," 40 declared that the burden of proof to justify the disparities among the
districts fell upon the defendants. Judge Bryan admitted the existence
of factors other than population to be weighed in evaluating the justness of an apportionment, but he concluded that population was the
predominant apportionment standard under the Fourteenth Amendment. The other relevant factors were compactness and contiguity,
community of interest, observance of "natural lines," and adherence to
the boundaries of political subdivisions. But there had to be evidence
that such factors were actually considered in constructing legislative
districts. In Virginia, his opinion concluded, no such evidence was
forthcoming.
The defendants had contended that a factor explaining the variations in the districts was the number of military persons located in
Arlington and Fairfax counties and in the City of Norfolk. Judge
Bryan said, however, that the evidence presented was not explicit or
satisfactory. The majority of the Court, speaking through the opinion,
asserted "there must be a fair approach to equality unless it be shown
that other acceptable factors may make up for the differences in the
numbers of people." 41 Two of the 3 members of the Court obviously
felt that no demonstration of the application of other factors had been
made in defense of the 1962 redistricting.
The Court refused to distinguish between the 2 legislative houses in
the application of a population standard for apportionment. Judge
Bryan commented briefly that the state Senate was not a "regional
39Mann

v. Davis, supra note 34, at 580.
4Od. at 584.
441hid.
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counterpart" 42 of the United States, and that State Senate districts did
not have State autonomy. The Court thus concluded that it could
find "no rational basis for the disfavoring of Arlington, Fairfax, and
Norfolk." 43 Without setting any permissible tolerances in mathematical terms for the disparities in district size and without declaring that
wide differences between districts cannot be tolerated "if a, sound
reason cannot be advanced," the Court held "unconstitutional, invidious discrimination adverse to Arlington, Fairfax, and Norfolk
has been proved." 4
Judge Bryan's opinion in Mann v. Davis was one of the better apportionment opinions in this early period of reapportionment litigation
in lower Federal and state courts. The opinion is admirably concise
and the reasoning is clear and to the point. The substantial issues were
treated as their significance merited and they were met directly. The
opinion was particularly outstanding for the reasonable approach to
the concept of equal representation as reflected in the population
characteristics of legislative districts. The Court perceived the difficulty
of achieving mathematical exactness in the population size of districts
and did not attempt to establish an exact standard for acceptable districting. Although population was declared the principal standard
for- legislative districts, the Court admitted the relevance of other
factors in assessing the constitutionality of an apportionment system.
In these respect§, the Court generally anticipated the subsequent U.S.
Supreme Court approach to the problem. In viewing population as the
primary basis for representation and examining deviations from population equality in terms of rational use of non-population factors, the
Court. took a reasonable view of the difficulties- and objectives of the
redistricting process. The- most significant feature of Mann v. ,Daviwas to place the responsibility for justifying departures from population- equality upon the State-and to demand evidence -of the rationality
and relevance of the factors offered in defense of districts of disparate
size. The failure to produce a rational explanation for Virginia's redistricting acts of 1962 proved fatal.
Judge Hoffman's dissent argued that because the U.S. Supreme
Court had provided only limited guidance ,inthe reapportionment
area, the inequalities in Virginia's 1962 redistricting acts did not conclusively constitute invidious discrimination. Judge Hoffman was impressed with the relative standing of Virginia's- apportionment. in
42Ibid.
431d.at 585.

"441bid.
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comparison to the representative nature of other state legislatures.45
Data furnished the Court by the State indicated that at that time, Virginia ranked 10th among the states in the minimum proportion of
population that could elect majorities in both legislative houses. He
also noted that even the extreme disparities in the size of Virginia
districts were considerably less than in other states where apportionment systems had been invalidated and in some cases upheld in the
courts. Judge Hoffman contended that there were too many unanswered questions about apportionment to justify invalidating Virginia's redistricting effort. He felt that State courts should have an
opportunity to, assess the apportionment system while the District
Court retained jurisdiction. If the State courts invalidated the apportionment using superior knowledge of local conditions, the General
Assembly could reexamine State policies and Federal interference
might be unnecessary. Nevertheless, Judge Hoffman's principal difference with the majority lay in his conviction that insufficient guidelines
existed to decide the case. It is significant that he did not suggest that
he was impressed by the relevance of military population or, other
factors cited in defense of the redistricting.
The Court entered a judgment declaring the 1962 redistricting acts
invalid -but stayed the effect of the injunction until January 31, 1963,
so that either an appeal could be taken to the U.S. Supreme Court
or a special session of the General Assembly could be convened to
reapportion. The Court retained jurisdiction of the case but said that
further stays would have to be secured from the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Attorney General of Virginia on December 10 requested a stay
of the lower court order and Chief Justice Earl Warren issued the
stay on.December 15 to permit an appeal to the Supreme Court. The
stay permitted the General Assembly to be elected in November 1963
on the basis of the 1962 redistricting acts. On June 9, 1963, the Supreme
Court announced that it would review the lower court decision along
with cases from 5 other states. The cases were scheduled for argument beginning November 12. The decision in Dasds v. Mann was not
handed down until June 15, 1964.
In the interim, suit was filed in State court by 2 citizens of Norfolk
alleging that the 1962 redistricting acts violated § 43 of the Virginia
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Originally filed in the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, the case
45

In

the summer of 1962, Virginia ranked 8th among the states in comparative

view of the overall representative nature of state legislatures as calculated by
the Dauer-Kelsay method of assessing how representative state legislatures were
See David & Eisenberg, op. cit., supra note 20.
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was transferred to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond which
possessed exclusive jurisdiction in cases against State officials. The
move to the State court took cognizance of Judge Hoffman's dissent
in the Federal case and sought to exhaust State court remedies. Judge
Edmund W. Hening, Jr., of the Richmond court, delivered his opinion
on September 19, 1963. Citing precedents of the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia in dealing with apportionment of congressional
districts in the State,47 Judge Hening suggested that the Virginia
Court's 1932 guideline that deviations from population equality had to
be grave and unreasonable to be invalidated might be a .preferable
standard by which to evaluate apportionment. 48 Judge Hening pointed
to the responsibility of persons who assail statutes as unconstitutional
to bear the burden of establishing it. He also was guided by a presumption in favor of the reasonableness of legislative action. With these
premises, Judge Hening recited the small extremes of deviation in
Virginia's apportionment compared to those of other states and Virginia's comparative high standing among the states in the overall representative character of the General Assembly. He concluded that the
disparities in Virginia districts were not invidious in view of the accommodation of factors of compactness, contiguity, integrity of county and city boundary lines, geographic features, and community of
interests. Judge Hening concluded that the 1962 acts were marked by
"an honest and fair discretion" exercised in "good faith" by the
General Assembly. The population disparities, he said, were "in every
way reasonable and a far cry from invidious discrimination." Judge
Hening also considered the effect of excluding military population
from the computation of extreme district ratios, although he viewed
the point unnecessary to the disposition of the case. He concluded
that if military population were excluded, the 1962 acts were even
more acceptable. Therefore, he upheld the 1962 acts. Although an appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was made, no action
had occurred when the U.S. Supreme Court finally acted on the Reapportionment Cases.
The Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions revolved about the
principal opinion in Reynolds v. Sims,49 the case from Alabama. The
46

8-38 par. 9, 8-40.
Wise v. Bigger, 79 Va. 269 (1884), and Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166
S.E. 105 (1932).
4
STyler v. Davis, Civil No. B2908 Cir. Ct. of the City of Richmond, Va, Sept.
VA. CODE, S§

47

19, 1963.
4377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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court's opinion in Dasis v. Mann50 was written by Chief Justice Warren
with only Justice Harlan in dissent. The Supreme Court held that both
houses of the Virginia General Assembly were not apportioned sufficiently on a population basis and that they were therefore unconstitutionally apportioned, thereby sustaining the District Court decision.
Chief Justice Warren noted that in Reynolds v. Sims the Supreme
Court "held that the Equal Protection Clause requires that seats in
both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned substantially on a population basis." Against that standard, the 1962 redistricting acts were deficient in their relation to a population base.
Even though Virginia had reapportioned regularly, the Court said
"state legislative malapportionment, whether resulting from prolonged
legislative inaction or from failure to comply sufficiently with federal
constitutional requisites, although reapportionment is accomplished
periodically, falls equally within the proscription of the Equal Protection Clause." 51
The Supreme Court also explicitly rejected the argument that the
underrepresentation of Arlington, Fairfax, and Norfolk was constitutional because of their large military-related populations. Chief Justice
Warren asserted: "Discrimination against a class of individuals, merely
because of the nature. of their employment, without more being
shown, is constitutionally impermissible." 52 In addition, the Chief Justice noted that there was no evidence that the legislature had "in
fact" taken military population into account in devising its apportionment system, and cited the District Court's opinion in this regard. He
also took notice that Virginia statutes fostered voting by military-related personnel by waiving registration and poll tax requirements for military personnel and in applying the. same residence requirements for
voting to military personnel .as for other citizens.of the State. Even if
military personnel were to be. excluded from the population of legislative districts, Warren pointed out, the.variations between the smallest and largest districts, in each house would still be excessive. It is
difficult to ascertain what the Chief Justice contemplated by implying
that discrimination against a class of individuals might be sustained if
enough were shown. Ffuitheriore, in pointing out that the deviations
were excessive' even if 'such exclusions were permissible, the Chief
Justice seems to suggest that somehow not counting some individuals
because of employment can, be supported. It seems, however, that un50377 US. 678 (1964)..

"5IdM at 691.
52bid.

.
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less employment carries very temporary residence, perhaps less
than the applicable State residence requirements, there are few instances where exclusion would be justified.
The opinion proceeded to rebut the other arguments offered in support of the 1962 redistricting. The argument that the apportionment
was designed to balance urban and rural political power was met by
pointing out that urban areas in Virginia were not all treated in the
same fashion. The Court cited the adequacy of representation given
to Richmond in contrast to that extended to Arlington, Fairfax, and
Norfolk. This logical defect in the defense of the 1962 redistricting
had been obvious since the passage of the legislation. Examples of
other urban areas adequately represented in the 1962 statutes were
Virginia Beach, Lynchburg, and Danville. Allusions to the inequities
of the Electoral College in defense of the redistricting were also rejected by referring to the Court's rejection in Reynolds of the Federal
analogy argument.
The Court did not discuss remedies at length, but noted that
sufficient time remained before the next legislative elections to give
the General Assembly an opportunity to devise valid apportionment
statutes. The Supreme Court noted that the District Court had retained jurisdiction in the case and assumed that the lower court would
take further action if the legislature failed to take constitutionally
valid action.
The District Court on September 18, 1964, reaffirmed its previous
order of November 28, 1962, but stayed enforcement until December
15, 1964, to give the General Assembly an opportunity to reapportion
both legislative houses.5 The District Court also declared that the
terms of incumbent senators would end at the expiration of the -terms
of the delegates elected in 1963. Thus, the Court interrupted'the 4year terms of the entire Senate, who were supposed to hold office until
January 1968. The Court also declared that the incumbent General
Assembly could enact legislation only after it had enacted a constitutionally, valid apportionment plan. Finally, the Court retained
jurisdiction in the case in the event that the General Assembly -failed
to act or produced an unacceptable apportionment plan.
Judge Bryan justified the interruption of senators' terms in asserting
that to permitto act -in 1,966 a legislature composed of 1. constitutionally valid house and 1 constitutionally invalid house would
not be constitutionally justifiable. Both houses form -a single legis53
Mann v. Davis, 238 F. Supp. 458 (ED. Va. 1964), order'on mhdatf-238
. "I
F. Supp. 459.
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lature and to be constitutionally valid I house could not be permitted to lag behind the other in the equality of representation.
This view took proper notice of the fact that the legislative process
involves both legislative houses, and that the principle of equal representation in 1 house is effectively diluted if the 2d chamber is not
apportioned equally. To be effective, equal representation is required in both houses of a legislature, when viewed, as all of the apportionment cases were, in terms of the right to vote. An individual
hardly realizes an equally effective vote if he has an equal voice in 1
house but a diluted vote in the 2d.

The State responded to the District Court's order by seeking a
stay to appeal again to the U.S. Supreme Court. But the petition was
denied without comment-M and Virginia faced the problem of devising
a constitutionally valid apportionment plan.
Governor Harrison called a special session of the General Assembly
to meet on November 30 to reapportion itself. Appropriate legislation
was passed by both houses on December 2 and signed by the Governor
on the next day so that the General Assembly could proceed to consider other legislative matters. The patient wait by the legislature
for the Governor to affix his signature to the legislation reflected
the seriousness with which the General Assembly viewed the directions of the District Court.55 The 1964 redistricting acts extended
to the areas involved in the litigation the representation to which
population entitled themY8 In addition to the 2 senators that Fairfax
County and Falls Church alone were to elect, Arlington was allotted
4 delegates; Norfolk its 7 delegates and a 3d senator; Fairfax County
and Falls Church were to elect 6 delegates, and together with Alexandria another delegate, and with Arlington County another senator.
The 1964 redistricting reduced the extreme variations between districts in the House to 1.53-1.00 and in the Senate to 1.37-1.00. Majorities of the membership could be elected by 47.7% of the population of
the State in the House and 48.2% in the Senate. The 1964 reapportionment satisfied both the original plaintiffs from Northern Virginia and
the intervening plaintiffs from Norfolk: they did not return to the
court to seek additional corrective action.
To this point, the Virginia apportionment cases offered little in
the way of surprises in their progress or outcome. After Baker v. Carr
54

Davis v. Mann, 379 U.S. 694 (1965).

55

Daffron, Assembly Speedily Passes Bills to Redistrict Virginia, Lynchburg

News, Dec. 2, 1964, p. 1.
61964 Special Session Acts, c. 1 and 2.
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and the development of litigation elsewhere, it seemed that the Virginia apportionment was destined to be invalidated unless the U.S.
Supreme Court were to permit wide variations in the size of legislative
districts and thereby run the risk of committing itself to some fixed
tolerable ratio of inequality. This move would not only be inconsistent
with principles of equal representation but also invite difficulty in
uniformity, and exploitation by state legislatures. Even if the Court had
been more lax in interpreting the population requirements of equal
representation, Virginia was confronted with a historic reliance upon
population as the principal standard for apportioning both legislative
houses, with little evidence that military population was a factor seriously considered by the General Assembly in redistricting in 1962 or
even uniformly evident, and with little consistency in the manner in
which some areas received overrepresentation and others underrepresentation. It was difficult, therefore, to characterize the statutes as
rational in design.
The next and final stages of litigation affecting Virginia's legislative
apportionment raised more difficult questions, those of gerrymandering. The 1964 reapportionment was challenged by 3 groups of voters
resident in the City of Richmond, Henrico County, and Shenandoah
County who alleged that because of the legislative districts in which
these governmental units were placed the Equal Protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was violated. Three separate questions relating
to the districting process and its relation to the one man-one vote
principle of representation were raised. Judges Bryan, Lewis, and
Hoffman heard the suits, exercising the jurisdiction which the Court
had retained. 57
The Henrico County petitioners claimed that they were injured in
the effectiveness of the vote which they could cast because Henrico
County was combined with the City of Richmond into a single legislative district to elect 8 delegates on an at-large basis. Therefore, it
was alleged that the 117,339 people of Henrico would suffer adversely
because, theoretically, the 219,958 people of Richmond would dominate the district; hence, Henrico residents would not be able to elect
an Henrico resident to office. The Henrico petitioners noted that
Richmond alone was entitled to 5 delegates and Henrico County to
almost 3 by themselves. Noting that Virginia cities and counties
traditionally were allotted whole numbers of representatives when they
had sufficient population to merit them, the petitioners alleged invidious discrimination to dilute the effectiveness of their votes. They
57

Mann v. Davis, 245 F. Supp. 241 (ED. Va. 1965).
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also pointed to the fact that the 1964 reapportionment established
Richmond and Henrico as separate Senate districts.
The Court resolved the question by examining the composition of
legislative districts solely in terms of the population of the respective
districts. The claim of the Henrico citizens was rejected. The Court
cited Fortson v. Dorsey58 to note that multi-member districts and
multi-county or city-county districts are constitutional. Similarly,
the Court commented that because a legislator was elected fromone
part of a district rather than another did not invalidate the district, It
also commented that Henrico had not complained of the 1962 redistricting when Henrico elected 1 delegate and shared 8 others with
Richmond.
.The Court: asserted that the principle of the integrity of city -and
county boundary lines was not violated because Richmond. and
Henrico still were separate Senate districts. Presumably alluding to
the rationale for bicameral legislatures, the Court saw no inconsistency
in having House districts devised differently from Senate districts. The
logic of the design was evidently to "'balance off minor inequities,"'
sanctioned in Reynolds. In further evaluating the rationale of the Richmond-Henrico district, the Court noted the close geographic, resi....
dential, and economic interests of the 2 units.
'Central to the Court's validation of the district was the conclusion
that in neither Richmond nor Henrico did the district devalue -the
votes of residents. The Court was clearly impressed by the fact 'that
the 8 delegates allotted to the city and county each represented 42;164
persons, closer to -the ideal of 39,669 than the alternatives suggested
by Henrico. If Richmond were to elect 5 delegates, each would -represent 43,992 persons, or 90% of perfectly equal representation; if
Henrico elected '3representatives each would represent 39,113 persons,
or 101% of perfectly equal representation. The 42,164 persons which
each of the 8 delegates represented under the 1964 reapportionment
amounted to 94% of ideally equal representation. Hence the deviation
from equality was only 6% -under the 1964 acts but - would be 10%
under the alternative proposal. Because the 1964 statutes provided
"representation fairly nearing the par," the Court refused to invalidate
the district.5 9 In addition to the other factors cited above, the population equality feature of the district seemed to determine the outcome.
• An allegation of racial gerrymandering was made by Richmond
Negro citizens against the same Richmond-Henrico delegate districts
M379 U.S. 433 (1965).
Mann v. Davis, supra note 57, at 245.
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although they also leveled the same charge against the Richmond
Senate district, which was elected 2 senators-at-large throughout the
city. They stressed that Negroes constituted 42% of the population
of Richmond but only 29% of the population of the combined Richmond-Henrico district. Thus, it was contended that by being united
with predominantly-white Henrico County, Negroes in Richmond
suffered a dilution of the effectiveness of their vote insofar as it would
be more difficult to elect a Negro to the General Assembly. The
remedy sought was "twofold. First, it was suggested.-that Richmond
and Henrico County be separated as delegate districts so that each
political subdivision elected its own delegates. The proposal paralleled
that of the Henrico residents in suggesting that Richmond. elect 5
delegates and Henrico 3 delegates. Second, it was suggested. that the
5 delegates, and the 2 senators, then elected from Richmond should be
elected from single-member districts of equal population. The result, it was suggested, would make Negro votes effective so that a
Negro might be elected to the legislature. This effect would-follow
because Negroes in Richmond lived in compact areas, and *ith singlemember districts Negroeswould elect at least 1 delegate and possibly I
of the 2 senators. To marshal arguments in support of thii position,
the Negro residents suggested, that the intent of the State's constitutional and statutory provisions was to elect legislators from districts
without regard to county and city boundary lines. They thus alleged
a deprivation of rights under both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.
Judge Bryan disposed -of these contentions rather' summarily in
upholding the validity of Rchmond-Henico district against this atnack. First, Bryan noted the upholding of the district against"-the
challenge of Henrico'Courity residents. Second, he concluded that the
discrimination on racial grounds was not evident in the case. The
at-large system of representation, Judge Bryan emphasized; had deep
historic roots in Virginia legislative elections. Single-member districting or subdistricting had never been used in Virginia cities or counties
entitled to more than a single legislator. With this background, it
was clearly difficult to prove that continued adherence to multi-member distxicts was motivated by racial considerations. Judge Bryan buitressed his conclusion by noting the at-large system for electing Richmond city councilmen, "without question by either race?" 0 The
consistent record of using multi-member districts in particular made
the case for single-member districts difficult to sustain. Perhaps the
6llhid.

316

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIII

more effective argument for a dilution of the Negro vote lay in the
challenge to the Richmond-Henrico district. But the general problem
of proving racial discrimination in diluting voting rights is illustrated
by the conflicting claims put forth by Richmond Negroes on the one
hand and Henrico whites on the other. Each group claimed an attempt
to dilute the votes of residents of each of the 2 components of the
district. The Negro cause was undoubtedly damaged by the Henrico
claim which, it should be stressed, was equally genuine.
Judge Bryan's response to the allegation of racial gerrymandering
was:
The concept of "one person-one vote" we understand, neither
connotes nor envisages representation according to color. Certainly it does not demand an alignment of districts to assure success
at the polls of any race. No line may be drawn to prefer by race
or color.8 1
This view of the question was in accord with the U. S. Supreme
Court's decision in Wright v. Rockefeller8 2 and even with the principles enunciated in dissent in that case by Justice Douglas, whom
Judge Bryan quoted in his opinion. The District Court's hesitancy to
act on these gerrymandering questions was mirrored by subsequent
judicial reluctance to enter the morass this issue involved. The virtues
of relying upon population as the primary standard of the one man-one
vote principle and putting the burden upon the State to explain deviations from a population standard was evident in the Court's accepting
approximations of population equality in gerrymandering allegations
and allocating the burden of proof to those charging a gerrymander.
The disposition by the Court of the gerrymandering allegation by
Shenandoah County residents also illustrates the reliance upon the
population standard in examining the validity of districts. Shenandoah
County with its 21,825 population had constituted a single district
to elect 1 delegate in the 1962 redistricting, and hence was one of the
most overrepresented areas in the State. But the 1964 reapportionment
placed Shenandoah County along with Page County, with its population of 15,572, into a legislative district with Rockingham County and
the City of Harrisonburg, which made for an additional population
of 52,401, to elect 1 delegate. But Rockingham and Harrisonburg
alone constituted another district to elect 1 delegate, an application of
Virginia's use of "floater districts." The Court focused upon the 461jbid.
62376 US. 52 (1964), cited in Mann v. Davis, supra note 57, at 245.
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unit district and noted that district's deviation from the ideal district

population of 39,669. The injustice of the district's size was compensated for Rockingham and Harrisonburg by their additional delegate, but "Shenandoah with Page suffers from a clear underrepresentation." s Invidious discrimination against Shenandoah County thus
was proved. The Court found the disparity in population figures alone
sufficient to prove the discrimination, as it had when examining the
1962 statutes in the absence of any demonstration of rationale by the
State. The contrast to the Court's approach in the Richmond-Henrico
district is obvious and without population equality as a feature of the
Shenandoah situation the district was doomed.
The Court itself acted to correct the Shenandoah situation because of the proximity of the filing dates for candidates in the primary
election. The Court felt there was not enough time for the General
Assembly to meet to rectify the situation. The Court set aside the 1964

act's provisions concerning the 2 districts and the 4 governmental
units and ordered that Harrisonburg, Rockingham, Page, and
doah counties constitute a single district to elect 2 delegates.
the 2 delegates, then, the Court noted, would represent 45,380
"above the proper ratio" but not "an unfair approach in the

ShenanEach of
persons,
circumstances." " The Court also expressed its approval of the 1964 act.
Efforts by the Henrico and Richmond citizens to have the U. S.
Supreme Court review the dismissal of their allegations were unsuccessful.65
II. CONGRESSIONAL DisTucTs
Congressional districts in Virginia have also been subjected to attack
in court. The 1962 session of the General Assembly which reapportioned the legislature did not redistrict the State's 10 congressional
districts. The 1960 Census had revealed population disparities from
356,000 to 539,000 among the congressional districts.
The Commission on Redistricting, reporting to the 1962 legislature,
concluded that it was unnecessary to reapportion congressional representation.6 The Commission's logic was that the failure of the State to
lose a congressional seat as a result of the census permitted existing
districts to continue to be valid. The Commission's view was that
congressional districts, if valid when created, remained valid despite
63Mann

v. Davis, supra note 57, at 246.

0I4bid.
WBurnette v. Davis, 382 US. 42 (1965).
OGREPoRT OF THE COMMISSION ON REDISTRICTING,

op. cit., supra note 28, at 6-7.
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subsequent changes in their populations. The Commission conceded
that there were considerable population disparities among legislative
districts. To remedy such disparities, the Commission concluded,
would require the abandonment of a consistent Virginia practice, the
principle of the integrity of county and city boundary lines in constructing congressional districts. The Commission also suggested that
to alter overpopulated districts would violate other relevant districting
criteria, such as contiguity, compactness, and community of interest.
For these reasons, and acknowledging the extensive continuity of
service by Virginia Congressmen, which the Commission noted might
be upset by rearranging districts, no congressional redistricting plans
were offered. This conclusion was postulated despite the citation of
the requirements of § 55 of the Constitution.
The first constitutional reference to a principle of equality in congressional district apportionment was found in the 1830 Constitution6
which required congressional representation to be "apportioned as
nearly as may be amongst the several counties, cities, boroughs, and
towns of. the State, according to their respective numbers." The
numbers of course included only 3/5 of slaves and excluded "Indians
not taxed." :

The origins of the provisions of § 55, requiring congressional districts to be composed of "contiguous and compact territory containing as -nearly as practicable, an equal number of inhabitants," are found
in the 1851 Constitution. 8 That Constitution provided that the State
was to be divided into districts of "contiguous counties, cities and
towns, be compact, and include, as nearly as may be, an equal number
of the population." Similar provisions were found in the 1864 and 1869
Constitutions. 9 The modifications of this language in the 1902 Constinon, which now are effective, appear not to have been a matter of discussion at the 1901-02 Convention.
The suit by Norfolk residents attacking congressional districts in
Virginia, styled Wilkins v. Dauis,70 was -initiated in State courts, and,
since a -iolation of the State Constitution was alleged, the Supreme
71
Court of Appeals of Virginia heard the case in the first instance.
Behind the litigatioi in 1963 lay a direct precedent in Virginia on
the very question of congressional districts: Brown v. Saunders in
-

7

.6 VA. CoNsr. 1830, art. "III, 6.
8
6 VA. CoNsr. 1851,
69

art. IV, §5 13-14.
Hi 13-14; VA. CoNSr. 1869, art. V, iS 12-15.'
.
7OWilkins v. Davis, 205 Va. 803, 139 S.E. 2d 849 (1965).
VA. CoNsT. 1864, art. IV,

71VA.

CoN sr., art. VI, 5 88.-

.:
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193272 had invalidated the congressional districts enacted by the General Assembly in that year. The Virginia Supreme Court had decided
Brown strictly on State constitutional grounds in matching the 1932
redistricting against § 55 of the Constitution. The Court in Brown
conceded the impossibility of achieving mathematical equality of districts and the inevitability of some variation from the ideal size,
particularly when in Virginia there was an "unbroken custom to refrain from dividing any county or city into separate districts." 73
The Court traced the use of population as the standard for congressional districts in Virginia for over 100 years and declared:
Mathematical exactness, either in compactness of territory or
in equality of population, cannot be attained, nor was it contemplated in the provisions of section 55. The discretion to be exercised should be an honest and fair discretion, the result revealing an attempt, in good faith, to be governed by the limitations enumerated in the fundamental law of the land. No small
or trivial deviation from equality of population would justify or
warrant an application to a court for redress. It must be a grave,
palpable and unreasonable deviation from the principles fixed by
the.Constitution. No exact dividing line can be drawn 7 4
Moving on to the merits of the case, the Court asserted:
Applying these principles to the facts, there can be no uncertainty in the conclusion to be reached in the case under consideration. The inequality is obvious, indisputable 'and excessive. No
argument is needed. It is demonstrated by the statement of facts7 5
Hence, the Court invalidated the 1932 redistricting .and ordered the
State's 9 congressmen elected at large.
Table II, which is set forth .on page 320, illustrates the variations in
the populations of the 9 districts in 1932 and of the 10 districts in 1964.
It is clear that the 1964 districts had greater disparities in their absolute
population size than those in 1932. The extent of underrepresentation
of the Second and Tenth districts in 1964 was significant. However,
the ratio of the largest to the smallest district in 1964 was 1.69 to 1
compared to 1.83 to 1 in 1932.
A petition for a writ of mandamus was filed in the Supreme Court
of Appeals of. Virginia. on April. 10, 1964, by a resident of, Norfolk
i159

Va. 28.

731d. at 37.
741d. at 43-44.
751d. at 45.
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TABLE II
POPULATION OF VIRGINIA CONGRESSIONAL DrsTR cps,

1932

1932

DiSTRICr

Population

1 .......
2.......

AND

1964

1964

Percent
Variation Variafrom
tion
Ideal
from DisTRiCr
Size
Ideal

Population

Percent
Variation Variafrom
tion
Ideal
from
Size
Ideal

+ 27,182
+ 98,850
+ 22,639
- 43,235
- 69,453
- 16,578
- 82,552

Size

Size

239,835
302,715
3........ 288,939
4...... 212,952
5....... 251,090
6....... 280,708
7....... 336,654

-29,257
+33,623
+19,847
-56,140
-18,002
+11,616
+67,562

-10.9
+12.5
+ 7.4
-20.9
- 6.7
+ 4.3
+25.1

1 ......
2 ......
3......
4 ......
5 ......
6......
7......

422,624
494,292
418,081
352,157
325,989
378,864
312,890

8.......

-85,158

-31.6

8......

357,461 - 37,469

- 9.6

9.......325,024 +55,932 +20.8
9.
....................... 10 ......

364,973 - 30,469
527,098 +131,656

-

183,934

269,092 = Ideal population per district

+ 6.9
+25.0
+ 5.7
-10.9
-17.6
- 4.2
-20.9
7.7
+33.3

395,442 = Ideal population per district

to compel the State Board of Elections to certify only candidates at
large for election to Congress because the existing districts violated
S 55 of the Virginia Constitution and rights guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution. The decision in Wilkins v. Davis was handed down on
January 18, 1965, in an opinion written by Justice Buchanan.7 6 The
Court invalidated the 1952 redistricting acts and ordered that until the
General Assembly enacted constitutionally valid congressional districts, only elections at large for Congress could be held.
The Court rejected the defendant's arguments that military population could properly be excluded in determining the number of inhabitants in congressional districts. Justice Buchanan reported that
the Court was "not convinced that the military personnel constitute
a permissible exclusion." 77 He noted that military population were
included in the determination that Virginia was entitled to 10 congressmen. The Court also cited Dais v. Mann78 in rejecting the military
personnel.deductibility.argument.
Justice Buchanan then proceeded to determine whether the variations in the district populations were excessive. He noted the difficulties of drawing district lines to achieve mathematical equality and
to achieve effective community of interest, remarked that "from the
standpoint of community of interest alone this record would show
"MSupra
note 70.
7
lSupra note 70, at 808.
7
sSupra note 57, cited in Wilkins v. Davis, supra note 70, at 809.-
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little reason for disturbing the boundaries of the present districts,"
and continued:
But community of interest is not the only requirement, or even
one of the requirements spelled out in the Constitution. There
must be, as nearly as practicable, an equal number of inhabitants
in the districts. 7
The Court then proceeded to note the inequalities in the districts,
particularly those in the Second and Tenth districts. The Court concluded that the record did not disclose that the districts as composed
were as nearly equal as practicable, or that alternative districts could
not be constructed that were as equal as practicable as well as compact
and contiguous. Because the requirements of § 55 were violated, the
districts were invalid.
Justice Buchanan also pointed out that the congressional districts
were invalid when pitted against the U.S. Constitution. He cited the
U.S. Supreme Court holding in Wesberry v. Sanderss0 that Article I
required members of the House of Representatives to be chosen by
the people. Wesberry had held that "as nearly as is practicable one
man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's," and that "it was population which was to be the basis of the
House of Representatives." After reviewing the U.S. Supreme Court's
actions and opinions in Baker v. Carrs ' and Reynolds v. Sims,8 2 the
Virginia Court concluded that the congressional districts could not be
upheld because they violated the Federal Constitution "as construed
and applied" by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Justice Buchanan affirmed the duty of the General Assembly to
reapportion the congressional districts so that the constitutional requirements of equality of population and compactness and contiguity
were realized. In addition, the General Assembly could "so far as can
be done without impairing the essential requirement of substantial
equality in the number of inhabitants among the districts, give effect
to the community of interests within the districts." 83 But clearly, to
the Court, substantial equality of population was the most vital ingredient of a constitutionally valid apportionment plan. The remedy
the Court offered was at-large elections if the General Assembly failed
to reapportion congressional districts.
79Wilkins v. Davis, supra note 70, at 810.
80376 U.S. 1 (1964).
81369 U.S. 186 (1962).
82377 US. 533 (1964).
83
Supra note 70, at 813.
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Once again, Governor Harrison called the General Assembly into
special session for reapportionment purposes. The special session convened on August 31 and met for only 4 days. New congressional districts were enacted which were based on substantial equality of population and preserved what seemed feasible, of the compactness and
contiguity requirements." Even community of interest considerations
seemed to be accommodated. No challenge to the 1965 congressional
districts was forthcoming and the first elections under that districting
scheme were held in the primary election on July 12, 1966.' The
populations of the 10 districts and the disparities among them: ard contained in Table IM. The ratio of the largest district to the smallest is
now merely 1.11 to 1.
TABLE III
PoPuLATIoN

OF

1965

VIRGINIA CONGRESSIONAL DisTICrs,:

DisTRieT

1...........

Population

...........

2 .................................

3 .......
4......

.

.

......"..........

*:.......................

5..................................
'6..................... ......... ...
7.................................
8..................................
9..................................
10 ..................................
395,442

-

Variation
from

Ideal Size

401,052

+ 5,610

408,494

.+ 13,052 .

419,642
386,712

386,179

381,611
377,511
398,951
386,965
407,312

Percent
Variation

from
Ideal Size

..+1.4

+24,200

-+6.1

. 3

- 8,730

:,-.2

- 9,263
-13,831

-17,931
+ 3,509
- 8;477'
+11,870.

-2.4

"

.:,-.3.5
q4.5
0:9
. -2.1
'+3.0

Ideal population per district

The litigation which. produced reapportionments of Virginia .legislative and congressional districts has not yet produced any revQlutions
in the constitutional, legal, or political systems of Virginia. The implications of Wesberry85 and Reynolds"0 require the use of. population
as the. standard for future apportionment, but this standard is clearly
not new to Virginia. The primary effect of the decisions is to ,return
Virginia to the apportionment standard to which in its own Constitution the State committed itself many years ago. It also marked a return
to the legislative standard the State itself applied until the 1950 Census
841965 Special Session Acts, c. 1.
85Supra note 80.
SGSupra note 82.
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demonstrated the increasing urbanization, and its concentration, in the
Commonwealth. Attempts to dilute the population standard since 1950
have been arrested and reversed by the litigation, and future efforts
to amend the standard prevented.
The ultimate political effects of these cases in Virginia are unclear.
Efforts to prevent urban populations from wielding political weight
equivalent to their numbers has failed, hence the urban character
of the State will be reflected in legislative as well as executive institutions. Policy-making in the State, therefore, will take place in the context of equal voting power for all of the State's people. This return
to the traditional Virginia view of representation offers the State
the opportunity to reassert its vital governmental role in responding to
the needs of the Commonwealth as perceived by its people. Political
realities under a one man-one vote standard will insure this response.
It is preferable to retain the democratic principles of Virginia
government even through involvement in the "Reapportionment Revolution" than to have distorted them through legislative action.
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NOTE

NOTE
AUTOMOBILE SAFETY:

A DIAGNOSIS OF AN -EPIDEMIC

Our country is currently faced with a major epidemic on'its highways. The severity and magnitude of this problem are such that it
demands intensive and immediate action, yet our current efforts in
curtailing the number of deaths and injuries caused by automobiles
have been ineffective and misdirected. The problem has reached such
grave proportions and poses such a serious threat to the safety of
every individual in our society that there is an immediate need for
the formulation of a national policy on automobile safety.' From
1900 through 1964 motor vehicles have accounted for 1,510,000 deaths
in the United States, while war deaths from 1775 through 1964 totaled only 605,000.2 We have well-established military and foreign
policies, yet there has been no manifestation of a national policy on
automobile safety. We must act now to launch an effective attack
against this carnage on our highways. This action should be directed
primarily toward producing safer automobiles, for it is the vehicle not
the driver that is the major factor in producing injury and death in
automobile accidents.3
To realize the danger and magnitude of this threat to our national
safety, it is perhaps best to examine some statistics concerning, automobile accidents. In'1965 49,000 Americans died in autmobile accidents.4 The annual death toll remained at about 37,506 for over a
generation until 1962 when deaths from automobile accidents exceeded 40,000 for the first time." Despite the increase in fatalities
caused by automobile accidents, the number of deaths per miles of
travel had been constantly decreasing 7 until 1962 when that figure
lIn a recent message to a meeting of the American Trial Lawyers Association,
President Johnson said, "'You and I know ... that the gravest problem before
this nation-next to the war in Vietnam-is the death and destruction, the
shocking and senseless carnage, that strikes daily on our highways and that takes
a higher and more terrible toll each year.'" The National Observer, Feb. 7, 1966,

p. 15, col. 1.
2112 Cong. Rec. 1841 (daily ed. Feb. 2,1966).
3

1fra note 39.

4The National Observer, Feb. 7, 1966, p. 1, col.
GMoynihan, Public Health and Traffic Safety, 51 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 93
(1960).
CO'Connell, Taming the Automnobile, 58 Nw. U.L. Rev. 299 -(1963).
7
Moynihan, supranote 5.
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also started to rise." As grim as these figures may be, they do not tell
the entire story. They are somewhat misleading because the majority
of accidents result in injuries rather than death. "For every fatal
injury there are upwards of 125 non-fatal injuries." 9 Thus a better
measure of the magnitude of the problem is the number of non-fatal
injuries, yet these statistics are much harder to ascertain and are much
less reliable than the death figures. 10 According to the National Health
Survey, there are about 4,500,000 people injured in vehicular accidents
annually, and of these, approximately 200,000 suffer some permanent
disability." In addition to the tremendous loss of health and life,
traffic accidents result in great economic loss. They result in "wage
losses of $1,550,000,000, property damage of $1,850,000,000, medical
expenses of $150,000,000, and overhead insurance costs of $1,750,000,000,", 12 a total of $5.3 billion.
These figures indicate the enormity of the problem and the threat
it poses to our health and economy; yet the problem continues to
grow, and there has been little effective effort directed at its correction. When we consider how long the problem has existed and contrast it with the progress made in other fields of public health,' 3 "it
has become something of a national scandal, one of the series of problems that seem to defy solution by a democratic free-enterprise
society." 14
There are several reasons why the problem continues to grow. The
indifference of the automobile manufacturers to the problem and their
refusal to initiate effective voluntary improvements is certainly one
of the reasons.
Automobile manufacturers utilize their tremendous resources and
their brilliant array of engineering talent to enhance the appear8

Deaths per 100,000,000 miles:

Total Fatalities

1961
1962
1963

5.2
5.3
5.5

38,091
40,804
43,564

1964

5.7

47,700

Kennedy, "Why Can't We Make Cars Safer?," Popular Science, Nov. 1965,
pp. 63, 64.

SMoynihan, supra note 5, at 94.
'OHearings on S. Res. 56 Before the Subco7mnittee on Executive Reorganization of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 260-61 (1965) [hereafter cited as 1965 Hearings pt. 1].
:"O'Connell, supra note 6, at 302.
121d. at 303.
1SMoynihan,
supranote 5, at 93.
14 Moynihan, The Legal Regulation of Automobile Design, Passenger Car Design and Highway Safety, 265, 276 (1961).
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ance of their product, to boost the horsepower and improve the
compression ratio of the engines, and to make driving effortless by
power equipment. They do everything except apply the intelligence of the average school boy to protecting the lives of the
peoples who ride in their automobiles. 15
Another major factor in the continuing epidemic is the futility of the
present approaches to traffic safety. 16
The present approaches to correcting the automobile safety problem are constantly directed toward the human element-the driver.
This is due primarily to the fact that the overwhelming number of
automobile accidents are the result of human error.' 7 Thus the tendency has been to direct all efforts at reducing death and injury toward
the cause of the accident rather than toward the design of the vehicle
which is the main factor in causing injury.' Drivers have generally
been regarded as law observers who follow legal regulations regardless
of any tendency that might arise from the design of their vehicles.' 9
The current approaches to the problem are directed toward accident
prevention and can be divided into 3 main groups: (1) exhorta20
tion, (2) civil liability, and (3) criminal punishment.
(1) The most striking example of exhortation directed toward the
driver is the ever-present highway sign proclaiming "speed kills" and
warning "slow down and live." These signs are designed to frighten
the motorist into safe driving, but probably they are completely disregarded. The average American motorist considers himself a superior
driver, and refuses to associate himself with the death and destruction
portrayed in such grizzly advertising. His basic optimism makes him
2
unable to comprehend that such terrible things will happen to him. '
' 5 Katz, The Liability in Tort or Warranty of Automobile Manufacturers for
the Inherently Dangerous Design of Passenger Automobiles, 37 Chi. B. Record
363, 364 (1955).
'0A general lack of knowledge in the field has also been an important factor
in our lack of success with the problem. 1965 Hearings pt. 1, at 282.
170'Connell, supra note 6, at 318.
'81d. at 334.
'OMoynihan, supra note 14, at 273.
20
0'Connell, supra note 6, at 306.
2t
The National Safety Council's much-publicized predictions of holiday death
tolls reflect the unreal aspect of such campaigns. "Over the years these preholiday pronouncements have lost their necromantic quality and become rather
like the posting of odds before a big race: a sure sign that exciting moments
and good times are on the way. The deaths, when they come, seem no more
real than the weekly television toll of the hired guns." Moynihan, "Epidemic on
the Highways," The Reporter, Apr. 30, 1959, p. 16.
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In fact, the odds that he will escape death are in his favor: there are
22
only 5.7 fatalities for every 100,000,000 miles traveled.
In addition to providing no specific advice except "slow down" and
"speed kills," the signs-advocating a lesser rate of speed-even if they
are heeded-are of no practical value in reducing the number of accidents, for speed is not a major factor in causing accidents. 23 A survey
conducted by the Bureau of Public Roads revealed "that for speeds
from 35 mph to 65 mph the faster you drive, the fewer accidents
you have." 24 Although higher speed is not a factor in causing accidents, it would seem that higher speeds should increase the risk of
injury to the driver, but it appears that greater speed does not correlate with more serious injury or death.25 These risks are influenced
26
more by the design of the vehicle than by raw speed.
(2) 'Imposing civil liability on the errant driver is no more effective
in improving the traffic safety problem than exhortation. It is generally agreed that the 3 basic purposes of tort law are compensation, pro~hylaxis, and punishment for fault. How effective are these
principles in improving automobile safety? In the first place, the compensatory purpose of tort law is directed toward repaying the loss
after the harm has resulted and is of no value in preventing the accident from occurring. The second purpose, prophylaxis, seldom enters
into the problem because few accidents are intentional, and most occur
without forethought of any legal consequences.27 Certainly, since the
development time of the average accident is less than 10 seconds, the
average driver is probably not thinking of his insurance coverage
during that period. It is also true that those at fault in automobile
accidents seldom pay, because of the availability, and in some jurisdictions the mandatory nature, of at least marginally adequate insur28
ance coverage.
22

Kennedy, supra note 8.
An attempt to solve the problem by cracking down on speeders was under-

23

taken by Senator Abraham Ribicoff when he was governor of Connecticut. The

result was that the number of deaths decreased slightly but the rate of accidents
and injuries increased. After 4 years of intensive enforcement of speeding
laws and suspension of licenses the chance of injury increased 8% for every
mile traveled. Moynihan, supra note 5, at 94.
24
Moynihan, supra note 5, at 94.
25
The increase in fatal injuries is relatively small in the range from 0-60 mph,
but in speeds over 60 the danger of serious or fatal injuries increases 3
times. O'Connell, supra note 6, at 309.
261d. at 309.
2t
7 ee Conrad, Automobile Accident Costs and Payments, 88-90 (Mich. Legal
Studies).
2

8Only New York, Massachusetts,

and North Carolina

have compulsory
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(3) In addition to involvement with civil law, the automobile safety
problem is necessarily related to criminal law. In fact, the American
people probably have more contact with their government through
the legal regulation of their automobiles than through any other
source.2 9 Naturally, the application of criminal law to automobile
accidents involves no element of compensation for its primary purpose
is the deterrence of offenses.
The threat of fines and loss of licenses may act as a more effective
deterrent to the average motorist than the threat of death or injury,
primarily because the threat of criminal punishment is not so remote
as the threat of death. However, here again too much emphasis is
placed on the driver's ability to prevent accidents rather than on the
inherent shortcomings of the vehicle.30 The result of the criminal law
31
regulation of traffic has been to make us a nation of law violators,
and there is not much evidence indicating that such regulation has
been effective in reducing accidents. Even more important is the effect
criminal regulation has had on the individual's regard for the law and
the legal process. The criminal law should have the support of society
and should be premised upon having a reasonable opportunity to
conform one's conduct to the standard required by the law. "Manifestly, a good criminal law should be clear and comprehensible; else
how is the citizen to conform and thereby be deterred?" 32 Most traffic laws are in direct conflict with this basic principle of criminal law
33
because they are essentially vague and uncertain.
Another obvious fault with the criminal law regulating traffic violations is that sanctions are imposed without regard to whether the
driver's conduct was conscious or unconscious, voluntary or involunautomobile liability insurance. Statement by State Senator Simon J. Liebowitz
(N.Y)., Chairman of the Joint Legislative Committee on Motor Vehicles, Traffic
and Highway Safety, before the Senate Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization, Feb. 3, 1966, p. 4. It has been estimated that 85% of automobile drivers
have liability insurance. Supra note 27, &t90.
2
3 9Moynihan, supra note 14, at 271.
OThis is not to suggest that driver error is not an important factor in
traffic accidents for it is a significant factor in causing accidents. O'Connell,
supra note 6, at 322-31. It is suggested, however, that this overemphasis on
driver responsibility has thus far done little to reduce effectively the great
number
of automobile accidents.
3
lMoynihan, supranote 14, at 272.

32

0'Connell, supra note 6, at 314.
331d. at 315. A recent study by the American Trial Lawyers Association,
Stop Murder by Motor, indicates that even when the law is a clear one, such
as a speed-limit law, the "driver puts too much faith in the protective power
of traffic regulations. He feels that if he obeys the traffic regulations he is
safe." 112 Cong. Rec. 1841 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1966).
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tary.34 Motor vehicle laws are governed by the principle of malum
prohibitum, which may mean that the defendant is convicted regardless of any knowledge that his act was wrongful.3 5 Thus a driver who
checks his tail lights before leaving home and finds them to be functioning properly is guilty of a violation if they later go out through
no fault of his own. His guilt thus depends upon chance and not
upon his own carelessness. How effective are such laws in promoting
safety' if the driver is found guilty regardless of the fact that he has
made every effort to comply with such laws?
The punishments established for traffic violations are seldom arrived
at rationally or scientifically, and if the sanctions are designed to serve
a specific purpose, it is usually to provide revenue rather than to deter
improper driving and accidents.3 6 The average citizen knows this and
it is certainly not conducive to respect for the law; in fact, this arbitrary application of law may encourage drivers to do all they can
to escape punishment rather than convincing them to observe traffic
laws.
No doubt there are valid arguments for the present approaches to
the automobile accident problem, but the fact remains that "the
number of violations and accidents continue to rise." 37
Rather than allowing the increasing number of deaths and injuries
on our highways to continue to mock our futile approaches to the curtailment of traffic accidents, should we not seek some new approach to
the problem? The logical answer would appear to be to approach
the problem at its crux, the vehicle itself. Rather than continuing to
direct our effort toward the driver and the multitude of human factors involved, it seems more probable that the real progress will be
made by improving the crash-resistant features of the vehicle. 8 For
34

Mueller, How To Increase Traffic Fatalities: A Useful Guide for Modern
Legislators and Traffic Courts, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 944, 957 (1960).
35Ibid.
36
0'Connell, supra note 6, at 316.
37Moynihan, supranote 14, at 272.
38Moynihan, "Epidemic on the Highways," The Reporter, Apr. 30, 1959, p. 16.
Moynihan has suggested that efforts directed toward emphasis on driver responsibility are a "most serious disservice to traffic safety" and that it "seems a little
bit like trying to stop a typhoid epidemic by urging each family to boil its own
drinking water and not eat oysters.. . ." Id. at p. 17. Our attention should be
directed toward factors we can reasonably hope to control rather than "to
factors such as the temperament and behavior of 80 million drivers, which
are not susceptible to any form of consistent, over-all control. .. " Ibid.
"Individuals are not perfect, and individuals will make mistakes, and individuals
will drive carelessly. We should do everything we can to have good drivers and
good roads ....
However, we must take into account that since millions of
people drive automobiles, and many of them are careless, at least the car they
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it is the vehicle-not the driver-that is the major factor in producing
injury and death.39 "[T] raffic accidents should come to be looked upon
as the inevitable result of putting the power of hundreds of herses
[sic] into frail human hands for use in a crowded and intractable
world of snow or darkness or glare." 40 By concentrating on the vehicle one can ignore the enormous number of variables inevitable in
dealing with individual drivers. In addition, the improvements can
be effected by a handful of automobile manufacturers rather than by
the 110 million drivers expected by 1970.41

For the purpose of this discussion we will assume that there do
exist adequate changes that can be made in the vehicle which will
effectively reduce the deaths and injuries resulting from automobile
accidents.42 The General Services Administration, purchasing agent
for the federal government, regards the following design improvements as important enough to require them on all 1967 automobiles
the Government will buy:
[P] added dash and vents, recessed instruments and controls on the
instrument panel, impact-absorbing steering wheel and steering
column, safety door latches and hinges, anchorage for seat belt
assemblies, anchorage of seats, dual-brake system, standard gear
quadrant (P-R-N-D-L), safety glass, glare reduction surfaces on
the instrument panel and windshield wipers, tires and safety rims,
exhaust emission control system to limit the amount of air-polluting elements from the tailpipe, windshield wipers and washers,
standard bumper heights, four-way flasher that will flash all signal
drive should give them as much protection as they [sic) possibly can, not only
the careless driver but the innocent victim of a careless driver." Hearings on
S. Res. 56 Before the Subcomnittee on Executive Reorganization of the Senate
Committee on Governmental Operations,89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 849 (1965)

[hereafter cited as 1965 Hearings pt. 2].
90'Connell, supra note 6, at 334. Moynihan quotes Dr. C. Hunter Shelden
writing in 159 A.M.A.J. 981 (1955): "'The accidents may occur as the result of
speed, inadequate highways, poor judgment, or mechanical failure, but none of
these actually causes the passenger injury. The injury occurs primarily as a
result of faulty interior design of the automobile:" Moynihan, supra note 38, at
20.
40

0'Connell, supra note 6, at 323.

411965 Hearingspt. 1, at 434.
42
EImer Paul of the United States Public Health Service Accident Prevention
Bureau estimates that if our cars were built differently and certain safety
devices were used, 43% of those killed in autos might be alive today:' Kennedy,
supra note 8. Ralph Nader in his book, Unsafe at Any Speed, has said that 42%
of those killed in automobile accidents have died under survivable conditions.
112 Cong. Rec. 1986 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1966)..
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lights together to warn of hazard, backup lights, outside rear48

view

mirror.

An example of the value of incorporating new safety devices in automobiles and of what can be done to improve the safety of the vehicle is a feasibility study prepared by Republic Aviation Division of
Fairchild-Hiller Corporation under the auspices of the New York State
Motor Vehicle Department. This study shows that it is feasible to
build a prototype safety car that will result in the virtual elimination
of injuries and deaths up to impact speeds of 50 mph even in head-on
collisions with another vehicle traveling at the same speed. 4" Assuming
that automobiles can be made safer, how should these changes be
made? There seem to be 2 ways to achieve the desired result: voluntary reform by the manufacturers or mandatory reform through
government regulation.
In the past, it has been the general opinion of the American people
that the automobile manufacturers are responsible firms which are
producing the safest product possible.45 However, in the light of
recent publicity and the moderate concern over traffic safety, it appears that the manufacturers are not using their resources to improve
effectively the safety of their product, and that a safer vehicle can
be manufactured. 46 Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff has said, "I think
431965 Hearings pt. 1, at 242. The General Services Administration has just recently added 9 new safety devices to this list and will require them on all 1968
models purchased: window and door controls placed either in out-of-the-way
locations or of types that would break away upon impact, recessed or break
away ashtrays, arm rests without sharp corners, padding on backs of the front
seats, electric or reflective side markers that show the outline of stopped cars
at night, rear window defrosters, roll bars for soft-top vehicles, and fuel
tanks and lines that will not burst upon impact. Richmond Times-Dispatch,
Feb. 17, 1966, p. 22.
44
Statement of State Senator Edward J. Speno (N.Y.) before Senate SubCommittee on Executive Reorganization, Feb. 3, 1966, p. 4.
45
Moynihan, supra note 14, at 273.
46This view has been expounded by Ralph Nader in Unsafe at Any Speed, a
book that has been described as "likely to be the Silent Spring of traffic safety."
150 Science 1136 (1965). Mr. Nader sums up the attitude of the automobile
industry towards the proposition that their cars could be made safer with this
quotation from a 1961 statement of General Motors President John F. Gordon:
"'The traffic safety field ... has in recent years been particularly beset by
self-styled experts with radical and ill-conceived proposals.... The general
thesis of these amateur engineers is that cars could be made virtually foolproof
and crashproof, that this is the only practical route to greater safety and that
federal regulation of vehicle design is needed. This thesis is, of course, wholly
unrealistic.... The suggestion that we abandon hope of teaching drivers to
avoid traffic accidents and concentrate on designing cars that will make col-
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the automobile industry is dragging its feet. I think the automobile
industry has a big responsibility to the American people that they
are not fulfilling." 4 Why the relative indifference of the autmobile
manufacturers?
The highly competitive nature of the automobile industry is perhaps the largest single factor in the reluctance of the manufacturers
to emphasize safety in their product. "No feature of our economy,
other than defense, so dominates the national economy." 48 These
safety innovations would necessarily increase production costs because
they would necessitate rechanneling of resources into extensive research programs, but a company like General Motors which had a
profit of $1.7 billion last year 49 could certainly absorb the initial
rechanneling cost. The production cost would then decrease as features were engineered into the vehicle.
Because of the tremendous race for sale, consumer demand is allimportant to the manufacturers; and to the consumer, styling and
appearance, not safety, are the most important factors in the choice
of a new car.r ° The automobile industry spends millions of dollars
every year in advertising its product. If this advertising is a valid
projection of consumer demand, a random sampling of the medium
shows that the consumer is not interested in safety:
A howitzer with windshield wipers. The new Buick Skylark Gran
Sport

. .

. is almost like having your own, personal-type nuclear

deterrent.5 '

action: Olds 442 .
New package of instant 52
wheels!

.

. the sweetest piece

of live action on
The Riviera with muscles on its muscles. New Riviera Gran
Sport. We have discovered... a cluster of hotbloods ...

yearn-

ing for a little more heat. 58

What sets Pontiac apart? . . . a tigerish 389-cubic inch V-8 en. . .54
gine ... and a look that others can't seem to capture
lisions harmless is a perplexing combination of defeatism and wishful thinking."'
Id. at 1136-37. See book review of Unsafe at Any Speed, this issue Wash. and
Lee L. Rev. at 445.
471965 Hearingspt. 1, at 242.
48

0'Connell, supra note 6, at 357.

491965 Hearingspt. 2, at 780.
500'Connell, supra note 6, at 357.
81

Time, Feb. 12, 1965, p. 56.

52
Thne, Jan. 5, 1965, p. 1.
53
Time, Apr. 23, 1965, p. 5.
54

Esquire, Apr. 1965, p. 41.
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If you're in'search of... size and luxury in your next car,' you
should drive a 1965 Cadillac soon.55
Buick Electra 225: . . .eloquent, long, graceful, infinitely luxu-

rious. Make the merest turn... like a cruise to Nassau.5 6

But there is no doubt that in addition to measuring public tastes, advertising is also instrumental in creating them. 57 Speed, styling, and
luxury are preeminent in the public mind. As a result the industry,
forever fearful of its future prosperity, continues to meet the buying
public's demands which the industry itself has probably created.
There are instances which illustrate the manufacturer's willingness
to undertake safety innovations voluntarily, but the ineffectiveness of
such isolated instances is further evidence of the public's lack of concern over safety and the industry's desire to preserve its solvency.
In 1956 Ford introduced various safety devices (padded dash, "deep
dished" steering wheel, safety door latches, and seat belts) and stressed
them in its advertising, while other manufacturers continued their
frenzied preoccupation with speed and power.5 8 The result of such
advertising and features was that Ford's sales dropped sharply and
that by August no further mention of the newly introduced safety
features was to be found in its advertising. Sales increased almost
immediately, but nevertheless 1956 was a poor year for Ford, and
the safety advertising was blamed. 59 Ford had learned its lesson-the
public was not interested in safety.
Since the Ford fiasco of 1956, the industry has remained firm in its
stand against safety. 60 It was not until the New York legislature
threatened compulsory installation that the manufacturers voluntarily
installed seat belts in their automobiles. 61 Congress, in spite of quiet
55

Time, Feb. 12, 1965, p. 33.
56Esquire, Apr. 1965, p. 57.
-5O'Connell, supra note 6, at 358. Mr. Roy Abernathy, President of American
Motors recognizes the effect of advertising on buyers: "I think there may be
some indication, Senator, that there are some people, particularly young people,
who are romanced by it [emphasis on speed and power] and might purchase
cars on that account. We are not against horsepower. We are against the
glamorizing of it." 1965 Hearings pt. 2, at 874.
5SMoynihan, supra note 38, p. 20.
Ibid.
60
"We have found that obsolete concepts of salability based on styling still
reign in Detroit, despite recent assurances to the contrary. As an indication,
there is no one in the automobile industry in charge of safety design who has
vice-presidential status, but each of the Big Three has a vice-president for
styling." Statement of Assemblyman Alexander Chanavau (N.Y.) before the
Senate Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization, Feb. 3, 1966.
81 0'Connell, supra note 6, at 365.
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lobbying by the automobile manufacturers, recently passed a bill requiring 17 additional safety devices in the automobiles purchased by
the General Services Administration for federal use. 2 The federal
government purchases 10,000 cars a year, and the manufacturers have
recently announced that they are voluntarily including these devices
(for example, safety door latches, anchorage of seats, dual brake
system, impact absorbing steering wheel and column) on all 1967
models produced. 63 Thus it appears that manufacturers have been
less than anxious to place the much-needed safety devices on their
automobiles; when they eventually do, it has been after considerable
pressure from the state and federal governments.
There are those who feel that the best method of encouraging the
manufacturers to undertake the task of reforming the design of their
vehicles voluntarily is fear of tort liability, 4 but the present application of the law of products liability seems sadly unable to provide
the needed impetus. Prior obstacles to placing liability on manufacturers for harm caused by defective products, such as privity of contract, have been steadily reduced in recent years, 6 5 and the expansion
of the principles of products liability to include liability for negligent
design has provided a basis for imposing liability on automobile manufacturers for the unsafe design of their vehicle." The Restatement
of Torts provides relatively adequate substantive law for holding a
manufacturer liable:
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which
makes it dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured is
subject to liability to others whom he should expect to use the
chattle or to be endangered by its probable use for physical harm
caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoptibn
7
of a safe plan or design.6
This enabling principle makes it clear that a manufacturer may be
held liable for unsafe design as well as for unsafe construction of a
vehicle, and 3 relatively recent cases have imposed liability for unsafe
62Washington Post, Apr. 1, 1965, § A, p. 39. See generally note 43 supra and

accompanying text.
OThe National Observer, Feb. 14, 1966, p.
, col.
64Katz, supra note 15, at 366.
"1The landmark cases are MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111
N.E. 1050 (1916) (negligence); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358
161 A.2d 69 (1960) (implied warranty); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.,
59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962) (strict liability).

"8Katz,Liability of Automobile Manufacturersfor Unsafe Design of Passenger
Cars, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 863 (1956).
8
IREsTATEmENr (Second), TORTS § 398, at 336 (1965).
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vehicle design. 8 However, while courts are willing to hold the manufacturer liable for injuries caused by various defects in construction, 69
they are usually reluctant to impose liability when the defect is one of
design. 70 As long as the vehicle is properly constructed and it or its components function properly and do not break down due to some defect
in construction, there is generally no liability.71
An excellent example of the willingness of courts to impose liability
on manufacturers for defects in construction and their reluctance to
72
hold them liable for defects in design is Zahn v. Ford Motor Co.
There the passenger in the automobile was thrown against the dashboard when the driver was forced to come to a sudden stop. His
head struck the jagged edge of a defectively made ashtray and his eye
was put out. He was allowed recovery from the manufacturer only
because of the defective construction of the ashtray, not because of
its negligent location or design. In so holding the court said: "If the
ashtray was properly prepared for anticipated use by owner or guest
there could be no liability on the part of Ford." 73
Thomas v. Jerominek74 is another example of the lengths to which
courts will go in refusing to impose liability for defective design. In
a suit for personal injuries the plaintiff alleged that her automobile
was constructed in an unsafe manner in that the door and window
knobs were indistinguishable. The court held that as a matter of law
the plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted because she complained "of nothing which relates to the
68
Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954);
Hyatt v. Hyster Co., 106 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on stipulation of
the parties; 205 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1953); Clark v. Zuzich Truck Lines, 344
S.W.2d 304 (Mo. Kans. City Ct. App. 1961).
69See e.g., Kanatser v. Chrysler Corp., 199 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 344 U. S. 921 (1953); Hupp Motor Car Corp. v. Wadsworth, 113 F.2d
827 (6th Cir. 1940); Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1930)
(tractor); Zahn v. Ford Motor Co, 164 F. Supp. 936 (D. Minn. 1958); Bird v.
Ford
Motor Co., 15 F. Supp. 590 (W.D.N.Y. 1936).
0

7 See e.g., Amason v. Ford Motor Co., 80 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1935); Ford

Motor Co. v. Wolber, 32 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1929) (tractor); Davlin v. Henry
Ford & Son, Inc., 20 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1927) (tractor); Thomas v. Jerominek,
8 Misc. 2d 517, 170 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Reusch v. Ford Motor Co.,
196 Wash. 213, 82 P.2d 556 (1938); Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 139 Wash. 341,
24671Pac. 945 (1926) (tractor).
Zahn v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 65; Reusch v. Ford Motor Co., supra note
70. Contra Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., supra note 67; Hyatt v.
Hyster, supranote 67.
72164 F. Supp. 936 (D.Minn. 1958).
731d at 941.
748 Misc. 2d 517, 170 N.Y.S. 2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
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existence of a latent defect .... ,, 75 It would certainly seem that a
jury of reasonable men might have found that the manufacturer had
failed to "exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan or
design," 71 but the court did not allow the case to progress beyond
77
the pleading stage.
Thus it is clear that the current attitude of the courts toward the
liability of automobile manufacturers for unsafe design of their product is far from adequate. It has been suggested that
nothing in law or fact insulates the automobile manufacturer
from liability not only for defects in construction, which we have
long recognized, but . . . [also] for the creation of unnecessary
not reasonably designed
risk by the marketing of an automobile
78
to protect the safety of its occupants.
The idea of imposing liability on a manufacturer for a negligently
designed vehicle is simply an application of the existing law of products liability to include, as it properly should, all aspects of the manufacturing process from the drawing board through the actual construction and sale of the vehicle or component part. A negligently
designed vehicle can create just as great a risk of harm as can one
which is negligently constructed. The test of liability should be not
only whether the manufacturer installed faulty door latches or ashtrays, but also whether he has created an unreasonable risk to others
by placing a negligently designed vehicle on the market. The factors
which should determine the manufacturer's liability are those stated
in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 79 by Judge Learned Hand: the
probability and magnitude of the risk weighed against the burden of
taking adequate precautions. Thus viewed it seems obvious that by
placing millions of automobiles on the road without using their tremendous engineering potential to increase the safety of their products, the manufacturers have created perhaps the greatest risk and
have effected the most extensive neglect of duty in modem times.80
There is little doubt that the courts have failed to provide the necessary incentive to force the manufacturers into voluntary reform of
751d. at 389-90.
76
77

RE rATEMENT (Second), TORTS § 398, at 336 (1965).

Accord, Amason v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 70. This case also involved

a suit based upon defective design of rear-hinged doors. The court emphasized

that plaintiff had "not charged that any defective material was used in constructing the car or that any part of it broke." Id. at 266.
78
Katz, supra note 15, at 365.
79159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
80

Katz, supra note 15, at 365-66.
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their, vehicle designs. Even though the manufacturers could be held
liable under present concepts of products liability, the real question
is whether the courts are equipped to obtain the necessary expert
knowledge to be sufficiently familiar with what in fact constitutes a
dangerous design. They would necessarily rely more upon expert
testimony than independent research, but this may be inadequately
presented or misunderstood. Moreover the necessary reforms dependent upon individual lawsuits could result in episodic reform.8 '
One writer has suggested that the problem of the court's inadequate
research machinery and knowledge in the field of design has been
caused in part by trial attorneys who have failed to realize the role
played by the automobile in accidents and injuries.8 2 Attorneys
should direct their attention to vehicle design as a primary cause of
many of the injuries stemming from automobile accidents. It is fundamental to our adversary system that courts generally act only upon
issues, raised by the litigants through their attorneys, thus issues of
negligent design will not be considered unless the attorney takes this
initial step. By effective investigation at the site of the accident and
by making use of available external engineering information,8 3 attorneys will be able to impart to the court the necessary knowledge in
the field of automobile design. As more scientific knowledge of what
constitutes safe design becomes available and as the leading instrumentalities of injury in a vehicle are made known, the manufacturer's
liability for faulty design will develop with more precision;8 4 and as
courts develop a sense of confidence in their knowledge of the field
perhaps their reluctance to impose liability will gradually disappear.
This solution to the problem might be sound if the problem were
not one that demanded immediate action. The traffic safety problem
has reached such proportions that it is imperative that the fastest possible and most effective measures be instituted to bring about the
needed reforms. The solution can most probably "be achieved better
by a consistent application of regulatory standards drawn up by
experts and kept current by research, rather than by ad hoc decisions
of inexpert judges and juries." 85
It is apparent that the manufacturers have been reluctant to make
safer automobiles without some compulsion, and the courts have been
81

0'Connell, supra note 6, at 375.
Nader, Automobile Design: Evidence Catching Up With the Law, 42 Den.
Law Cent. Jour. 32 (1965).
831d. at 33.
84Id. at 39.
8
50'Connell, supra note 6, at 375.
82
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reluctant to compel design improvements by imposing liability for
unsafe design features. Even if the courts were to begin to impose
such liability on the manufacturers, this approach is not adequate to
achieve automotive safety in the near future or under a uniform plan.
Moreover, the law of products liability probably will refuse to
compel a manufacturer "to so design a product that it can be used
carelessly with impunity," 86 thus the aim of preventing deaths and
injuries which occur as a result of driver negligence and frailties
would not be achieved. In addition, the judicial process is necessarily
slow, and it would be some time before the results of liability for
negligent design would be manifested in the vehicle itself.
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that the only realistic
approach to the automobile safety problem is some sort of government
regulation of vehicle design. But should this regulation be on the state
or federal level?
The effectiveness of state regulation would be impeded by several
8 7
important factors.

Any regulation would be far from uniform

unless the states enacted some type of uniform act, but such legislation is seldom accepted by every state, and if and when it is, it is
only after years of debate and trial and error.8 8 The lack of uniformity would hardly be advantageous to the manufacturer who could
conceivably be placed in a position of manufacturing over 50 different varieties of automobiles.89 Also, the effect such regulation might
have on interstate commerce is significant. A state would probably
be constitutionally unable to prohibit out-of-state vehicles which did
8

6Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a

Product, 71 YAI.- L.J. 816, 874 (1962).
87

Moynihan, supra note 14, at 274.
88"[T]he passing of motor vehicle equipment safety laws by individual States
is the long way toward reaching our ultimate goal of safer automobiles ....
Motor vehicle equipment safety laws have become effective by the "trickle
down" method. After one State passes a law it is picked up by another and
another until finally the manufacturers capitulate . . ." Statement by State
Senator Simon J. Liebowitz (N.Y.), Chairman of the Joint Legislative Committee
on Motor Vehicles, Traffic and Highway Safety before the Senate Subcommittee
on Executive Reorganization, Feb. 3, 1966, p. 1.
89
An exchange between Senator Ribicoff and Frederick G. Donner, Chairman
of the Board of General Motors indicates the effect this would have on the
automobile industry:
"Senator Ribicoff. Well, can the automobile industry really produce on a
mass-production basis the manufacture and sale of automobiles if you have a
different standard in 50 different states?
Mr. Donner. No, we recognize that problem."
1965 Hearingspt. 2, at 792.
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not comply with its design standards from traveling on its highways.90
Thus the states would have to exclude such interstate vehicles from
its xegulations, and the regulations would become that much less effective in promoting safety on the highways. 91 Another obstacle
would be the cost of each state's establishing the various research
facilities needed to arrive at its own minimum standards. 92 Of course,
state cooperation in research could reduce this cost.
. Even if these obstacles could be overcome, the process of establishing effective state regulation of vehicle design would take considerable time, and time is of the essence in solving a problem of this
magnitude.
Everything involved in the traffic safety problem seems to point
to the advisability of federal regulation. The problem is unquestionably a national one and can best be handled by a central government
rather than by over fifty separate governments. 93 The automobile
industry is the only major element of our transportation system that
is not required to conform to federal safety standards,9 4 and the fact
that automobiles are necessarily involved in interstate commerce certainly permits active federal involvement. 95
There is no question that the federal government is already involved
in the automobile safety problem;96 however, there is a question as to
the effectiveness of this involvement. Sixteen separate federal agencies have some role in the federal automobile safety program.9 7 The
9OAny

state regulation that prohibited the use of its highways to interstate
vehicles which did not comply with its design would probably be held unconstitutional if it imposed a substantial burden on interstate commerce. Brenner,

Legal Requirements for the Equipment and Design of Private Motor Vehicles:
State Action and National Problems, 23 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 429, 448 (1955).
91

0'Connell, supra note 6, at 378.

921d. at 379.
93
Brenner,
94

supranote 90, at 448-49.
Moynihan, supra note 14, at 276. "It should first be kept in mind that automobiles are but one of several common forms of transportation and that, although design regulation is somewhat the exception with specific regard to
automobiles, it is the norm with regard to means of transportation in general.
Furthermore, the regulation of other means of transportation is, on the whole,
carried out at the federal level."Id. at 265.
95
1n 1915 the United States Supreme Court implied that federal control of
motor vehicles for safety purposes was proper and that the states were enabled
to exercise such authority only because of the absence of federal preemptive
legislation. Henrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915). Safety regulations have
usually been looked upon with favor and "have but rarely raised either constitutional or philosophical issues . . . ." Moynihan, supra note 14, at 265.
96The most recent Federal involvement in the automobile safety problem has
taken the form of the newly signed Federal Highway Safety Act which gives the
Secretary of Commerce certain regulatory powers.
971965

Hearingspt. 1, at 1.
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Division of Accident Prevention of the United States Public Health
Service, one of the agencies involved, administered a $2,700,000 study
into why accidents occur, but only $134,000 was spent for research
in vehicle safety design.98 The most curious of the government
programs is the President's Committee for Traffic Safety, which has
an annual budget of $200,000, of which $150,000 comes from federal
funds and $50,000 from insurance and automobile industry grants. 99
Although this Committee enjoys the prestige of the President's name,
it seems to be controlled by an advisory council composed of representatives of private organizations. 100 In fact, "the Committee is
Detroit's public relations annex at the White House." l There might
be some advantage to this diversity if the findings of the various
research programs could be coordinated and exchanged, but there is
no single agency that has the responsibility for coordinating the findings of the various agencies or for prescribing policy. 12 Thus the
present federal involvement in traffic safety consists of 16 separate
agencies each working separately and lacking any single agency or
individual vested with the responsibility of coordinating all of the
03
efforts into a uniform system..
There have been several proposals for bringing about efficient federal involvement in the automobile safety problem. Perhaps the most
valid is the suggestion of former Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel
Moynihan that the proper means of formulating safety standards and
enforcing regulations would be to establish a Federal Automobile
Agency.'0 4 This agency would unite all intramural and extramural
research activities of the federal government in the field of highway
safety in one agency. Rather than concentrating only upon design
research, it should also have responsibility for research and development of highway and driver safety programs. Such an agency
would provide a centralizing element for all the independent research
that is conducted by various organizations throughout the country
and could eliminate considerable duplication of effort.
DsRidgeway, "Car Design and Public Safety," The New Republic, Sept. 19, 1964,

pp. 9, 11.
M0lbid.
lOOlbid.
lOlIbid.
1021965 Hearings,pt. 1, at 209, 233, 282.

103 0ne agency has had an employee working for months gathering information to determine how much money the federal government spends for
highway safety work and the head of that agency indicated that it would take
another
three months to get it. 1965 Hearings pt. 1, at 231, 233.
04Moynihan, supra note 14, at 279.
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Moynihan's proposal for a Federal Automobile Agency is certainly
valid as far as it goes. Centrally controlled research is necessary in
determining what can be done to prevent the growing slaughter on
our highways, but research itself is of little value unless the agency
has the authority to set minimum safety standards for the automobiles. The legislation which would establish a central research agency
should also authorize that agency to set minimum standards and to
impose sanctions on manufacturers for failure to meet those standards.
The success of any federal regulatory agency in the field of automobile safety will necessarily depend upon 2 things: (1) It is imperative that those who are chosen to serve in research capacities
in this proposed agency be the most highly qualified men available,
and those in administrative capacities should be capable of understanding the viewpoints of both government and industry. (2) The
agency should not be looked upon as a means of forcing the manufacturers to submit to arbitrary government regulation. 1 5 Of course
the purpose of the agency is some regulation, but the basic precepts
of our private enterprise system should also be preserved. If the
agency were founded upon the proposition of mutual cooperation
between the automobile industry and the central government with
the common goal of reducing the carnage on our highways, the results of such a program could be extremely rewarding.
Whatever form regulation may take, there will be opposition. It
is a psychological fact that human beings would prefer not to think
about the dangers of living, and this is particularly true of the eternally optimistic American public. As a result we tend to resent those
who force us to face the unpleasant. This resentment would most
certainly be quite intense when the public is forced to recognize the
danger inherent in its most revered symbol of pleasure, status, and
release. Notwithstanding our aversion to facing the unpleasant, we
are capable of reasonable and practical reflection upon problems that
endanger our society as a whole. The public will gradually accept
the innovations and welcome the regulation when they become fully
aware of the magnitude and severity of the problem, and when they
realize how much good that regulation can produce.
There is no simple means of determining the proportions a problem must assume before a decision is made to impose preventive
measures, but certainly if any contemporary problem deserves national
-publicity and national action, it is the epidemic rampant on our
highways.
JoN A. KERR
103d. at 279-80.
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ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION IN TORT ACTIONS
"[F]rom the very inception of the federal judiciary to the present,
federal courts have taken jurisdiction (without reference to amount
in controversy, diversity of citizenship, or the presence of any other
'federal question') of all causes of action arising under maritime law." 1
Admiralty has developed its own criteria for jurisdiction: in contracts
jurisdiction depends on subject matter; in tort jurisdiction depends on
locality.2 The Plymouth3 set forth the locality test in the broadest
terms: "Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether on
board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of
admiralty cognizance." 4 But the precise scope of admiralty jurisdiction is not a matter of "obvious principle or of very accurate history," and it has frequently been questioned whether locality is the
exclusive test of jurisdiction in tort actions or whether the tort must also
be of a maritime character.6 The exclusiveness of the locality test has
never been determined by the Supreme Court,7 and the test continues
to be questioned and attacked.
The locality test is frequently criticized in cases in which the tort
occurs upon navigable waters but does not involve a vessel and has no
relation to the maritime industry." Such a situation was presented in
Thomson v. Chesapeake Yacht Club, Inc.9 when libelant fell into
navigable waters through a hole in respondent's pier. The court held
that the locality test controlled but denied admiralty jurisdiction because the negligent act or omission became operative on libelant while
'Slaughter, Basic Principles of Admiralty, 19 Ark. L. Rev. 93, 95 (1965).

2

"The general doctrine that in contract matters, admiralty jurisdiction depends
upon the nature of the transaction and in tort matters upon the locality, has
been so frequently asserted by this court that it must now be treated as settled."
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U.S. 479, 480 (1923).
3
Hough v. The Western Transp. Co. (The Plymouth), 70 US. (3 Wall.) 20
(1865).

41d. at 36.

uThe Blackheath, 195 U.S. 361, 365 (1904).
6
E.g., Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914).
7"No definitive judicial determination was ever made as to whether locality was

the sole and exclusive test, or whether the maritime character of the -particular
tortious act was likewise a relevant jurisdictional consideration." Note, 60 Mich.
L. Rev. 208, 209 (1961).
8E.g., McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
OAdmiralty No. 4820, D. Md., Oct. 26, 1965. It should be noted that under the
saving to suitors clause, § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 76, 79 (1789),

as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1948), libelant could have proceeded as an
ordinary tort plaintiff in the Maryland court system.
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he was still on land even though libelant suffered no injury until
he struck the navigable waters. The court stated that the tort was complete before libelant touched the water and the subsequent injury
related only to the extent of damages and was not significant in determining whether this action was of a maritime nature.10 If locality is the
exclusive test of admiralty jurisdiction in tort actions, Thomson was
within the admiralty jurisdiction.
The fact that the tort in Thomson did not involve a vessel has no
bearing on the locality test.' Admiralty jurisdiction has been upheld
14
in cases involving water skiers,12 bathers,' 3 and aircraft passengers
1
despite the fact that no vessel was involved.
The crucial requirement of the locality test is that "the wrong and
injury . . . or at least, the substance and consummation of the same
must have taken place wholly upon . .. [navigable] waters." 16 Ad7
miralty has long held that when the necessary elements of the tort'
occur partly on land and partly on navigable waters, the place of the
injury constitutes the "substance and consummation" of the tort.' s
In McDonald v. Cape Cod Trawling Corp.19 a lamppost fell from
the wharf and struck a seaman aboard a vessel. The court upheld
admiralty jurisdiction stating that "this is a commonplace illustration of
the familiar general conflict of laws rule that the place of wrong is
the place where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for
lOThonson was quoting directly from Wiper v. Great Lakes Eng'r Works, 340
F.2d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 1965).

11"The jurisdiction of admiralty over maritime torts does not depend upon the
wrong
having been committed on board the vessel . .. ." Supra note 3, at 35.
2
1 King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).

' 3Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Serv. Corp, 232 N.Y. 115, 133 N.E. 371
(1921). It should be noted that in Reinhardt the court was primarily concerned
with whether a seaplane was a vessel and did not question the status of the
bather. But cf. McGuire v. City of New York, supranote 8.
34 Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963); Wilson v.
Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1959).

'SAdmiralty jurisdiction has also been upheld in cases which involve "things"
not technically considered "vessels," e.g., drydocks, United States v. Bruce Dry
Dock Co., 65 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1933); and incomplete vessels, Grant Smith-Porter
Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); Note, 4 Texas L. Rev. 306, 310 (1926).
bsSupra note 3, at 35.

17The necessary elements of the tort of negligence are: (1) duty violation;
(2) causal connection between duty-violating conduct and the resulting injury;
(3) actual loss or damage. Proof of damages is thus an essential part of plaintiff's
case. Prosser, Torts S 30 (3d ed. 1964).
18Rundall v. La Campagnie Generale Transadantique, 100 Fed. 655, 657
(7th Cir. 1900).

1971 F. Supp. 888 (D. Mass. 1947).
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an alleged tort occurs." 20 Without injury there is no tort of negligence but only "damnum absque injuria," 21 and it is "clear that the
locality of the thing to be considered is that of the thing injured, and
not of the agent causing the injury .. ," 22
In The City of Lincoln23 and in Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of
ilonterey24 respondents' wharves collapsed and libelants' goods were
thrown into navigable waters. The courts held, directly contrary to
Thomson, that "the injury to libelant's steel-booms was effected
wholly in the water, into which they were thrown through the breaking down of the wharf. The whole 'substance and consummation of
the injury' were . . . in the water. It was the water that did the
damage. That was the place of the damage and consequently the place
of the tort, for the purpose of jurisdiction." 25 Admiralty jurisdiction
has also been upheld when faulty repairs or maintenance on land caused
an aircraft to crash at sea. If there is no impact upon the person or
property before striking the water "it is recognized that the tort occurs upon the water within the admiralty jurisdiction." 2 0
The language of The Plymouth in establishing the locality test was
certainly broad, yet it provided a single and precise criterion for determining admiralty jurisdiction in tort actions.2 7 The majority of
courts have maintained that locality is still the exclusive test for determining admiralty jurisdiction in tort actions2 s and that jurisdiction is
not affected by the character or extent of the tort, or by the relations of the persons injured.2 Thus Thomson should be within
admiralty jurisdiction because it meets the sole requirement of the
locality test that the tort be consummated on navigable waters.
But there has always been some doubt whether locality was merely
2

01d. at 890.

21
Hermann
22

v. Port Blakely Mill Co., 69 Fed. 646, 651 (N.D. Cal. 1895).
Smith v. Lampe, 64 F.2d 201, 202 (6th Cir. 1933); Dorrington v. City of

Detroit, 223 Fed. 232, 242 (6th Cir. 1915). "It has long been established law

that, if a person on the high seas is killed by a shot fired by a person on shore,
the offense is committed on the high seas." Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of
Monterey, 6 F.2d 893, 894-95 (N.D. Cal. 1925).
225 Fed. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1885).

246 F.2d 893 (N.D. Cal. 1925).
25Supra note 23, at 837 (Emphasis added.)
20
Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, supra note 14, at 92.
27

When the locality test "was announced, it was believed both by the courts
and by the profession that a single test for tort jurisdiction had been established."
Note,
75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 655 (1927).
28
"[T]he weight of authority is clearly to the effect that locality alone
determines whether or not a tort claim is within admiralty jurisdiction."
Weinstein
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., supra note 14, at 763.
29
The Highland Light, 12 Fed. Cas. 138 (No. 6477) (C.C.D. Md. 1867).
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one of the tests for determining admiralty jurisdiction or the sole
test. The most famous of these is "Mr. Benedict's celebrated doubt"
which questions whether admiralty jurisdiction would extend to an
assault between two bathers, which obviously does not involve a
vessel and has no relation to the maritime industry 30
The doubts about the locality test were created, not by any ambiguity in The Plymouth, but by the terminology and holdings of subsequent cases. The first cases to cast doubt on the locality test involved
ship-to-shore injuries, termed "amphibious torts."'1 For 40 years
after The Plymouth "admiralty denied jurisdiction where damage
was done by a ship to any object fixed to land." 32 Then The Blackheath33 extended admiralty jurisdiction to cover a collision between a
vessel and a beacon surrounded by navigable waters but attached to
land. 34 The Blackheath held that although the beacon was attached
to land its purpose was to serve as an "aid to navigation"; therefore it was within admiralty jurisdiction. Justice Brown, concurring,
stated that this extension of admiralty jurisdiction to cover structures
affixed to land overruled The Plymouth and the locality test and that
"to attempt to draw the line of jurisdiction between different kinds
of fixed structures, as, for instance, between beacons and wharves,
would lead to great confusion and much further litigation." 3 5 In subsequent cases The Blackheath was held not to overrule the locality test
but to create a minor exception to it. Locality was still the test for admiralty jurisdiction in tort actions with the exception that if the structure was an "aid to navigation" admiralty had jurisdiction regardless of
the fact that the structure was attached to land.36 However, Justice
Brown's prediction of confusion and unnecessary litigation was borne
out,3 7 and the courts became involved in a long line of cases which
3

- OlBenedict, Admiralty 351 (6th ed. 1940).

3SJurisdiction over ship-to-shore injuries was regulated by the Extension of
Admiralty Act, which extended admiralty jurisdiction to all torts "caused by a
vessel on navigable waters." 62 Stat. 496, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1948). However, since
the Act was concerned only with vessel-caused injury, it did not affect the
situation in Thomson, which involved a shore-to-water injury in no way related
to any vessel.
3"Supra note 27.
33Supra note 5.

34The beacon "was built on piles driven firmly into the bottom. There is no
question that it was . . . part of [the realty] .... " Supra note 5, at 364. But
see Doullut & Williams, Inc. v. United States, 268 U.S. 33, 34 (1925).

35Supra note 5, at 369.
36
Gilmore & Black, Admiralty 432 (1957); 1 Benedict § 129 (6th ed. 1940);
Note, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 208 (1962). See The Barbara Cates, 8 F. Supp. 470
(E.D.
Pa. 1934); The Senator, 54 F.2d 420 (D. Del. 1931).
37

There has been much confusion and litigation over the difficulty of differ-
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attempted to distinguish a land structure from an "aid to navigation."
The questionableness of some of these distinctions is exemplified by
the cable cases in which submarine cables used for communication
were deemed "aids to navigation" and held to be within admiralty
jurisdiction 8 while cables used solely to carry electric current were
deemed land structures and not within admiralty jurisdiction.3 9
In all of the cases involving an "aid to navigation" attached to
land, the court looked beyond the locality of the structure and sought
to ascertain the purpose of the structure. Such consideration of
purpose, aside from locality, led to direct attacks on the exclusiveness
of the locality test. Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek4" questioned
whether locality was the sole test of admiralty jurisdiction in tort
actions or whether the basis for "all admiralty jurisdiction, whether
in contract or in tort, is the maritime nature of the transaction or
event . . . . ,41 The petitioner contended that the locality test is not
exclusive and "that in every adjudicated case in this country in which
the jurisdiction of admiralty with respect to torts has been sustained,
the tort apart from the mere place of its occurrence, has been of a
maritime character." 42 Imbrovek gave no decision on the locality
test because "in the present case the wrong which was the subject
of the suit was, we think, of a maritime nature, and hence the District
Court, from any point of view, had jurisdiction."

4

Imbrovek furnished impetus to those attacking the locality test as
arbitrary, wholly irrational, bearing no relation to the purpose of
admiralty jurisdiction, and a blind following of history. 4 The "reasoning" behind the locality test is said to be exemplified by the
quaint statement of the respondent in The Plymouth that once "we
broke the Constitution by discarding the limit of tidewater and the
sovereign arbitrament of the moon" we must now hold to the hisentiating between objects or structures which take their character from the land
to which they are in some way connected and those which are deemed so related
to navigation as to become subjects of maritime jurisdiction. Farnum, Admiralty
Jurisdiction
and Amphibious Torts, 43 Yale L.J. 34, 39 (1934).
3

sPostal Tel. Cable Co. v. P. Sanford Ross, Inc., 221 Fed. 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1915).
39Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha v. Great W. Power Co., 17 F.2d 239

(9th
Cir. 1927).
4

oSupra note 6.
1d. at 61.

41

421d.at 60.
431d. at 61.
44

Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique And Suggestions, 50 Colum. L. Rev.
259, 264 (1950); Ryan, The Amphibious Tort Problems, 13 Brooklyn L. Rev. 129
(1947); Bruncken, Tradition And Commonsense In Admiralty, 14 Marq. L. Rev.
16, 17 (1929).
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torically established locality test." Those objecting to the locality
test offer as additional or alternative tests (1) that a vessel be involved
or (2) that the incident be of a maritime nature.
Vessels are felt to be necessary because "admiralty was the result of
commerce on the high seas, the commerce made possible by sailing
vessels. Just as vessels were the source of admiralty, they remain the
focal point of admiralty jurisdiction." 46 This view contends that the
locality test does not mean that "a tort or injury in no way connected
with any vessel, or its owner, officers, or crew, although occurring in
. . . [navigable waters] is for that reason within the jurisdiction of
the admiralty." 47 "Merely because events occur upon navigable waters
does not put them within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
Transactions are 'maritime' only when in some way connected with a

'vessel'."

48

Nevertheless it has frequently been contended that pleasure boating,
which involves vessels, should not be within the admiralty jurisdiction.49 The word "vessel" is highly ambiguous and might include a
P 1
raft5 ° but not an ocean liner afloat but unfinished.
There is nothing
magic about the word "vessel" which assures that it is a proper
subject of maritime concern. There seems little reason why a collision
between two rafts should be in admiralty (under the maritime nature
test) any more than a collision between two bathers (under the locality
test), or why admiralty should concern itself with nonmaritime
events which take place on vessels, for example, dog bites 52 and
thefts. 83
A broader alternative to the locality test than vessel-involvement is
that of the maritime nature of the incident. "The fundamental principle underlying all cases of tort, as well as contract, is that, to
bring a case within the jurisdiction of a court of admiralty, maritime
relations of some sort must exist .... ,, 54 Thus viewed, admiralty
would extend to all torts arising out of maritime matters, whether
45

Bruncken, supra note 44, at 17.
46McGuire
v. City of New York, supra note 8, at 871.
47
Campbell v. H. Hackfeld & Co., 125 Fed. 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1903).
48
Robinson, Admiralty § 8 at 42 (1939).

49

Comment, 23 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 169 (1966).
50" 'The word "vessel" includes every description of water craft or other
artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation
on water."' Pleason v. Gulfport Shipbldg. Corp., 221 F.2d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 1955).
51
Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); The Francis
McDonald,
254 U.S. 242 (1920).
52
The Lord Derby, 17 Fed. 265 (E.D. La. 1883).
53

The Minnetonka, 146 Fed. 509 (2d Cir. 1906).

54Campbell v. H. Hackfeld &Co., supra note 47, at 697.
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occurring on sea or land.55 England and France apply the maritime
nature test to determine admiralty jurisdiction and it has been contended that this is the most realistic test.5 6
The maritime nature test, however, creates the difficulty of a caseby-case determination of what is of a "maritime nature." 5 The difficulty of applying this test is well known in contract cases s and is
evidenced by the long established arbitrary principle that construction
of a vessel is not maritime in nature while repairing a vessel is maritime. 9 "[M]aritime transactions are inseparably connected with and
shade into the non-maridme" 00 and no satisfactory basis for distinguishing the 2 has been developed. If tort locality is no longer
to be considered, it is questionable how far inland the maritime nature
test should extend. 61 Thus while the locality test has been criticized,
there are also grounds for criticizing the suggested alternative tests.
Proper evaluation of these proposed tests or any test for admiralty
jurisdiction necessitates making a choice as to the purpose of an
admiralty jurisdiction. The logical validity of any test for admiralty
jurisdiction depends largely upon one's view of the purpose of admiralty. Even the supposedly irrational locality test can be justified
under at least 1 view of admiralty's purpose. Such a view contends that admiralty developed to handle the peculiar needs of the
maritime industry,6 2 and, taking a purely analytical approach, an obvious peculiarity of the maritime industry is that it is the only 1
involving transportation on water.63 "There can be nothing more
maritime than the sea" 6 and "the guide to admiralty jurisdiction must
be the needs of the sea or the needs of seagoing commerce." '5 Thus
if admiralty is based on the peculiar needs and hazards of the sea,
admiralty jurisdiction should extend to all actions arising from occurrences on the sea, and locality seems a logical test. Under the local'5"[AJ tort, arising as it does out of a maritime 'status' or 'relation', is
cognizable by the maritime law whether it arises on sea or on land." Strika v.
Netherlands Ministry Of Traffic, 185 F.2d 555, 558 (2d Cit. 1950).
GuMcGuire v. City of New York, supra note 8, at 867. See 25 Harv. L. Rev.
381 (1912).
57
Note, 16 Harv. L. Rev. 210, 211 (1903).
581bid.; 25 Harv. L. Rev. 381, 382-83 (1912).
GThe Francis McDonald, supra note 51.
0
OGilmore & Black, supranote 36, at 27.
O12Note, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 655, 658-59 (1927).
6 Gilmore & Black, supra note 36, at 11.

63Another obvious peculiarity of the maritime industry before the 19th
century
was that it was the only major means of bulk transportation.
4
O3'Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., supra note 14, at 763.
65McGuire v. City of New York, supra note 8, at 871.

352

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIII

ity test an action arising from an aircraft crash in the sea, though not
involving a vessel or the maritime industry, would be within admiralty
jurisdiction because "when an aircraft crashes into navigable
waters, the dangers to persons and property are much the same as those
arising out of the sinking of a ship or a collision between two vessels." 66

Thus the locality test is logically sound under the view that admiralty's purpose is to deal with actions involving the peculiar needs
and hazards of the sea. The locality test is also simple and easy to
apply r and "the fact that in a few unusual instances the results
reached may be . . . [seemingly technical] is counterbalanced by the

fact that strict application of the test makes it possible to predict with
accuracy the results to be reached in a given case."188 The only difficult aspect of the locality test is determining where the tort was consummated, and a careful analysis of the facts will eliminate that difficulty.6 9 Careful analysis of the facts in Thomson reveals that the
injury, therefore the consummation of the tort, occurred on navigable
waters. Thug under a pure locality test Thomson was within admiralty
jurisdiction.
Though the locality test is not so irrational as some critics have
contended, its logical validity does hinge upon acceptance of the
view that the purpose of admiralty is to handle actions involving the
peculiar needs and hazards of navigable waters. However, such a
purpose for admiralty seems too narrow in view of the present highly
developed and complex maritime industry. A preferable purpose for
admiralty is to provide "orderly and uniform judicial governance of
the concerns of the maritime industry." 70 Such judicial governance
should be furnished by a separate system of admiralty courts7' with
06
Weinstein
8T

v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., supra note 14, at 763.
Note, 4 Texas L. Rev. 306, 315 (1926); Hough, Admiralty Jurisdiction-Of
Late Years, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 529, 533 (1924); Note, 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 508,
510 (1959).

G8Note, 4 Texas L. Rev. 306, 315 (1926). "If the Court ... [hadlieft the
locality test intact and without qualifications there would be little doubt as to
when maritime law should be applied ... ." Note, 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 508, 510
(1959).
09
Note, 4 Texas L. Rev. 306, 315 (1926).

7OBlack, supra note 44, at 262.
71Since the adoption of the Constitution, instance (non-prize) admiralty actions
in the United States have not been heard by a special court. Admiralty actions
are placed on a separate admiralty docket in 31 federal judicial districts; the
other 57 maintain no separate admiralty docket. Currie, The Silver Oar and All
That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1959). However, it
frequently develops that almost all admiralty actions are heard by one judge
within the district and considerable expertise may already exist under the
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special expertise to deal "with the major concerns of the shipping
industry-with all of them, and not just with a few of them selected
on antiquarian criteria." 72 Thus the test for admiralty jurisdiction
in all matters should be whether the subject is one of the "major
concerns" of the maritime industry. Such a test and purpose for
admiralty would arm it with
the responsibility ... jurisdiction and remedial power needed
to keep watch over the concerns of the shipping industry in their
commercial and property aspects. It would be a sort of oneindustry Tribunal of Commerce. As such it would be in a position
to give vigorous articulation to the federal interest in shipping,
and at the same time would implement a valuable experiment in
the use of the industrial court.7 3
RONALD

J. BACIGAL

CLAYTON ACT TOLLING PROVISIONA NEW INTERPRETATION
Section 5 of the Clayton Act, which was included to encourage the
private litigant to seek recovery for antitrust violations, in addition to
the treble measure of damages provided for in the preceding section
of the Act, 2 provides:
(a) A final judgment or decree . . . rendered in any civil or
criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United
States under the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has
present system. In 1960, 5655 admiralty actions constituting 94% of all
admiralty actions in the United States were distributed among 19 admiralty
districts, the top 6 of which had the following admiralty caseloads: SD.N.Y,
2294; ED. La., 869; ED. Pa., 485; S.D. Tex., 361; ND. Cal., 261; E.D. Va.,
229. Fiddler, The Admiralty Practice in Montana and All That. 17 Me. L. Rev. 15,
17 (1965).
72
Gilmore & Black, supra note 36, at 27.
73Black, supranote 44, at 276-77.
the offense is committed on the high seas.' Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of
1
"Section 5 . . . was passed in response to the plea of President Wilson. In a
speech to the Congress on January 20, 1914, he urged that a law be enacted
which would permit victims of antitrust violations to have 'redress upon the
facts and judgments proved and entered in suits by the Government' and that
'the statute of limitations ... be suffered to run against such litigants only
from the date of the conclusion of the Government's action." Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 US. 311, 318
(1965).
2
Clayton Act 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1914), I5 U.S.C. S 15
(1914).
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violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other
party against such defendant under ... [§ 4 of the Clayton Act]
as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would
be an estoppel as between the parties thereto ....
(b) Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the
United States to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any
of the antitrust laws ...

the running of the statute of limitations

in respect of every private right of action arising under said
laws and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of
in said proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof
and for one year thereafter. .... 3

This section affords 2 advantages to the private litigants: "It
may help them with any limitations problems they have," and "it also
helps them with their proof by giving them permission to use the
government action as evidence." 4
Section 5 (b) (hereafter referred to as the tolling provision) has been
judicially interpreted as being related to and dependent on § 5(a)
(hereafter referred to as the prima facie evidence provision) for its
meaning. As a result, the collateral estoppel language of the prima
facie evidence provision has been held to apply to the requirement of
the tolling provision that the private suit be "based in whole or in
part on any matter complained of" in the Government suit. This
means that private litigants have found it necessary to show perfect
identity between the private and Government suits to bring the tolling
provision into play, thereby depriving private antitrust litigants of
many possible advantages of the tolling provision.
Eynich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,5 decided in 1951, is
generally recognized" as stating the scope and purpose of the prima
3
Clayton Act, supra note 2, § 16 as amended 69 Stat. 283 (1955) 15 U.S.C.
S 16 (1955).
4
Simon, The Private Litigant and Prior Government Judgments or Decrees,
7 Antitrust Bull. 27 (1962).
-340 U.S. 558 (1951).
0
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S.
311, 317 (1965); Partmar Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Theatres Corp., 347 U.S.
89, 102 (1954); Buckhead Theatre Co. v. Atlanta Enterprises, Inc., 327 F.2d 365,
367 (5th Cir. 1964); New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346, 357 (3d Cir. 1964); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.
v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 225 (9th Cir. 1964); International Shoe Mach. Corp.
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 315 F.2d 449, 454 (1st Cit. 1963); Hyslop v. United
States, 261 F.2d 786, 790 (8th Cit. 1958); Eagle Lion Studios, Inc. v. Loew's,
Inc., 248 F.2d 438, 444 (2d Cit. 1957); Loew's, Inc. v. Cinema Amusements, Inc.,
210 F.2d 86, 90 (10th Cir. 1954); Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.,
213 F.2d 284, 290 (7th Cir. 1954).
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facie evidence provision. That provision must be analyzed before any
interpretation of the tolling provision can be attempted.
Emich held that the prima facie evidence provision makes available
to the private litigant only those "matters previously established by
the Government in antitrust actions." 7 The Supreme Court stated that
"Congress intended to confer, subject only to a defendant's enjoyment
of its day in court against a new party, as large an advantage as the
estoppel doctrine would afford had the Government brought suit." 8
It was further held that the collateral estoppel doctrine must be referred to in order to determine the evidentiary use which may be made
of prior judgments or decrees.0 This means that "final judgments or
decrees ... are admissible under § 5 of the Clayton Act as prima facie
evidence only of issues actually determined in the prior adjudication
... )510 The prima facie evidence provision, then, focuses "on the
narrow issue of the use by private parties of judgments or decrees as
prima facie evidence." "
In Steiner v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp. 12 the Supreme Court
established the principles to be followed in applying the tolling provision, holding that the prima facie evidence and tolling provisions are
to be read together. This means that the identity necessary between the
private action and the Government action must be perfect in order
to satisfy the requirement in the tolling provision that the private
suit be "based in whole or in part on any matter complained of" in
the Government suit. Thus, as the Court puts it, "the same means must
be used to achieve the same objectives of the same conspiracies by
the same defendants" 13 to make the tolling provision operative.
The Steiner interpretation is based on the argument that (1) the
legislative history of § 5 supports the interpretation of the words "any
matter complained of" to mean the exact acts of the defendant complained of by the Government, not just the same conspiracy; 14 (2)
private civil antitrust actions are not founded upon the conspiracy
itself, but upon the overt injury-causing acts done in furtherance of
7

Emich Motor Corp. v. General Motors Corp., supra note 5, at 568.

slbid.
9Ibid.

1OPartnar Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Theatres Corp., 347 U.S. 89, 102 (1954),
citing Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., supra note 5.
"lMinnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S.
311, 317 (1965).
12232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956).
131d. at 196.

141bid.
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the conspiracy; 15 thus (3) the tolling provision cannot be extended to
matters (acts) which might have been but were not complained of by

the United, States."'
Thus under Steiner, claims which the private litigant cannot establish
as perfectly identical to those complained of by the Government must
be brought within the statute of limitations. If there are also perfectly identical claims, they would fall under the tolling provision, thus
leaving 2 different limitation periods governing the same lawsuit, a
classic trap for the unknowing.
Application of the collateral estoppel rules to the tolling provision,
thus requiring perfect identity between the Government and private
claims, would be logical if Congress had intended the scope of the
tolling provision to be as limited as the scope of the prima facie evidence provision.' 7 The courts accepted this assumption of identical
scope until it was questioned in Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v.
Nisley' s decided by the 10th Circuit in 1961. Prior to Union Carbide,
the problem had seldom arisen as to what constituted the necessary
identity between the matters complained of in the private and the
151hid. It is interesting to note here that the Circuit Court in Leh, infra note
20, although following Steiner, supra note 12, said that the 9th Circuit had
gone further than other circuits, by holding that the words "any matter
complained of" referred to overt acts of the defendants in the Government
proceeding and not just the conspiracy behind those acts. Leh v. General
Petroleum Corp., 330 F.2d 288, 301 n.15 (9th Cir. 1964). One commentator expressed a concern whether Steiner meant that virtually identical overt acts
had to be alleged. Wiprud, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits Against Electrical
Manufacturers: The Statute of Limitations and Other Hurdles, 57 Nw. U.L. Rev.
29, 45 (1962). A 1964 Ninth Circuit decision, Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 219 (9th Cir. 1964), held that "the tolling
statute does not require, and the Steiner test does not provide, that all matters
complained of in the private action must find a counterpart in the Government
action." While this holding appears to weaken the Steiner test, it is significant
that before making the -above statement the court in Goldwyn went to some
length to point out that there were, in fact, the same means, objectives, defendants, and conspiracies alleged in both actions. Id. at 217-19.
'6Steiner v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., supra note 12.
17In addition to Steiner, support for this proposition can be found in the
following: Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, 213 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.
1954); Momand v. Universal Film Exchanges, Inc., 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948);
United Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 172 F. Supp. 580, 586 (D. Conn. 1959);
Cardinal Films, Inc. v. Republic Pictures Corp., 148 F. Supp. 156, 159 (S.D.N.Y.
1957). See also Court DeGraw Theatre, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 198,
200 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); Rubenstein, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 154 F. Supp.
216, 218 (D. Minn. 1957); Schreiber v. Loew's Inc., 147 F. Supp. 319, 323
(WD. Mich. 1957); Levy v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 787, 789
(ND. Cal. 1952).
18300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961).
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Government suits to make the tolling provision operative. 19 The
courts had merely compared the 2 complaints to determine whether
the matters complained of by the private litigant were matters as to
which a judgment or decree in the Government suit would be an
estoppel as between the parties in the Government suit.
The result reached in 1964 by the 9th Circuit in Leh v. General
Petroleum Corp.20 created a conflict between this and the 10th Circuit

decision in Union Carbide. To resolve this conflict the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine the degree of identity necessary to
satisfy the tolling provision requirement that the private suit be based
"in whole or in part on any matter complained of" in the Government
suit.2 1 Leb involved a private treble damage action against 7 companies engaged in producing, refining, and marketing gasoline and
other hydrocarbon substances in interstate commerce. The defendants
were charged with violating § § 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act22 by

conspiring to restrain and to monopolize the wholesale and retail dis-

tribution of refined gasoline throughout Southern California. The
restraint was allegedly accomplished by excluding independent jobbers
from distribution and by eliminating such jobbers' retail outlets,
thereby preventing them from competing with the retail outlets
owned and operated by defendants. Although a problem arose as to
2
which of 2 statutes of limitations was applicable to the action,
the plaintiffs were not concerned with that aspect of the case, but con-

tended that any applicable statute of limitations was suspended under
the tolling provision of the Clayton Act because a 1950 United States
19 "Controversy raised by the limitations portion of Section 5 has dealt mainly
with the question of during what period of time the government action was
pending and when did it cease to pend." Simon, supra note 4, at 28. A typical
statement of the applicable rule regarding pendency is found in Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 117 F. Supp. 747, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1953): "It is clear
...
that antitrust suits should be considered 'pending' until the entry of a
judgment or decree which finally disposes of all the allegations of antitrust
violations." See generally WViprud, supra note 15, at 43-44.
20330 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1964).
2
Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54 (1965).
226 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1955).
23
The defendants argued that plaintiffs' action was barred by the California
1-year statute of limitations applicable to suits for statutory penalties. Plaintiffs
contended that the governing provision was the 3-year statute respecting suits
for a statutory liability other than a penalty. The plaintiffs conceded that the
4-year limitations period added to the Clayton Act in 1955, supra note 3, was
not applicable to their cause of action accruing in 1954.
On this matter, the 9th Circuit held that a private treble damage action
was of a penal rather than remedial nature and therefore, the applicable provision was the 1-year statute. For a discussion concerning this aspect of -Leb,
see 40 Wash. L. Rev. 222 (1966).
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antitrust proceeding arising from the same conspiracy was still pending at the time the plaintiffs filed their complaint.
24
The 9th Circuit, in affirming the decision of the District Court,
upheld the defendant's statute of limitations defense by interpreting the
tolling provision in the light of Steiner, thus requiring perfect identity
between the Government and private suits to make the tolling provision operative. The Court said the 2 claims lacked perfect identity
because:
1) The dates of the conspiracies differed-the Government
alleging a conspiracy running from 1936 until 1950 and plaintiffs
alleging a conspiracy from 1948 until 1951.
2) The defendants were not the same in both actions-Shell Oil
Co. and the Conservation Committee of California Oil Producers
being joined in the Government suit, but not in the private suit,
and the Olympic Refining Co., though later dropped, being
originally joined by the private claimants but not by the Government.
3) The conspiracies differed-the Government charging that
the defendants had conspired to eliminate the competition of independent marketers, and plaintiffs charging a conspiracy to eliminate independent jobbers and retailers.
4) The areas of the conspiracies differed-plaintiffs alleging
a conspiracy involving Southern California, which was only a
part of the Pacific States area with which the Government was
concerned.
In reversing the 9th Circuit the Supreme Court relied primarily upon
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co.,25
decided between the granting of certiorari and oral argument in Leh.
New Jersey Wood Finishingestablished certain basic principles for the
interpretation of the tolling provision and swept away much of the
foundation for the perfect identity required in Steiner. The Court
held that the prima facie evidence provision and the tolling provision
are not necessarily coextensive, being governed by different considerations as well as different Congressional policy objectives, thus making
the 2 provisions readily severable. 26 Leh, in following up and
establishing the new approach to be taken to these 2 sections, held
that "substantial identity" - of subject matter in the 2 suits is all
24Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 208 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Cal. 1962), aff'd,
330 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1964).
2381 U.S. 311 (1965).
231d.at 318.
2

7Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., supra note 21, at 63.
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that is required to make the tolling provision operative, applying
the same test used earlier by the 10th Circuit in Union Carbide.
As to the tolling provision itself, "the textual distinctions as well
as to the policy basis of. . . [the tolling provision] indicate that it was
to serve a more comprehensive function in the congressional scheme of
things" 28 than that allowed by the perfect identity interpretation. The
purpose in adopting the tolling provision was not as limited as that
behind the prima facie evidence provision, because when enacting
the tolling provision Congress "was not then dealing with the delicate
area in which a judgment secured in an action between two parties
may be used by a third" and because it was plain that with the tolling
provision "Congress meant to assist private litigants in utilizing any
benefits they might cull from government antitrust actions." 29 Thus,
the tolling provision can operate to make available to the private litigant the Government's earlier pleadings, transcripts of testimony, and
exhibits, all of which are potentially of great value in the investigation
of this case. Moreover, involved and difficult legal questions may be
resolved to the private litigant's advantage before he initiates proceedings. These are reasonably expectable advantages of the tolling
provision if the "more comprehensive function" envisaged by CongressO0 for that provision is to have any meaning. New Jersey Wood
Finishing went so far as to say that it was of crucial significance that
the potential advantages available to litigants because of the tolling provision reach far beyond the specific and limited benefits accruing to
them under the prima facie evidence provision.3 '
28

Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., supra
note 11, at 319.
291d. at 317.
30
The Supreme Court admitted that there is almost a complete absence of
Congressional discussion on the extent of the coverage of the tolling provision. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., supra
note 11, at 320. The Court referred, however, to its decision in Burnett v. New
York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965), an FELA case, where the question involved
effecting Congressional purpose by tolling the statute of limitations in given circumstances. Burnett said that to determine that intent "the purposes and policies
underlying the limitation provision, the Act itself, and the remedial scheme
developed for the enforcement of the rights given by the Act" must be
examined. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R, supra at 427. Since the whole idea of the
Clayton Act was "intended to help persons of small means who are injured in
their property or business by combinations or corporations violating the antitrust
laws," H.R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong, 2d Sess. 14 (1914), it is logical that Congress meant to offer the private litigants as many advantages as a reasonable
interpretation
of the tolling provision allows.
3
1Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., supra
note 11, at 320.
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Two major textual distinctions between the tolling and prima facie
evidence provisions lend further support to the conclusion that they
are not dependent upon each other for their application: (1) A
"final judgment or decree" is a condition precedent to the application
of the prima facie evidence provision. However, the tolling provision suspends the statute of limitations from the time the Government institutes suit regardless of whether a final judgment or decree is
ultimately entered. (2) The applicability of the tolling provision in
no way turns on the success of the Government's case, while the
prima facie evidence provision turns on raising an estoppel against the
unsuccessful defendant in the Government suit through use of the proGovernment judgment or decree.
It is clear, then, that the tolling provision is not-and should not
be-limited in its applicability to the rules of collateral estoppel which
govern the prima facie evidence provision. However, a question remains: the decree of identity required between the private and Government suits to permit the private litigant the benefits of the tolling
provision.
The "substantial identity of subject matter" test, originally established by the 10th Circuit in Union Carbide and now accepted by the
Supreme Court in Leh, will cause some difficulty because of the
vagueness of the phrase "substantial identity." The Supreme Court
did warn that "care must be exercised to insure . . . that the matters
complained of . . .bear a real relation to the private plaintiff's claim

for relief." 82 The Court continued, however, that "the courts must
not allow a legitimate concern that invocation of. . .[the tolling provision] be made in good faith to lead them into a niggardly construction of the statutory language ... 33 Thus the Court has indicated
that its desire to give the private litigant the advantages of this tolling
provision greatly outweighs the increased difficulty in determining
what are "matters complained of" in both private and Government
suits.
"

3 2Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., supra note 21, at 59.
33lbid. Union Carbide points out the ultimate inequity of the collateral estoppel
approach to the tolling provision:
If we accept the . . . [collateral estoppel] interpretation of . . . [the tolling

provision], a Section 4 [treble damage action provision] plaintiff would be put
to the necessity of bringing suit on the same conspiracy alleged in the
government suit, or suffer the bar of the statute as to every overt act not complained of in the government suit. This interpretation would lead to a
multiplicity of suits with duplication of proof. It would add to the burdens
of the private suitor to the harassment of the defendants.
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, supra note 18, at 570.
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Yet some guideline is necessary to the application of the tolling
provision. Leh establishes that in applying the "substantial identity"
test "effect must be given to the broad terms of the statute itself-'based
in 'whole or in part on any matter complained of.' " 34Thus the private
plaintiff need not allege that the identical defendants used the identical
means to achieve the identical objectives of the identical conspiracies.
As to identity of parties, the Court explained why absence of complete identity of defendants is unrelated to whether the private
claimantes suit is based on matters of which the Government complained:
In the interim between the filing of the two actions it may have
become apparent that a party named as a defendant by the Government was in fact not a party to the antitrust violation alleged.
Or the private plaintiff may prefer to limit his suit to the defendants named by the Government whose activities contributed most
directly to the injury of which he complains. On the other hand,
some of the conspirators whose activities injured the private
claimant may have been too low in the conspiracy to be selected
as named defendants or co-conspirators in the Government's
necessarily broader net.3 5
The disparity in time periods is equally insignificant:
That plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy corresponding in time to the
period during which they were in business obviously does not
mean that this conspiracy is not based in part on matters complained of by the Government. 6
Also, differences in the scope and effect of the conspiracies have
likewise no effect on the operation of the tolling provision.
Leh, therefore, significantly changes the degree of identity required
in the private and Government suits. The statute of limitations can
now be suspended even against those defendants not named by the
Government. Of course, it is still necessary that the matters complained of in the private suit against that defendant be in some way a
part of the conspiracy alleged by the Government. However, if the
private plaintiff can show that a particular defendant was involved
in the larger conspiracy alleged by the Government, even so remotely
as to be unnamed as a defendant in the Government suit, he may
take advantage of the tolling provision against that defendant and
34

Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., supra note 21, at 59.

33M. at 64.
"GIbid.
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prove the particular effect of that defendant's localized conspiracy
37
on him as private plaintiff.
Leh is authority for this proposition, but one should note that the
1 defendant named by the private plaintiff and not by the Government was dismissed from the case prior to the ruling on the statute of
limitations defense. The Court's statement that some conspirators'
activities "may have been too low in the conspiracy to be selected
as named defendants . . . in the Government's necessarily broader
nee, a8 indicates that absence of complete identity of defendants is
unrelated to whether the private suit is based on "matters complained
of" by the Government and indicates that courts should no longer
hesitate to apply the tolling provision to even those defendants not
named in the Government suit.
The Leh interpretation of the tolling provision is certainly the proper
one and makes the provision one of the most effective devices
available to private antitrust litigants. This approach to the tolling
provision by the Supreme Court now fits the intent of Congress to
afford the private litigant as many advantages as possible in its scheme
to provide impetus to the whole field of antitrust litigation.
One may question the propriety of tolling the statute of limitations
at all during the pendency of Government proceedings. Doing so
seems to avoid the whole policy behind statutes of limitations,30 since
the private plaintiff working under the advantages of the tolling provision is not required to pursue his cause of action until 1 year
after the Government action has ended. Consequently, defendants may
37Since the statute of limitations against private antitrust actions is tolled by
the institution of any civil or criminal proceeding by the United States, the private litigant is spared certain problems. Normally, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4,
a plaintiff is required to serve process within a reasonable time after the
complaint has been filed. This would mean that, as to private antitrust litigants,
the suit would probably come to trial before the Government proceeding had
ended and the private litigant would not have the intended benefits of that
Government action. With the tolling provision, however, the private litigant
does not even have to file his complaint until 1 year after the Government
suit has ended. Therefore, there will be no problem of the suit in trial before
the private litigant desires. Of course, even this situation could be handled
by obtaining a continuance when the suit did reach trial.
38
• Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., supra note 21, at 64.
39Such statutes "promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival
of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memoties have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one
has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within
the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time
comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them." Order of R.R. Telegraphers
v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
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be confronted by the private litigant with matters that were not litigated by the Government and, because of the passage of perhaps 10
to 15 years the defendant may find it impossible to obtain evidence
to defend against the claim. Also, since under Leh the statute is probably tolled even against defendants not named in the Government
suit, some defendants in private suits may be faced with a wholly
unanticipated suit with all of the resultant evidence-acquisition problems, years after the occurrence of the matters complained of.
A much more just and less confusing procedure would be for the
private plaintiff to file a timely claim, then have a right to continuance
until the Government suit has been completed. This procedure would
still enable the private litigant to make full use of the Government suit,
but would be more equitable, since defendants would have notice of
the pending suit against them and could within the time which the
statute of limitations indicates is the outermost limit of fairness begin
obtaining evidence.
HOWARD J. Bacx, JR.

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION UPON
MANDATORY RETIREMENT
The purpose of unemployment compensation is to provide for the
systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment from
which temporary benefits may be paid during periods of unemployment. Unemployment compensation thus helps the employee to obtain
another job by temporarily maintaining his purchasing power. With
this assistance a claimant can remain in the labor market until he
finds work comparable to his previous job.1 The unemployment
compensation system is tied into a nationwide system of publicly
run employment offices which help to reduce the volume of unemployment.2
'Fla. Stat. Ann. § 443.02 (1952).
2
The Wagner-Peyser Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 49-49(l) establishes the United States
Employment Service. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3301 (Supp. 1966) provides for a maximum
tax on the employer of 3.13% of each covered employee's total wages, as
defined in 26 U.S.CA. § 3306(b), as the means of financing this service. Various
credits are available to employers to reduce this tax liability, among them the
allowance of a credit of up to 90% of the tax otherwise due. The employer
must thus pay at least 10% of the tax (.31% of the taxable wages), and this
amount is used to defray the administrative expenses of the entire system.
26 U.S.CA. § 3302. Each state unemployment compensation system receives
necessary appropriations from the .31% and the remaining amount is paid into the
individual state benefit fund.
To qualify for appropriations a state unemployment compensation agency
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Eligibility for unemployment compensation requires that the claimant be unemployed through other than his own fault or design, that
he be capable of work, and that he be actively seeking suitable employment. If such a claimant is unable to obtain employment and the
required waiting period, usually a week, has elapsed since his application for unemployment compensation, he is entitled to receive monetary benefits. Of course, a claimant cannot refuse to accept an offer of
suitable work without good cause and still receive monetary benefits.
Unemployment compensation is available to the claimant only for
a limited period after termination of his previous employment3 and
may not be waived or assigned and is exempt from execution and
attachment by creditors.4 Since unemployment compensation is premised upon the employee's leaving his employment through some
fault of his employer,5 it is paid to a claimant entirely from money
must be vested with all powers necessary to cooperate with the United States
Employment Service and to adopt certain provisions of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 49(c), certified by the Secretary of Labor as conforming to the Act. 26
U.S.C.A. § 3304. Individual state acts provide that an application for unemployment compensation benefits is also an application for suitable employment, and
the state agencies serve as job clearing houses for employer and employee.
3
Fla. Star. Ann. § 443.04(4) (1952); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.30 (Baldwin
1964).
4
No agreement by an employee to waive his right to benefits is valid, nor
shall benefits be assigned, released, or commuted. Such benefits are exempt
from all claims of creditors and from levy, execution, garnishment, attachment, and all other process or remedy for recovery or collection of a debt,
which exemption may not be waived. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.32
(Baldwin 1964). See also Fla. Star. Ann. § 443.16 (1952).
SThe dismissal of an employee pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement has been held a voluntary leaving without good cause attributable to
the employer; thus the employee is not within the statutory terms under which
unemployment compensation is payable. For example:
(a) refusal to join labor organizations with which the employer had a
closed or union-shop agreement, In Re Malaspina, 285 App. Div. 564, 139
N.Y.S.2d 521 (1955), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 413, 131 NE.2d 709 (1956);
(b) refsual to pay union dues and thus remain in good standing with the
union as required under the contract, O'Donnell v. Unemployment Comp.
Bd., 173 Pa. Super. 263, 98 A.2d 406 (1953);
(c) marriage, after which the contract requires discharge, Means v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 177 Pa. Super. 410, 110 A.2d 886 (1955);
(d) pregnancy, requiring discharge under terms of the contract, Rzepski v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd., 182 Pa. Super. 16, 124 A.2d 651 (1956);
(e) refusal of a contract-permitted transfer or downgrading which involves
lower pay or less favorable hours (with retention of seniority), In re
Gerdano, 2 App. Div. 2d 88, 153 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1956); Roberts v. Chain
Belt Co., 2 Wis. 2d 399, 86 N.W.2d 406 (1957). See Annor, 90 A.L.R.2d
835 (1963) where "termination of employment as a result of union action or
pursuant to union contract as 'voluntary' for purposes of unemployment
compensation benefits" is dealt with.
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the discharging employer has paid into a general fund.e The contribution rates for the employer are therefore based upon his past
experience in causing employees to be eligible for benefits1
The requirement of employer-fault raises the question whether an
employee who, pursuant to his employment contract, is mandatorily
retired with a pension paid in part or exclusively by his employer may
also receive unemployment compensation. It is probable that in the
negotiation of such an employment contract, frequently a collective
bargaining agreement, a claim for unemployment compensation upon
mandatory retirement is not contemplated by either party. Payment
of both the pension and unemployment compensation introduces a
double financial burden upon the employer. Nonpayment of unemployment compensation introduces the possibility of a mandatorily
retired employee's loss of his anticipated right to unemployment
compensation with the consequential hardship of being placed at a
disadvantage in the search for employment. Equitable resolution of
this problem requires considering the interaction of unemployment
compensation, pensions, social security, and the welfare role of the state
and federal governments.
In determining whether such an employee may receive both benefits,
courts have reached opposite conclusions. FloridaO has held that
the mandatorily retired employee who, pursuant to his employment
contract, is receiving a pension may also receive unemployment compensation; but Ohio9 has reached the opposite result.
Marcum v. Ohio Match Co.10 denied unemployment compensation
to an employee retired pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement
providing for a pension upon mandatory retirement. To deny the
claimant compensation, the court had to find, in the words of the
applicable statute, that the claimant had "quit his work without just
cause or . . .been discharged for just cause in connection with his
work. . ... 11 Marcum, in upholding the result reached by the Ohio
Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, differed with the Bureau's
6"[C]ontributions become due and shall be paid by each employer to the
bureau of unemployment compensation for the unemployment compensation fund
in accordance with such regulations as the administrator of the bureau of unemployment compensation prescribes, and shall not be deducted, in whole or in
part, from the remuneration of individuals in his employ." Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 4141.23 (Baldwin 1964); See also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 443.08 (1952).
7Fla. Star. Ann. § 443.08(3) (1952).
sSt. Joe Paper Co. v. Gautreaux, 180 So. 2d 668 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1965).
9
Marcum v. Ohio Match Co., 4 Ohio App. 2d 95, 212 NZE.2d 425 (1965).
lOlbid.
"Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.29(D) (2) (a) (Baldwin 1964).
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holding that this was a quit without cause 12 and held that the employee's mandatory retirement was a discharge for just cause in
connection with his work.' 3 The court used claimant's compulsory
union membership and consequent representation by the bargaining
agent as a novel basis for holding that acceptance of a pension as a
benefit of the employment contract required acceptance of mandatory
retirement as a burden of the contract. The court therefore held that
mandatory retirement is a discharge for just cause. 14
From the employer's viewpoint, this result is satisfactory since
it leaves him with only the burden of the pension which he had
contracted to bear. Since unemployment compensation is not due,
the employer does not bear the additional burden of a rise in unemployment compensation rates. From the employee's viewpoint, this decision
is inequitable and violates the spirit of unemployment compensation to
the extent that pension payments are less than unemployment compensation benefits. To the extent of this deficit, the employee is deprived of the opportunity to compete in the labor market on a relatively equal footing with other unemployed workers. 1 There is
little reason to exclude a covered employee from unemployment
compensation solely on the ground that he is old'0 or that his employment contract implies that he wishes to be retired when actually
he is an able worker who desires to continue his employment.' 7 To
hold that a mandatory retirement is a voluntary leaving can be done
only by holding that the making of the contract of employment providing for mandatory retirement is itself voluntary. However, this
12 Marcum v. Ohio Match Co., supra note 9, at 426.
131d. at 427-28.

1l4bid. The statutory reduction in unemployment compensation benefits in
the event that retirement pay is received, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. S 4141.31
(Baldwin 1964), was not construed by the court as implying a right to unemployment benefits when retirement pay is received. The court further held
that there was no statute-violating waiver of benefits. "Before one can waive
benefits under a statute, it must first be determined that one is entitled to those
rights." Id. at 427.
' 0 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 443.02 (1952).

16Age may be "just cause" for dismissal if one is incapacitated by age. That
view leaves to relief the problem of the superannuated employee who is attempting to find work which he is still able to perform.
'1 The failure of the claimant to find employment is presumed to arise either
from claimant's age or the fact that his union which had contracted for his
retirement pervaded the field, thus tending automatically excluding him from future work. It is possible that the claimant knew he could not get future employment and was applying only to receive unemployment compensation. However, to
assume this would impute a dishonest intent to the claimant and not allow a
rational investigation of the problem.
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holding is not valid because the real choice of an employee when
faced with such a contract is not whether he wishes to comply with
the retirement provision but whether he prefers to work under such
terms or not at all. That is a Hobson's choice.
The Florida decision in St. Joe Paper Co. v. Gautreaux8 permitted
the former employee mandatorily retired by the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement to receive unemployment compensation in addition to his pension. It is interesting to note that although St. Joe Paper
Co. concluded that "an unemployment compensation statute is remedial
and is to be liberally construed to effect its beneficent purpose, and
that the disqualifying provisions therein are to be narrowly construed," 19 the court may have been forced into its result by the wording of the Florida statute. To have reached the opposite result and
denied unemployment compensation, St. Joe Paper Co. would have had
to hold that mandatory retirement was a quit without just cause or a
discharge for misconduct in connection with the claimant's work.20
It is difficult to rationalize how mandatory retirement could be put
under either of these categories. The court, "in the interest of relieving
the economic insecurity of a person unemployed through no fault
of his own . . . [and] in order to attain the Legislature's goal of

lightening the burden of unemployment.
," 21 held that the claimant had not voluntarily left his employment. 22 Legislative intent for
this result was also derived from other Florida statutes which make
a waiver of any right of unemployment compensation void 23 and from
statutes guaranteeing that employees have the right of self-organization. 24 But, in accordance with a Florida Industrial Commission policy,
18180 So. 2d 668 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1965).

'Dld. at 674.
20

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 443.06 (1) (1952).

21St. Joe Paper Co. v. Gautreaux, supra note 18, at 671.
22lbid.
23

FIa. Star. Ann. § 443.16 (1) (1952) provides in part:
"Any agreement by an individual to waive, release, or commute his rights to
benefits or any other rights under this chapter shall be void."
Cf. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.32 (Baldwin 1964), which was dismissed by
Marcum as inapplicable. Marcum v. Ohio Match Co., supra note 9, at 427.
24
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 447.03 (1952):
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
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the holding was limited to cases in which the claimant's weekly pension
payments are less than the weekly unemployment compensation.2 5
In Marcum, on the other hand, the court had different statutory
language to interpret. Only with considerable difficulty could mandatory retirement be called a "quit without just cause," but it could,
without doing violence to the language involved, be called a "discharge for just cause in connection with . .. [claimant's] work." 26
Thus the variance in the 2 holdings may have resulted from the
fact that Marcum found the "discharge for just cause" phrase of the
Ohio statute could reasonably be interpreted to permit discharge of an
employee pursuant to a mandatory retirement agreement or discharge
because one has reached a certain age.
St. Joe Paper Co. required benefits to be paid to the claimant only
if weekly pension payments are less than weekly unemployment compensation. A decision that both pension and unemployment compensation were fully payable would have imposed upon the employer possible double liability 21 for the amount of the unemployment compensation. The employer would thus have been misled by his reliance upon
the unemployment contract with the employee or representative of the
employee. Such an unexpected financial burden would place the employer at a disadvantage compared to competitors who do not have
pension plans in effect or with competitors in other jurisdictions
where only a single liability is imposed.
In any attempt to solve this problem, one must consider the entire
scope of social legislation. If it is decided that an employee retired
under a mandatory retirement agreement which includes a pension at
least equal to the benefits under unemployment compensation is
25

In St. Joe Paper Co. v. Gautreaux, supra note 18, at 670, the court refers to
Rule 185U-2.07 of the Florida Industrial Commission:
[WIhere an employee is retired-pursuant to the terms of a retirement
plan financed in whole or in part by the employer, under which he had
no option to continue in his employment, he shall be disqualified for
unemployment compensation benefits on the ground that he has voluntarily
left his employment without good cause attributable to the employer "only
if the Commission finds" that the payments to the employee under the
plan, when. pro-rated by weeks, "equal or exceed the maximum weekly
benefit amount allowable under the Florida Unemployment Compensation
Law."
260Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.29 (Baldwin 1964).
27
St. Joe Paper Co. v. Gautreaux, supra note 18, at 674 recognizes this inequity,
stating that to allow the claimant to receive unemployment benefits "would
penalize the employer who has instituted a pension plan for his employees, as
compared to an employer who has not, for the former would be required to bear
the double financial burden of contributing to both the pension plan and the
unemployment compensation fund:'
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eligible for benefits which would raise his income above the level of
unemployment compensation, it must then be decided who is to pay for
such compensation. The employer is wholly responsible for unemployment compensation 2s and for the pension he contracted to provide
the employee. Moreover, the employee will probably be receiving
social security to which the employee and all his employers combined
have contributed equally.2 9 The employee who collects a pension,
unemployment compensation, and social security places a tremendous financial burden upon the employer. The excess of the
pension, social security, and unemployment compensation combined
over unemployment compensation alone might then be said to be a
welfare payment made largely by the retirement employer. That
employer would thus bear a burden which has traditionally been
spread throughout the entire population by means of a general tax.
If the net sum 3O of weekly social security and pension payments at
least equals the weekly unemployment compensation benefits, which
is the legislative determination of the income necessary to allow one to
stay in the labor market, the purpose of unemployment compensation
is accomplished without resort to unemployment compensation itself.
When the pension income is less than the unemployment compensation, the employer should be liable for the net difference between the
pension and the unemployment compensation otherwise due. If, as in
Marcum, the employer is not to be liable for that difference, a possible
solution is to hold the union liable since the union has a duty to represent adequately all employees for which it is the collective bargaining
agent. The liability of the union could be based upon a theory of inadequate representation of the employee. A union fund to cover the
difference could be financed from union dues and the retired employee
would thus be enabled to search for another job without undue
economic hardship.
Another possible solution would be a statute requiring that a contract
28

Fla. Star. Ann. § 443.08 (1952); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.23 (Baldwin
1964).
29
1nt. Rev. Code of 1954 § 3111; Int. Rev. Code of 1954 S 3101.
30Neither unemployment compensation nor Social Security payments is taxable.
IT 3230, 1938-2 Cum. Bull. 136-37; 3 P-H 1966 Fed. Tax Serv.
7032(5); IT
3447, 1941-1 Cum. Bull. 191. However, by virtue of Int. Rev. Code of 1954
§ 106, all of a pension paid wholly from employer contributions, none of which
contributions was considered taxable income of the employee when made, is,
when received, taxable income of the employee. Thus the net amount a retired
employee receives when a pension is a substitute for any portion of unemployment compensation may be less than if full unemployment compensation is received. The net difference would usually be small, but small amounts of money
can be significant at the income levels typically involved here.
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between a union and an employer providing for mandatory retirement
with a pension be construed as not providing for pension payments
while the employer is also liable for unemployment compensation. Of
course an employer could probably provide effectively for this as a
term of the employment contract.
Yet another solution would be a judicial ruling, whether or not
pursuant to a statute, which would allow substitution of benefits
already being received by the employee in lieu of payment of
unemployment compensation. Possible substitutions are the pension and
either the half of the social security paid by employers for the employee's benefits or the entire amount of social security receivable by
the employee. The problem of the waiver section of the applicable
unemployment compensation statute would have to be solved and
might, as in Marcum, be accomplished by holding that the employee
has no right to unemployment compensation.
The foregoing propositions are not ultimate answers; they are, however, an attempt to balance the equities of the situation and are
submitted as a guide for jurisdictions considering the problem. But
an answer should be sought, preferably by the legislatures, which
would allow employers and the employees to know in advance how
the provisions of employment contracts providing for mandatory retirement with a pension for a retiring employee will be
construed. With such prior knowledge, employers could protect themselves from a double financial burden, and employees would know how
their retirement would affect the assumed right to apply for unemployment compensation when there is inability to find immediate employment after mandatory retirement.
JAMES F. DouTHAT
FEDERAL TAX LIENS IN BANKRUPTCY
An important policy of the Bankruptcy Act is to achieve pro rata
distribution among all creditors of the bankrupt.' The general order
of distribution of the bankrupt estate is:
I. Secured claims.2 Claims of creditors who have security for their
debts upon property of the bankrupt.3
'See 3 Collier, Bankruptcy S 64.02, at 2058 (14th ed. 1964) [hereafter cited as
Collier].
2
The right of a secured creditor is technically a property right rather than a
claim against the bankrupt estate. MacLachlan, Bankruptcy § 150 (1956) [hereafter
cited as MacLachlani.
3
Bankruptcy Act § 1 (28), 52 Stat. 840 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 2 (28) (1964).
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II. The General Bankrupt Estate.
A. Unsecured priority claims.
4

Claims given priority by the

Bankruptcy Act.

These in order of priority are:
1. General expenses of administering the bankrupt estate.
2. Wages and commissions of employees of the bankrupt
earned within 3 months before bankruptcy not to exceed
$600 per claimant.
3. Expenses of creditors incurred in the successful opposition
to a discharge or in adducing evidence resulting in the
conviction of any person of a bankruptcy offense.
4. Unsecured federal, state, and local tax claims.
5. Debts owing to any person including the United States,
entitled to priority under any federal statute and rent within
certain limitations entitled to priority under applicable state
law.

B. Unsecured general claims. Dividends to general unsecured
creditors0 [Bracketed numerals and letters used hereafter refer to this
outline.]
The Internal Revenue Code provides that the federal government
acquires a lien for taxes on all property of any taxpayer liable for
such taxes when it makes a demand for payment and the taxpayer
neglects or refuses to pay." There is no practical way to discover
the existence of this secret lien, but to alleviate some of its harshness
Congress has provided in § 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code that
the lien is not valid against a "mortgagee, pledgee, puichaser, or
judgment creditor" until notice of the lien is recorded.7
4§ 64a, 52 Stat. 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104a (1964); See MacLachlan §5 150-55.
51Bankruptcy Act § 65a, 52 Stat. 875 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 105a (1964). See MacLachlan §§ 301-02.
8
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same
after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition
to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in
addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all
property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to
such person. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6321.
7
"[Tlhe lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against any mortgagee,
pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed by
the Secretary or his delegate. . . ." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323 (a). Notice must
be filed in the office designated by the law of the state or territory in which
the property subject to the lien is situated. When the state or territory has
not designated such an office, notice is filed with the clerk of the United States
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If the federal government acquires a tax lien by demand and refusal
before: a taxpayer goes into bankruptcy, the tax claim will ordinarily 8
be paid as a secured claim [I] ahead of the claims of both priority
[II A] and general unsecured creditors [II B], even though the lien
is not recorded,9 unless the trustee in bankruptcy can be made to fall
within one of the 4 classes-mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers, or judgment. creditors-against whom the tax lien must be recorded to be
valid.
The "strong arm clause" of the Bankruptcy Act, which is a part
of § 70c, provides:
The trustee, as to all property, whether or not coming into possession or control of the court, upon which a creditor of the
bankrupt could have obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings at the date of bankruptcy, shall be deemed vested as of
such date with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor
then holding a lien thereon by such proceedings, whether or not
such a creditor actually exists.' 0
This section has consistently been interpreted to give the trustee in
bankruptcy all the powers of a "judgment creditor" to avoid liens
when a judgment creditor would, under applicable state law, have
better rights than such lienholder. 11 For example, the trustee is able
to defeat the lien of a mortgagee who failed to record his mortgage
before bankruptcy; the mortgagee then takes as a general unsecured
creditor [II B] rather than as a secured claimant [I]. 12
The Courts of Appeals for the 2d, 3d, and 9th Circuits have not,
however, held that the "strong-arm clause" vests the trustee with the
District Court in which the property is situated. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S
6323(a) (1)-(2).

8
Under certain circumstances the tax lien will not be paid until after payment of. administration expenses and wages-the first two unsecured priority
claims
[II A 1, 21. See text accompanying note 55, infra.
2
See, e.g., cases cited at note 13, infra.
1052 Star. 879 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110c (1964) [Emphasis added.]

"See, 'e.g., In re Sayre Manor, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 215 (D.N.J. 1954)

(Un-

recorded land purchase contracts void under New Jersey law against subsequent
judgment creditors without notice void as to trustee); McKay v. Trusco Finance

Co., 198 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1952) (Unrecorded conditional sales contract

void as to judgment creditor with lien under Alabama law void as to trustee);

Sampbell v. Straub, 194 F.2d 228, 231 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.

927 (1952) (Unrecorded homestead exemption void as to judgment lienholders
under
California law void as to trustee).
2
1 E.g, Hams. v. Marshall, 43 F.2d 703, 704 (2d Cir.) cert. denied 282 U.S. 882

(1930), (decided under bankruptcy Act § 47a, 30 Star. 557 (1898), the predecessor
to present § 70c). See 4 Collier § 70.55.
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rights of a "judgment creditor" insofar as protection from the unrecorded federal tax lien is concerned.' 3 These decisions were based
on the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Gilbert Associates14
involving a municipal tax assessment that the New Hampshire Su15
preme Court had held was "in the nature of a judgment."' Gilbert
sustained the validity of the unrecorded federal tax lien against the
municipal tax claim, holding that a "judgment creditor," for purposes
of defining the class protected from the unrecorded tax lien, is a
creditor holding a judgment "in the usual, conventional sense of a
judgment of a court of record." 16 Gilbert stressed the necessity for
a uniform interpretation of federal statutes and the confusion which
would result from permitting state courts to make different interpretations of the phrase "judgment creditor."
When the 6th Circuit held that the "strong-arm clause" does give
the trustee the rights of a judgment creditor as against the unrecorded
federal tax lien,' 7 the Supreme Court granted certiorari' 8 to resolve
the resulting inter-Circuit conflict and affirmed in United States v.
Speers,'9 thus settling the most common question involving the tax
lien in bankruptcy proceedings. 20 In Speers, the federal government
acquired a lien for more than $14,000 in withholding taxes and interest on the property of the Kurtz Roofing Co. 17 days before
bankruptcy. The lien arose by demand and refusal and was not recorded before bankruptcy. Sale of the assets of the Kurtz Roofing
Co. after expenses of sale produced approximately $14,000.21 The
trustee successfully contended that "judgment creditors" are protected
from the unrecorded federal tax lien by the Internal Revenue Code,
and that under the "strong-arm clause" of the Bankruptcy Act the
13Simonson v. Granquist, 287 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds,
369 U.S. 38 (1962); inre Fidelity Tube Corp., 278 F.2d 776 (3d Cir.), cert. denied
sub nor. Borough of East Newark v. United States, 364 U.S. 828 (1960);
Brust v. Sturr, 237 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1956).
14345 U.S. 361 (1953) (decided under Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3672, the
predecessor of § 6323).
15Petition of Gilbert Associates, Inc., 97 N. H. 411, 414, 90 A.2d 499, 502 (1952).
' 0 United States v. Gilbert Associates, supra note 14, at 364. A judgment
creditor must also have a llen to be protected by § 6323 of the Int. Rev. Code,
Miller v. Bank of America, 166 F.2d 415, 417 (9th Cir. 1948) (decided under
Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 3672, the predecessor of § 6323).
171n re Kurtz Roofing Co., 335 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1964). See note, 1965 Duke
L.J. 142; 53 Geo. L.J. 813 (1965).

'sUnited States v. Speers, 379 U.S. 958 (1965).
19382
US. 266 (Black dissenting).
2
0See Levit, United States v. Speers-A Milestone, 71 Com. L.J. 70 (1966).
21
Notice of final meeting of creditors of Kurtz Roofing Co., No. 27743,
(D. C. N. D. Ohio, V. Div., March 5, 1962).
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trustee is deemed a "judgment creditor." Under the trustee's proproposed plan of distribution, affirmed by Speers, the federal government received less than $9,000 of the approximately $14,000 realized
from sale of the bankrupt's property; 22 the Government's claim was
reduced to the less favored status of a 4th priority unsecured tax
claim [II A 4] sharing pro-rata with state and local taxes.
Speers permits for the first time an artificial judgment creditor, the
bankruptcy trustee, to prevail against an unrecorded federal tax lien.
The uniformity problem in Gilbert (the possibility of confusion resulting from permitting state courts to make different interpretations
of the phrase "judgment creditor") is not present in Speers since
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act is a federal matter.2 3
Speers felt that Congress intended to confer "judgment creditor"
status on the trustee in bankruptcy. The predecessor of the "strongarm clause" was enacted in 1910 and read in part:
Such trustees, as to all property in the custody or coming into
the custody of the bankruptcy court, shall be deemed vested
with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor holding a
lien by equitable or legal proceedings thereon; and also, as to all
property not in the custody of the bankruptcy court, shall be
deemed vested with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a
judgment creditor holding an execution duly returned unsatis24
fied.
Prior to this amendment, the Bankruptcy Act provided that the
trustee was to be vested with the title of the bankrupt to all property
"which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process
against... [the bankrupt] ." 25 However, in 1906 the Supreme Court
in York Mfg. Co. v. Cassel2 6 had refused, despite the existing lan22
The federal government actually received only about $1800 since costs of
the appeal to the Supreme Court had to be paid as an administration expense
[II A 11 before payment of its tax claim [II A 41. Notice of Final Meeting
of creditors of Kurtz Roofing Co., No. 27743, (D. C. N. D. Ohio, W. Div.,

Feb. 7, 1966).

23
The application of Gilbert as a basis for holding that the trustee was not to
be deemed a judgment creditor in order to prevail against the unrecorded
federal tax lien met with much disapproval. See, e.g., 4 Collier § 70.49 n.3c,
at 1415; MacLachlan § 183, at 192; Loiseaux, Federal Tax Liens in Bankruptcy,

15 Vand. L. Rev. 137, 138-42 (1961); Seligson, Creditors Rights, 32 N.Y.Ul..

Rev.
708-11 (1957).
24
Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, 36 Stat. 838, 840 (Emphasis added.)
25Bankruptcy Act, § 70a (5), 30 Stat. 565 (1898) (now as amended, 66 Stat.
429 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (5) (1964).
26201 U.S. 344

at 187.

(1906).

See 4 Collier § 70.47, at 1396; MacLachlan

§ 183,
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guage of the Act, to give the trustee title to property in the possessiori
of the bankrupt as a vendee under an unrecorded conditional sale
contract. In Cassell, the Court found that under the controlling Ohio
conditional sales law only creditors with liens could avoid an unrecorded conditional sale and that the conditional sale contract was
still good between the parties even though not recorded. Since the
trustee took the same title to property that the bankrupt had, the
trustee simply stood in the shoes of the bankrupt in such circumstances and could not be given the benefit of the Ohio recording act.
The 1910 amendment, therefore, expanded the trustee's powers to
reach those cases where state law protected creditors with unrecorded
liens. 27
The only substantial amendment"8 to the "strong-arm clause,"
adopted in 1950,20 clearly simplified the definition of the status of the
trustee.30 The distinction between property coming into the custody
of the bankruptcy court and property not coming into the custody
of the bankruptcy court was eliminated, and the clause conferring
the "rights, remedies, and powers of a judgment creditor then holding an execution returned unsatisfied" was deleted. Instead, the trustee
was given the rights of a creditor who "could have obtained a lien
by legal or equitable proceedings" as to all property of the bankrupt
whether or not such property comes into the custody of the bankruptcy court. Since the rights of a creditor holding a lien by legal
or equitable proceedings are ordinarily greater than those of a judgment creditor holding an execution returned unsatisfied,3 1 the elimination of the distinction as to possession by the 1950 amendment:
clearly put the trustee in the stronger of the 2 positions which
had existed under the original enactment of the "strong-arm clause." 32
A creditor with a lien through legal or equitable proceedings does
not necessarily have a judgment. For example, a creditor may acquire
a lien by attachment prior to judgment. 33 A "judgment creditor"
does not necessarily have a lien; in some jurisdictions a judgment does
not become a lien until properly docketed.3 4 It has generally been
27
See
28

4 Collier § 70.47, at 1388-91.
Other amendments occurred in 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Star. 879, and 1952,

ch. 579, § 23, 66 Stat. 420.
29

Act of March 18, 1950, ch. 70, § 2, 64 Stat. 25.
DOSee 4 Collier § 70.47, at 1393.
S1See 4 Collier 70.47 n.18, at 1393; MacLachlan, § 70c of the Bankruptcy Act,
243Ref.
J. 107 (1950).
2
See MacLachlan § 183, at 192.
33
See 4 Collier § 70.49, at 1412, n3a at 1413.
34
See 4 Collier § 67.08 and cases cited in n.7 at 96-97.
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held, however, that the "strong-arm clause" gives the trustee the
rights of a judgment creditor as against imperfect liens other than
the unrecorded federal tax lien.3 5 For example, the trustee's rights
are better than those of a mortgagee who has failed to record his
mortgage.36 Speers said that the purpose of the 1950 amendment was
to broaden rather than reduce the powers of the trustee3 7 since "elsewhere in the same legislation it was recognized that the category of
those holding judicial liens includes judgment creditors 3 8 and a judicial
lienholder generally has 'greater rights than a judgment creditor.' "9
Originally the federal tax lien statute did not protect any subsequent
creditors from the secret tax lien.40 In 1893 the Supreme Court held 4'
that the tax lien was valid against a bona fide purchaser for value,
but to alleviate the harshness of this holding, Congress provided in
1913 that the federal tax lien would not be valid against a "mortgagee,
42
purchaser, or judgment creditor" until the lien had been recorded.
Pledgees were added in 1939 to the classes protected. 43 During the
period in which the term "judgment creditor" appeared in both the
"strong-arm clause" of the Bankruptcy Act and the tax lien sections
of the Internal Revenue Code, the 2d Circuit in 1949 said in dictum in
United States v. Sands44 that the trustee in bankruptcy was to be
deemed a "judgment creditor" for purposes of avoiding the unrecorded
tax lien.4 After the 1950 deletion of the term "judgment creditor" from
the "strong-arm clause," and after the Gilbert holding that a judgment
creditor for purpose of protection from the unrecorded federal tax
35

See 4 Collier S 70.49, at 1412-13.
S6See e.g., Hams v. Marshall, supra note 12.
3
7H.R. Rep. No. 1293, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1949); See 4 Collier § 70.47, at
1393.
38
Act of March 18, 1950, ch. 70, 64 Stat. 24, 25 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96a(4).
See 4 Collier § 70.49, n.3, at 1415; MacLachlan S 183, at 192 (1957); Loiseaux,
supra note 23, at 139.
39
United States v. Speers supra note 19, at 273, quoting H.R. Rep. No. 745,
86th Cong., 1st Sess, to accompany H.R. 7242, p. 10. See Loiseaux, supra note
23, at 139.
4ORev.
Stat., § 318b (1875), as amended, ch. 125, 20 Stat. 327, 331 (1879).
41
United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893).
42
Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 166, 37 Stat. 1016.
43
1nr. Rev. Code of 1939, § 401, ch. 247, 53 Stat. 862, 882.
44174
F.2d 384, 385 (2d Cir. 1949).
45
Speers said that the 2d Circuit was "the only Court of Appeals [in Sands,
supra note 44,] squarely to pass upon the question." United States v. Speers,
supra note 19, at 272 (Emphasis added.) Although Sands unequivocably stated
that the trustee in bankruptcy had the rights of a judgment creditor as against the
unrecorded federal tax lien, since the collector had taken possession of the
property before bankruptcy the court upheld the Government's unrecorded
lien on the ground that it was a statutory lien by distraint.
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lien meant a creditor with a judgment of a court of record, -I Congressional effort was made expressly to exclude from the Internal
Revenue Code "artificial" judgment creditors such as the trustee in
bankruptcy from the classes protected against the unrecorded federal
tax lien.46 The Senate, however, deemed it "advisable to continue to
rely upon judicial interpretation of existing law." 47 Speers felt that
this existing law sought to be preserved was not Gilbert but the dictum
in Sands, and cases holding that the trustee in bankruptcy was to have
the rights which a judgment creditor would have under state law. 48 Although Gilbert held that for purposes of avoiding the unrecorded
federal tax lien a judgment creditor must be a creditor with a judgment of a court of record, at the time the legislation was proposed,
"Gilbert had not yet been applied by any court to displace the rights
of the trustee in bankruptcy as against an unrecorded federal tax
lien.: 49
Speers also found that after the view began to spread that Gilbert
compelled exclusion of the trustee in bankruptcy from the protection
given judgment creditors against the unrecorded federal tax lien, legislation had been introduced "expressly to reiterate the trustee's power
to upset unrecorded federal tax liens." 50 The proposed legislation5 l
on 1 occasion passed both Houses of Congress but was vetoed by
President Eisenhower. 52 Speers based its holding in part upon such
"expressions of congressional discontent with recent decisions" denying the trustee the protection given judgment creditors against unrecorded tax liens. 3
Speers indicates that under an opposite result-upholding of the
validity of the unrecorded federal tax lien against the trustee-the
Government would have received "the full amount owing to it." 54
Even if this result had been reached, § 67c of the Bankruptcy Act 55
43H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H.R. 8300, p.
A407; 1954 U. S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4554.
47S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H.R. 8300, p. 575;
1954 U. S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5224; H. Conf. Rep. No. 2543, 83d Cong. 2d
Sess.,
to accompany H.R. 8300, p. 78.
4
8E.g., MacKay v. Trusco Finance Co., SampseU v. Straub; supra note 11.
49
United States v. Speers, supra note 19, at 274.
SOlbid.
51H. R. 7242, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., § 6; H. R. 394, 88th Cong. 2d Sess., § 6;

H. R. 136, 89th Cong, 1st Sess., § 6.
52H.R. 7242, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., § 6, vetoed 'by President on Sept. 8, 1960,
106 Cong. Rec. 19168.

OaUnited States v. Speers, supra note 19, at 275.
541d. at 269.
5566 Star. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1964).
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provides that payment of statutory liens, including liens for taxes

owing to the United States, may be postponed until payment of the
first two priority claims, administration expenses and wages up to
$600 [II A 1, 21. This provision is applicable only if:
(1) The bankrupt estate is insolvent.
(2) The lien is on personal property.5 6
(3) The lien is not accompanied by possession.
(4) The lien has not been enforced by sale prior to the filing of
the petition in bankruptcy.
Although these requirements limit the instances to which the statutory
lien postponement provisions of § 67c are applicable, the federal tax
lien can under the proper circumstances be subordinated to the administration expense and wage priorities. This possibility existed be:fore Speers.57 Thus, in those cases where the trustee could already
have applied the statutory lien postponement provision, the only
benefit to unsecured creditors is to enhance the positions of the
priority class 3 creditors [II A 3] and state and local tax claims
[II A 4] to the extent the Government's position is made less favorable. The unrecorded federal tax lien still has priority over the claims
of unsecured general creditors [II B].
The Government contended in its brief that to allow the trustee to
invalidate the unrecorded federal tax lien would result in a "windfall"
to secured creditors who are not mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers, or
judgment creditors whose security was obtained subsequent to the
unrecorded tax lien. 58 Under this contention, creditors who are not
already protected by the recordation requirement of § 6323 of the
Internal Revenue Code but whose liens are nevertheless valid in bankruptcy as secured claims [I], advance monetarily by the amount of
the invalidated tax claim. To illustrate: Assume that before bankruptcy the Government acquires, but fails to record, a tax lien for
$10,000 and that subsequent to the tax lien but still before bankruptcy a creditor files, but does not reduce to judgment, a valid"9
attachment lien which will be paid as a secured claim [I] in bankruptcy. Assume that sale of the property produces no more than
56"Personal property" has been interpreted to mean tangible personal property.

United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir.
67
See 4 Collier S 67.27.
58

1955).

Brief for Petitioner, United States v. Speers, supra note 19.

59To be valid the attachment must not be followed by bankruptcy within
4 months of its acquisition if at the time the lien was obtained the debtor was
insolvent. Bankruptcy Act § 67a, 52 Stat. 875 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 107(a) (1964).
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$10,000. Unless the trustee can avoid the unrecorded tax lien, the
Government takes the entire amount, because as against the federal
tax lien the attachment lien is "inchoate" until judgment and therefore does not make the attachment holder a judgment creditor.60 But,
if the federal tax lien is invalid against the trustee for failure to record
and thereby reduced from a secured claim [I] to an unsecured tax
claim [II A 4], the attachment lien will be the first secured claim to
be paid, thus producing an obvious windfall for the attaching creditor.
Speers accepted this contention without argument:
It is true that the consequence of depriving the United States of
claimed priority for its secret lien is to improve the relative positions of creditors-if there are any not already protected by
§ 6323-whose security was obtained subsequent to the Government's lien and who, once the federal lien is invalidated, have a
prior claim to the secured assets. 61
Such windfalls to junior lienors could be avoided if the trustees
could assert the Government's invalidated rights for himself and obtain the amount the Government would have obtained had the federal tax lien been recorded for the benefit of the general estate [II].
Other sections of the Bankruptcy Act which enable the trustee to
avoid or postpone certain transfers and security interests expressly
provide for subrogation of the trustee to the invalidated interest, resulting in a larger distribution to the general estate [II]. § 67c, dealing with postponement of statutory liens, not only allows the trustee
to postpone statutory liens, including federal tax liens, on personal
property not in the lienholder's possession until payment of the administration and wage expense priorities; it also permits the trustees to
step into the shoes of the creditor whose statutory lien has been postponed for the benefit of the general bankrupt estate.62 But, although
Speers enables the trustee to avoid the unrecorded tax lien, it does not
appear that he is in a position to use any preservation provision such
as that contained in § 67c or other sections of the Bankruptcy Act
to preserve the lien for the benefit of the general bankrupt estate and
I0 United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950) (attachment
lien inchoate until judgment, tax lien attaching prior to judgment entitled to
priority). The "choate lien doctrine" requires that an antecedent lien must
be specific and perfected to prevail against the government's lien. Choateness is
always a matter of federal law. See Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the
Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien,
63 YAL LJ. 905 (1954).
0
lUnited States v. Speers, supra note 19, at 275-76.
0266 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 US.C. § 107(c) (1964).
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prevent windfalls to competing lienholders. § 6063 is the voidable preference section of the Bankruptcy Act. When a creditor of the bankrupt, having reasonable cause to believe the bankrupt insolvent,
would receive a greater percentage of his debt than creditors of the
same class, the trustee may avoid transfers made within 4 months
before bankruptcy by the bankrupt debtor to such creditor-transferee.
A transfer within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act" includes
securing an involuntary as well as voluntary lien.65 A tax lien is an
involuntary lien. § 60 further provides that where the preference is
voidable, the court may
order such lien or title to be preserved for the benefit of the general bankrupt estate, in which event such lien or title shall pass to
the trustee.
If these requirements are met, § 60 would apply to tax liens as involuntary transfers6 6 were it not for § 67b which provides for a sweeping
validation of statutory liens even though arising while the debtor
is insolvent and within 4 months before bankruptcy.67 § 67b allows
statutory liens, including liens for federal taxes, to be perfected after
bankruptcy if perfected within the time allowed by the applicable
federal or state law creating or recognizing the lien. 8 As Speers
pointed out:
§ 67, sub. b permits an otherwise inchoate federal tax claim to be
"perfected" by assessment and demand within the four months
prior to bankruptcy or afterwards. It does not nullify or purport
to nullify the consequences which flow from the Government's
failure to file its perfected lien prior to the date when the trustee's rights as a statutory judgment creditor attach-namely, on
filing of the petition in bankruptcy.69
Although it would now seem superfluous to be able to perfect the
tax lien after bankruptcy since it must also be recorded to be valid
against the trustee,70 § 67b would always permit the lien to be per6364 Stat. 24 (1950), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964).

6 4Bankruptcy Act § 1 (30), 30 Star. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 1 (30)

(1964).

653 Collier § 60.07, 60.09 (14th ed. 1964).
663 Collier § 60.12.
6766 Star. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1964).
68

See 4 Collier § 67.20 at 183.

69United States v. Speers, supra note 19, at 278.

7OThe "strong-arm clause" may in other instances render impossible the

perfection of statutory liens after bankruptcy under § 67b. See Oglebay, Some
Developments in Bankruptcy Law, 24 Ref. J. 63 (1950).
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fected within the 4 months before bankruptcy thus taking it out of
the § 60 voidable preference category.
§67a 7l is another section that must be analyzed in connection with
preventing windfalls to competing lienholders when the unrecorded
federal tax lien is invalidated. It provides for invalidation of judicial
liens and also contains an avoidance and preservation provision. Under
§ 67a every lien obtained by attachment, judgment, levy, "or other
legal or equitable process or proceedings" within 4 months before
filing of a petition in bankruptcy shall be void if the debtor was
insolvent at the time the lien was obtained, and the bankruptcy
court may order any such lien to be preserved for the trustee for the
benefit of the general bankrupt estate. However, a federal tax lien
is a statutory lien rather than a lien obtained by "legal or equitable
72
process or proceedings," § 67a is therefore inapplicable.
§ 70e 73 provides that any transfer or obligation incurred by the
bankrupt estate which is voidable under non-bankruptcy law by any
creditor having a claim provable in bankruptcy shall be void against
the trustee, and that the trustee may preserve such transfer or obligation for the benefit of the general bankrupt estate. But, to apply
§ 70e, it must be shown that at least 1 of the present creditors of
the estate holding a provable claim was a creditor as against whom the
transfer was fraudulent or voidable under the controlling state or
74
federal law.

Although it appears no existing provision of the Bankruptcy Act
can be used to preserve the invalidated tax lien for the trustee for
the benefit of the general bankrupt estate [II] to prevent windfalls to
competing lienholders, 75 the same result might be achieved by reference to the priorities contemplated by the Internal Revenue Code.
It can be argued that the trustee's rights against the unrecorded federal
tax lien in no way affect the federal government's rights against other
lienholders against whom the unrecorded federal tax lien is valid. The
Internal Revenue Code provides that to be valid against a "mortgagee,
7152 Stat. 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1964).

72

"[Lliens created by statute to protect particular classes of persons are
governed in bankruptcy by sub-divisions b and c of § 67, whatever the mode
of perfection or enforcement." 4 Collier 67.12 [1] n.2a, at 120. See e.g., Davis
v. City of New York, 119 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1941) (city sales tax lien arising
on docketing of a warrant in county clerk's office held statutory lien within
67b rather than lien obtained by legal proceedings).
7352 Stat. 882 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1964).
744 Collier § 70.90, at 1729.
75See Comment, Avoiding Federal Tax Liens in Bankruptcy, 39 Texas L. Rev.
616 (1961); Note, 35 Ind. L.J. 351, 353-57 (1960).
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pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor" the federal tax lien must
be recorded; if the lien is not recorded, a judgment creditor such as
the trustee in bankruptcy has greater rights to the taxpayer's property
than the Government. The Internal Revenue Code does not provide,
however, that the existence of a judgment creditor will increase the
rights of any other lienholder against whom the unrecorded tax lien
is still valid. Rather, after the amount of the judgment creditor's lien
has been paid, any balance remaining should be applied to the tax
lien and then to the lien which is junior to the federal tax lien. Since
the "strong-arm clause" of the Bankruptcy Act gives the trustee the
power of a judgment creditor as to all property of the bankrupt
taxpayer, as a practical matter there will never be anything left for
a lienholder junior to the tax lien after the trustee has defeated the
unrecorded tax lien. Thus, such junior lienholders who would receive
windfalls under the assumption in Speers could only take as general
creditors [II].
The Speers holding will never benefit more than a few claims, primarily unsecured state and local tax claims which, even then, will only
share pro-rata with the federal tax claim. Third priority creditors'
fraud expenses [II A 3] will also benefit, but such claims are rare. 78
Except in cases involving real property, administration expenses and
wages [II A 1 & 2], the first 2 priorities, would by virtue of § 67c
(the statutory lien postponement section) be paid before the federal
tax lien anyway unless the Government takes possession of the property before bankruptcy, 77 the bankrupt estate is solvent, or the Government enforces its lien by sale prior to bankruptcy.78 Furthermore,
if the Court is correct in assuming the elevation of liens ordinarily
behind the tax lien, the result is a windfall to junior lienholders simply
because of the intervention of bankruptcy. It is obvious that this result is not contemplated by the Bankruptcy Act 79 inasmuch as all
other sections permitting the trustee to invalidate liens and transfers
provide that the trustee can preserve and assert the rights of the
claimant whose interest has been invalidated for the benefit of the
general bankrupt estate [111.80
7oSee Note, 39 Ref. J. 55, 56, n.21 (1965).
77See Goggin v. Division of Labor Law Enforcement, 336 U.S. 118 (1949).
78
See text accompanying note 54, supra.
79
See Seligson, Recent Developments in the Field of Federal Tax Claims, 29
Ref. J. 7, 11 (1955).
SOBankruptcy Act § 60, 64 Star. 24 (1950), as amended, 11 U.S.C. S 96
(preferences) (1964); § 67a, 52 Stat. 875 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. S 107(a)
(1964) (judicial liens); § 67c, 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1964)
(postponement of statutory liens); § 67d, 66 Stat. 428 (1952), 11 U.S.C. S 107(d)
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The Speers holding does, however, conform to the general policy
of the strong-arm clause and the entire Bankruptcy Act in giving the
trustee broader control over the bankrupt's assets at the date of bankruptcy than would a holding that an unrecorded federal tax lien is
valid in bankruptcy as a secured claim [I].81
While the Bankruptcy Act attempts to make distributions to the
bankrupts' creditors as fair as possible, it also seeks to enable the
bankrupt debtor to return to economic and social productiveness by
discharging him from claims of his old creditors. 82 Even though the
amount the Government receives is altered by Speers, the bankrupt
taxpayer is still liable for the excess amount not realized in bankruptcy, since no tax claim is dischargeable.83 If avoidance of the
unrecorded federal tax lien results in larger payments to junior lienholders and priority creditors, then to the extent of such payments
the bankrupt is left with a greater amount of nondischargeable tax
indebtedness.
The policy of insuring the collection of the Government's revenues
is strong8 as evidenced by the existence of the secret tax lien and the
strict judicial definition of the classes against whom the unrecorded
lien is invalid under § 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code. 85 Since
allowing the trustee to invalidate the unrecorded tax lien primarily
benefits unsecured state and local tax claims and, presumably, junior
liens not protected by § 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code, as a
result of Speers the policy of protecting the federal revenue is altered
somewhat by the advent of bankruptcy. Speers permits a result in
bankruptcy which nonbankruptcy cases such as Gilbert refused to
reach.86 While the unrecorded federal tax lien defeated the local
assessment in Gilbert, Speers allowed the local tax to share pro-rata
(1964)

(fraudulent transfers); § 70e, 52 Stat. 882 (1938),

U.S.C. § 110(e)

(1964)

as amended, 11

(transfers voidable by any creditor of the bankrupt

voidable by trustee).
81See 4 Collier S 70.45, at 1384.
82

See MacLachlan 5 100.

83Bankruptcy Act § 17 (9) (1), 30 Star. 544 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 35 (9) (1)
(1964).
84
The purpose of the secret tax lien is to insure prompt and certain collection
of taxes. See United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 51 (1950);
United States v. Bond, 279 F.2d 837, 847 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
895 (1960); "The Court today gives frail and inadequate support, I think, for
its judicial destruction of the Government's congressionally created lien." United

States
v. Speers, supranote 19, at 280 (Black dissenting).
85
See United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 53 (1950)
(concurring opinion); Walker, What Protection Against the Secret Federal Tax

Lien? 9 J. Taxation 8 (1958).

8OUnited States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361 (1953).
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with the unrecorded federal tax claim. Although Speers to a limited
extent represents an erosion in favor of state and local governments
of the effectiveness of the unrecorded federal tax lien, its effect upon
distributions to general creditors of the bankrupt is nonexistent. Of
course, the Government can avoid the whole Speers problem entirely
by recording its lien before bankruptcy in accordance with § 6323
of the Internal Revenue Code. If the Government should, as a matter
of policy, decide that the effect of Speers upon the federal revenue
is great enough to warrant recordation in all cases, then the result
of Speers will be simply the elimination of the secret aspects of the
federal tax lien.
JOSEPH

D.

LOGAN, I1

TAXATION-LEGAL FEES IN UNSUCCESSFUL CRIMINAL
DEFENSE HELD DEDUCTIBLE AS BUSINESS EXPENSES
In Commissioner v. Tellierl the Supreme Court was presented with
the argument that legal fees incurred in the unsuccessful defense of
a criminal charge arising out of taxpayer's business, though they meet
the literal requirements of § 162(a), are not deductible because deduction would reward criminal activity. Taxpayer in Tellier was
engaged in the business of underwriting and selling securities. He
was convicted and fined $18,000 for violating the fraud section of
the Securities Act of 1933,2 the mail fraud statute,3 and conspiracy
to violate both of these statutes. 4 In his defense taxpayer incurred
and paid approximately $23,000 in legal fees, and he sought
to deduct this expenditure as an "ordinary and necessary" business
expense under § 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction and was sustained by the Tax
Court on the ground that "public policy" bars the deduction of legal
expenses incurred in defense of acts found to be criminal.0 The 2d
Circuit en banc unanimously reversed 7 and the Supreme Court agreed,
holding that such expenses are "ordinary and necessary" within the
'86 Sup. Ct. 1118 (1966).
248 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1954).
81g U.S.C. S 1341 (1948).
418
U.S.C. § 371 (1948).
5
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a), "There shall be allowed as a deduction
all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year
in carrying on any trade or business .....
0
Walter F. Tellier, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1207 (1963).
7
Tellier v. Commissioner, 342 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965).
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meaning of § 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, hence fully deductible because no sharply defined public policy is frustrated by
allowing the deduction. 8"
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 allows a deduction for "all the
ordinary and necessary expenses" incurred in carrying on a trade or
business.9 Judicial interpretation of the statutory language "ordinary
and necessary" requires only that the expenditure be directly connected with or proximately result from the taxpayer's business,' 0
that the expenditure be common and accepted in that type of business,11 and that the expenditure be appropriate at the time or helpful
to the taxpayer. 12 In short "ordinary" has been construed to mean
"normal" or "common" among similarly situated businessmen, and
"necessary" has been construed to mean "helpful" or "appropriate"
to the maintenance of the taxpayer's business. 13 Cardozo in applying
the statutory language to legal fees said:
Ordinary in this context does not mean that the payments must be
habitual or normal in the sense that the same taxpayer will have
to make them often. A lawsuit affecting the safety of a business
may happen once in a lifetime. The counsel fees may be so heavy
that repetition is unlikely. None the less, the expense is an ordinary
one because we know from experience that payments for such a
purpose, whether the amount is large or small, are the common
and accepted means of defense against attack. 14
Although the Code imposes no general requirement that business
expenses be lawful or arise out of lawful activities,' 5 the judiciary
has developed a "public policy" exception to the Code language denying the deduction of otherwise "ordinary and necessary" expenses if
886 Sup. Ct. 1118 (1966).
OInt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162 (a).
10 E.g., Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 153 (1928).
"E.g., Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 93 (1952);

Commissioner

v.

Heiniuger, 320 U.S. 467, 471 (1943); Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940).
12 E.g., Lilly v. Commissioner, supra note 11, at 93-94; Commissioner v. Heininger, supra note 11, at 471.

13 See, e.g., Lilly v. United States, 348 U.S. 90 (1952); Deputy v. duPont, 308

U.S. 488 (1940); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1933); Kornhauser
v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928). Commissioner v. Tellier, supra note 1, at
1120 provides:

The principal function of the term ordinary in § 162(a) is to clarify the
distinction, often difficult, between those expenses that are currently deductible and those that are in the nature of capital expenditures, which, if'
deductible at all, must be amortized over the useful life of the asset.
' 4 Welch v. Helvering, supra note 13, at 114.
' 5 Commissioner v. Heininger, supra note 11, at 474; 50 Cong,-Rec. 3849 (1913).
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such expenditures arise out of or are related to unlawful activities.10
Of course some expenditures, particularly those illegal or unethical
in themselves, may validly be disallowed as extraordinary if they are
uncommon or unaccepted ways of doing business.' 7 The underlying
reason for disallowing expenditures associated with illegal activity is
that the allowance of a deduction will, through the consequent reduction of tax liability, benefit, hence encourage, illegal activities."8
Although such reasoning has merit, it fails to recognize that a basic
goal of the federal tax system is conformation of tax liability solely
to the ability to pay. 19 To accomplish this the tax should be measured
by net, rather than gross income. No matter how large the gross
from business activities may be, if there is no net income, there is, at
least theoretically, no greater ability to pay than there would have
been if the activities had not been engaged in.20 The denial of otherwise "ordinary and necessary" business expense deductions results in
measuring tax liability in terms of gross income, contrary to a basic
21
principle of our tax system.
The judiciary early formulated rules as to the tax deductibility of
litigation expenses. No deduction is allowed for legal expenses if they
are incurred in purely personal litigation.22 However, legal expenses
incurred in maintaining or defending a civil action arising out of the
16See, e.g., United States v. Worcester, 190 F. Supp. 548 (D. Mass. 1961);

Dixie Mach. Welding & Metal Works, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.2d 439
(5th Cir. 1963); N. A. Woodworth Co. v. Kavanaugh, 202 F.2d 154 (6th Cir.
1953).
17
See, e.g., United Draperies. Inc. v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 936 (7th Cir.
1964), where it was held: "the record reveals nothing inherent in the nature of
petitioner's drapery enterprise which serves to endow such payments with a
character of ordinariness they would not otherwise possess. In reaching this conclusion we do so apart from consideration of the morality or legality of the
practice" Id.at 938, but compare the dissent which felt that the "kickback"
payments were ordinary and necessary within the meaning of the applicable
regulations. The dissenting justice stated: "the methods used by the taxpayer
in the instant case should be prohibited," but that this result should be
attained by Congressional action and not by court edict. id.at 938. See also
Reid, Dissallowance of Tax Deductions on Grounds of Public Policy-A Critique,
17 Fed. BJ. 575, 582-83 (1957).
'8E.g., Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949).
'9 See Keesling, Illegal Transactions and the Income Tax, 5 U.CJL.A. L. Rev.
26, 35 (1958).
2Olbid.
2l1bid.
22
ee United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963), where the Court held
that "the origin and character of the claim with respect to which an expense was
incurred, rather than its potential consequences upon the fortunes of the taxpayer,
is the controlling basic test of whether the expense was 'business' or 'personal'
within the meaning of § 162 (a).
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conduct of business have uniformly been held deductible.2 Moreover,
taxpayers have uniformly been allowed to deduct legal fees incurred
in the successful defense of a criminal action where the acts arose
out of the conduct of their business. Successful defenses include ac27
quittal, 24 dismissal, 25 nolle prosequi, 2 and favorable consent decrees.
Until Tellier the lower courts had uniformly disallowed the deduction
of legal fees incurred in the unsuccessful defense of criminal actions
28
where the acts arose out of the conduct of business.
This disallowance was first established in Burroughs Bldg. Material
Co. v. Commissioner9 in 1932 by the same Circuit that later abrogated
it. Taxpayer had claimed deductions for fines imposed and legal fees
incurred in a criminal prosecution for antitrust violations. Burroughs
disallowed the deduction of the fines and legal fees, reasoning that
public policy requires that "illegal" acts not be sanctioned by the
courts, and concluded: "If the fines and costs cannot be deducted,
the legal expenses . . . should naturally fall with the fines them-

selves." 3 0 The court overlooked an important distinction between
fines and legal fees in arriving at its conclusion, as have courts following this precedent. The amount of a fine, in theory, represents
an appropriate exaction for unlawful conduct. Although disallowing deduction of a fine may be necessary to sustain its punitive effect,3 1
litigation expenses are, in theory, of no concern to the criminal law.
Their disallowance creates an additional penalty not called for by
the statutory violation. Further, the amount of legal expenses varies
with the time spent in conducting the defense rather than with the
severity of the crime; thus the denial of the deduction may be unduly
32
harsh in relation to the statutory penalty.
The application of a broad "public policy" rationale in disallowing
business deductions was considerably restricted in 1943 by the Supreme
23
See, e.g., Foss v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 326 (1st Cir. 1935); John W. Clark,
30 T.C. 1330 (1958).
24
Commissioner v. People's-Pittsburg Trust Co., 60 F.2d 187 (3rd Cir. 1932).
25Commissioner v. Shapiro, 278 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1960).
2
6Morgan S. Kaufman, 12 T.C. 1114 (1949).
2
7National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878 (2d
Cir.
1937).
28
See, e.g., Bell v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1963); Acker v.
Commissioner, 258 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1958); Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v.
Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931); Anthony Cornero Stralla, 9 T.C. 801
(1947).
2947 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1931).

3ld. at 180.
3

lCf. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
See Note, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 752, 757 (1951).

32
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Court in Commissioner v. Heininger.33 The Court held that a business
expense deduction may be disallowed only when permitting the deduction would "frustrate sharply defined national or state policies
proscribing particular types of conduct." U Lilly v. Commissioner 5
added a further restriction when it allowed business expense deductions for kickback payments by opticians to doctors for glasses prescribed by the doctors because there was no clear frustration of a
public policy "evidenced by some governmental declaration." The
Court suggested such. declarations should be left to "the province of
legislatures." 36 Finally, the "test of nondeductibility always is the
severity and the immediacy of the frustration resulting from allowance
of the deduction." 37
The Supreme Court has found "frustration of sharply defined policy" in only 2 types of otherwise "ordinary and necessary" business expenses: (1) criminal fines,8 8 (disallowed in order not to frustrate legislative policy by reducing the 'sting' of the prescribed penalty); (2) lobbying expenditures, 89 (disallowed on the ground that
expenses incurred in influencing legislation or securing government
contracts should not receive governmental sanction in any form). 40
Moreover, the Supreme Court has continually emphasized that the
intent of Congress in providing for deduction of ordinary and necessary business expenses was, except where specifically provided otherwise,41 to tax net income regardless of its source, rather than to
"reform men's moral characters." 42 Thus, in 1958 the Court in
Commissioner v. Sullivan48 held payments for rent and employees'
salaries in the conduct of an illegal gambling enterprise were deduct83320 U.S. 467 (1943).
841d. at 473.
85343 U.S. 90 (1952).
S61d. at 97.
87
Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958).
88
Hoover
9

Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958).
S Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959); Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
4
oSee Note, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1408 (1954). These holdings are now embodied
in § 162(e) (2) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954. § 162(e) (2) states that the
§ 162 deduction is disallowed "For any amount paid or incurred ... in connection with any attempt to influence the general public, or segments thereof,
with respect to legislative matters, elections, or referendums."
41
E.g., nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 165(d) which limits the deduction of wagering
losses to the amount of wagering gains.
4250 Cong. Rec. 3849 (1913) (cited in Tellier supra note 8, at 1121); Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958); Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S.
467, 474 (1943).
48356 U.S. 27 (1958).
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ible, even though the payments violated the applicable state penal
statute. Sullivan reasoned that amounts paid as wages and rent are
"ordinary and necessary expenses" in the accepted meaning of those
words and that to disallow them "would come close to making this
type of business taxable on the basis of its gross receipts, while all
other business would be taxable on the basis of net income. If that
choice is to be made, Congress should do it."

44

As a result of Sullivan,

the Justice Department recommended to Congress a bill disallowing
expenses incurred by businesses violating state and federal statutes. 4

The proposal was never enacted. A few years earlier Congress had
considered a bill disallowing expenses resulting from illegal gambling
and rejected it on the ground that the Internal Revenue Code is not
intended to penalize or prohibit unlawful activities. 46
These recent rejections by Congress coupled with the Supreme
Court decisions in Heininger and Lilly seem to endorse neutrality
in the administration of the tax statutes where illegal conduct is invoked as a basis for disallowing business deductions. In any case the
frustration doctrine announced in Heininger requires only that allowance of a deduction not frustrate sharply defined public policy,
that is, more than frustration of vague or general policy is required.
The attitude with which the pre-Tellier lower courts have approached the issue presented in Tellier is illustrated by Learned Hand's
statement that to allow deduction of counsel fees for an unsuccessful
defense would tend to "subsidize the obduracy of those offenders
who were unwilling to pay without a contest and who therefore
added impenitence to their offense." 47 Such reasoning is especially
inappropriate when applied to vague statutes regulating trade practices, in which neither the Government nor the defendant can in any
real sense be said to know the requirements of the law before the
courts declare it.4s As a result of Hand's language and of dictum in

Heininger,49 it has been suggested that the deduction be allowed only
where the criminal defense is asserted in good faith.50 This suggestion
441d. at 29.

45H.R. Rep. No. 7394, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
4697 Cong. Rec. 12230-44 (1951).
47
jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 1949).
48
See Comment, 72 Yale LJ. 108, 135 (1962).
40320 U.S. 467, 471. "Since the record contains no suggestion that the defense

was in bad faith or that the attorney's fees were unreasonable, the expenses incurred in defending the business can also be assumed appropriate and helpful,
and
therefore 'necessary.'"
60
McDonald, Deduction of Attorney's Fees for Federal Income Tax Purposes,
103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 168, 180 (1954).

390

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIII

has been criticized for the administrative difficulties it presents, since
a test based on the good faith of the defense would seem to place an
impossible burden on the courts, the Internal Revenue Service, and
the taxpayer. 51 Moreover, it is difficult to know what, short of a
defense that itself violates the law, is a bad faith defense. Perhaps
Hand's contention has merit where the crime is malum in se. In
making no reference to either the nature of the crime for which the
taxpayer was convicted, or the merits of the defense presented, the
Supreme Court apparently rejected by implication both of these
distinctions. But the Commissioner, who has long espoused the view
continue to use such disrejected in Tellier, will in all probability
52
tinctions to disallow these deductions.
The 2d Circuit in holding contrary to long established precedent
remarked:
There has been no 'governmental declaration' of any 'sharply defined' national or state policy of discouraging the hiring of counsel and the incurring of other legal expense in defense against a
criminal charge. In fact it is highly doubtful whether such a public policy could exist in the face of the Sixth Amendment's
guaranty of the right to counsel.Ps
Both the 2d Circuit's and the Supreme Court's reasoning are related
to decisions defining the defendant's constitutional right to counsel.
The Court stated that no public policy is offended when one faced
with serious criminal charge employs a lawyer to help in his defense.
To the contrary, "in an adversary system of criminal justice, it is
a basic of our public policy that a defendant in a criminal case have
counsel to represent him." 54 But the reasoning in Tellier may not be
sound. Late in its opinion the Court assumed the issue to be whether
there is a public policy to deter the employment of counsel. Surely
no such policy exists. The real issue is whether there is a public
policy against deducting litigation expenses incurred in unsuccessfully
defending a criminal charge. The Court merges these 2 issues by
presupposing that a denial of the deduction would deter the employ5t
Comment,
52

72 Yale LJ. 108, 134 (1962).
"During the oral arguments before the Court, the question arose as to
whether a person engaged in bank robbing as a trade or business could deduct
his legal fees in fighting prosecution. A liberal reading of the Court's opinion
could lead to a 'yes' answer. Under the rationale of Sullivan, it is apparent that
the business itself does not have to be legal. However, it remains to be seen if
Tellier can be stretched that far." 24 J. Taxation 300 (May 1966).
53Tellier v. Commissioner, 342 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1965).
54
Commissioner v. Tellier, supranote 1, at 1122.
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e to
ment of counsel. The Court then cites Gideon v. Wain~wrights
justify its decision. Tellier, however, is not concerned with an indigent denied the right to counsel. If the Court's reasoning is followed to its logical conclusion, legal fees for all criminals, not just
those whose crime has occurred in a business context, should be
deductible.
The Supreme Court, by asserting that "the federal income tax is a
tax on net income, not a sanction against wrongdoing," 6 supports
the concept of moral neutrality in the tax Code. The Court's statement
brings into question any public policy doctrine in denying deductions
of otherwise "ordinary and necessary" business expenses. Rejection
of the elusive public policy criteria would be consistent with what
appears to be the attitude of Congress: tax laws relating to business
are intended to tax net income, regardless of its source. Where Congress has intended to curb particular forms of business conduct by
the tax statutes, it has done so by specific legislation. 57 This legislative practice combined with the inconsistencies and confusion which
result from the judicial ad hoc public policy doctrine calls for legislative determination of which business expenses should be disallowed
on public policy grounds. The courts should not by themselves add
a morality gloss to our already complex tax Code.
PE= W.

MARTONE

TOWARD A UNIFORM COTENANCY LAW
For the magic word "survivorship" opens a Pandora's box, releasing strange spirits from the past, spirits as strange and alien
to the modern world as the Salem witches. Here comes Joint
Tenancy, with his handmaidens, Per Tout and Per My. There
in solemn black march the Four Unities, in cadence slow. Vested
Remainder dances the gavotte with his wife, Contingent to the
strains of lutes played by Severance and Ius Accrescendi.
Through the air on evanescent wings float Possibilities,now alone
and now coupled with an interest.'
55372 U.S. 335 (1963).

GOCommissioner v. Tellier, supra note 1, at 1120.
57

See Int. Rev. Code of

1954, §

162(c). "No deduction shall be allowed ...

for any expenses paid or incurred if the payment thereof is made, directly or
indirectly, to an official or employee of a foreign country, and if the maling
of the payment would be unlawful under the laws of the United States if such
laws were applicable to such payment and to such official or employee:'
Section 162 (e) disallows certain lobbying expenses.
'Stephenson, Survivorship Deeds Under the Statute, 34 Conn. BJ. 15-16 (1960).
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The desirability of some form of joint ownership is demonstrated
by its use in the common law for over 6 centuries2 as well as its
availability in every jurisdiction today.3 The common law provided
3 forms of joint ownership which are still in use: Tenancy in
Common, Joint Tenancy, and Tenancy by the Entirety.4
(1) Tenancy in Common was the simplest: each tenant owned only
an undivided part of the estate5 subject to compulsory partition by
either of the tenants or forced sale for division of the proceeds of
the sale 6 with no right of survivorship. 7
(2) Joint Tenancy was that joint estate with a destructible right of
survivorship. In this form of ownership the right of 1 tenant to
receive the whole estate at the death of the other(s) could be cut
off by compulsory partition,8 forced sale for division of the proceeds
from the sale, 9 or a sale without the permission of the other tenant.10
This estate was favored by the common law and any transfer to 2
or more tenants was presumed to be a joint tenancy, which automatically carried a right of survivorship. 11
(3) Tenancy by the Entirety, a form of joint ownership available
only to married tenants,' 2 contained an indestructible right of survivorship. 13 Since at common law husband and wife were 1 person
2

See English, Concurrent Estates in Real Property I (pt. 1), 11 Catholic
U.L. Rev. 63 (1962).
SSee 4 Powell, Real Property
602 (1965); 2 Tiffany, Real Property § 424
(3d
ed. 1939).
4
Tenancy by Coparcenary is of little or no significance today. See 1 Aigler,
Smith & Tefft, Property 703 (1960); 4 Powell, Real Property
600 (1965);
2 Tiffany, Real Property 429 (3d ed. 1939).
5State v. Hoskins, 357 Mo. 377, 208 S.W.2d 221, 222 (1948); Taylor v. Millard,
1186 N.Y. 244, 23 N.E. 376, 377 (1890); See McConnel v. Kibbe, 43 Ill. 12 (1867).
Willard v. Willard, 145 U.S. 116, 120-21 (1892). "Partition" refers to division
of the property itself among joint owners. Ibid. When property held by tenants in
common is incapable of equitable division it may be sold and the proceeds from
the sale divided equally among the tenants. Henry v. White, 224 Ala. 427, 140 So.
3917 (1932).
Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Harvey, 143 Conn. 233, 121 A.2d 276,
280 (1956); In re Hoermann's Estate, 234 Wis. 130, 290 N.W. 608, 610 (1940);
Woodward
v. Congdon, 34 R.I. 316, 83 Ad. 433, 435 (1912).
8
Gwinn v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 224, 228 (1932); Midgley v. Walker,
101 Mich. 583, 60 N.W. 296 (1894).
91bid.
101bid.; Green v. Skinner, 185 Cal. 435, 197 Pac. 60, 61 (1921).
l'Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 11 Cal. App. 2d 451, 54 P.2d 73, 75 (1936); Allen
v. Almy, 87 Conn. 517, 89 Ad. 205, 207 (1913); Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 IM. 19,
13212N.E. 280, 283 (1921).
Simons v. Bollinger, 154 Ind. 83, 56 N.E. 23, 24 (1900); see Taub v.
Shampanier, 95 NJ.L. 349, 112 Ad. 322 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
13 "Indestructible" in this sense means that it cannot be cut off by a third
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and the estate belonged to that entity and not to either alone, the
right of survivorship could not be cut off by compulsory partition,
forced sale for division, or attempted transfer by 1 spouse without
the permission of the other spouse. 14
Two serious objections have been made to survivorship as it was
used at common law. First, widespread use of survivorship among
laymen without full recognition of all its ramifications often resulted
in frustration of the real intent of the parties.15 This was especially
undesirable where the survivorship was created not by an act of the
parties but by the common law presumption in favor of joint tenancy.
The second objection was that the indestructible nature of the right
of survivorship in tenancy by the entirety could be used to defeat
the rights of the tenants' creditors.' 6
Different jurisdictions have attempted to meet these 2 objections
in many different ways. A very small minority has tried to meet both
objections by abolishing joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety,
leaving only tenancy in common, an estate without a right of sur7
vivorship.1
The more usual method of meeting the objection of the uninparty or by an act of one tenant alone. Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764, 765
(4th4 Cir. 1931); Hoffmann v. Newell, 249 Ky. 270, 60 S.W.2d 607, 609 (1932).
1 This idea was commonly expressed by saying such tenants hold per tout
and not per my; see Taub v. Shampanier, 95 N.J.L. 349, 112 Ad. 322 (Sup. Ct.
1921).
151n Bernhard the parties apparently had no idea they were creating an
indestructible right of survivorship. It can hardly be seriously asserted that the
words "as tenants by the entirety with the right of survivorship" sufficiently alerts
the layman to the indestructible nature of the estate he is creating.
' 6 Since the survivorship cannot be destroyed and there is no way to ascertain
who the survivor will be, there can be no attachment since the debtor's interest
in the property is unascertained. A second reason for non-attachment is the
common law fiction that the estate belongs to both of the tenants as one but to
neither of them alone. English, ConcurrentEstates in Real Property II, (pt. 2) 12
Catholic U.L. Rev. 1, 2 (1963).
17Washington withdrew from this dwindling minority with Wash. Sess. Laws
1961, ch. 2, which repealed Wash. Rev. Code § 11.04.070 (1953). Alabama was
briefly in this minority before Ala. Code tit. 47, § 19 (1958) was amended in
1945, 4 Powell, Real Property 602 n.15 (1965). Oregon tried to abolish joint
tenancy by statute, now Ore. Rev. Star. § 93.180 (1953), but the Supreme Court
of Oregon apparently construed the statute to mean that no more than the old
common law presumption in favor of joint tenancy was destroyed. For an
explanation of the status of the Oregon law as well as the ambiguity of the
revised statute see O'Connell, Are Joint Tenancies Abolished In Oregon?, 21
,Ore. L. Rev. 159 (1942). Alaska apparently follows the Oregon view of joint
,tenancy, Alaska Stat. § 34.15.130 (1962), Pilip v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 397,
402 (D. Alaska 1960), although Alaska Stat. § 34.15.140 (1962), expressly allows
creation of a limited tenancy by the entirety.
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tentional use of survivorship, however, has been by statutory abolition of the common law presumption in favor of joint tenancy and
creation of a statutory presumption in favor of a tenancy in common. 8 Under such statutes a grant to 2 or more grantees is presumed to create a tenancy in common, an estate without survivorship,
instead of a joint tenancy, an estate with survivorship. This presumption can always be rebutted by an express provision in the instrument
showing a clear intent to create a joint tenancy, on the rationale that
such an estate is permissible if the grantor realizes what he is doing.19
In slightly more than half the jurisdictions the method of dealing
with the creditors' objection to tenancy by the entirety has been to
abolish tenancy by the entirety outright,20 leaving joint tenancy as
the only jointly held estate with survivorship. Although a few jurisdictions have simply held that tenancy by the entirety does not completely insulate against creditors,21 a sizable minority has refused to
change the common law rule that a tenancy by the entirety is not
subject to levy or attachment for any debt not incurred by both
22
spouses jointly.
Alabama judicially abolished tenancy by the entirety in 1860.23 The
presumption in favor of joint tenancy was abolished by a statute which
allowed joint tenancy only if the intent to create it were clearly
expressed:
When one joint tenant dies before the severance, his interest does
18See, e.g., Lynch v. Murray, 139 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1943); Prall v. Burck-

hartt, 299 Ill. 19, 132 N.E. 280 (1921); Salvation Army, Inc. v. Hart, 239 Ind. 1,
154 N.E.2d 487 (1958); Midgley v. Walker, 100 Mich. 583, 60 N.W. 296 (1894);
In re Blumenthal's Estate, 236 N.Y. 448, 141 N.E. 911 (1923).
19 Allen v. Almy, 87 Conn. 517, 89 Atl. 205, 207 (1913); Frey v. Wubbena,
26 IMI.2d 62, 185 N.E.2d 850 (1962); Wilken v. Young, 149 Ind. 1, 41 N.E. 68

(1895).
2
OAnother method of achieving the same result is to refuse to recognize it.
For an excellent grouping and classification of the methods by which tenancy by
the entirety is not recognized in 29 jurisdictions see Phipps, Tenancy By
Entireties,25 Temp. L.Q. 24, 32-33 (1951).
21in Kentucky and Tennessee the creditor can levy and sell the interest of the

debtor spouse. The buyer at execution thus gets only the contingent right of
Isurvivorship, see Hoffmann v. Newell, 249 Ky. 270, 60 S.W.2d 607 (1932); Francis
v. Vastine, 229 Ky. 431, 17 S.W.2d 419 (1929); Cole Mfg. Co. v. Collier, 95
Tenn. 115, 31 S.W. 1000 (1895). In Arkansas the purchaser at execution takes
the debtor spouse's interest in half the rents and profits as well as the con,tingent right of survivorship, see Moore v. Denson, 167 Ark. 134, 268 S.vV. 609
(1924);
Branch v. Polk, 61 Ark. 388, 33 S.W. 424 (1895).
22

For a grouping and classification of the 20 jurisdictions which have retained
tenancy by the entirety, see Phipps, Tenancy By Entireties, 25 Temp. L.Q.
24,2333-34, 46-57 (1951).
See Walthall v. Goree, 36 Ala. 728 (1860).

1966]

CASE COMMENTS

not survive to the other joint tenants, but descends and vests as
if his interest had been severed and ascertained, provided, however, that in the event it is stated in the instrument creating such
tenancy, that such tenancy is with right of survivorship, or other
words used therein showing such intention, then upon the death
of one joint tenant, his interest shall pass to the surviving joint
tenant or tenants according to the intent of such instrument. This
shall include those instruments . . . in which . . . it clearly appears
that the intent is to create such a survivorship between joint tenants as is herein contemplated. 24
Thus, as in the majority of jurisdictions, after this statute was adopted
the law of Alabama appeared to be that while a tenancy by the entirety
with an indestructible right of survivorship could not be created under
any circumstances, a joint tenancy with a destructible right of survivorship could be created if the intent to do so were clearly
expressed.
The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, interpreted this statute
25
in a very unusual way in Bernhard v. Bernhard.
There the husband
filed a bill to force a sale for division of the proceeds from the house
and land which he and his estranged wife had been granted. The
deed stated that the parties were to take
as joint tenants with right of survivorship . . . it being the intention of the parties to this conveyance, that (unless the joint tenancy hereby created is severed or terminated during the joint
lives of the grantees herein), in the event one grantee herein
survives the other, the entire interest in fee simple shall pass to
26
the surviving grantee ....
According to the view uniformly adhered to in jurisdictions which,
like Alabama, have abolished tenancy by the entirety but allow creation of joint tenancy by express intention, such language would have
created a joint tenancy (with a destructible right of survivorship)
in accordance with the intent of the parties.2 7 Not recognizing this,
the Bernhard court took the novel position that the estate of joint
tenancy, instead of the common law presumption in favor of joint
tenancy, had been abolished by the statute. 28 The reason seems to be
24

Ala. Code tit. 47, § 19 (1958).
So. 2d 565 (Ala. 1965).
261d. at 566.
27
Supra notes 18, and 19.
28
Bernhard, supra note 25, at 567, cites only 1 case as authority for this
construction, Finch v. Haynes, 144 Mich. 352, 107 N.W. 910 (1906), which is
cited incorrectly since it expressly distinguished the situation presented by
25177
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the incorrect assumption that the first part of the statute abolishing
joint tenancy was inconsistent with the latter part allowing it.29 Apparently believing itself forced to choose between 2 inconsistent
statutory clauses, the court implied that the more logical construction
was that the legislature had intended to retain only 1 incident of
joint tenancy, survivorship, rather than the entire estate of joint
tenancy. To replace the abolished estate of joint tenancy the court
fashioned a strange estate called a "tenancy in common with an indestructible right of survivorship" which the court equated to a tenancy
in common for the joint lives of the tenants with cross-contingent
remainders in both tenants.30 This estate has been used before in other
jurisdictions,3 ' usually when an attempted joint tenancy fails for want
of one of the 4 uniies; 32 but this case is the first instance of
forcibly establishing it over the intention of both the legislature and
the parties to the instrument.
The court fictionalized the intent of the parties in order to achieve
this result by saying that the intention of the parties was other than
it patently was. It seized upon a provision in the deed which in effect
Bernhard. The Michigan Supreme Court, in carefully limiting their result to
grants "to A & B and the survivor of them," considered a precedent where, as
in Bernhard, the grant was "to A & B as joint tenants with a right of survivorship" and held:
That was a case where the interest of one of two joint tenants under a
deed, where the right of survivorship was expressly granted, was purchased
under an execution sale ... and this court held that such interest was subject
If the deed under consideration had . . . made the
to levy and sale ....
grantees therein nmned joint tenants of the fee, either of those grantees
could, by conveyance in her lifetime, have deprived the other of the right of
But that deed [to A & B and the survivor of them] did
survivorsbip....
not make the grantees joint tenants of the fee. 'Deeds and devices . . . to
two or more, and to the survivor of them and his heirs ... make them
joint tenants for life with a contingent remainder in fee to the one who
survives'.
Id. at 910-11 (1906) (Emphasis added.)
29
Supra note 25, at 566-67.
3
OThe term "tenancy in common with cross-contingent remainders" means
that each tenant has a life interest in the estate with all of the rights and
duties of tenants in common followed by a remainder in fee simple in the
whole estate contingent upon his surviving the other tenant. Since the survivor
is unascertainable while both tenants are living, the land cannot be partitioned
or sold for division of the proceeds since the interest of such party cannot
be determined until the death of one.
31
See, e.g., Hass v. Hass, 248 Wis. 212, 21 N.W.2d 398 (1946); Burns v.
Nolette, 83 N.H. 489, 144 Atl. 848 (1929); Schultz v. Brohl, 116 Mich. 603, 74
N.W. 1012 (1898).
32
See, e.g., Anson v. Murphy, 149 Neb. 716, 32 N.W.2d 271 (1948).
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only restated the Alabama Simultaneous Death Act 3 3-if both parties
died simultaneously there could be no survivor hence the property
must descend as if the estate had been a tenancy in common. Since
by statute this rule operates in every joint tenancy, the provision
added nothing. However, one provision which is not present in every
joint tenancy is the clause, "unless the joint tenancy hereby created
is severed or terminated during the joint lives of the grantees herein."
(Emphasis added.) The intent of the parties concerning the possibility of termination could hardly be plainer.
The result in Bernhard, however, does not seem inequitable. The
court did not allow the husband to sell the house in which his
estranged wife was living and divide the proceeds from the sale,
because the estate created by the court, tenancy in common with
cross-contingent remainders, was not subject to compulsory sale for
division.3 4 Two analyses can be suggested as rational bases for the
result in Bernhard: First, it can be called a protection of the rights
of an estranged wife before divorce. If the court had sold the house
and had given her half the proceeds, the result would have been to
reduce, at least temporarily, her house-occupying station in life by
one half. Normally when a marriage fails, the wife who has devoted
herself to domestic skills has few, if any, skills with which she can
compete in the labor market, while the husband has acquired more
earning capacity by developing skills in more demand on the labor
market. Second, married people tend to view their physically indivisible joint property not as half "his" and half "hers," but as "theirs"
in the sense that it would somehow be improper for either to alienate
his half interest without the consent of the other. In this sense the
marital entity may be more than an old common law concept: in
certain areas of behavior it is almost a psychological fact.
In fact this result, if not this analysis, would obtain in almost half
the jurisdictions today under the rationale that tenancy by the entirety
is neither partitionable nor salable for division.35 While in such jurisdictions that result is restricted to married tenants,30 the Bernhard
result applies to all joint owners in Alabama since there is no distinction between married tenants and unmarried tenants.37 The importance
33

34

Ala. Code tit. 16 § 36 (1958).

Simes & Smith, Future Interests § 1772 (2d ed. 1956).
2sSee Huber, Creditors'Rights In Tenancies By The Entireties, 1 Boston College
Industrial and Commercial L. Rev. 197, 198 (1959); Phipps, Tenancy By Entireties,
25 Temp. L.Q. 24, 36 (1951).
30

SuPra note 35.

37Supra note 23.
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of this difference between Alabama and other jurisdictions is that the
chief objections to tenancy by the entirety, creation of an estate without full knowledge of technical results and possible defeat of creditors'
rights, now attach in Alabama to every joint estate in which the parties
have created a right of survivorship. If the only estate with survivorship left by the court's interpretation of the statute is tenancy in
common with a right of survivorship, and if that kind of contingent
right of survivorship is indivisible because of the contingency of the
interests of the parties, it follows that every joint estate with survivorship is indivisible. It also must follow that since every joint
estate with survivorship is indivisible because of the contingency of
interests of the tenants, the estate is insulated against those who are
creditors of 1 spouse only. For if the reason for non-division is
that a contingent remainder is by its very nature indivisible, it is
immaterial whether a spouse or a creditor is trying to have it sold for
division. Thus every landowner in Alabama could by timely action
completely insulate his estate from attachment by creditors simply by
transferring it to himself and another as tenants in common for their
joint lives with the right of survivorship. 38
Obviously, the court will at least have to modify or restrict its
Bernhard opinion. Just how it can do so without overruling Bernhard
is not clear. The case cannot be restricted on the basis of the intention
of the parties, since the intention of the parties in Bernhard was to
create a severable joint tenancy and not a tenancy in common with
an indestructible right of survivorship. There is no reason for restricting the opinion to married tenants since the statute (1842) applies to
all joint owners, 39 and the judicial abolition (1860) of tenancy by the
entirety leaves no distinction between married and unmarried joint
40
tenants.
Apparently the case must be distinguished on some fictional ground
or it must be overruled. Assuming that the court wants to pursue
a policy of protection of the rights of an estranged wife even when
creditors are involved, it will probably limit this case in some way
to married tenants. If that happens, the court will have done something far more significant than fictionalize the result of the present
case: it will have reinstated tenancy by the entirety. Although there
may be a theoretical difference between the concept of tenancy by
3

SAla. Code tit. 46 § 19 (1958) gives a landholder the power to make a
conveyance to himself and another with the right of survivorship.
39
Supra note 24.
4
oSupra note 23.
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the entirety and tenancy in common with an indestructible right of
survivorship, 41 the practical results of both estates are identical: the
creation of a joint estate between married tenants only, with an indestructible right of survivorship immune from attachment by creditors
of 1 spouse only.
If that is the direction of the opinion, it contains 3 serious
flaws. First, the court has created uncertainty as to what the substantive law of real property actually is. It is clear that the case must
be modified or overruled, but how is the practicing attorney to know
which? The court obviously has adopted the policy of protecting the
rights of the estranged wife by preventing the husband from forcing
sale of "their" property, but what will happen when that policy conflicts with the policy of protecting the rights of non-joint creditors?
Assuming that the court considered all relevant implications of its
decision, it has, in effect, weighed the advantages of tenancy by the
entirety against its disadvantages and decided that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. Since the court did not even mention such
an obvious implication, 42 the practicing attorney can only guess
whether it was considered, thus can only guess whether the court
actually wishes to pursue this policy when non-joint creditors are
involved.
A second flaw in the decision is the potential confusion the decision
has created in the language of property law. While a tenancy in
common with a right of survivorship is not exactly a technical contradiction in terms, such terminology will create pointless confusion.
Although survivorship is not an estate itself, it is something more
than an alienable characteristic of an estate. It is the label that identifies the estate as either a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety
and not a tenancy in common since a basic distinction between tenancy in common and the other 2 joint estates is that survivorship
is not a feature of tenancy in common. 43 Saying that survivorship is
only an incident of 1 estate which can arbitrarily be assigned to
another estate, while perhaps technically permissible, 44 subject to the
requirements of due process, is like saying that having equestrian
41
A tenant by the entirety owns the whole estate while a tenant in common
with an indestructible right of survivorship owns only a part of the estate with
a contingent
remainder in fee simple in the whole.
42
-The point was raised neither in the opinion, nor in the brief of counsel
arguing for division of proceeds from forced sale, Brief for Appellee, Bernhard
v. Bernhard, 177 So. 2d 565 (Ala. 1965), and it could hardly be expected to be
raised
in Appellant's Brief.
43
See United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 370 (1939); Moynihan, Introduction to Real Property, 220, 224, 229 (1962).
"4Seesupra note 41.
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characteristics is only an incident of an animal called a "horse'?. which
can arbitrarily be assigned to another animal. If the decision of the
court is that results uniquely obtainable from tenancy by the entirety are desirable, it should overrule the 1860 case abolishing tenancy
by the entirety and avoid the kind of confusion which results from
4
a misdirected sense of reverence. 5
The third and basic flaw in this opinion, is its ad hoc approach
designed to deal with one particular problem of co-ownership without proper regard for the whole body of co-ownership law. It was
this same approach that originally raised this problem in Walthall v.
Goree46 when the Supreme Court of Alabama abolished tenancy by
the entirety on the narrow ground that it was inconsistent with the
married women's property act.47 Bernhard treated the problem in the
same narrow way, and instead of considering the relation of a particular estate to the rest of joint ownership law, considered only the
relation of that particular estate to a particular statute. The approach
of trying to deal with the relation of one joint estate to one statute
or set of social conditions overlooks the problem that a significant
adjustment of any one common law joint estate necessitates a corresponding adjustment in some other common law joint estate. The
common law provided almost any kind of estate which the parties to
a conveyance wished to create, and when 1 of these estates is deprived of a useful feature by a narrow reading of a statute, then some
other estate must be adapted to fulfill that feature. The proper approach would be based on the realization that the utility of a particular
estate in modem property law is determined by its relation to other
joint estates as well as its relation to modern social conditions. Trying
to adjust joint tenancy to modern conditions without considering its
relation to gaps in the law left by tenancy in common and tenancy
by the entirety is as ludicrous as trying to adjust the flight pattern
of an airplane without considering weather conditions.
Unfortunately, this approach is not confined to the judiciary. This
is precisely the approach urged on courts and legislatures by many
legal periodicals, which seem more concerned with criticizing tenancy
45The Alabama approach seems to be that while the decision abolishing
tenancy by the entirety was not technically correct, it should not be overruled because of its venerability. Goree, supra note 23, was based on an implicit
non sequitur; that because under the married women's property act tenancy
by the entirety was no longer mandatory, it was no longer permissible. See,
Gillon, Joint Titles with Survivorship, 22 Ala. Lawyer 341, 353 (1961).
46Supra note 23.
41

Supra note 45.
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by the entirety than with creating a viable, integrated law of coownership.4 8 This approach as well as its conclusion is suspect.
While the lack of compulsory division among tenants by the entirety may frustrate the rights of some creditors who do not have
the signatures of both husband and wife or do not check their credit
properly, it does not follow that the estate should be abolished without considering whether it serves any useful function. The Alabama
experience indicates that abolition of tenancy by the entirety does not
automatically improve the law of co-ownership. Moreover, it would
seem that protection of the wife's rights in jointly held property as
opposed to her husband's creditors is at least as appealing as protection from an estranged spouse.49
The proper suggestion to the legislature is to begin anew. It should
consider the reasons for and against all 3 common law joint estates
with an eye to rewriting the whole body of co-ownership law to fit
modem conditions. The final result would be surprisingly similar to
the common law. Such a statute could read:
§ 1. Any transfer to two or more persons jointly is presumed to
be a tenancy in common. This presumption is rebuttable only
by language on the face of the instrument expressly showing an
intent to set up a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety.
§ 2. A common law joint tenancy with a destructible right of

survivorship may be created if that is the intent of the parties as
expressly manifested on the face of the instrument. Any tenants,
including husband and wife, may hold as joint tenants, and any
deed styled "with a right of survivorship" without stating whether it is intended to be a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety is presumed to be a joint tenancy.
§ 3a. A tenancy by the entirety with an indestructible right of
survivorship may be created between husband and wife, if such
intention is expressed on the face of the instrument, subject to
two limitations:
4

SSee, e.g., Ritter, A Criticism Of The Estate By The Entirety, 5 Fla. L. Rev.
153 (1952); For less extreme examples, see English, Concurrent Estates in Real
Property 11 (pt. 2), 12 Catholic L. Rev. 1 (1963); Huber, Creditors' Rights In
Tenancies By The Entireties, 1 Boston College Industrial and Commercial L. Rev.
197 (1959); Comment, 42 U. Det. L.J. 362 (1965).
4

OUnder existing law a strongly reasoned case can be made out for both
creditor and wife. While it seems inequitable to defeat the rights of the creditor
who has done all he may think is legally necessary to insure he will be paid,
it also seems inequitable to make the wife pay from her own property (and it
is her own property: per tout) for her husband's bad judgment in business.
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(i) that all such instruments contain the statement "It is understood by the grantor5O and the grantees that neither of the
grantees may sell or encumber his own interest in the property without the consent of the other grantee, any oral agreement notwithstanding."
(ii) that a brief description of all property held by tenants
by the entirety be filed [with a central filing system easily
accessible to all creditors] identifying the property so held
and stating that the grantees hold as tenants by the entirety.
§ 3b. Failure to meet both the requirements of § 3a(i) and § 3a(ii)
above converts the estate into a joint tenancy with a destructible
right of survivorship. No tenant by the entirety may assert such
tenancy as a defense against an attachment by a creditor if the
tenant held the property in question other than as a tenant by the
entirety at the time the obligation was incurred.
RoNALD W. MooRE

ALCOHOLISM AND ITS SYMPTOMS:

CRIME OR DISEASE?

Joe B. Driver was convicted of public intoxication for the first
time when he was 24. He was convicted of the same offense over
200 times in the next 35 years, spending an estimated 2/3 of his life
in jail. Most of those convictions occurred in Durham, North Carolina, under a statute1 making public intoxication a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment. Following at least 3 previous convictions in Durham for public intoxication in 1963, Driver was ar-

rested in December, 1963, for the same offense.2 After posting bail
5OThe inclusion of the grantor is to cover such situations as a testator's wish
to devise land to one of his married children.
'N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-335 (1951) provides in part:
If any person shall be found drunk or intoxicated on the public highway,
or at any public place or meeting, in any county ...herein named, he
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished as is
provided in this section ....
In 1965 this statute was amended by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-335 (Supp. 1965):
12.
In . . . Durham [County] ... by a fine, for the first offense, of
not more than fifty dollars . . ., or imprisonment for not more than thirty
days; for the second offense within a period of twelve months, by a fine
of not more than one hundred dollars .. .or imprisonment for not more
than sixty days; and for the third offense within any twelve months' period
such offense is declared a misdemeanor, punishable as a misdemeanor within
the discretion of the court.
2

Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 763 (4th Cir. 1966).
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he was released pending trial, but the next day he was arrested for
being drunk in the Durham County Court House itself. Conviction
for both offenses followed. Those 5 convictions resulted in a 2-year
prison sentence, the maximum allowable under North Carolina law
for a misdemeanor. 3 On appeal the Supreme Court of North Carolina4
affirmed the convictions and sentence in a per curiam decision.
Driver's habeas corpus petition to the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina 5 was denied despite the court's
decision that Driver was a chronic alcoholic.6 The court defined
alcoholic as one who habitually and chronically uses "'alcoholic beverages to the extent that he has lost the power of self-control with
respect to the use of such beverages' "7 and stated that "a chronic
alcoholic is a sick person in need of proper medical, institutional, and
rehabilitative treatment." 8 From this denial Driver appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, which reversed the conviction9
on the grounds that Driver lacked the requisite criminal intent and
that the punishment was in violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment as applied to the states.
Driver v. Hinnant,10 citing Morissette v. United States," held that
an "evil intent" or a "consciousness of wrongdoing" was necessary
for Driver to be convicted. 12 Morissette is distinguishable because it
dealt with larceny, an offense which requires criminal intent. There
are a number of crimes, however, which have never required a criminal intent.13 Driver's behavior falls into this category and is in the
3N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-3 (1953) provides in part that "all misdemeanors, where
punishment is not prescribed shall be punished as misdemeanors at common
law . . . ." The maximum sentence at common law for a misdemeanor is 2

State v. Wilson, 216 N.C. 130, 4 S.E.2d 440, 441 (1939).
years.
4
State v. Driver, 262 N.C. 92, 136 S.E.2d 208 (1964). What troubled the North
Carolina Supreme Court was that Driver had not been punished directly for
the disease of alcoholism but for succumbing to the disease in public. The
4th Circuit overcame this difficulty by citing the World Health Organization's
definition of alcoholism as "'a chronic illness that manifests itself as a disorder of
behavior.'" Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). This meant that
public intoxication was a symptom of the disease of alcoholism.
5Driver v. Hinnant, 243 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
6id. at 97.
71bid. The court adopted the Congressional definition of a chronic alcoholic.
Slbid. The court took judicial notice of this fact.
9
Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
'Old. at 764.
11342 US. 246, 250-52 (1952).

12Driver v. Hinnant, supra note 9, at 764.
13Sayre, Public Htelfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55 (1933), discusses this in
detail.
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nature of what may be termed "public welfare offenses." 14 This type
of offense, which includes such crimes as illegal sales of intoxicating
liquor,'5 traffic violations,' 6 motor-vehicle law violations,17 and criminal nuisances' 8 has traditionally been penalized without requiring the
criminal intent held necessary by Morissette. Driver's lack of criminal intent should thus have no bearing on the problem since intent
constituted no part of his statutory offense. But Hinnant held that
Driver's misbehavior could not be punished "as a trangression of a
police regulation" that does not require intent as an element of
the crime.' 9 Hinnant neglects to explain why. Perhaps the court
wanted to strengthen its decision by having a ground for reversal in
addition to that of cruel and unusual punishment. Or, the court may
have reasoned that the length of Driver's sentence changed his offense from a public welfare offense, usually punished by light fine or
jail sentence,20 to one requiring criminal intent. Finally, Hinnant may
have meant literally what it said: evil intent is an indispensable ingredient of any crime. 21 Requiring criminal intent would virtually
abolish public welfare offenses and other statutory crimes such as
adultery, bigamy, 22 or (statutory) rape. 23
Hinnant's main reliance appears to be on the Federal Constitutional
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as interpreted by
'41bid.
15Hill v. State, 19 Ariz. 78, 165 Pac. 326 (1917). See generally Sayre, supra
note 13, at 84-85.
'OCommonwealth v. Closson, 229 Mass. 329, 118 N.E. 653 (1918). See generally
Sayre, supra note 13, at 87.
' 7 Commonwealth v. Coleman, 252 Mass. 241, 147 N.E. 552 (1925). See generally
Sayre, supra note 13, at 87.
'SState v. Cray, 85 Vt. 99, 81 Ad. 450 (1911). See generally Sayre, supra note
13, at 86.
Driver's behavior would fall under this general category, which includes
"annoyances . . .to the public health, safety, repose or comfort' Sayre, supra
note 13, at 73.
19 Driver v. Hinnant, supranote 9, at 764.
2
OSayre, supranote 13, at 72, 83.
2t
Driver v. Hinnant, supranote 9, at 765.
22
People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956); People v. Spoor, 235
111. 230, 85 N.E. 207 (1908); State v. Sherwood, 68 Vt. 414, 35 Ad. 352 (1896).
See generally Packer, Mere Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Supreme Court
Rev. 107, 149; Sayre, supra note 13, at 74-75.
2
3Askew v. State, 118 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1960); People v. Lewellyn, 314 Ill. 106,
145 N.E. 289 (1924); Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. (30 Gratt.) 845

(1878).

Some cases have already taken this view. See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 39
Cal. Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673 (1964); State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa 447, 450 (1859).
See generally Packer, supra note 22, at 146-52; Sayre, supra note 13, at 73-74; 22
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 119 (1965).
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Robinson.v. California.24 Defendant in Robinson had been convicted
under a California statute25 making it a crime to be addicted to the
use of narcotics. All that was required for conviction under the

statute was the defendant's presence in California while addicted to
drugs; it was not necessary to prove that he had used narcotics while
in California. The United States Supreme Court held 6-2 that the
status of drug addiction cannot constitutionally be a crime. 26 Five
Justices held that the punishment violated the cruel and unusual
punishment prohibition of the Eighth Amendment as applied to the
states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would
attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally
ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease. A State
might determine that the general health and welfare require that
the victims of these and other human afflictions be dealt with by
compulsory treatment, involving quarantine, confinement, or sequestration. But, in the light of contemporary human knowledge,
a law which made a criminal offense of such a disease would
doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments ....
To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is
not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be considered in the abstract. Even
one day in prison ¢would be a cruel and
unusual punishment for
27
the 'crime' of having a common cold.
Robinson did not explain why the Eighth Amendment is applicable
to the states or why the punishment therein was cruel and unusual. It
did not discuss the matter of applicability, but assumed that the prohibition was applicable to the states as it is now accepted to be. 28
24370

U.S. 660 (1962). Hinnant stated: "Robinson .

.

. sustains, if not com-

mands,
the view we take." Driver v. Hinnant, at 764.
25

Cal. Health &Safety Code § 11721, reads in part:

No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the
use of narcotics, excepting when administered by or under the direction of
a person licensed by the State to prescribe and administer narcotics.
243
Mr. justice Frankfurter did not participate in the decision. Mr. Justice
Stewart wrote the Court's opinion with Justices Black, Brennan, and Mr.
Chief Justice Warren concurring. Justices Douglas and Harlan wrote separate
concurring opinions, Douglas on cruel and unusual punishment grounds and
Harlan on the ground that the punishment was "for a bare desire to commit
a criminal
act." Justices White and Clark dissented.
27
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. at 666, 667. (Emphasis added.)

28

- Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1965) (concurring opinion); Driver
v. Hinnapt, 243 F. Supp. 95, 99-100 (E.D.N.C. 1965); Redding v. Pate, 220 F.
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Similarly, Robinson simply assumed that the punishment violated the
standards of the Eighth Amendment.
Prior to Robinson the Supreme Court had specifically held the
Eighth Amendment ban against cruel and unusual punishment inapplicable to the states.29 Those earlier decisions were questioned in
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber3 ° which assumed, but did not
decide, that the cruel and unusual punishment clause was applicable
to the states. 31 Robinson was thus novel in its application of the cruel
and unusual punishment clause to the states.
The Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment was
adopted in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights almost verbatim from
the 10th clause of the English Declaration of Rights of 1688.32 But
the scope of the prohibition is not certain. In Wilkerson v. Utah33
the Supreme Court said:
Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the
extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel
and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to
affirm that punishments of torture... and all others in the same
line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden. .... 34
The early ban was undoubtedly aimed at torture and other barbarous punishments, 35 but the Supreme Court has recognized that the
Supp. 124, 127 (N.D. IMI.1963); Staff of Subcomm. On Constitutional Rights,
Senate Comm. On The Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., Layman's Guide To
Individual Rights Under The United States Constitution (Comm. Print 1962);
Corwin & Peltason, Understanding the Constitution 138-39 (3d ed. 1965).
2
90'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 332 (1892); Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72
U.S. (5 Wail.) 475, 479-80 (1866); Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243,
250 (1833) (dictum).
See Driver v. Hinnant, 243 F. Supp. 95, 97 & n.8 (E.DIN.C. 1965).
a0329 U.S. 459 (1947).
31id.
at 462.
32

Robinson v. California, supra note 24, at 675; Sutherland, Constitutionalism in

America 99 (1965); Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 635, 636 (1966). Some authorities
say the origin dates back to the Magna Carta or the Laws of Edward the

Confessor. 34 Minn. L. Rev. 134, 135 (1950).
a399 U.S. 130 (1878).
34M. at 135-36. For a similar view see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,

375 (1910).

S5Robinson v. California, supra note 24, at 675; Note, 79 -arv. L. Rev. 635,
636-37 (1966).
The prohibition has also been held to include:
a.
burning at the stake. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890). See
generally Robinson v. California, supra note 24, at 675; Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86 (1958); Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 635 (1966).
b.
crucifixion. In re Kemmler, supra.
See generally Robinson v. California, supra note 24; Trop v. Dulles, supra;
Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev, supra.
C.
breaking on the wheel. In re Kemmler, supra. See generally Robinson
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prohibition "must be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth . . . " if the prohibition is "to be vital." 36 Ex

parte Picken 3 7 held that the clause "is to be considered in the light
of developing civilization;" it is therefore "not necessary to speculate
as to what might have been considered cruel and inhuman punishment in 1787." 38 Other courts have held that punishment is cruel
and unusual if it "shocks the moral sense of all reasonable men as to
what is right and proper under the circumstances" 9 or is "so excessive as to shock the sense of mankind." 40 In Trop v. Dulles41 the
Supreme Court struck down as cruel and unusual a method of punishment involving no pain or physical hardship: deprivation of citizenship for wartime desertion. The Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment "is not static": it "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." 42

It appears that the true Robinson rationale was that drug addiction
was not a crime and that any punishment for that which is not a crime
is cruel and unusual. Robinson thus limits the state's power to define
what a crime is, which appears to be a matter of substantive due
process. In his dissent Justice White observed that the Court's reasoning resembled that of substantive due process.4 3 Other comments on
Robinson have also recognized this and have suggested that a decision
44
based on substantive due process would have been more rational.
Since the statute bore no "rational relation to some legitimate legislav. California, supra note 24; Trop v. Dulles, supra; Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev.,
supra.
d.
the rack, O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 363 (1892).

See generally Robinson v. California, supra note 24; Trop v. Dulles, supra;
Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev, supra.
e. the thumbscrew, O'Neil v. Vermont, supra.
See generally Robinson v. California, supra note 24; Trop v. Dulles, supra;
Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev., supra.
f.
quartering, Robinson v. California, supra note 24, at 675; Note, 79
Harv. L. Rev., supra at 637.
g. in some circumstances, solitary confinement. See Robinson v. California,
supra note 24, at 675-76.
2

3Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
F. Supp. 285 (D. Alaska 1951).

37101

3Sd. at 288.
agWeber v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 56, 196 S.W.2d 465, 469 (1946).
40Hayes v. United States, 112 F.2d 417, 420 (10th Cir. 1940).
41356 U.S. 86 (1958).
421d. at 100-01.
43
Robinson v. California, supra note 24, at 689.
44
Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev., supra note 35, at 649; 29 Brooklyn L. Rev. 139, 141
(1963).
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tive end [control of narcotics] i.e., conduct rightfully regulated within the four comers of the police power," it did not comport with
substantive due process. 4 5 In other words, to punish as criminal that
which is not criminal violates due process, and, according to Robinson,
also violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Robinson thus creates the problem of determining what is punishable as a crime. The Model Penal Code defines a crime as any offense
defined by the Code or by statute for which the death penalty or
imprisonment may be exacted. 46 A crime has also been defined as
"any act or omission prohibited by public law for the protection of
the public, and made punishable by the state in a judicial proceeding
in its own name." 47 A crime therefore is simply what the legislature
has made punishable through a criminal proceeding. But this definition is of no use in determining what acts or omissions the legislature
constitutionally may punish. It seems obvious that if the legislature
passed, for no reason, a Pink Car Law which required all cars to be
painted pink, the law would be held unconstitutional. A law must
bear a rational relation to some legitimate legislative end; the Pink
Car Law would not. It is not so obvious why punishment for drug
addiction or alcoholism or public intoxication of the alcoholic would
be unconstitutional.
Although it was not discussed, Hinnant's reasoning approximates
the Durham Rule for insanity cases: Durham v. United States48 held
that "an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was
the product of mental disease or mental defect." 49 Driver's intoxication was certainly the product of a disease. Application of the Durham Rule50 would relieve Driver of criminal responsibility. Even
4529 Brooklyn L. Rev., supranote 44, at 141.
46

Model Penal Code § 1.04 (1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
47Clark & Marshall, Crimes S 2.01 at 79 (6th ed. 1958).
4821t4 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
491d. at 874-75.
50
Application of the combination M'Naghten-Irresistible Impulse Test or the
Substantial Capacity Test promulgated by the American Law Institute would yield
the same result.
The M'Naghten Rule was established in Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng.
Rep. 718 (1843), and is as follows:
If, because of. . . 'defect of reason,' the defendant did not know what he was
doing he is not guilty of crime.
Even if the defendant knew what he was doing he is not guilty of crime if,
because of this 'defect of reason,' he did not know what he was doing was
wrong. Perkins, Criminal Law 747 (1957).
Thie Ifresistible Impulse Test is that one has an impulse to commit a criminal
act, the actor not being able to overcome or resist the impulse because insanity
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though Driver's physical acts comprised what would normally be a
crime, he lacked culpability and therefore could not be held criminally responsible.5 1 Public intoxication of an alcoholic is therefore,
under the Durham rule, not a crime.
"'[T]he idea of basing treatment for disease on purgatorial acts
and ordeals is an ancient one in medicine'" 52 tracing back to the
Biblical belief that disease represented punishment for sin. The general
belief was that "'relief [from sin] could take the form of a final
heroic act of atonement.' "52a Basis for the belief that intoxication is
a sin may be found in Biblical condemnations of drunkennessPtu Under
early English law drunkenness was punishable by the ecclesiastical courts
as a crime against religion 54 rather than as a common law crime. 5 But
if the drunkenness went so far as to constitute a public nuisance, it
was punishable as a common law crime.56 Public intoxication was made
a stautory offense in England in 16 0 6 . But since the enactment of
such statutes, advancements in medical and other scientific fields have
invalidated the grounds on which such statutes were based. Generally
alcoholism is viewed today as a disease, not a crime. 58 Much has been
or mental disease has destroyed the freedom of his will and his power of selfcontrol, the actor is relieved of criminal responsibility. See generally Perkins,
supra at 756-63.
The Substantial Capacity Test is:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks either substantial
capacity to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law. Model Penal Code § 4.01 (1)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
GSPerkins,
op. cit. supra note 50, at 5.
52
Robinson v. California, supra note 24, at 669.

52aIbid.The quotation continues:
This superstition appears to have given support to fallicious medical rationales
for such procedures as purging, bleeding, induced vomiting, and blistering,

as well as an entire chamber of horrors constituting the early treatment of
mental illness. The latter included a wide assortment of shock techniques, such
as the "water cures" (dousing, ducking, and near drowning), spinning in a
chair, centrifugal swinging, and an early form of electric shock.* All, it
would appear, were planned as means of driving from the body some evil
spirit or to.ic vapor.
[*Reference could be made here to the Salem Witch Trials in the 17th
century. Author's note.]
53 Isaiah 5:11; Proverbs 23:31-32; 1 Corinthians 6:10; Ephesians 5:18.
54
Perkins, op. cit. supra note 50, at 777; 2 Stephen, History of the Criminal
Law of England 410 (1883).
5
GPerkins, op. cit. supra note 50, at 777.
561bid.; 2 Wharton, Criminal Law § 1720 (12th ed. 1932).
575 Jac. 1, c.5 (1606); Perkins, op. cit. supranote 50, at 777.
SSAthough alcoholism was generally not recognized as a disease until'relatively
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done in the past half century to improve penal methods, but little attendon has been paid to the need for updating substantive criminal law.
It has been said that criminal law is "one of the most faithful mirrors
of a given civilization, reflecting the fundamental values on which the
latter rests." 59 When these values change, it is also necessary for
substantive criminal law to change. 60 That is the problem Hinnant
faced. The solution may be civil commitment 6 ' to a hospital or a re2
habilitation center for the treatment of the disease,
Hinnant leaves questions unanswered and creates new problems.
recently, there is evidence that it was so recognized as early as 1804. See McCarthy, Alcoholism: Attitudes and Attacks, 1775-1935, 315 Annals 12 (1958).
Robinson v. California, supra note 24, at 667 n.8; Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d
761 n.6 (4th Cir. 1966); Driver v. Hinnant, 243 F. Supp. 95, 97 & n.6 (E.D.N.C.
1965).
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, appendix f, Driver v. Hinnant,
supra; Brief for Appellant, appendix c, Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d
50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Logan, Alcoholism-A Legal Problem?, 36 Dicta 446 (1959); Mann, The Challenge of Alcoholism, 24 Fed. Prob. 18, 19 (1960); Pinardi, Helping Alcoholic
Criminals,9 Crime & Delinquency 71 (1963).
59Donnelly, Goldstein & Schwartz, Criminal Law 524 (1962).
6Olbid.
61
There is a basic distinction between criminal and civil punishment. This
distinction was recognized in White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647, 650 (D.D.C.
1954):
Therefore some of the features of penal institutions resemble those of educational, industrial and training schools for juvenile delinquents. The basic
function and purpose of penal institutions, however, is punishment as a
deterrent to crime. However broad the different methods of discipline, care
and treatment that are appropriate for individual prisoners according to
age, character, mental condition, and the like, there is a fundamental legal
and practical difference in purpose and technique. Unless the institution is
one whose primary concern is the individual's moral and physical wellbeing, unless its facilities are intended for and adapted to guidance, care,
education and training rather than punishment, unless its supervision is
that of a guardian, not that of a prison guard or jailer, it seems clear a
commitment to such institution is by reason of conviction of crime and
cannot withstand an assault for violation of fundamental Constitutional safeguards.
Benton -v. Reid, 231 F.2d 780, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1956), held that jail is a
"place for punishment of crimes" and to put one there who was prosecuted
under a civil statute would raise "grave constitutional questions."
A similar result was reached in In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470,
476 (1958).
62
Alexander, Jail Administration 237 (1957); Guttrmacher & Wiehofen, Psychiatry and The Law 319 (1952); Perkins, op. cit. supra note 50, at 781;

Brunner-Orne, The Role of a General Hospital in the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Alcoholics, 19 QJ. of Studies on Alcohol 108, 108-09 (1958); Logan,

supra note 58, at 446-50; MacCormick, Correctional Views on Alcohol, Alco-

holism, and Crime, 9 Crime & Delinquency 15, 18, 27 (1963); Mann, supra note
58; Murtagh, The Derelicts of Skid Row, The Atlantic Monthly, March, 1962, at
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No guideline has been established for determining when a person is
a chronic alcoholic. 63 It is not clear what constitutes a symptom of
alcoholism. Would driving by an alcoholic while intoxicated be a
symptom? 4 Would an alcoholic's stealing in order to satisfy his
insatiable desire to consume alcohol be a symptom? 65 Despite these
and other unanswered questions, Hinnant brings the criminal law a
step closer to a true reflection of the values of our civilization.
ROBERT H.

PowEuL, III

BLOOD GROUPING TEST RESULTS: EVIDENTIAL FACT
OR CONCLUSION OF LAW?
When a husband petitioning for divorce on the ground of adultery
alleges that he is not the father of a child born to his wife during
their marriage, he usually finds himself confronted by a rule of evidence founded on the presumption of legitimacy,1 a "policy presumption" 2 which is not easily surmounted. 3 The considerations
81; Pinardi, supra note 58; Rubington, The Chronic Drunkenness Offender, 315
Annals 65, 66-67 (1958); Well & Price, Alcoholism in a Metropolis, 9 Crime &
Delinquency 60, 60-61 (1963); 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 122, 127-28 (1962).
3Washington Post, April 1, 1966, § A, p. 1, col. 1; Washington Post, April 1,
1966, § A, p. 6, col. 3.
64Brief for Appellee, p. 23, Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
The early indications are that it will not be treated as a symptom. Washington Post, April 15, 1966, § B, p. 1, col. 4.
10 Brief for Appellee, supra note 64. The early indications are that it will be
treated as a symptom. Washington Post, April 15, 1966, § A, p. 1, col. 2.
1
1n most cases this policy presumption would be considered a rule of law
and be conclusive. 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2492 (3d ed. 1940). But see infra
note 5. Some authors have been quite critical of such policy presumptions when
the evidence factually refutes the presumption. E.g.,
Presumptions of law or fact arise from incidents in which the courts do not
Imow what actually happened and for reasons of social discipline and policy
have assumed a non-existent fact from a known existing fact .... [Wlhen
the ignorance of their inception is cleared away by the discovery of science
or experience, we should discard them and proceed along the newly lighted
course. These presumptions of law often amount to a license to do wrong.
The use of scientific proof will curb this legal encouragement of illegality
.... [Aifter a method has been conclusively verified, we should not be
bound by presumptions in the face of it.
29 Iowa L. Rev. 121, 123-24 (1943).
2
-"When a child X is born to a wife A married to a husband B, it is natural
to infer that the intercourse which begot the child was the intercourse of the
husband B, ie., that the child is legitimate." 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 163 (3d ed.
1940).
3
McCormiclk states that "it is universally agreed that in the case of this
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behind this rule seek to protect children born during a legal marriage
from the stigma of illegitimacy; 4 courts have deferred to this policy
by making proof of such illegitimacy difficult. 5 A strict adherence
to this policy can result in a declaration that a man is legally the
father of a child when in fact he is not. 6 A further injustice may
occur when a divorce is not granted because the adultery would
bastardize a child. Aid in the prevention of such injustice was realized
upon the discovery and medical acceptance of blood grouping tests
to determine nonpaternity.7 Such tests are usually acknowledged to
be competent evidence only if they exclude paternity.8
Blood grouping test results are material and relevant evidence in
both adultery-divorce and paternity proceedings. Where such evidence is admissible in divorce proceedings, it will usually involve a
risk of bastardization. However, such a risk will rarely be involved
in a paternity suit, because the woman involved is usually not married.
In a paternity suit not involving a married woman, thus not involving
the risk of bastardization, the only basis for not regarding evidence
of blood grouping test results as conclusive is the possible unreliability
of those results; when the woman involved is married, hence the risk
of bastardization is involved, the presumption of legitimacy is a further basis for exclusion of such evidence. The courts have had less
difficulty and been readier to admit such evidence when the risk of
bastardization is not involved.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska held 4-3 in Houghton v. Houghton9 that competently administered tests excluding the husband as the
presumption, the adversary contending for illegitimacy does have the burden
[of persuasion] . . . usually measured not by the normal standard for civil cases
but rather by the requirement of clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof
or even by the criminal formula, beyond a reasonable doubt." McCormick,
Evidence § 309, at 646-47 (1954).
4
Houghton v. Houghton, 179 Neb. 275, 137 N.W.2d 861, 872-73 (1965) (dissenting opinion); McCormick, Evidence § 309 (1954).
5'Presumptions have often developed into rules of substantive law. Here, however, the course of evolution has been from a rule of substantive law into a
rebuttable presumption. But the strictness of an older day when if the husband
was not beyond the four seas, the child was conclusively assumed to be his,
in modified form." McCormick, Evidence § 309 n.31, at 646 (1954).
lingers
6
Bullock v. Knox, 96 Ala. 195, 11 So. 339 (1892).

7See generally Gradwohl, Legal Medicine 524 (1954).
Sld. at 534.
9179

Neb. 275,

137

N.W.2d

861

(1965).

All

3 dissenting judges

were

opposed to permitting the blood test results to determine paternity conclusively.
Id. at 872. The only 1 who gave his reasons thought legislation necessary to
make blood grouping tests conclusive of paternity. Id. at 874. Since no dissenter
questioned the propriety of taking judicial notice of the accuracy of such test
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father of a child conceived during marriage provide conclusive evidence of nonpaternity, thereby overcoming the presumption of legitimacy. The Supreme Court's reversal granting the appellant husband
a divorce on the ground of adultery was based solely on evidence of
paternity-excluding blood test results. 10
The wife had previously filed for divorce on the ground of extreme
cruelty. Nine months later she filed a supplemental petition alleging
that she had become pregnant due to the resumption of marital relations with her husband and once again sued for divorce on the ground
of cruelty. The husband's amended answer and cross-petition admitted
having relations with her, but denied any relations until after the
time during which she claimed to have become pregnant. He crosspetitioned for a divorce on the ground of adultery. The child was born
7 /2 months after the date of the husband's admitted intercourse and
was fully developed at birth. The trial court found the husband to
be the father of the child and granted the wife an absolute divorce.
The husband's motion for a new trial was denied and he appealed,
alleging error in the trial court's failure to find that the results of
the blood tests excluding his paternity were conclusive and overcame
the presumption of the child's legitimacy. The Supreme Court of
Nebraska reversed, stating in the syllabus, "In the absence of evidence
of a defect in the testing methods, blood grouping tests are conclusive
on the issue of nonpaternity." 11 In the court's opinion the results
of the tests proved as a matter of law that the wife had committed
adultery. 2
The doctrine of the presumption of legitimacy-a child born to a
married woman during wedlock is prima facie legitimate-arose under
early English common law.' 3 The presumption was due to fear among
the nobility of disinheritance. 1 4 Early in the common law this presumption became conclusive unless the husband seeking to bastardize
the child could prove either that he was beyond the "four seas" at
all times during the relevant gestation period,15 or that he was under
some physical disability. 16 Physical disability was shown if the husresults, the only basis for not admitting evidence of these results would be
policy considerations implicit in the presumption of legitimacy.

Oid. at 870.
1"ld. at 863.

121d. at 870.
13 Banbury Peerage Case, 1 Sim. & St. 153, 57 Eng. Rep. 62 (1811).
14Wright v. Hicks, 12 Ga. 155, 159 (1852).
15 Regina v. Murrey, 1 Salk 122, 91 Eng. Rep. 115 (1704); Rex. Albertson,
1 Ld. Raym. 396,91 Eng. Rep. 1163 (1698).
'0 Rolle's Abridgment of the Common Law reports that castration was con-
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band was impotent, sterile, or prepubescent. 17 Gradually the rule of
the "four seas" was eroded 8 as the courts began allowing the husband to show other evidence of nonaccess. 19 Thus even if he was
within the "four seas," he was allowed to show that the necessary
access for him to be the father of the child was lacking. 20 A means
of overcoming the presumption of legitimacy other than nonaccess
was acknowledged when evidence that the child was of a different
color from the putative parents, or, as it was quaintly put, "the child
was against the laws of nature," was permitted.21 All of these means
of overcoming the presumption evolved because courts recognized
that it would be impossible under the circumstances for the husband
22
to be the father.
The presumption of legitimacy caused considerable confusion in
the United States as to the quantum of proof necessary to overcome
it.2 3 Analytically it is a problem of the quantum of proof necessary
sidered such a physical disability. See Done & Egerton v. Hinton & Starky, Roll.
Abr. 358, pl. 8 (Eng. 1617), cited in 3 Eng. & Emp. Dig. 402, n.39 (repl. vol.
1960).
17Schatkin, Disputed Paternity Proceedings 20 (3d ed. 1953).
'SPendrell v. Pendrell, 2 Str. 925, 93 Eng. Rep. 945 (1732).
191 Wigmore, Evidence § 134 (3d ed. 1940).
2
OBanbury Peerage Case, supranote 15.
21
Lord Campbell stated that "so strong is the legal presumption of legitimacy
that, in the case of a white woman having a mulatto child, although the husband is also white, & the supposed paramour black, the child is presumed legitimate, if there was an opportunity for intercourse." Piers v. Piers, 13 Jur. 569, 572
(Eng. 1849) (dictum), cited in 3 Eng. & Emp. Dig. 399, n.15 (rep1. vol. 1960).
In this country it has been held that such a birth would be against the laws
of nature and thus the presumption is overcome. Bullock v. Knox, supra note 6.
22
Schatkin, supra note 17, at 20.
23
E.g., Arkansas: Morrison v. Nicks, 211 Ark. 261, 200 S.W.2d 100 (1947), the
clearest evidence; Florida: Eldridge v. Eldridge, 153 Fla. 873, 16 So. 2d 163
(1944), evidence sufficiently strong to remove the presumption; Illinois: People v.
Powers, 340 Ill. App. 201, 91 N.E.2d 637 (1950), strong and compelling evidence; Indiana: Duke v. Duke, 134 Ind. App. 172, 185 N.E.2d 478 (1962), clear evidence; Kentucky: Ousley v. Ousley, 261 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1953), higher degree of
evidence than necessary to convict of a minor criminal offense; Massachusetts:
Commonwealth v. Stappen, 336 Mass. 174, 143 N.E.2d 221 (1957), proof beyond
all reasonable doubt; Missouri: Ash v. Modem Sand & Gravel Co., 234 Mo.
App. 1195, 122 S.W.2d 45 (1938), not overcome unless no judicial escape from
doing so; Nebraska: Zutavem v. Zutavem, 155 Neb. 395, 52 N.W.2d 254 (1952),
clear and convincing evidence; Ohio: Ashley v. Ashley, 118 Ohio App. 155,
193 N.E.2d 535 (1962), clear and convincing evidence; Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Kerr, 150 Pa. Super. 598, 29 A.2d 340 (1942), competent proof beyond
a reasonable doubt; Wisconsin: Schmidt v. Schmidt, 21 Wis. 2d 433, 124 N.W.2d
569 (1963), clear and satisfactory preponderance of the evidence.
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to satisfy the burden of persuasion placed upon the party attempting
to bastardize the child.2 4 The Model Code of Evidence states:
Whenever it is established in an action that a child was born
to a woman while she was the lawful wife of a specified man, the
party asserting the illegitimacy of the child has the burden of
producing evidence and the burden of persuading the trier of fact
in criminal cases] that the man was
beyond a reasonable doubt 2[as
5
not the father of the child.
a reasonIn other words, to bastardize, it is necessary to prove beyond
20
able doubt the impossibility of the putative paternity.
The question now is whether courts will regard scientific blood
grouping tests as another method of showing impossibility of paternity. When the scientific facts derived from blood grouping tests
first became available, courts were reluctant to receive these facts in
evidence, probably because of a lack of understanding of the scientific
27
procedure involved and a desire to avoid change.
In some states the courts have understood and accepted the value
of these tests as a factual exclusion of paternity and have taken judicial notice of their accuracy.2 8 These states acknowledged that the
results of blood grouping tests were receiving universal approval
as an exclusion of paternity among scientists knowledgeable in pathology.29 The courts recognized that by continuing to disregard the
test results, which were considered scientifically accurate,30 they
24
McCormick,
25
Model Code
2

Evidence § 309, at 646-47 (1954).
of Evidence rule 703 (1942). (Emphasis added.)
GThis is easily understood because of the desire to keep a child legitimate.
This social policy is so strong in some states that the child is declared legitimate
even if the marriage is determined to be void. E.g., La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 118
(West 1959); W. Va. Code Ann. § 4086 (1961).
27
In State ex rel. Slovak v. Holod, 63 Ohio App. 16, 24 N.E.2d 962 (1939),
the court went to great lengths to avoid giving such test results conclusive weight
despite the fact that State v. Wright, 59 Ohio App. 191, 17 N.E.2d 428 (1938),
had affirmed a trial judge who granted a new trial when the verdict named the
the father despite test results excluding paternity.
defendant
28
"[J]udicial notice is one of the first hurdles a scientific test or experiment
must overcome in order to simplify methods of proof, and eventually achieve
the weight to which it is entitled." Richardson Modem Scientific Evidence, §
12.17, at 338 (1961).
Some courts have taken judicial notice of the accuracy and reliability of
blood tests in the absence of statute. E.g., Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479 (D.C.
Cir. 1940); Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N.J. Super. 152, 76 A.2d 717 (Super Ct. App.
Div. 1950); State v. Damm, 64 S.D. 309, 266 N.W. 667 (1936) (dictum).
2
9E.g., Commissioner ex rel. Tyler v. Costonie, 277 App. Div. 90, N.Y.S.2d
804,
806 (1950) (concurring opinion).
30
E.g., Retzer v. Retzer, 161 A.2d 469, 471 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1960).
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would be ignoring new means of proof, which would result in decisions contrary to those produced by the older policy.8 ' Reliability

of such tests may be proved, of course, 82by judicial notice through
resort to sources of indisputable accuracy.
In other states statutes make the test results admissible evidence.

Some statutes permit the test results in evidence only in bastardy
proceedings;.3 others permit them in both bastardy and divorce proceedings.8 4 Those states denying the admission of the test results in

divorce proceedings appear to have attached more importance to the
policy against making a child illegitimate than to the policy against
requiring a man to support a child not his own.
A majority of the states with statutes on this subject hold that the
test results are admissible only if they exclude the man as father of
the child. 5 In this respect the experts agree that the test results are
81

E.g., Beach v. Beach, supra note 28.

S2 McCormick, Evidence § 325, at 691-92 (1954).
38

Alabanza: Ala. Code tit. 27, § 12(5) (Supp. 1963) in conjunction with Mason
v. Mason, 276 Ala. 265, 160 So. 2d 881 (1964); Arkansas: Ark. Star. Ann. §
34-705.1 (repl. vol. 1962); California: Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1980.6; District of
Colwnbia: D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2347 (Supp. V 1966); Louisiana: Williams v.
Williams, 230 La. 1, 87 So. 2d 707 (1956), has held that in a divorce proceeding
the husband is not entitled to prove adultery by means of blood test results;
Maryland: Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 66G (Supp. 1965); Rhode Island: R.I. Gen.
Laws Ann. § 15-8-13 (1956); West Virginia: W.Va. Code Ann. § 4776(1) (1961).
a4 Colorado: Colo. Rev. Star. Ann. § 52-1-27 (perm. supp. 1960); Connecticut:
Conn. Gen. Star. Ann. § 52-184 (1958); Illinois: M11.Ann. Star. ch. 106%, § 5
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965); Indiana: Ind. Ann. Star. § 3-658 (Supp. 1965); Maine:
Me. Rev. Star. Ann. tit. 19, § 262 (1964); Massachusetts: Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 273,
§ 12A (1956); Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. § 383-08 (Supp. 1964); Nevada:
Nev. Rev. Star. § 56.020 (1951); New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Star. Ann. §
522:1 (1955); New Jersey: NJ. Star. Ann. § 2A:83-2 (1952); New York: N.Y.
Family Ct. Act § 532; North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Star. § 8-50.1 (Supp. 1965);
Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. S 2317.47 (Baldwin 1964); Oregon: Ore. Rev. Stat.
§ 109.250 (1953); Pennsylvania: Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 307.1 (Supp. 1965);
Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-716 (Supp. 1965); Wisconsin: Wis. Star. §
325.23 (1963).
35
A1abama: Ala. Code tit. 27, § 12(5) (Supp. 1963); Arkansas: Ark. Star. Ann.
§ 34-705.1 (repl. vol. 1962); Colorado: Colo. Rev. Star. Ann. § 52-1-27 (perm.
supp. 1960); District of Columbia: D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2347 (Supp. V 1966);
Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Star. Ann. § 52-184 (1958); Indiana: Ind. Ann. Star.
§ 2-658 (Supp. 1965); Maine: Me. Rev. Star. Ann. tit. 19, § 262 (1964); Maryland:
Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 66G (Supp. 1965); Massachusetts: Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 273, § 12A (1956); Nevada: Nev. Rev. Star. § 56.020 (1951); New Jersey:
N.J. Star. Ann. 2A:83-2 (1952); New York: N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 532; Ohio:
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.47 (Baldwin 1964); Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws
Ann. § 15-8-13 (1956); Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-716 (Supp. 1965);
West Virginia: W.Va. Code Ann. § 4776 (1) (1961); Wisconsin: Wis. Star.
§ 325.23 (1963).
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conclusive only in excluding the putative father.30 The results might
show him to have a blood type which the father of the child must
have had; but this only indicates that of all the people of that blood
type or group, he, as well as anyone else with that blood type or
group, could have been the father of the child. 7 (There is some
authority for the opinion that as new types and groups are discovered
and the information concerning them is made available, it will be
possible eventually for positive statistical probability proof of paternity to be made.) 38 The states which have adopted the Uniform Act
on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity 9 permit admission of the test
results even if they do not exclude the putative father when the types
and groups of the parties involved are rare.40 In Alabama the statute
does not admit results if the experts disagree upon the findings or
conclusions, 41 while those states which have adopted the Uniform
Act allow the trier of facts to consider all the facts including the test
results and determine the paternity question if the experts disagree.4 2
Medical experts agree that blood groups never change during lifetime, and that by the laws of genetics it is indisputable that no individual can possess a blood group factor which is absent in both of
his true parents.4 3 Therefore when the blood types of the mother and
child are known, medical experts can determine scientifically what
the blood type of the father may be and what it cannot be.4 4 The
medical profession does not claim that the tests are infallible even if
correctly administered, but instead admits that there are theoretical
exceptions-one in approximately every 50,000 to 100,000 cases.4 5 Such
exceptions, however, are of little importance when it is considered
that when "tests are accurately performed there is hardly any other
evidence that can approach in reliability the conclusions based on
36
Davidsohn, Levine, Wiener, Medicolegal Application of Blood Grouping
Tests, 149 A.M.AJ. 699, 703 (1952).
37
38

McCormlck, Evidence § 178, at 382 (1954).

Wiener, Parentage and Blood Groups, 191 Scientific American 78, 79 (July
1954).
309 Uniform Laws Ann. 102 (1952).
40
Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity § 4 (1952).
41
Alabarza: Ala. Code tit. 27, § 12(5) (Supp. 1963).
42
California: Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1980.6; Illinois: Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 106Y,
1 4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965); New Hamzpshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 522:4
(1955); Oregon: Ore. Rev. Stat. § 109.258 (1953); Pennsylvania: Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 28, § 307.6 (Supp. 1965).
43
Allen, Diamond, Jones, Medicolegal Applications of Blood Grouping, 251
New England J. Medicine 146 (1954).
44
Gradwohl, supra note 7, at 546 (1954).
45
Davidsohn, supra note 36, at 702; Ross, cf. The Value of Blood Tests as Evidence in Paternity Cases,71 Harv. L. Rev. 466,468 (1958).
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such blood tests." 46 By considering the results of all of the tests which
are readily performable, the probabilities are one in one hundred
billion that such an exception will occur.47
In 1952 the American Medical Association Committee on Medicolegal Problems recommended judicial acceptance of blood test evidence of nonpaternity as a substitution of scientific fact for opinion.48
According to its report, in tests upon families with a total of over
25,000 children, tests of the A-B-O groups revealed no exceptions to
the expected results which could not be explained either by laboratory error or by a case of illegitimacy.49 The Committee's report
stated:
The theory of multiple alleles50 leads to the following laws:
1. The agglutinogens A and B cannot appear in the blood of a
person unless they are present in the blood of one or both of his
parents. 2. A parent with blood of group AB cannot have a
child with blood of group 0, and a parent of group 0 cannot
have a child of group AB. 51
In tests which were completed upon families with a total of over
10,000 children using the M-N type for identification, the Committee
46Davidsohn, supra note 36, at 702.
47
See, Ross, The Value of Blood Tests as Evidence in Paternity Cases, 71 Harv.
L. Rev. 466, 468 (1958).
This conservative estimate is based on information obtained on the A-B-O,
M-N
and Rh-hr tests.
48
Schatkln, supra note 17, at 185.
49
Davidsohn, supranote 36, at 702.
50 Alleles is the term applied to members of a pair of contrasting genes. Sets
of alleles may contain more than two members and such sets are called multiple
alleles. Snyder & David, Heredity ch. 13, at 174 (5th ed. 1957).
5t
Davidsohn, supra note 36, at 702. (Emphasis added.) See the following chart
for example.
BLOOD GROUP
OF CHILD

MEDICO-LEGAL ASPECTS
BLOOD GROUP BLOOD GROUP TO WHICH
OF MOTHER
FATHER CANNOT BELONG"

O
O
O
A
A
B
B

0
A
B
0
B
0
A

AB

A

AB
B
AB
AB
**Snyder & Davis, Heredity 183 (5th ed. 1957).

AB
AB
AB
O, B
O, B
O, A
O, A

O, A
O, B
0
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reported that there were no exceptions to the predicted results which
could not be explained by cases of illegitimacy.52 The Committee
reported that
according to the generally accepted theory, the M-N types are
inherited by a pair of allelic genes M and N.... The theory leads
to the following two laws: 1. Agglutinogens M and N cannot
appear in the blood of a person unless they are present in the
blood of one or both of his parents. 2. A parent with blood of
type M cannot have a child with blood of type N, and a parent
53
with type N blood cannot have a child with type M blood.
Use of the Rh-hr blood types in studies on families with a total
of over 5,000 children revealed no exceptions to the theory that could
not be explained by cases of illegitimacy.54 The report stated:
For practical purposes the consequences of the genetic theory
can be summarized in the following laws: 1. Blood properties
Rho, rh', rh", hr', and hr" cannot appear in the blood of a person unless they are present in the blood of one or both his parents.
2. A parent who is rh'-negative (cc) cannot have an hr'-negative
(CC) child; nor can an hr'-negative (CC) parent have an rh'negative (cc) child. 3. A parent who is rh"-negative (ee) cannot
have an hr"-negative (EE) child; nor can an hr"-negative (EE)
parent have an rh"-negative (ee) child. 55
As a result of these studies, in cases where a man is falsely accused
of paternity, proof of nonpaternity by the A-B-O, M-N, and Rh-hr
tests can at present be expected to result in exoneration of over 50%
of those accused.5 6
S2 Davidsohn, supra note 36, at 702.
531bid. (Emphasis added.) See the following chart for example.
MEDICO-LEGAL APPLICATION OF THE BLOOD TYPES
TYPE OF
CHILD
M
M
N
N
MN
MN

TYPE OF
MOTHER
M
MN
N
MN
M
N

TYPE TO WHICH
FATHER CANNOT BELONG**
N
N
M
M
M
N

*Schatkin, supra note 17, at 170.
Davidsohn, supra note 36, at 703.
551bid. (Emphasis added.) See Schatkin, supra note 17, at 171-92c, for full discussion of all the complexities.
56 McCormick, Evidence § 179, at 380 (1954); Richardson, Modern Scientific
54
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When the legal profession does accept the test as positively excluding paternity, the problem of the weight to be given the test results
arises. Some courts hold that paternity-excluding test results should
be weighed equally with other evidence by the trier of fact.57 This
position has been strongly attacked:
In contested divorce actions... judges apparently prefer to accept the testimony of the wife rather than the objective blood
test findings, so that in courts of this country . . . not much
progress has been made away from the law of the 'four seas ....
When a court refuses to dissolve or annul a marriage of two completely incompatible people, even though there is scientific proof
of the wife's deceit or fraud ..
the court would not appear to
be carrying out its responsibilities as an administrator of justice.5 8
Consideration of the blood test results equally with other evidence
has also been called judicial blindness to the advances of science.59
Medical experts and legal writers have also attacked the position of
those courts which consider the testimony of the expert who administers and interprets the results of the blood tests to be on the same
evidentiary level as regular expert testimony concerning hypothetical
situations.6 0 Unlike the testimony of the usual expert, the blood
grouping expert deals with nonhypothetical facts of the case at hand.
One medicolegal authority states that "the pathologist whose report
excludes paternity is not giving 'opinion' evidence, . . [but is] testifying to a fact of life and Nature." 61
The testimony of the parties in a paternity proceeding is seldom
highly credible. There is an understandable self-serving interest on
02
the part of each party which makes his testimony subject to doubt.
The fact that the medical expert testifying in the case is a disinterested
Evidence § 12.3, at 324 (1961); Schatkin, supra note 17, at 206; Sussman, Blood

Grouping Tests in Disputed Paternity Proceedings, 155 A.M.AJ. 1143 (1954);
Davidsohn, supra note 36, at 702; Allen, supra note 43.
57E.g., Groulx v. Groulx, 98 N.H. 481, 103 A.2d 188 (1954); Ross v. Marx, 24
NJ. Super. 25, 93 A.2d 597 (1952); State ex rel. Steiger v. Gray, 76 Ohio L. Abs.
393, 145 N-E.2d 162 (Juv. Ct. 1957).
58124 A.M.J. 776 (1944).

5
NBeck v. Beck, 153 Colo. 90, 384 P.2d 731 (1963); Prochnow v. Prochnow, 274
Wis. 491, 80 N.W.2d 278, 285 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
GODenton, Blood Groups and Disputed Parentage, 27 Can. B. Rev. 537, 547-48
(1949).
01
Gradwohl, supra note 7, at 576 (1954).
62 State ex rel. Steiger v. Gray, supra note 57, at 165.
Chapter IX of Schatkin, supra note 17, describes a number of cases in which
the complaining female changed her testimony when faced with the blood tests
results. Unfortunately these are for the most part unreported cases.
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third person should make his testimony more credible than that of the
parties.
Where test results show that the husband could not possibly have
been the father of his wife's child, the only question remaining for
determination by the trier of fact is whether the tests were properly
conducted. This involves the procedures in administering the blood
tests, the qualifications of the persons testing the blood and interpreting the test. Authorities on legal medicine agree on the qualifications necessary for those who administer the tests and the general
procedures to be followed. The tests must be carried out and interpreted by an expert. For some authorities this means having a
pathologist or serologist, 63 not a medical technologist. However, there
is no reason why a medical technologist cannot qualify as an expert
in making such tests, leaving the pathologist or serologist as the interpreting expert. Houghton acknowledged that technicians were competent to perform the tests under ordinary circumstances impliedly
because of the
extensive education now required to become a medical
4
technician.
Authorities also stipulate steps which should be followed in performing the tests and feel that in addition to the necessity of fresh6 5
and properly labeled 6 blood specimens, the expert should at all times
have a large panel of persons of representative blood groups and types
available from among whom he can obtain blood samples. These serve
as positive and negative controls of the various antibodies employedt
so that the reactions of known blood types can be compared with the
test specimens. The results of the control tests are to be included
in the final report.68 The main test should be completely carried out
for the A-B groups, the M-N types, and the Rh-hr types, 69 and the
final report should contain the intermediate results for all tests performed.70 Additional tests may be performed by equally qualified
colleagues of the expert performing the tests, 71 thereby increasing the
63
Denton, supra note 60, at 547; Richardson, supra note 56, § 12.15 citing
Denton's article; Schatkin, supra note 17, at 203; Sussman, supra note 56; Davidsohn, supra note 36, at 704.
64
Houghton v. Houghton, supra note 9, at 866.
65Sussman, supra note 56.
6O6bid.; Denton, supranote 60, at 548.
67
Davidsohn, supra note 36, at 704.
OSIbid.
69
Schatldn, supra note 17, at 203.
7ODenton, supranote 60, at 548.

711bid.; Sussman, supra note 56, at 1144.
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credibility of the results. Some states permit the court to require
that tests be made by more than 1 expert.7 2
There has been some difference of opinion concerning the various
sera to be used-some writers require the expert to make the serum
himself, 73 while others allow the use of commercially prepared
serum. 74 Those requiring the expert to prepare his own serum feel
that in this way he best acquires the experience needed for such
75
precise work.
The only areas in which the results of blood grouping tests should
be open to attack are in the method of testing or in the qualifications
of the persons performing the tests. In the event of error in one of
the aspects of the tests, the jury may be permitted to determine
from the evidence what effect such error will have on the evidentiary
weight to be afforded such test results. 76 A mere questioning of the
methods or persons employed should not be sufficient to allow the
jury to determine such weight; there should be evidence that there
was something materially wrong, e.g., failure to keep the test specimens in a place inaccessible to interested persons. 77 A better solution
in case of doubt is to recess the court or continue the case to allow
further testing.78 The evidence in such a situation is constant because
the blood types of the parties involved will never change.
Competently administered blood grouping tests which exclude paternity should be considered conclusive as a matter of law. 79 Once
the results excluding paternity are no longer challenged, impossibility
of paternity comparable to the common law nonaccess has been
shown. When the courts recognize that the scientific results are much
72
California: Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1980.4; Maine: Me. Rev. Star. Ann.
tit. 19, § 262 (1964); Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. § 383-09 (Supp. 1964); New
Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Star. Ann. § 522:2 (1955); New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2A:83-2 (1952); Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.47 (1964); Oregon: Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 109.254 (1953); Pennsylvania: Pa. Star. Ann. tit. 28, § 307.1 (Supp.
1965); Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-716 (Supp. 1965); Wisconsin: Wis. Stat.

§ 52.36(1) (1963).

'73 Davidsohn, supra note 36, at 699.
741bid.
75
Davidsohn, supra note 36, at 699.
70
Commissioner ex rek Tyler v. Costonie, supra note 29, at 805 (1950).
77
Denton, supra note 60, at 548.
7825 Iowa L. Rev. 823, 825 (1940).
79
Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity § 5 (1952).
The A.M.A. Committee did not recommend that the courts be bound by the
test results when they excluded paternity. Davidsohn, supra note 36, at 703.
Richardson says this is due to a "deference to the judicial process rather than
any lack of faith in the test." Richardson, Modern Scientific Evidence § 12.12,
n.34 (1961).
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more accurate than any other evidence of nonpaternity, they will
discover that they have not changed the quantum of proof necessary
to overcome the presumption of legitimacy; blood grouping exclusion
shows impossibility.
Louis C. ROBERTs, III

POLICE SURVEILLANCE OF PUBLIC TOILETS
Clandestine police surveillance of public toilets as a means of detecting consensual homosexuality has raised Fourth Amendment problems concerning the right of privacy and freedom from unreasonable
searches. Public toilets are known to provide an environment for
criminal activities,' and observation by hidden parties provides an
effective means of apprehending the participants. The most recent
decisions have approved systematic and continuous surveillance
through air vents,2 peepholess and even a 2-way mirror,4 with the
result that the privacy apparently offered the public is deceptive.
The result of such decisions is a balancing of the individual's Fourth
Amendment right of freedom from unreasonable search and seizure
against the exigencies of law enforcement. The problem is farreaching: such searches may affect every citizen who uses public
facilities, not just the few who are suspected of violations. The United
States Supreme Court has not yet considered the problem, but has
denied certiorari in 3 cases decided in 1965.5
In Smayda v. United States,6 the 9th Circuit refused to apply the
Fourth Amendment restrictions to peephole observation of a public
toilet in a national park campsite. The manager of the campsite had
received several complaints of homosexual activity in a particular
1"Judges can take judicial knowledge from the case files in their own courts
that public toilets in metropolitan parks, terminals, theaters, department stores and
in similar places, frequented daily by masses of people, are often the locale of vice
of many kinds such as sexual perversion, sale of narcotics, petty thefts, robbery
and assaults." People v. Young, 214 Cal. App. 2d 131, 29 Cal. Rptr. 492, 494
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
21d. at 494.
SPeople v. Norton, 209 Cal. App. 2d 173, 25 Cal. Rptr. 676 (Dist. Ct. App.
1962).
4
State ex rel. Poore v. Mayer, 176 Ohio St. 78, 197 N.E. 2d 577, cert. denied,
379 U.S. 928 (1964).
uIn addition to the principal case, see People v. Hensel, 233 Cal. App. 2d 834,
43 Cal. Rptr. 965 (Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 942 (1965). Cf. State
ex rel. Poore v. Mayer, 176 Ohio St. 78, 197 NE.2d 557, cert. denied, 379 U.S.
928 (1964), petition for removal denied, 243 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
0352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966).
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restroom. The restroom toilets were open to the public, and not
elaborately constructed: board partitions between the 3 stalls were
18 inches above the floor, and the doors had no latches, thereby affording only a minimum of privacy. The manager, with the help of
park police, constructed observation windows, disguised as air vents,
in the ceiling of the restroom. Surveillance was conducted after
11 p.m. on successive Saturdays. After the officers had observed some
40 persons using the facility, they photographed the defendants committing a criminal homosexual act.7 They were arrested and prosecuted for violating the Assimilative Crimes Act; violation of the
pertinent California statute thus became a federal offense. 8 The district court denied the defendants' motion to suppress the evidence
procured by the surveillance.
The Court of Appeals affirmed on 2, possibly 3, grounds: (1) the
defendants waived any right of privacy they might have had; 9 (2)
the search was not unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment,' ° because it was undertaken upon reasonable cause,"
and (3) possibly because a public toilet is not a "house" as defined
by the Fourth Amendment,' 2 hence there was no search.
The concurring opinion found that there was no "'intrusion into
a constitutionally protected area,' "13 that the actions of the manager
as a private individual were not within the Fourth Amendment prohibitions, 14 and that there was no right of privacy per se. 15
A strong dissent emphasized that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect the partial right of privacy which a person might
7Cal.

Pen. Code § 288a.

"The Assimilative Crimes Act creates a federal
offense; it refers to the California statutes for its definition and its penalty, but it
does not incorporate the whole criminal and constitutional law of California
818 U.S.C. § 13 (1950).

We look, then, to the Constitution of the United States, not that of

California." Smayda v. United States, supranote 6, at 253.
9
1d. at 255, citing People v. Norton, 209 Cal. App. 2d 173, 25 Cal. Rptr. 676,
678 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).

'OSmayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 255.
"Id. at 257. The term "reasonable cause" is used throughout the opinion, apparently in preference to "probable cause." "Reasonable cause has been generally
defined to be such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and
prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion
that the person is guilty of a crime." People v. Ingle, 53 Cal. 2d 407, 412-13, 348
P.2d 577, 580, 2 Cal. Rptr. 14, 17 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
12 Smayda v. United States, supranote 6, at 256.

13ld. at 257; see Manwaring, California and the Fourth Amendment, 16 Stan.

L. Rev. 318, 329 (1964) (search requires a physical intrusion).

14Smayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 257, citing Burdeau v. McDowell,

256 U.S. 465 (1921) (leading case).

15Smayda v. United States, supranote 6, at 258.
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reasonably expect in a given situation. 16 The dissenter rejected the
theory that the defendants waived their rights,17 indicated that cutting
the holes in the ceiling was a physical intrusion,1 8 and concluded
that no similar search had ever been held reasonable. 19 Finally, he
termed the search a general exploratory search, "reminiscent of the
abusive writs of assistance and general warrants which motivated the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment." 20
Waiver of Fourth Amendment rights, the first ground of decision,
should not have been inferred from the present fact situation. Federal
and state decisions make it overwhelmingly clear that the right of
freedom from unreasonable searches can be waived by consent, 2' but
that the consent must be unequivocal, specific, and intelligently
given. 22 Some courts say they "'indulge every reasonable presump24
tion against waiver'" of fundamental rights. 23 People v. Norton
found a waiver of rights where the act was committed in the open
area of the restroom, but recognized that this waiver would not extend to acts committed in the stalls. 25 Thus assuming a search, if the
search in the present case is to stand it must do so on the strength of
the determination of its reasonableness.
Smayda's discussion of the reasonableness of the search was similar
to that in the 5 previous toilet surveillance cases which California
appellate courts have decided to date,28 and which are now the basic
'old. at 259. The majority conceded there was a protected right of privacy
in a public toilet. Id. at 257.
171d. at 260.
181d. at 261, citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).

IOSmayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 261, citing Manwaring, supra note
13,2 at 350 (search merely a substitute for less intrusive methods).
0Smayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 262.
21See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 346 F.2d 383, 387 (9th Cit. 1965); Shafer
v. State, 214 Tenn. 416, 381 S.WV.2d 254, 258-59 (1964); Simmons v. State, 210
Tenn.
443, 360 S.W.2d 10, 11 (1962).
22
United States v. Como, 340 F.2d 891, 893 (2d Cir. 1965); Montana v. Tomich,
332 F.2d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Katz, 238 F. Supp. 689,
694-95
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); State v. King, 44 NJ. 346, 209 A.2d 110, 113 (1965).
23
See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); United States v. Royster,
204 F. Supp. 760, 763 (N.D. Ohio 1961); People v. Cangione, 33 Misc. 2d 23, 224
N.Y.S.2d 549, 552 (Queen's County Ct. 1962).
24209
Cal. App. 2d 173, 25 Cal. Reptr. 676 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
2
5d. at 678.
26
See Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552
(1962) (stalls held to offer maximum privacy); Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d
469, 374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962) (stalls held to offer maximum privacy);
People v. Hensel, supra note 5 (act done in open area of restroom); People v.
Young, supra note 1 (no partitions); People v. Norton, supra note 6 (no doors).
Of these, the first two, Bielicki and Britt excluded the evidence as an unreasonable
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source of case law on the subject.2 7 All 5 cases have spoken strictly
in Fourth Amendment terms, although there have been suggestions
that due process 2 8 and Fifth Amendment self-incrimination 29 considerations may also apply. All 5 cases have approached the problem in
a way common to search and seizure, by considering 3 separate
grounds:3 0 (1) whether the particular activity constituted a search;
(2) whether the place investigated was within the Fourth Amendment
protection of "persons, houses, papers, or effects;" 31 (3) whether the
search was reasonable. In Smayda, the holding of reasonableness was
of paramount importance, and the contentions that there was no
search and that the toilet was not a "house" were only summarily
considered.
(1) Smayda recognized that "both the eye and the ear as well as
33 and it was
the hand, can 'search'.
." 32 This is the general rule,
Court.3 4
v.
Superior
in
Bielicki
first applied to peephole surveillance
The later California decisions,3 5 however, have been prone to take
peephole surveillance cases out of the rule by following the principle
that there is no search in observing that which is open to public
view. 0 Activities which are considered open to public view fall into
invasion of privacy, but the later three refused to follow them by finding that
the27acts were open to public view.
1n addition to United States v. Smayda, see State ex rel. Poore v. Mayer, 243
F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ohio 1965), which adopted the reasoning of the three later

California cases, on similar fact situations. Craft v. State, 181 So. 2d 140 (Miss.
1965), did not cite the California cases, but relied instead on a trespass theory to

admit
the evidence obtained by a peephole search.
28

Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962

Supreme Court Rev. 212, 247-48.
29King, Electronic Surveillance and Constitutional Rights: Some Recent
Developments and Observations, 33 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 240 (1964).
3063 Colum. L. Rev. 955, 956 (1963).
3

l"[E]very person who enters an enclosed stall in a public toilet is entitled to

believe that, while there, he will have at least the modicum of privacy that its
design affords." Smadya v. United States, supra note 6, at 257.

32d.
at 255.
33

See, e.g., People v. Kramer, 38 Misc. 2d 889, 239 N.Y.S.2d 303, 307 (Sup.
Ct. 1963) (observation of premises from wall held to be a search); People v.
Sheridan, 236 Cal. App. 2d 756, 46 Cal. Rptr. 295, 297 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965)

(searching held to be a function of sight); People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290

P.2d 855, 858 (1955)

(looking through window held not to be unreasonable

search); Craft v. Mississippi, supra note 24 (peephole view held to be a lawful
search).
34"'[Tlhe term implies some exploratory investigation or an invasion and
quest . . . or seeking out .... ' Bielicki v. Superior Court, supra note 26, at
553-54.
35
People v. Hensel, supra note 5, People v. Young, supra note 1, People v.
Norton, supra note 24.
36
"Merely to observe what is perfectly apparent to any member of the
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2 categories: acts observable in or from an area open to the public

in plain view of police as well as to any member of the public,8 7 and
88
acts observable by looking through an open window.
(2) The contention that the stalls were private places analogous to
houses and therefore covered by the Fourth Amendment was rejected in Smayda.39 But that point was unimportant to the outcome

since the court conceded, as did generally the earlier cases, 40 that
there was a protected right of privacy in a public toilet.41 The protection from unreasonable searches of houses has been extended to
include a taxicab, 42 an automobile,43 an office, 44 a store,4 5 and a

temporarily unoccupied dwelling. 4

Thus there is no reason why,

upon recognition of a right of privacy in Smayda circumstances, the
toilet could not be considered a house for Fourth Amendment purposes. It was unfortunate that the court relied on the theory that
visual observation of a house without a trespass is not a search,47 for

there is a growing awareness of the inadequacies of the trespass test
in this context.48 Peephole surveillance cases are regarded as out of
the "mainstream of search-and-seizure jurisprudence," 49 and it is for
this reason that reliance on analogy to search for tangible objects
is not appropriate in a peephole surveillance case. 50 Silverman v.
general public who might happen on the premises is not a search:' People v.
Young, supra note 1, at 494. The rule is well established, see, e.g., Trujillo v.
United States, 294 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1961); Petteway v. United States, 261 F.2d
53, 54 (4th Cir. 1958). The extension of this rule to activities in enclosed areas
of toilet stalls does not necessarily follow. No such mechanical approach should
be used. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962); Nelson v. Hancock, 239
F. Supp. 857 (D.N.H. 1965).
3
7People v. Rayson, 197 Cal. App. 2d 33, 17 Cal. Rptr. 243 (Dist. Cr. App.
1961) (observation of shoe shine parlor from street).
3SPeopIe v. Martin, supra note 33 (a leading case).
3
, Smayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 256.
40
See Bielicld v. Superior Court, supra note 26, at 556; Britt v. Superior Court,
supra
note 26, at 851.
4
lSmayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 257.
4Rios
v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
43
Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927) (car treated as extension of
person).
44
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
45
Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (store adjoining house).
46Roberson
v. United States, 165 F.2d 752, 754-55 (6th Cir. 1948).
47
Smayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 256.
4
8lnfra note 50.
4
OManwaring, supra note 12, at 347.
50
Similar analogy was tried in early electronic surveillance cases, such as Olinstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), where it was held that there could be
no seizure of a voice which is intangible. King, supra note 29, discusses the disadvantages of such techniques, and Beaney, supra note 28, discusses the fight
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United States,51 held that insertion of a spike microphone into a wall
was an intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, but stressed
that the intrusion was not to be determined by local trespass law.
Subtle distinctions based on property law were rejected more recently
in Stoner v. California.52
(3) The holding that the search was reasonable is certainly the
significant holding of Smayda. It is here that Smayda differs from
California precedents, which had admitted the evidence acquired by
surveillance by factually distinguishing the Bielicki land mark. 3 The
Smayda holding of reasonableness is in direct conflict with Bielicki,
which held the search unreasonable for lack of probable cause. 54 If
observation of the toilet can be considered a reasonable search, it
would not be prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, which applies
only to unreasonable searches and seizures.55 In order to find the
Smayda search reasonable, it is necessary, as the concurring opinion
recognizes, that "a somewhat less strict view of what constitutes adequate proof of probable cause for search must be taken" 56
' -"somewhat less strict" because focus on a particular suspect is generally
required to constitute reasonable cause. 57 Because there is not a particular suspect, it becomes extremely difficult to distinguish a peephole
of privacy in this area. That mechanical analysis fails to consider the nature
of the freedom protected is reflected in Justice Douglas's statement that
My trouble with stare decisis in this field is that it leads us to a matching
of cases on irrelevant facts. An electronic device on the outside wall of a
house is a permissible invasion of privacy according to Goldman v. United
States... while an electronic device that penetrates the wall, as here, is not.
Yet the invasion of privacy is as great in one case as in the other.
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1961) (concurring opinion).
This was at least tacitly recognized in an earlier case, Brock v United States,
223 F.2d 681, 685 (5th Cir. 1955) which held that suggestive questioning through
a window to a person talking in his sleep violated the "right to be left alone."
A visual search may be illegal even without a trespass. People v. Regalado, 224
Cal. App. 2d 586, 36 Cal. Rptr. 795 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (observation of hotel
room through peephole in door); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451
(1948) (looking through transom of rooming house). Moreover, a trespass may
not of itself render a search illegal. United States v. Young, 322 F.2d 443 (4th Cir.
1963) (trespass on grounds surrounding building is not per se an illegal search);
"[A] simple trespass without more does not invalidate a subsequent seizure."
United States v. Lewis, 227 F. Supp. 433, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
51365 U.S. 505 (1961).

52376 U.S. 483 (1964).
63Smayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 253.
54lbid.;
Bielicki v. Superior Court, supra note 26.
55
See, e.g., United States v. Abel, 258 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1958), aff'd 362 U.S.
217 (1960).
5 6Smayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 259.

57ld. at 257.
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surveillance from a general exploratory search for evidence. The
usual rule is that no such general exploratory search can be justified
even with a warrant.5 8 This rule is the most significant obstacle
to sustaining the reasonableness of a toilet surveillance. Since the sole
purpose of the general surveillance is to obtain evidence of guilt,
0
both Bielicki v. Superior Court59 and Britt v. Superior CourtO
considered such surveillance a general exploratory search. Smayda attempted a distinction, saying that other exploratory searches involved
"physical invasion of private premises, an arrest, and then a general
exploratory search of the premises for evidence of crime." 61 Such a
distinction seems to overlook the obvious, for persons and effects
may be searched without an invasion of premises and without an
62
arrest; and premises may be searched without a physical invasion.
More significant is Smayda's holding that
when, as here, the police have reasonable cause to believe that
public toilet stalls are being used in the commission of crime, and
when, as here, they confine their activities to the times when such
crimes are most likely to occur, they are entitled to institute
clandestine surveillance.. . .The public interest in its privacy,
we think, must, to that extent, be subordinated to the public interest in law enforcement.63
This reemphasizes the importance of the holding of the reasonableness
of the search, and makes it even more apparent that the validity of
the decision is highly, even entirely, dependent on the wisdom of the
determination of reasonableness.
There are doubts as to the wisdom of the determination that, even
under the restrictive circumstances just mentioned, a peephole surveillance should be allowed to compromise the right of privacyf 4
But there is authority indicating that there are situations where the
58

See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465 (1932); "Whatever
reason law enforcement officials may have to believe that illegal activities are
being conducted within a house, they may not, without a warrant, invade the
house for the purpose of searching for and seizing evidence of criminal acts.",
United States v. Young, supra note 50, at 444; Drayton v. United States, 205

F.2d 35, 37 (5th Cir. 1953) (fact premises had an unsavory reputation did not
authorize a general search); United States v. Bayley, 240 F. Supp. 649, 658
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) "[slearches for and seizures of mere evidence are always unreasonable"; 2 Underhill, Criminal Evidence § 410, at 1055 (5th ed. 1956).
59Supra note 26, at 554.
6
oSupra note 26, at 850.
OlSmayda
v. United States, supra note 6, at 256.
62
Cases cited note 50, supra.
3
6 Smayda v. United States, supra note 6, at 257.
64
lnfra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
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usual standards of reasonableness can be relaxed. 65 The United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly and emphatically stated that "there is
no formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to
be decided on its own facts and circumstances." 16 This was recently
reemphasized in Ker v. California,67 which was taken on certiorari
after Mapp v. Obio68 for the express purpose of further explication
of "the standard by which state searches and seizures must be evaluated."

69

Ker stated that the "standards of reasonableness . . . are

not susceptible of procrustean application." 70 This is very much in
accord with the abovementioned disapproval of the use of improper
analogy, such as trespass, in search and seizure cases. 7' The test of
reasonableness of a search is usually stated in broad terms, typically,
whether the thing done, in sum of its form, scope, nature, incidents and effect, impresses as being fundamentally unfair or unreasonable in the specific situation when the immediate end sought
is considered against the private right affected. 72
73
The determination of reasonableness involves a balancing of interests,
or an examination of the total fact situation with regard to the constitutional right of privacy. 74 Reasonableness has been called the
fundamental requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 75
Despite such broad views of what constitutes reasonableness, Smayda is still an extension of traditional concepts. There are several ways
in which the more traditional concepts may be asserted in a case of
this type: Courts have held that reasonableness depends on the ex77
istence of probable cause, 76 or even on whether there was a trespass.
GuSee Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) (a leading case holding
that where impracticable a warrant is not necessary for search of an automobile);
Comment,
22 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 221, 222 (1965).
66
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931). See Rios
v. United States, supra note 42, at 255; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 US.
56, 63 (1950).
07374 U.S. 23 (1963).
68367 U.S. 643 (1961).
09
Ker v. California, supra note 67, at 24.
7id.at 33.
"'See note 50 supraand accompanying text.
72United States v. Cook, 213 F. Supp. 568, 571 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
73
See People v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65, 204 N.E.2d 176, 177, 255 N.YS.2d 833,
835 (1964).
4
"t
State v. Chinn, 231 Ore. 259, 373 P.2d 392, 396 (1962).
75
State v. Romeo, 43 N.J. 188, 203 A.2d 23, 32 (1964).
76
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Holloway v. Reincke, 229 F. Supp. 132, 136
(D. Conn. 1964); United States v. O'Lear., 201 F. Supp. 926, 929 (E.D. Tenn.
1961).
77
See Jones v. United States, 339 F.2d 419, 420 (5th Cir. 1964) (equates physical
intrusion with encroachment).
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There are suggestions that the seriousness of the crime is to be considered, with greater constitutional scrutiny afforded methods of
search in less serious crimes such as gambling or obscenity, and less
exacting standards in more serious crimes such as burglary, robbery,
or crimes involving a dangerous weapon. 78 Consensual homosexuality
would presumably fall into the category of- lesser crimes, so that it
would be inappropriate to justify the surveillance by reference to
the comparatively relaxed standards of reasonableness encountered in
dealing with dangerous crimes. Also, it is frequently recognized that a
warrantless search may be reasonable, hence justified, in exceptional
circumstances.7 9 But it would require a substantial extension to apply
the exceptional circumstances principle to toilet surveillance cases. For
the exceptional circumstances principle has been applied rarely, and
if at all,80 to the necessitous circumstances of some military searches,"
or more traditionally to instances of a crime committed in the officer's presence,8 2 or to threatened imminent destruction of evidence.a
Even if such a search might be considered reasonable, the wisdom
of such a determination is still doubtful. Most courts would find it
distasteful that such a search entails widespread observation of innocent parties.8 4 There is a basic objection to any systematic clandestine surveillance where privacy is apparently offered. Such surveillance violates the recognized right to be left alone,as and is probably a tortious invasion of privacy.88 There is only a fine line between
it and the drilling of peepholes in every door of a hotel, a practice
condemned in People v.Regalado.87 There is opinion to the effect
78

See, e.g., Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F2d 690, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1940);

People v. Salerno, 38 Misc. 2d 467, 235 N.Y.S.2d 879, 884 (Sup. Ct. 1962); 63
Colum.
L. Rev. 955, 958 (1963).
79
See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948); McDonald v.

United
States, supra note 50, at 456.
80
"It is of interest that no federal or New Jersey appellate decision has been
found actually sustaining a search without a warrant, not incidental to an arrest,
on the express basis of the exceptional circumstances rule." State v. Naturile, 83
N.J. Super. 563, 200 A.2d 617, 619 (Super. Ct. 1964). But see Wayne v. United
States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (abortion case where likelihood of death
justified an otherwise unlawful entry).

8'United States v. Grisby, 335 F2d 652 (4th Cir. 1964).
82United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
83
See Chapman v. United States, supranote 21.
84
See, e.g, Smayda v. United States, supranote 6, at 257.
8
5See United States v. Brock, supra note 50.
8
sProsser defines the tort, as pertinent here, as an "intrusion upon the plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion" which extends beyond physical intrusion to
eavesdropping and even to peering in the windows of a home. Prosser, Torts
§ 112,
87 at 833 (3d ed. 1964).
Supra note 50.

432

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIII

that consensual homosexuality poses too slight a threat to the general
welfare to justify criminal sanctions. s8 It makes little sense to diminish
the privacy of a large segment of the population to prevent acts
posing- only a slight threat to the public welfare.
Traditional concepts of justice have left little room for the Peeping Tom policeman, and it is difficult to understand why the present
fact situation would necessitate such draconian measures. If, however,
peephole surveillance is necessary to enforce the laws, it would be
more in harmony with accepted principles of justice if notice of its
likelihood were given. This has been done in other areas, with express
notice in the case of highway signs warning of the possible use of
radar, and implied notice in the case of postal employees who understand that their activities may be observed secretly. As applied to the
present problem, a competently drafted vice statute may remove
constitutional objections and serve as a deterrent to crime in toilets.
Such a statute could provide a procedure to be followed once a
magistrate is convinced of the need for surveillance of a specific
facility or could provide for some permanent display of notice. In
either case effective measures to insure procedural compliance would
be necessary.89
As -important as the need for procedural safeguards is the need
for a definitive and realistic statement of the extent of the right of
privacy. If Smayda is to stand, it must do so apart from reliance on
fictional reasoning to find a waiver of constitutional rights or on
faulty analogy which recognizes no search without a physical trespass against the defendants. These do not provide proper guidelines
for determining how the balance between the personal right of privacy
and the practicalities of enforcement is to be struck.
WALmR

H. RvriND

UNCERTAINTY OF DURATION: THE CONTINUING
PERFORMANCE CONTRACT
In Poultry Haulers, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co.1 plaintiff agreed to transport poultry from various poultry farms in Alabama to defendant's
88
Comment,
89

70 Yale LJ. 623, 627-28 (1961).
Such measures might include: excluding evidence obtained in violation of the
proper procedure; criminal or civil penalties against property owners or licensees
who permit no-notice surveillance where privacy appears to be offered.
1247 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ala. 1964), aff'd per curiam 353 F.2d 538 (5th Cir.
1965).
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processing plant. The terms of the oral agreement provided that
plaintiff was to haul for defendant "between 200,000 and 250,000
birds per week and was to receive sixty-five cents per one hundred
pounds as compensation .... ," 2 The hauling was to "continue as long
as the defendant had poultry to be hauled to its processing plant" 3
and as long as the hauling services were performed satisfactorily.
Defendant also represented that if the hauling were performed satisfactorily the contract would exist for a reasonable time. After moving
its plant to a new location, plaintiff-haulers began performance of
the contract. Six months later the defendant informed plaintiff that
the quantity of birds to be hauled would be increased to 300,000 per
week. Plaintiff then purchased additional equipment in reliance upon
defendant's representation. One month after the announced increase
defendant served notice of an intention to reduce the weekly volume
to 100,000 birds, "representing to plaintiff that they [defendant]
would haul the remainder" 4 of the birds. Plaintiff treated the reduction in volume as a breach of contract, stopped transporting, poultry
for defendant, and sued for the breach. After careful consideration
of the briefs and "an independent research of the law," 5 the United
States District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that
under Alabama law the contract lacked mutuality and was uncertain
as to its duration.
Lack of mutuality was not the significant reason for dismissing the
complaint since the court merely stated that it was nowhere alleged
"that the plaintiff was obligated to perform for any definite period
of time." 6 The court's injection of mutuality into its discussion of
the agreement only adds to its decision the confusion which surrounds that term.7 Obviously the court was not saying that the contract lacked mutuality because plaintiff was not obligated or had not
promised to perform; the complaint alleged that an "agreement existed between plaintiff and defendant, said agreement being that
plaintiff would transport poultry." 8 Only the plaintiff-hauler could
2

Id. at 557.
3lbid.
4

Amendment to Amendment to Complaint, Count Three, p. 2, Poultry Haulers,
Inc. v. Pillsbury Co, supranote 1.
5Poultry Haulers, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., supra note 1, at 557.
Old. at 558.
7See IA Corbin, Contracts

§ 152

(1963);

1 Williston,

Contracts § 105A

(3d ed. 1957). See generally Oliphant, Mutuality of Obligation In Bilateral Contracts At Law (pts. 1-2), 25 Colum. L. Rev. 705 (1925), 28 Colum. L. Rev.
997 (1928).
SAmendment to Amendment to Complaint, Count Three, p. 1, Poultry Haulers
Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., supranote 1.
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have promised to haul poultry. If the court thought the contract
failed because plaintiff was obligated to perform but not for any
determinable period of time, it was begging the question. Plaintiff
promised to perform for the same period for which defendant promised-that period of time upon which they agreed. The actual question to be decided was whether the agreement was certain as to its
duration. The answer to that question is the same as the answer to
the question whether plaintiff was obligated to perform for any
determinable time. It appears that the court, in saying the contract
lacked mutuality, was really saying that it was uncertain as to its
duration.
The court's holding that the contract was uncertain as to its durations implies a consideration of 2 issues: (1) Is a contract which
expressly provides that it is to run "for a reasonable time" uncertain
as to its duration? (2) Is a contract for continuing performance to
run "as long as a shipper has particular goods to be shipped to its
plant" uncertain as to its duration?
(1) The court gave no attention to the contract provision for duration for a reasonable time. Since the hauling contract was entirely
oral, the court apparently thought that the reasonable time provision
was included in the allegations of the complaint merely to assure
maintenance of an action and actually had not been a term of the
contract at all. But the court was not privileged to disregard this
provision as not a part of the contract since it was considering a
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12b(6) 9 and had to accept all
material, not inherently incredible, allegations of the complaint as
true. It is clear that had the contract been read as providing for
hauling for a reasonable time it would have been certain as to time °
and the motion to dismiss should not have been granted. For purposes
of this discussion, the contract -will be read as containing no express
provision for duration for a reasonable time.
(2) The United States District Court held that the Alabama deci2
11
sion in Howard v. East Tennessee, Va. & Ga. Ry. was controlling
Oft is not acknowledged by the court that the motion was under 12b(6),

but there is no other proper motion.
10Frankfurt-Barnett Co. v. William Prym Co., 237 Fed. 21 (2d Cir 1916).
When a contract contains no duration provision, generally the law will imply
a reasonable time for performance. Restatement, Contracts S 32, illustration
4 (1932); 1 Corbin, Contracts § 96 (1963); 1 Wlliston, Contracts § 38 (3d ed.
1957). It follows that a reasonable time is a sufficiently certain time.
191 Ala. 268, 8 So. 868 (1891).
12
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Although not stated in the opinion, diversity of
citizenship was apparently the ground for federal jurisdiction.
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and failed to discuss the difference between the Pillsbury and Howard
contracts. In Howard the defendant railroad hired plaintiff to work
as its land agent to induce development along its route and to encourage passenger travel on its trains. The employment contract
provided for stipulated monthly compensation to plaintiff but contained no provision concerning duration of the employment. The
court thought "the material inquiry [was] ... whether the contract
as stated is not void for uncertainty, or one which either party could
terminate at will." 13 Plaintiff's claim for damages for defendant's
refusal to permit him to continue in his employment was denied without
clear explication of the ground of decision. The Howard result would
have been the same whether the contract was void for uncertainty or
a contract terminable at will since defendant claimed no damages for
past services.
The general rule is that a contract which does not specify expressly
or impliedly a particular period of time within which performance is
to be rendered shall continue for a reasonable time. 14 However, personal service contracts of unspecified duration are an exception 5 to
this general rule; the parties are presumed"6 to have intended the
contract to be terminable at will.' 7 But the contract is terminable
at will only when the contract itself specifies no duration and when
it is clear from the nature of the employment and the situation and
object of the parties that no definite time was intended. 18 The Howard agreement is typical of a personal service contract in which the
parties do not expressly agree upon duration and probably have no
understanding as to duration except that it is vaguely regarded as
indefinite. To hold that the employee has no action for breach of
contract upon the employer's terminating such an indefinite employment does not seem unjust.
The court failed to recognize a basic difference between the employment contract in Howard and the contract in Pillsbury. In
Howard (1) there was a complete absence in the contract itself of any
l3Howard v. East Tennessee, Va. & Ga. Ry., supra note 11, at 868.
' 4See Restatement, Contracts § 32, illustration 4 (1932); 1 Corbin, Contracts
5 96 (1963); 1 Williston, Contracts § 38 (3d ed. 1957).
5
1 Restatement, Contracts § 32, illustration 1 (1932); 48 Mich. L. Rev. 80 (1949).
'6 E.g., Cummings v. Kelling Nut Co., 368 Pa. 448, 84 A.2d 323, 325 (1951).
"7See Armor, 161 A.L.R. 706 (1946); 32 Mich. L. Rev. 107 (1933).

18See Robson v. Mississippi River Logging Co., 43 Fed. 364 (C.C.N.D. Iowa

1890); Putman v. Producers' Live Stock Marketing Ass'n, 256 Ky. 196, 75

S.W.2d 1075 (1934); Lubrecht v. Laurel Stripping Co., 387 Pa. 393, 127 A.2d 687
(1956); Restatement (Second), Agency § 442, comment a (1958); Restatement,

Contracts S 235(d), comment e (1932); 3A Corbin, Contracts § 684 (1960); 1
Williston, Contracts § 39 (3d ed. 1957).
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reference to duration, and (2) no circumstances implied a duration.
The contract in Pillsbury, however, expressly provided for duration,
though indefinite: plaintiff was to haul defendant's poultry as long as
defendant had poultry to be hauled to its processing plant. Howard
had indicated, and the Pillsbury court apparently so held quoting from
Howard, that "in the absence of some agreement or peculiar circumstances connected with the engagement . . . unless some time is fixed
during which the employment is to continue, either party may
terminate the contract at will." 19 If the Pillsbury court considered
the "as long as" provision it did not say so. Under the Restatement
of Contracts there are only 2 ways to invalidate the Pillsbury contract for indefinite duration.
I. If the "promise" according to its terms "makes the performance
optional with the promisor [shipper] whatever may happen, or whatever course of conduct in other respects he may pursue," it is no
promise at all, "often called an illusory promise." 2o If the defendant
had "promised" to have poultry for plaintiff to haul as long
as defendant wanted poultry hauled, there would have been no
promise, hence no contract. However, "if there is a period of time,
. .. fixed or indefinite, during which neither party is at liberty to
terminate the contract, then the contract is not so indefinite or uncertain as to its duration as to be incapable of enforcement." 21
II. If the promise or performance to be rendered by the promisor
(shipper) is so indefinite as not to be "reasonably certain," it is too
22
indefinite to be enforced.
If the defendant had promised to have poultry for plaintiff to haul
until World War III occurs, duration would not be reasonably certain,
and the contract would be too indefinite to be enforced.
"The question ... is not whether the contract is for an indefinite
term, it is whether the contract, by its terms, is indefinite as to its
duration." 23 A contract is not fatally defective merely because it
fails to specify a fixed termination date.24 If duration of a contract is
made to depend on an ascertainable future event that is reasonably
certain to occur the contract is not so indefinite as to duration as
39 Howard v. East Tennessee, Va. & Ga. Ry., supra note 11, at 869, quoted in
Poultry Haulers, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., supra note 1, at 558. (Emphasis added.)
2
ORestatement, Contracts § 2, comment b at 4 (1932).
21
Prescott v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co., 31 Wash. 177, 71 Pac. 772,
774 (1903).
22

Restatement, Contracts § 32 at 40 (1932).
Ketcham v. Hall Syndicate, Inc., 37 Misc. 2d 693, 236 N.Y.S.2d 206, 212
(1962),
aff'd 242 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1963).
24
Prescott v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co., supra note 21.
23
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to be no contract.25 The expression of a contingency, the occurrence
of which terminates the contract, necessarily excludes the idea that
each party is at liberty to terminate the contract at will.26 While

the contract in Pillsbury is uncertain in the sense that it is riot known

specifically how long defendant may have poultry to be hauled, it is
not a contract for an unending time. The event terminating the
Pillsbury contract-defendant's having no more poultry to be hauled
to its processing plant-is sufficiently definite for the contract to be
enforced even though the specific time the event will occur cannot
be determined in advance. 27 The longest possible time the contract
could run would be until defendant stopped operating its processing
plant. Agreements continuing as long as a particular business is operated have been upheld against contentions of invalidity for uncertainty as to duration. 28 It is not suggested that this is actually the
25Fuchs v. United Motor Stage Co., 135 Ohio St. 509, 21 N.E.2d 669, 672 (1939);
City of Big Spring v. Board of Control, 389 S.W.2d 523, 529 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965); Pallange v. Mueller, 206 Wis. 109, 238 N.W. 815 (1931); Robson v.
Mississippi
River Logging Co., supranote 18, at 370 (dictum).
26
See McMullan v. Dickerson Co., 63 Minn. 405, 65 N.W. 661, 662 (1896).
27
See Brown v. Birmingham Water Works Co., 169 Ala. 230, 52 So. 915
(1910), rev'd on other grounds 191 Ala. 457, 67 So. 613 (1914) (contract to
furnish water while plaintiff occupied a certain dwelling); Long Beach Drug
Co. v. United Drug Co., 13 Cal. 2d 158, 88 P.2d 698 (1939) (exclusive agency
contract to run as long as druggist kept the company's products in stock and
sold at full list price); Carter White-Lead Co. v. Kinlin, 47 Neb. 409, 66 N.W. 536
(1896) (contract to employ as long as the employer maintained a certain
plant); Rague v. New York Evening Journal Publishing Co, 164 App. Div. 126,
149 N.Y.S. 668 (1914) (contract to pay compensation as long as plaintiff refused
to sell newspapers of a competing company); Jugla v. Troutter, 120 N.Y. 21,
23 N.E. 1066 (1890) (contract to supply plaintiff with gloves as long as defendant manufactured them); Deucht v. Storper, 44 N.Y.S.2d 350 (N.Y. City Ct.
1943) (contract to employ plaintiff as long as defendant continued to employ
workers trained by plaintiff); Johnson v. Homestead-Iron Dyke Mines Co., 98
Ore. 318, 193 Pac. 1036 (1920) (contract to haul ore for defendant as long as
defendant had hauling to be done); Prescott v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging
Co., supra note 21 (contract of employment as long as defendant was working at Manila); American Steam Laundry Co. v. Riverside Printing Co., 171
Wis. 644, 177 N.W. 852 (1920) (contract to furnish steam while plaintiff occupied certain premises); City of Superior v. Douglas County Tel. Co., 141 Wis.
363, 122 N.W. 1023 (1909) (contract to provide free telephone service to city
offices as long as defendant operated telephone system in city); Foster Wheeler
Corp. v. Zell, 250 Ala. 146, 33 So. 2d 255 (1947) (dictum) (employment contract
to continue as long as defendant was engaged in a particular construction
project).
28
See, e.g., Ehrenworth v. George F. Stuhmer & Co., 229 N.Y. 2 10, 128 N.E.
108 (1920); Fuchs v. United Motor Stage Co., supra note 25 (as long as plaintiff owned 15 shares in defendant company or as long as plaintiff continued in
a particular business); City of Big Spring v. Board of Control, supra note 25;
Restatement, Contracts § 32, illustration 3 (1932).
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term contemplated by the parties. Just how long defendant would
29
have poultry to be hauled is a question of contract interpretation.
The validity of contracts for an indefinite term has long been recognized,30 and it is especially necessary that such contracts between
business concerns be enforced today. Large-scale production and
highly competitive markets give rise to business uncertainties and
increased business hazards often making absolute or calendric certainty in commercial contracts impractical or undesirable. A significant, manifestation of the need for flexibility in business contracts
is the development of requirement and output contracts. 31 Although
such contracts are indefinite, it is well established that they are not
invalid for lack of certaintyA2 "Business necessities require contracts
of this class, though more or less indefinite, to be upheld." 33 The
arrangement in Pillsbury is not uncommon in modern business practice; to require greater specificity would work undue hardship. The
court's failure to give any meaning to the "as long as" provision is
clearly wrong, whether the court assumed it to be illusory or not
reasonably certain.
Even assuming that the Pillsbury contract contained no duration
provision of any kind, as the court must have assumed, it is not
illusory nor lacking in reasonable certainty if the circumstances surrounding its making indicate the parties did not intend that the4
contract be terminable in the unfettered discretion of either party.
When a contract is not for the employment of a person's services but
is between business concerns for the use of one party's business services, the surrounding circumstances would ordinarily indicate that it
is unlikely that the parties intended the agreement to be terminable
in the unfettered discretion of either party. Although the contract
does not expressly provide for the period of time during which per29Although the hauling contract was to run as long as defendant had poultry
to be hauled, the term was subject to defendant's satisfaction with plaintiff's

haulage. However, defendants reservation of power to terminate for dissatisfac-

tion with plaintiff's haulage is not regarded as absolutely discretionary. The
duration of the contract depends upon defendant's exercising his honest business
judgment and not upon his whim; he must be honestly dissatisfied. Restatement,
Contracts S 32, illustration 9 (1932). Hence, a satisfaction requirement introduces

no30illusoriness.
See cases cited note 27 supra.
L. Rev.
SlSee Havighurst &Berman, Requirement and Output Contracts, 27 ]MI.
1 (1932).
32
Restatement, Contracts § 32, illustration 12 (1932); 1A Corbin, Contracts § 156
(1963); 1 Wiliston, Contracts § 104A (3d ed. 1957); Havighurst & Berman,
supranote 31,
B. Walker Mfg. Co. v. Swift & Co., 200 Fed. 529, 531 (5th Cir. 1912).
33T.
34
See note 18 supraand accompanying text.
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formance is to be rendered, the circumstances surrounding a commercial transaction will usually indicate that some performance period
was intended. 35 The court, having considered the nature of the contract and having found no provision for duration, could have interpreted the contract terminable only after a reasonable time and,
further, upon reasonable notice.
A contract between business concerns for continuing commercial
services is likely to involve a change of position by at least 1 partywith the knowledge and at the insistence of the other38 which would
result in hardship upon termination by the other party.
If the circumstances are such that a termination of the relation
by one party will result in great hardship or loss to the other,
as they must have known it would when they made the contract,
this is a factor of great weight in inducing a holding that the
parties agreed upon a specific period. The avoidance of such
hardship is not the sole reason that influences the court; such
proof indicates the kind of agreement that the parties probably
87
would have made.
In situations similar to Pillsbury there is some authority for requiring reasonable notice of termination, though termination is at
the unfettered will of either party.3 8 The courts do not give reasons
for requiring such notice except to state that such notice is the general rule.3 9 It is important to note, however, that the contracts
involved were all for haulage, as here, and were commercial contracts
as distinguished from personal service contracts. The requirement of
reasonable notice seems to recognize the commercial nature of the
3
aSee Burde v. Superflow Mfg. Co., 137 Conn. 488, 78 A.2d 698 (1951). Defendant agreed to supply various plumbing items and plaintiff agreed to solicit
orders on a commission basis for the items supplied; there was no express contract duration provision. In holding the contract not terminable at will, the
court said: "It is an agreement between two business concerns either of which
might incur ... substantial expense in the expansion of its facilities to meet
expected continuing performance by the other. To hold that either could,
at its option, bring the agreement to an end would be unreasonable" Id. at 702.
36Plaintiff in Pillsbury stated in its complaint that it purchased additional equipment at defendant's insistence and request.
373A Corbin, Contracts § 684, at 227 (1960). See Restatement, Contracts S 90
(1932).
3SSee Dover
Copper Mining Co. v. Doenges, 40 Ariz. 349, 12 P.2d 288 (1932);
United States Finance Co. v. Barber, 247 Miss. 800, 157 So. 2d 394 (1963);
Stonega Cole &Coal Co. v. Louisville &N.R.R., 106 Va. 223, 55 S.E. 551 (1906).
Contra, Victoria Limestone Co. v. Hinton, 156 Ky. 674, 161 S.W. 1109 (1914);
Restatement (Second), Agency § 442 (1958) (no particular length of time required, simply notice of termination).
39
See cases cited note 38 supra.
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relationship and the altered position of the nonterminating party and
seems to achieve at least as much as permitting termination only after
40
a reasonable time.
The Pillsbury court fails to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the contract which it must necessarily have considered to
interpret the hauling contract justly. The court mentioned in its
statement of the facts that plaintiff moved its plant in entering upon
performance of the contract and purchased additional equipment upon
defendant's notice of an increase in weekly volume to 300,000 birds.
The court suggested that "the expense incurred by plaintiff in making
the move would constitute consideration for the contract" 41 but
dismissed that as insufficient to relieve the contract of its uncertainty
and lack of mutuality. If plaintiff's reliance upon the contract constituted consideration, then a method for determining length of contract term has been established. It is settled contract law that if an
employee gives consideration in addition to his promise to serve, the
employer-is held to have promised to employ him "for a time which
is reasonable in view of the purposes of the party giving the consideration." 42 Even if plaintiff's plant relocation were viewed as mere
preparation and not part of the bargained-for performance, 43 certainly its purchase of additional equipment was reliance induced by
44
defendant's subsequent promise and was binding on defendant.
Thus viewed, the plaintiff was entitled under the contract to haul
poultry for a reasonable time, even if-as is doubtful-the contract
contained no duration provision.
It may be-that the court was refusing to interpret the contract as
one to run for a reasonable time when it said that "this type of contract is not to be confused with the distributorship agreements" ' 4 5
relied on by the defendant. Certainly for many purposes there is a
marked distinction between the contractual relations in a hauling
contract aid those in a distributorship. However, when a distributorship agreement contains no duration provision, the recent trend is to
4OReasonable notice of termination seems to imply duration for a reasonable
time but duration for a reasonable time does not necessarily imply reasonable
notice.
4
lPoultry Haulers, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., supra note 1, at 559.
42
Restatement (Second), Agency § 442, comment c at 340 (1958). See Restatement, Contracts § 45 (1932); Restatement (Second), Contracts §'45, comment b at 202 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
43
See Restatement, Contracts § 45, comment a (1932).
44
See Restatement, Contracts § 90 (1932).
4
5Poultry Haulers, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., supra note 1, at 559.
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hold that such agreements run for a reasonable time.46 Reasonable
time is implied because of the consideration given by the distributor
in addition to his promise to serve the manufacturer. 47 The expense
of establishing new facilities and purchasing new equipment is, of
course, not common to all hauling contracts; such expense much more
frequently occurs in distributorship arrangements. But where the
hauler relies to his detriment upon the promise that it will. be allowed
to haul goods, the rationale of the distributorship cases is applicable.
Pillsbury disregarded express provisions in the hauling contract and
read it as containing no duration provision whatever. It proceeded to
apply mechanically a rule dealing with the simple personal employment relationship where anticipated detrimental reliance and intent
to be obligated for some period of time are less easily implied.48 The
court had before it several more reasonable, more realistic alternatives
which would have resulted in an interpretation more compatible with
business necessities. To have recognized that absolute certainty is not
always practical in business agreements and to have upheld the contract as sufficiently certain within the context in which it was made
would have been a more sensible approach.
WItIAM McC. SCMLDT

46
See J. C. Millet Co. v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 123 F. Supp. 484
(N.D. Cal. 1954); Nathan Elson & Co. v. H. Beselln & Son, 116 Neb. 729, 218
N.W. 753, 756 (1928); 4 Williston Contracts § 1027A, at 2852 (rev. ed. 1936).
47
See authorities cited note 46 supra; Restatement, Contracts §§ 45-46 (1932);
Restatement (Second), Contracts § 45, comment b at 202 (Tent. Draft No. 1,

1964).
48

See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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OF MEN, AND NOT OF LAW. Lyman A. Garber. New York:
The Devin-Adair Company, 1966. 196 pp., $3.95.
Alleged "judicial usurpation" of the legislative function in fields of
law ranging from civil rights to sovereign immunity is the subject of
Lyman A. Garber's book Of Men, and Not of Law. Although American courts usually speak only in response to a "case or controversy,"
they not only adjudicate with some interstitial legislation, but frequently legislate on a grand scale.1 Proponents of grand-scale judicial
legislation urge courts to promote reform by correcting injustices
and guaranteeing constitutional rights to all citizens. 2 But opponents
accuse the courts of acting as "super legislators," 3 and insist that most
social, economic, and political evils cannot be cured by judicial decision. 4 Mr. Garber is a member of this latter group.
The author places part of the blame for the increasing crime rate
in the United States on the courts because of their alleged preoccupation with the protection of the criminal. According to the author, the
successful prosecution of lawbreakers is becoming more and more
difficult because judges have developed "infinite refinements on the
technique of 'trying the record' instead of trying the criminal."
(p. 117). He also says that "today Federal interference is the most
notable factor in criminology and is the major force in extending
further immunities to criminals." (p. 117). To support these statements, Mr. Garber points to the 31 reversals of state court judgments in
50 first-degree murder cases reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court between 1935 and 1957. But the author fails to include the
percentage of murder cases that were actually appealed, and 31
reversals in 22 years does not seem out of proportion to the great
number of such cases and the severity of the penalty. On the other
hand, Federal influence cannot be shown by statistics alone for the
threat of a reversal undoubtedly has an important curbing effect upon
state prosecutors.
Although the author praises rules that serve "solely" (p. 141) to
minimize the chance of convicting an innocent man, he condemms
rules that sometimes enable "unquestionably guilty" criminals to escape
'See
Pound, The Formative Era Of Comnon Law 124 (1938).
2

E.g., Vanderbilt, The Doctrine Of The Separation Of Powers And Its Present
Day
Significance 135-39 (2d ed. 1963).
3
Burns'Baking
Co.v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 534 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
4
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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punishment. For example, he criticizes the Federal evidence rule which
generally excludes evidence obtained by unlawful means, such 'as
unreasonable search and seizure. Mr. Garber suggests that the average
citizen would prefer to have his home invaded by law-violating police
officers rather than by law-violators called criminals, who, but for the
exclusionary evidence rule, might be safely lodged in prison. Also, the
author asserts that, with the exception of an occasional regulation that
is frequently flouted, "a fair degree of law and order is achievable only
when police power is so overwhelming that none but psychopathic
persons dare break the law." (p. 6). The zealous and powerful police
force advocated by Mr. Garber is not necessarily an ideal goal.
Of Men, and Not of Law also criticizes the judiciary for enabling
the Federal government to increase its control over individual citizens.
Two of the examples used by the author are the Supreme Court decisions in Wickard v. Filburn (1942)5 and Shelley v. Kraemer (1948).o
The former, by upholding the constitutionality of the wheat marketing
quota provision of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, sustained
a penalty against a farmer for raising wheat in excess of a quota set
by the United States Department of Agriculture. This wheat was intended solely for the farmer's own family and livestock, and Mr.
Garber claims this was an "invidious restriction on the freedom of
the American farmer." (p. 36). The author neglects to mention,
however, that prior to the effective date of the quota, the Secretary of
Agriculture was required to conduct a national referendum of wheat
growers. If 1/3 of those voting opposed the quota, the Secretary was
required to suspend its operation. On May 31, 1941, 81% of those
voting in the referendum favored the quota. Thus, though Farmer
Wickard was bound by the majority vote of his fellow wheat farmers,
he had an opportunity to vote against the quota.
.
Similarly, the author claims that Shelley, which prohibited state
court enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in real estate contracts, "abridged one of the American citizen's most valued and valuable rights-the freedom to contract and the related doctrine of sanctity
of contract." (p. 47). Mr. Garber apparently places property rights
at the "tip-most top of the top-most tip of the eucalyptus tree," for
he blatantly asserts that "the degree of liberty among human beings is
measurable by the right to own and manage property, to buy and sell
it, to contract." (p. 34).
There is no doubt that a good argument can be made for more
5317 U.S. 111 (1942).
6334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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self-restraint in the area of judicial law-making. However, Of Men,
and Not of Law fails rather miserably in its attempt, and is hardly
the "revealing expose of judicial usurpation" claimed in the book's
foreword. The book is of little value to laymen, lawyers, or students
of government. It is neither particularly well-written nor welldocumented, and the author's bias and lack of objectivity outweigh the
occasional valid and interesting comment. The book is especially disappointing because of the importance of its subject, for today judges
are exercising vast and undefined powers. The social philosophies of
our judges are quite legitimately a matter of great concern to all
citizens, because judges, once installed, are relatively independent
of popular control. Such independence, coupled with legislation on a
grand scale, can violate classical democratic theory. The people should
rely on their legislative representatives (who can raise the issues with
the people in their election campaigns) to make laws preserving the
liberties of all.
MALCoLM G. CRAWFORD
MASTERPIECES OF LEGAL FICTION. Ed. by Maximilian
Koessler. Rochester, New York: The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company, 1964. 862 pp., $9.95.
For this collection of 38 stories, Maximilian Koessler gathers notable
fiction in which law plays a prominent part. His scheme is simple. He
includes full stories only and generally arranges them according to
their time setting. Spanning Europe, America, and the Orient, the
stories in this collection suggest problems leading into and out of the
courtroom. Included are Herman Melville's "Billy Budd, Foretopman,"
Steen Steensen Blicher's "The Rector of Veilbye," and Anatole France's
"Crainquebille." Less familiar treasures include Sir A. P. Herbert's "Is
Marriage Lawful?" and "Computer in Court," Robert Bristow's
"Beyond Any Doubt," and Vincent Starrett's "The Eleventh Juror."
The stories in this volume appeal to a wide variety of literary
tastes. The suspense of "Billy Budd, Foretopman," for example,
centers on 2 characters who, representing moral extremes, clash
in a court-martial. As whimsical as "Billy Budd" is dramatic, Sir
Herbert's "Marrowfat v. Marrowfat: Is Marriage Lawful?" questions
whether marriage is a contract or a gamble. For those who enjoy
speculating as to tomorrow's law, there is a futuristic twist in "Computer in Court," which discusses the possibility of a libel suit when a
power failure causes a computer to publish an erroneous credit report.
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For readers who enjoy classic stories for the changeless problems
they present, there is Robert Bristow's "Beyond Any Doubt," an exploration into the minds of jurors during deliberation of a murder case;
Steen Steensen Blicher's "The Rector of Veilbye," involving the execution of an innocent man as a result of the perfidious fabrication of
circumstantial evidence; and Anatole France's "Crainquebille," the
classic reflection on how justice is administered to the poor. In all of
these stories, whether the central issue concerns jury deliberation, the
execution of the innocent, or legal treatment of the poor, law is treated
as a social dynamic, rather than as an intellectual discipline.
Aside from the intrinsic delights of each of the stories collected by
Mr. Koessler the book has a further advantage: it does not have to be
read from cover to cover to be enjoyed. The reader can enjoy it
whether he reads for an hour or an afternoon. The final test of a good
anthology is not whether you cannot put it down but how often
you pick it up. This book should be picked up often.
MA~x FERDINAND
UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED. Ralph Nader. New York: Grossman
Publishers, 1965. 365 pp., $5.95.
When the Senate Commerce Committee opened its hearings on the
Highway Safety Act of 1966, Ralph Nader as author of Unsafe At Any
Speed was among the first witnesses. A Phi Beta Kappa graduate of
Princeton and a graduate of the Harvard Law School, this Washington,
D. C., attorney has become the principal crusader for compulsory
automobile safety standards. Before the Commerce Committee, he
acted as the prime antagonist of the automobile manufacturers in calling for safety engineering legislation to take effect immediately.
Nader's testimony received much publicity for himself and his book,
which, on July 17, 1966, was 8th on the New York Times Book Review "General Best Seller List," its 13th week on the list.
Both the Commerce Committee and the author are concerned with
the prevention of the shocking number of automotive deaths and
injuries; in 1964 there were 47,700 deaths and more than 4 million
injuries. Automobile crashes are the 4th leading cause of death in the
United States and are responsible for 1/3 of the hospitalizations for
injuries. Nader accuses the $25 billion automobile industry of ignoring
safety in spending only 230 per car on safety research,1 compared to
$700 per car on the annual model change, mostly styling.
"'In the absence of company figures, federal highway safety researchers
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. The author 'believes that the lack of safety infoxmation and the
companies' failure to report available adverse safety information have
made possible public acceptance of unsafe cars. He denies that all cars
are, equally safe. Until Nader's book, criticism of auto defects centered
on the automobile in general without identifying particular models. A
leading investigation, Cornell's Automotive Crash Injury Research, has
only twice publicly compared companies, and then only companies,
not models. In 1 case, publication of the facts had quick results:
General Motors apparently redesigned its defective door latches, for
within a year after a Cornell report showed General Motors cars to
have 6 times more door loss than the next highest manufacturer, General Motors had reduced that loss to approximately that of the other
manufacturers;2
, What little automobile crash research there is results either from the
small efforts --of the manufacturers themselves or from federal and.
industry grants to universities. The effort is small: compare the$5,3,000
spent to investigate each airplane death to the $166 spent in highway
traffic research for each automobile death. 3 Nader wishes to change
the researcher's present policy under which the manufacturers-but
not the public-receive an analysis of model deficiencies. The author
calls for the publication of these specific crash research data in order
to expose the weaknesses of certain models. With knowledge of
structural defects the car purchaser would-if rationality prevailsbecome more selective and the automobile manufacturers would be
forced to compete in safety as well as styling.
Tie author cites many examples of insufficient. spending for safety
engineering. Particular attention is given to the first mass-produced
American rear engine car, tie Corvair, especially the 1960-63 models.
He finds that the cost-cutting produced a car subject to oversteering
and loss of control because of a poorly designed rear-end suspension
system. General Motors is now a defendant in more than 100 law suits,
estimate that the automobile manufacturers allot a total of two million dollars a

year to the design and evaluation of crash safety improvements. This amounts
to 2about twenty-three cents for every car sold." p. 187.
"On only two occasions has Cornell named the brands of cars involved in
ACIR [Automotive Crash Injury Research) reports. In 1964 ACIR's B. J. Campbell
reported that an analysis of door latch effectiveness on very late model cars
showed little difference between General Motors, Ford and Chrysler." p. 136.
3"With some 1200 or less fatalities annually in civil aviation, the federal

-government spent between thirty-five and sixty-four million dollars each year
from 1960 to 1965 on research and development for greater air safety. This was
in addition to what was spefit for safety work by the aircraft industry itself. Expenditure of sixty-four million dollars for 1200 fatalities means over fifty-three
thousand dollars spent in safety research per fatality" p. 338.
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totaling demands of $40 million, involving these Corvairs. Without
competitive safety, the industry has had no incentive to-produce a safer
car. The current request for an anti-trust exception for automobile
manufacturers' safety programs shows that the car industry has learned
little. In fact the Anti-Trust Division of the Justice Department is investigating agreements to cross-license car exhaust developments. Such
agreements would seem to insure that no company would put forth a
major inventive effort on car exhaust.
Nader seeks to alert the consumer to the hidden dangers in automobiles. Automobile designers have failed to protect the fragile
human body from collision with the surrounding interior. He sees a
car filled with danger from rigid steering columns and sprung glove
compartments capable on impact of penetrating an occupant. The
automobile manufacturers have generally omitted protective padding
and have allowed door handles and instrument panels to project-in a
manner which can result in serious injury. According to Nader, numerous Wayne State University crash tests have found the standard windshield to be penetrable on sudden stop at speeds as low at -12Y/ mph.
Nader notes that seat belts, optional in 1955, were not uniformly installed until 1964, when they were required by legislation.
The reformer-author's attempts to force out hidden facts and to
move an indifferent society sometimes show frustration and anger.
Loss of credibility, resulting from the author's emotional involvement
with the subject, is heightened by his failure to cite research sources.
The reliability of Nader's findings, however, has been supported by the
Commerce Committee hearings. The success of this book can be
measured by the increased public awareness of defective automobile
design and of the obvious need for safety engineering. The book is
well written and is recommended for lawyers and anyone who drives a
car.
CONRAD M.

CUTCLIFFE

CONTRACEPTION. John T. Noonan, Jr. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1965. 533 pp., $7.95.
In Contraception, the entire historical position of the Catholic
Church on birth control from the first century of the Roman Empire
to the latest Ecumenical Council has been analyzed and presented in
language easily understood by laymen. The Catholic doctrine opposed
to birth control is in a formal sense based on the Bible, thus Biblical
passages are examined.
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The Roman Catholic Church used Genesis 38:8-10, to provide a
Biblical explanation for its condemnation of contraception:
Then Juda said to Onan, 'Go to your brother's wife, perform
your duty as brother-in-law, and raise up seed for your brother.'
Onan knew that the descendants would not be his own, so whenever he had relations with his brother's wife, he let (the seed) be
lost on the ground, in order not to raise up seed for his brother.
What he did displeased Yahweh, who killed him also.'
Mr. Noonan considers the explanation a mere rationalization. The
Catholic Church took the position that Onan was killed because he
used a contraceptive method. Noonan contends Genesis 38:8-10 was
misinterpreted and takes the position that Onan was slain because he
broke a Mosaic Law which required Onan to propagate with his deceased brother's wife in order to furnish heirs. If Onan had first
impregnated his brother's wife, birth control thereafter would not have
violated Mosaic Law.
Mr. Noonan demonstrates that the Catholic Church adopted nonbiblical ideas in order to increase its membership and thereby its influence. For example, the Church borrowed a Stoic doctrine which
considered intercourse unlawful except for the purpose of creating
children. This Stoic doctrine also condemned intercourse for pleasure
because of an erroneous belief that during intercourse, but not otherwise, the female emitted a seed containing a soul.
Mistaken physiological concepts are examined after the predominant
influence of secular philosophies is presented. The author discusses
dozens of contraceptive methods based on incorrect biological assumptions and analyzes the various methods from the crude magical
potions of the first century, the abortion methods of the Dark Ages,
the menstrual cycle rhythm method, and the birth control pills
available today. From Catholic documents, Mr. Noonan verifies the
fact that the Church's opposition to most contraceptive methods stem
from the ancient belief that the female emits a seed during intercourse.
The Catholics then consider it homicide to disturb this seed. The next
step in his investigation leads to a physiological study of the female.
It has been proved that the female has no seed to emit during intercourse, but only an egg or ovum that ripens for fertilization between
menstrual periods and is emitted as waste during menstruation. This
has been substantiated from hundreds of medical books written after
'The translation is from the La Sainte Bible. The Hebrew omits the words
"his seed." Most English translations supply it.
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1900. Thus, a combination of a secular philosophy and lack of scientific
knowledge served as a rationalization of the Catholic doctrinal opposition to contraception.
It is Mr. Noonan's thesis that even without the Bible the Church
would have opposed birth control. The very existence of the Church
was threatened when the Gnostics and Manichees greatly increased
their numbers with a resulting decrease in Catholic influence. The
Gnostic heresy which opposed matrimony because Jesus did not marry
was popular in the second century. In the fourth century the Manichean heretics proclaimed that "Procreation is the evil act of evil."
(p. 111). These 2 sects opposed marriage and had a hedonistic attitude toward sex. Contraception explains how the clergy went outside the orthodox community and copied Stoic ideals in order to
attract the multitudes. The Stoic philosophy, which allowed intercourse only for the purpose of creating children, had an immediate
appeal for the Catholic Church, for it enabled the priests to differ
with their heretical enemies, the Gnostics and Manichees, and at the
same time increase their congregations.
Contraception will be controversial and should have a profound
effect upon Catholic thinking. The materials are well documented and
the author is unbiased in his presentation. The discussion of birth
control is presented as a conflict within the Church. All viewpoints
are examined and the issues precisely outlined. The socially-concerned
person should certainly read this book, for it deals with a pressing
social problem and is pertinent to both the Catholic and all other
religious communities.
F. WLAM

BURKE

BID FOR FREEDOM: U.S.S.R. v. TARAsov. C.L. Sareen. Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1966. 199 pp. $3.95.
The phrase "international anarchy" is often used to describe the
current status of international relations. The problem is that there is
no supreme source of law in the international sphere; and in any
international incident of consequence, political power rather than law
decides the controversy. Recently, there has been substantial agitation
by international legal authorities1 for "depoliticization" of international
disputes and increased emphasis on justice. Bid For Freedom, by C.L.
'For example, 1 The Strategy of World Order (Falk & Mendlovitz ed. 1966);
Clark &Sohn, World Peace Through World Law (2d ed. 1960).
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Sareen, in describing the litigation resulting from a recent attempt by
a Soviet national to defect, lends encouragement to the campaign for a
"rule of law" to govern international relations.
Early on the morning of November 25, 1962, Vladislav Tarasov, a
young Soviet naval mechanic, left his ship and slipped into the waters
of Calcutta Bay to seek asylum aboard a United States merchant
vessel moored nearby. The Soviet government discovered the escape
almost at once and launched a recovery attempt which became an
internationally publicized legal battle, matching the integrity of an
independent Indian judiciary against the immense political power of
the U.S.S.R. 2 C.L. Sareen, one of Tarasov's Indian attorneys, narrates
the progression of events in the case that leads to a direct confrontation
between principles of justice and international power.
On November 28, the Calcutta police took Tarasov from the United
States ship, pursuant to a Soviet charge that he had stolen money before
his escape. But a demand that he be turned over to the Soviet authorities was frustrated when the Calcutta magistrate, acting under a principle of international law by which each sovereign state has exclusive
jurisdiction over crimes committed within its own territory,3 refused to
relinquish custody of Tarasov. Subsequent attempts culminated in a
Soviet demand for immediate extradition. The Indians refused to
extradite except in accordance with the Indian Extradition Act of
1962,4 which requires that the party seeking extradition establish, to
the satisfaction of an Indian magistrate, a prima facie case of the
crime for which extradition is sought. On January 22, 1963, a formal
hearing commenced in New Delhi, in which the Soviets attempted
to establish a prima facie case.
Sareen's graphic description of the "courtroom environment" in
New Delhi hardly seems to depict the appropriate setting for an
international legal battle with far-reaching political repercussions:
Small, dusty and cramped, it was normally the scene of hearings
for such crimes as beatings, thefts, rapes, customs violations, prohibition offenses and an infrequent murder. Except for the magistrates' bench on a raised platform and a crude wooden seat for
2

This was considerable since India needed help in its border war against Red

China.
(p. 186.)
3

1t is an admitted principle of international law that a nation possesses and exercises within its own territory an absolute and exclusive jurisdiction, and that any
exception to this right must be traced to the consent of the nation. The Scooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 7 Cranch] 478, 481 (1812).
4'But the principles of international law recognize no right to extradition apart

from treaty." Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
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reporters, the courtroom was barren of furniture. Butts of.

.

. cig-

arettes were scattered on the floor and the doorstep was stained
red with splotches of pan spittle. Outside, ragged petty criminals
squatted in the dust, and pigeons flew in and out of the unscreened
windows to rest on the overhead ceiling fan, oblivious of the human activity below. (p. 56)
But, "a court is more than a courtroom" (p. 56), and on January 22,
this dingy room began to fill with high-ranking diplomats, political
observers, and correspondents from major newspapers all over the
world.
At the hearing, the Soviet Union continued to exert maximum
political pressure, but the presiding magistrate made it quite clear
that the hearing would be conducted according to the principles of
law, not politics. The entire incident reached its dramatic climax on
March 29, 1963, when the magistrate announced a decision in favor of
Tarasov before a packed courthouse of reporters, cameramen, and
observers.
Narrating from personal experience, Sareen combines his legal expertise with a definite flair for dramatic writing, making this "accurate and extremely readable account of what was undoubtedly the
most sensational case [in] of recent years" (p. iii) useful and interesting for both lawyer and layman. The techniques employed by
Tarasov's attorneys are fascinating. For example, the use of crossexamination by J.G. Sethi, the brilliant criminal lawyer who served as
Tarasov's head counsel, is an excellent example of the effectiveness of
that tool when employed by an expert.
But, most important, this book carries significant implications for the
future of international law and the preservation of individual freedom
and dignity. On April 1, two days after the hearing, The Statesmen of
New Delhi ran an editorial entitled "The Ways of Justice." The following excerpt, taken from that editorial, indicates the impact of the
Tarasov Case in the international arena:
The assumption that a person is innocent until he is proved
guilty is so fundamental to our system that it may seem incredible
that a different system could exist and that people could be tried
and condemned according to that system. .

.

. The difference

obviously is not between two systems but between two ways of
life. If the State becomes all-important and no limits are recognized to the demands it can make on the individual then it matters
little what the demand is so long as it is made in the name of
the State by a duly constituted authority. It is only where the
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individual is considered to have certain inherent rights that the
State's competence to curtail them in any way has to be established beyond reasonable doubt. This is accepted by most of us
without question and the fact that a totally different system might
collide with our own causes litle concern. To the extent that it has
corrected the perspective Tarasov's case should be useful, provided its implications are realized by public opinion.5
WILLIAM

5

p. 185.

P. TEDARDS,

JR.

